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81. INTRODUCTION
When I studied at the University of Deusto in Bilbao (in Euskara or Basque Bilbo) 
in 1996 and followed the politics of the Autonomous Basque Country of Spain at 
close quarters for the fi rst time, the moderate Basque Nationalist Party, Partido 
Nacionalista Vasco / Eusko Alderdi Jeltzalea (PNV/EAJ)1 was already 101 years 
old. As a student of history I was interested in the fact that the PNV, which was 
founded in 1895, was the oldest political party still active in Spain, along with 
the socialist party of Spain, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). Since it 
had also been continuously at the forefront of the regional government since the 
beginning of the current autonomy in 1980, the PNV could not be an insignifi cant 
political movement. Quite the contrary.
While living in Bilbao, I also noticed how this city and its neighbouring areas, 
traditionally characterized by heavy industry, were experiencing considerable 
economic changes and a redirection of its economy. As a citizen of Finland, in those 
days a new member state of the European Union (EU), my curiosity was aroused 
by the comments of the regional leaders, where the Autonomous Community 
was described, because of its taxation power, as one more member state of the 
EU.2 There was no need for more stimuli; my interest in the recent history of the 
economic policy and the PNV sʼ role in it was aroused. My Licentiate thesis (2001) 
concentrated on the history of the economic policy of the autonomous government 
of the Basque Country in 1980−1998.3
1  For simplicity, I use the abbreviation PNV in my thesis. In the complicated Basque 
politics even language has been politicized, and language or terminology used can 
be interpreted as taking a political stand. In this work I consciously use the Spanish 
(Castilian; castellano) toponyms and names of the parties or institutions, though I always 
mention the Basque or Euskara version of a name when I use it for the fi rst time. This 
is because the sources and the bibliography I have used are mainly in Spanish. Spanish 
toponyms are also better known than their Basque counterparts. In my thesis the terms 
national economy or region do not carry any political connotation they may have in 
Basque politics either. Basque nationalists may interpret my line as a political decision, 
which it is not. It must also be stated that calling the central government simply “Madrid” 
would be historically misleading, since various parties formed the governments in the 
period covered by my thesis. See also HYML: Raento 1996; for the use of toponyms for 
political purposes in situations where territorial claims, cultural differences or historical 
orismology have lent strong symbolic value to the use of certain place-names, see 
Monmonier 1996, 110–111 & Hall 1981, 320–322; for the link between power and maps 
in the use of nationalism, see Anderson 1991, 173; Kosonen 2000.
2  See, for example, Zulaika 1997, 81 & 83; CD/PNV: ... y ahora Europa. El Proyecto del 
Partido Nacionalista Vasco en Coalición Nacionalista 1989, 29–30; CD:PNV: Programa 
electoral para las elecciones europeas. 1994. EAJ-PNV, 40; El Mundo 1.12.1997 & 
2.12.1997.
3  Autonomisen Baskimaan aluehallituksen talouspolitiikka 1980–1998. HYHL: 
Nordberg 2001.
9In the previous studies of the Basque Country, too little attention has been 
paid to the history of the use of politico-economic power of the ruling party, the 
PNV. However, it reveals the internal tensions, tendencies and alignments as well 
as the strategy of moderate Basque nationalism. It also tells us about its way of 
operating. When I started post-graduate work in general history I believed, and 
still do, that this approach also offers an alternative explanation of the history of 
moderate Basque nationalism. The analysis of the PNV in particular as a long 
term user of power and a major political force in the region, provides elements for 
a historical study of its defi nitions of policy and internal forces.
My dissertation offers a fresh perspective on the history of the Basque 
nationalism, which is one of the most studied ethnic nationalist movements in 
Western Europe. Although this is a case study in which the subject is the Basque 
Country, the empirical analysis reveals that western European minority nationalism 
is not a simple matter. In the period I cover in my investigation (1980–1998), the 
PNV also proved tangibly through its actions that nationalism was not a political 
alignment in decline.
My Licentiate thesis was just a beginning. The methodological point of 
view I applied there was functional, but not adequate to clarify the history of 
the use of power and its most important player, the PNV, and the changes that 
took place in that process. The analysis must go deeper than simply investigating 
the interaction between the administration and the economy. The rationalization 
of the contemporary history of the Basque Country and the PNV can be 
found in the economic and administrative structures of the region, the centre-
periphery relationships that colour them, and in the internal and competing 
visions of economic policy within the party itself. The English historian G.R. 
Elton sʼ empirical method of political history and the empirical power analysis 
of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault were instrumental in 
my analysis of this complex. The theory template of my dissertation is based on 
interconnections between those two empirical approaches, and the subject of my 
study is the use of politico-economic power.
Because of the signifi cant internal political and economic differences, the 
Basque Country should not be approached as one entity, nor should Basque 
nationalism be seen as a coherent political movement, ignoring its antagonist 
internal tendencies and orientations. The political importance of the moderate 
Basque nationalism and its so far most signifi cant political manifestation, the 
PNV, should not be underrated in the historiography of the Basque Country. The 
basis of my analysis of the Basque Country as a historian is by no means the worst 
possible, since history is traditionally well represented within that fi eld together 
with political sciences, sociology and anthropology.
In my dissertation, I answer the questions of how the Basque Nationalist Party 
acted as an important power-broker, and how this infl uenced the party. As the 
hegemonic regional party, the PNV was also prone to change. These changes, 
together with the party sʼ ability to act pragmatically, allowed it to maintain its 
dominating position during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, I shall investigate 
what the answer of the PNV as a major political force was to the centre-periphery 
tensions within the Basque Country.
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The need to investigate and understand the history of the PNV has not 
diminished. As Elton stated, “historical knowledge gives solidity to the 
understanding of the present and may suggest guiding lines for the future.”4 This 
is particularly true in the case of the PNV and politico-economic power.
1.1. The subject of my thesis
The subject of my thesis is the PNV and its use of politico-economic power in the 
Autonomous Basque Country of Spain. The Basque Country5 (Figure 1), which is 
located on the coast of the Bay of Biscay and extends to both sides of the Pyrenees, 
consists culturally and historically of four provinces in Spain and three in France. 
Álava (Araba), Vizcaya (Bizkaia), Guipúzcoa (Gipuzkoa) and Navarra (Nafarroa) 
form the historical Basque Country of Spain. However, the fi rst three constitute 
the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (Comunidad Autónoma 
del País Vasco) established by the Autonomy Statute of 1979. It is one of the 17 
autonomous communities and two autonomous cities originating from the Spanish 
Constitution of 1978.6 In this study, I call the region the Basque Country, referring 
to that autonomous community of Spain. Navarra, which in cultural history forms 
a part of the Basque Country, is nowadays a separate autonomous region (Foral 
Comunidad de Navarra)7 that decided to opt out of the Autonomous Basque 
Country in 1979. The provinces located in France, Basse Navarre (Benafarroa), 
Labourd (Lapurdi) and Soule (Zuberoa) belong to the Department of Pyrénées 
Atlantiques and the Aquitaine Region.8
Why study the Basque Country and its politico-economic history? From 
a politico-economic viewpoint, the Basque Country is signifi cant because 
(1) from 1980 onwards it has had wide-ranging autonomy, and (2) the PNV, as the 
ruling party, exercised considerable politico-economic power there in the 1980s 
4  Elton 1967, 67.
5  Figure 1. The Basque or Euskara language spelling Euskadi is a political term. Sabino 
de Arana, who is considered the father of Basque nationalism, originally used the term 
Euzkadi, which changed to Euskadi in the usage of the radical nationalists. Euskal Herria 
is a concept of cultural history, which does not carry such strong political connotations.
6  The other autonomous communities are Andalusia, Aragón, Asturias, the Balearic 
Islands, the Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-Leon, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra and Valencia. For condensed 
information on the substance of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the structure of the 
state, see Aja 1999, 13–20 & Loughlin (et al.) 1999, 114.
7  Navarra is an autonomous community, established by a statute on 19 August 1982. 
In a referendum in 1979, the people of Navarra turned down the opportunity offered to 
them by the founders of the Spanish Constitution to join the autonomous community 
of the Basque Country. Payne 1985, 212; The Autonomy Statute of the Basque 
Country allows the later accession of Navarra if it so wishes. Ley Orgánica 3/1979, 
de 18 diciembre de Estatuto de Autonomía para el País Vasco. Artículo 2. LPV 1991, 75.
8  For information about the Basque provinces in France, see Raento 2002, 93−94.
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and 1990s. (3) Despite the economic problems the region experienced during that 
period, the Basque Country still remained one of the wealthiest regions of Spain.
Economic policy and its history can be studied in different ways. My thesis 
pertains to political history, and I concentrate on a period from the beginning of 
the current autonomy in 1980 to October 1998 when the sixth regional election 
was held. It is reasonable to limit my study to this, because only a couple of 
months before, the almost 10-year-old common governmental base of the PNV 
and the Basque Socialists, Partido Socialista de Euskadi / Euskadiko Ezkerra 
(PSE/EE) ended. After the election, the PNV and the EA formed a new two-party 
coalition government and started lengthy negotiations with the radical Basque 
nationalist party Euskal Herritarrok / Herri Batasuna (EH/HB), which then led 
to an agreement on parliamentary support in 1999.9 The moderate and radical 
nationalists cooperated in the regional parliament for the fi rst time in history.
The history of the use of politico-economic power in the Basque Country is 
actually an important matter for research, because economic policy, economics, 
and revenue relate to the historical analysis of the PNV and offer essential 
guidelines for it. The leading scholar on Basque nationalism, the historian Javier 
9  Acuerdo de bases de actuación colaboradora en sede parlamentaria para la legislatura 
1999–2002. GV/EJ Vitoria–Gazteiz 1999.
Figure 1. The Basque Country.
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Corcuera Atienza from the University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU),10 points 
out that in order to understand the PNV sʼ history, policies and exercise of power, 
it is of the utmost importance to be familiar with the economic history of the 
Basque Country.11 The economic changes, especially the rapid industrialization 
of the coastal area, were important factors in the emergence of the PNV at the 
end of the 19th century. However, the use of politico-economic power by the PNV, 
an infl uential party at regional and local level, has not been the main subject of 
previous studies on the Basque Country or the party, having only been touched 
upon in pursuance of other questions. For this reason, my thesis will give a fuller 
and more diversifi ed picture of the PNV than that in the previous historical studies 
on this subject.12 The historical analysis of the PNV sʼ exercise of power from 
1980–1998 involves studying economic policy decisions, background factors and, 
above all, the historical process that took place when the PNV used that power.13
A historical assessment of economic policy is crucial in trying to understand 
the ideology and strategy of the PNV and their changes in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The PNV was determined in its endeavour to enhance the transfer of powers up 
to the full scale established in the 1978 Constitution; the PNV still presumed that 
its own values should be applied and enforced in the Basque Country. No other 
political party in the region was as pragmatic in its everyday actions as the PNV, 
and at the same time as ideological in enhancing its own historical principles and 
symbols.
What makes the PNV an interesting research subject is its nature as a regional 
and populist party and the way it presents itself as a pragmatic defender of the 
market economy. Ideologically the PNV could be described as a predominantly 
Christian Democratic party. In its political reasoning, the self-government of 
the Basque Country is organically linked to the valid economic arrangement 
(Concierto Económico) which has its roots in history, and to its fi nancial instrument, 
the cupo.14 Under the latter, the Basque Country pays the maintenance cost of 
those parts of the public sector in the region which have not been transferred to 
the autonomous government and are still fi nanced by the state. In this thesis, I 
demonstrate how the analysis of the PNV as a long-standing user of politico-
economic power offers substance for assessment by historians of the party sʼ 
internal forces and structures. Divergent alignments governed within the PNV, 
and in turn dictated its economic policy.15 The changes in the PNV sʼ strategy and 
10  Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea or UPV/EHU.
11  Corcuera Atienza 1979.
12  For historical analysis and the need for further and complementary research on that 
question, see, for example, Granja, Beramendi & Anguera 2001, 289.
13  Cf. the tasks of history writing, according to Elton. Elton 1967, 93.
14  Cupo comes from the Spanish word cuota, a share. It means the share of tax levy 
the Basque Country delivers to the Spanish state for the cost of powers that have not been 
handed over to the region, such as defence or the coast guard.
15  Zirakzadeh 1991, 101–121 & 140–144.
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the mindset that dominated its lateral thinking are apparent in public comments 
made by the party sʼ representatives and in the writings of contemporaries. It is 
evident from the political debate in the Basque Country that those changes could 
be rapid.16
The PNV sʼ own structure also infl uenced its use of power in different policy 
fi elds. The PNV is formed by provinces and resembles a confederation; despite the 
strong role of the PNV sʼ national executive body, the Euskadi Buru Batzar (EBB), 
its provincial representations have a manifestly independent position (Figure 2).17 
During the period my thesis spans, the provincial councils of the PNV infl uenced 
the Basque Country sʼ internal public economy measures. It is also important to 
raise the question of how independent the regional economic policy really was in 
relation to the business elites of the Basque Country and its provinces. The results 
can be applied more generally to historical analysis of other Western European 
minority nationalisms, for example, the history of the political groups of Northern 
Italy.18
The framework of my thesis consists of studies of the PNV, among which 
the most signifi cant and outstanding work today is still the historian Corcuera 
Atienzaʼ s Orígenes, ideología y organización del nacionalismo vasco (1979). 
It has maintained its position as the basic study, analysing and explaining the 
establishment and ideology of the PNV, as well as the economic factors linked 
to these.19 Besides that convincing interpretation, it is worth mentioning the 
economic historian Joseph Harrison (1977), who considered the policy of the PNV 
at the beginning of the 20th century and the connections between the party and the 
Basque Country business elite.20 In political sociology, Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh 
has analysed the history of Basque politics and the PNV in the 1970s and early 
1980s through the economic development of the region, using the methodology of 
16  Despite an active discussion on economic policy, economic policy issues became 
more common, and more detailed, in the party sʼ political programmes at the end of 
1980s. Among other reasons, this was because of the economic and political changes 
in the region caused by Spain sʼ membership of the EC/EU (1986–). The EU funding 
available and the internal market regulations had their effect on the regional economy, 
fi shing as well as heavy industry being affected. For more information on changes in the 
fi shing sector, see Clark 1987 and Wallace & Wallace 2000, 351–352 & 363.
17  Since with the exception of the representation of Navarra and the Basque Country 
in France, the provinces had an even number of representatives in the national executive 
body of the PNV, the Euzkadi Buru Batzar (EBB), the signifi cant differences in the 
population of the provinces do not have a direct effect on their right to vote within the 
EBB. In 1998, Vizcaya had a population of 1,137,000, Guipúzcoa 677,000, and Álava less 
than 300,000. Manual del Estado Español 1999, 598–609.
18  See, for example, Shin & Agnew 2002, and  Agnew 1997; Tusell 1999, 190.
19  Corcuera Atienza 1979; for a revised edition, see Corcuera Atienza 2001a; a version 
in English was published in 2001 by the University Press of Nevada. Corcuera Atienza 
2001b.
20  Harrison 1977.
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history (1985 & 1991).21 He broadened the notion of the various economic policy 
factions within the party by analysing the economic policy of the Basque regional 
government at the beginning of the 1980s. The political scientist Robert Clark 
has observed (1985 & 1987) what effects representatives of economic life and the 
economic changes had on the PNV sʼ actions in the 1980s. He also investigated 
how Spain sʼ membership of the EC, and later the EU, affected the PNV.22 
According to historians of the UPV-EHU, Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and 
José A. Rodríguez Ranz (1999 & 2001), the characteristics of the economy of the 
Basque Country, such as its growing importance in Spain sʼ foreign trade since the 
21  Zirakzadeh 1985 & 1991.
22  Clark 1985 & 1987.
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1950s, has benefi ted the position of the faction that preferred regional autonomy, 
as opposed to the party wing supporting full independence.23
The theoretical setting of my thesis, which analyses the PNV sʼ behaviour in 
power, is based on Elton sʼ defi nition of empirical political history that is concerned 
with striving for and use of power.24 Elton has been the subject of wide-ranging 
and fi erce criticism from postmodernists such as Roy Jenkins (1991 & 1995).25 
Assimilation and reconciliation of empiricism and postmodernism has seemed 
to be a diffi cult task. But, as another English historian, Richard J. Evans (2000) 
stresses, we should not ignore the infl uence of postmodernism on historiography, 
but critically analyse its variety of positions and diverse ways of thinking.26 Evansʼ s 
opinion can be accepted, because by unifying and making a synthesis it is possible 
to try to merge history and postmodernism. In my thesis, I have adopted the critical 
but constructive attitude to postmodernism and the new, positive approaches that 
its discourse-oriented analysis can offer, as represented by Evans or the American 
historians Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob.27 
My thesis rests on Elton sʼ theory on political history but, because of the nature 
of my research subject, I shall compare and accommodate it to Foucault sʼ ideas 
in particular in my analysis of the use of power. Where Elton underlines dynamic 
action and “the system within which the political elements (individual or societal 
groupings) move into contact with each other”28 and the need for a historian to be 
familiar with all that, Foucault stresses that power and institutions are not basically 
the same thing. His idea is particularly interesting with regard to the complex 
organization of administration in the Basque Country and the dominant position of 
the PNV there. Nevertheless, Foucault also calls for knowledge of the structures of 
particular political systems. The core of Eltonʼ s and Foucault sʼ methodology is to 
recognize the use of power and its structures in an actual situation, in other words, 
empiricism.
The PNV sʼ use of power must be analysed as a historical process in which 
contexts are emphasized: (1) the autonomous community of the Basque Country; 
(2) the complex formed by the autonomous communities of Spain, and (3) the 
EC/EU. The main stage for the use of that power, the Basque administration, 
was characteristically multi-staged: the regional administration, common to the 
whole autonomous community, has existed since 1980 and consists of the regional 
23  Economic policy is dealt with through the history of the Basque General Council, which 
was formed for the pre-autonomy years (administración preautonómica, 1978–1980). 
Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 1999 & 2001.
24  Elton 1970, 4.
25  Jenkins 1991 & 1995.
26  Evans 2000, 254–255, 257 & 266.
27  Appleby, Lynn & Hunt 1994, 262. They emphasize the research standpoint, which 
always has an effect on the fi nal result; the exactitude of the historian sʼ work must not, 
however, suffer in this process.
28  Elton 1970, 9.
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parliament, government and president (lehendakari); by its side, there are the 
traditional or historical governing bodies, the councils and parliaments of the 
provinces (Figure 3). The separation of powers between the regional government 
and the provincial councils and the problems linked to this (such as coordination of 
economic and fi scal policy, internecine political horse-trading and piling of political 
pressures on to the regional government) resembled the relations between the 
Spanish central government and the autonomous regions in the 1980s and 1990s.29 
The internal tensions and differences in the PNV had already become visible in the 
relations between the regional and provincial administrations at the beginning of 
1980s.
In my study, I shall fi rstly, (1) concentrate on the context of the Basque Country, 
on how the political, economic and historical disagreements and rivalry between 
the provinces infl uenced the economic policy of the PNV-led government. This 
will allow me to defi ne the links between the Basque Country sʼ internal centre-
periphery relationship and the economic policy choices of the party. However, I 
must stress that I discuss the broad question of identity only when concerns the 
economy. First of all, one must be familiar with the whole sweep of economic policy 
decision-making. The historical role of the national council, the EBB, and its way 
of operating become central questions when a historian using the documents of 
the EBB analyses how various actors were placed in the process of the economic 
policy decision-making at the early or the fi nal stage. The rise of the EBB sʼ power 
in proportion to the regional government during the 1980s is already a recognized 
fact in the historiography, but the analysis of that process and its implications is 
incomplete; for example, the time frames in the studies by Clark are loose. In 
history writing, the use of politico-economic power must be analysed within a 
clear time frame and it must also lead to a synthesis.
In the context of the Basque Country, another important question is what the 
historical sources such as newspapers and offi cial documents can tell us about the 
role of the public sector in the PNV sʼ use of power. The PNV always advocated a 
market economy, but the role of the public sector was important in its economic 
policy between 1980 and 1998.30 The relationship between the PNV and the public 
sector was nonetheless complex. Even though the PNV embraced the concept and 
the meaning of the welfare state more openly by the end of 1980s, it pressed the 
need to reduce the size and role of the public sector again in the mid 1990s. The 
position of the PNV towards the public sector varied depending on the current 
situation and on whether it referred to the central or regional administration. 
In my dissertation, I wish to pursue the analysis of public-private cooperation, 
because there are several reasons for the strong position of the public sector in this 
context. The most important politico-economic arena for the PNV, the province of 
29  Aja 1999, 184; Colomer 1998, 40.
30  Cf. in 1980–1998, the proportion of jobs in the public sector and the growth in the 
service sector was the biggest in Spain. This was benefi cial in a situation where the 
number of jobs in industry practically collapsed. Domínguez Martín 2002, 295.
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Vizcaya and its administrative capital, Bilbao, is relevant in this respect. This was 
linked to the historical change in the strategy of the PNV. My thesis will reveal 
what consequences this had.
Secondly, (2) I shall examine the evolution of the politico-economic position 
of the Basque Country in the context of Spain. Before the Constitution of 1978, the 
structure of the state in Spain was characterized by authoritarianism and centralized 
use of power. In practice, the only exceptions in the 19th and 20th centuries were the 
period of 1868–1873, which culminated in the First Republic and the time of the 
Second Republic in 1931–1936. According to the Constitution of 1978, Spain is not 
a federal state, and the constitution does not even mention the established Spanish 
term el Estado Autonómico, the State of Autonomies which is being used of the 
current decentralized state structure.31 Nor are there any inter-regional bodies as in a 
federal state. In the context of Spain, the Basque Country has the greatest autonomy 
(Figures 4 & 5), even though the transfer of powers, limited by laws and regulations, 
31  The structure of autonomous regions in the 1978 Constitution has been developing 
throughout its existence. Aja stresses that it was not fully established in the latter part of 
the 1990s, and that various tensions still continued to “question” its validity. Aja 1999, 
13–14 & 33–34; see also Pelaz López 2002.
Regional institutions
Basque Parliament
Originally 60 seats (20 per province)
From the regional elections of 1984 onwards, 75 seats (25 per province)
Juntas Generales
de Vizcaya 
(or General Assembly;
51 members)
Figure 3. The regional and provincial political institutions in the Autonomous Basque 
Country since 1980.
Basque Government
Provincial institutions
Juntas Generales 
de Álava  
(51 members)
Juntas Generales 
de Guipúzcoa
(51 members)
Diputación Foral             
de Vizcaya 
(or Provincial Council)
Diputación Foral 
de Álava
Diputación Foral            
de Guipúzcoa
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had not been carried out fully by October 1998.32
The economic and fi scal policy of the Basque Country, and the disputes 
concerning it, dominated the relations between the central and regional 
governments. The politico-economic power was for historical reasons an area 
in the current autonomy that developed most quickly and extensively. Questions 
linked to this were important for the parties active in the region. A practical 
consequence of the Basque economic agreement was that its net share of payment 
to the Spanish government diminished substantially33 and, importantly, the 
32  Financial administration of the employment and social sectors, and fuel (oil and 
gas) in the industrial sector, for example, were open questions at the time.  See El Correo 
24.10.1999, and BOPV n° 40/1995, 1860–1889.
33  The Basque Country sʼ proportion as a net payer in the Spanish national economy 
dropped from 15 percent in 1975 to almost 2 percent in 1997. Domínguez Martín 2002, 
296–297; on the Basque Country sʼ contribution to the Spanish GDP see Figure 9.
Figure 4. The transfers of authority to the Basque Country 1980–1998
Source: Informe prioridades de negociación de las transferencias pendientes. BOPV n° 40 
& 43–44/1995; El Correo 24.10.1999.
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Figure 5. The Powers of the autonomous regions of Spain in 1998
Source: own elaboration, and Zulaika 2000, 74; Joumard & Varoudakis 2000, 37 & 39.
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region sʼ tax revenue remained in the region and benefi ted its own economy.34 The 
Basque Country therefore had its own public fi nances and national economy to 
a great extent, although the central government of Spain continued to have its 
own fi nancial administration. Using the Basque Country as an example, my thesis 
offers a historical point of view on the debate concerning the possible federalist 
characteristics of the Spanish state of autonomies35 in the time period covered. The 
particular problems of federalism and its theory are always case-specifi c.36 In this 
case, it is a question of fi scal federalism to a signifi cant degree.37 It is also worth 
noting that the authority of the Basque Country grew, but it also had different 
powers from most of the other autonomies in Spain. This type of asymmetry 
is, however, not typical of federalist systems.38 Secondly, using the concepts of 
economic policy, two levels of fi scal federalism can be found: (i) the position of 
the Basque Country in the context of the autonomies in Spain; (ii) an internal 
federalist structure within the Basque Country where the provinces had, in 
contrast to the regional government, widening, but identical powers since the early 
1980s (Figure 6). In any case, the politico-economic powers given to the Basque 
Country made a long term economic and fi scal policy and management of public 
fi nances possible. The approach of my study is based on a detailed historical study 
on the functioning of the Basque politico-economic structures.
(3) The third politico-economic context was, from 1986 onwards, the EC/EU, 
i.e., the continental context. Concrete results of this included community funding 
being funnelled directly to the regional and local level, and that the Internal 
Market regulations beginning to have an impact on the Basque economy and the 
region sʼ extensive politico-economic power. The relationship of regional powers 
and especially the politico-economic powers with the EC and later the EU in 
1986–1998 is part of the economic and political history of the Basque Country. 
Despite the fact that within the EU there are also other autonomous regions, the 
34  In my thesis, the term national economy does not have any political implication, 
and I do not indicate that the Basque economy was politically a separate unit. Because 
of its broad taxation powers, the Basque Country can still easily be seen as a region in 
economics and economic history. Hobsbawm has mounted a strong argument against 
the use of the term ʻnational economy .ʼ For example, in the case of the Basque Country, 
the nationalists use it to promote their own views, though it is a ʻmeaninglessʼ concept 
according to Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm 1992, 184–185.
35  Aja 1999, 31, who considers that the Spanish state of autonomies includes characteristics 
that are typical of a federal system, like “the existence of a functional system of regional 
fi nancing”. Similar interpretations have also been published by Muguruza Arrese (1997) 
and Tusell (1999).
36  Cf. for example Berndtson 2002, 88.
37  Joumard & Varoudakis 2000, 35–46; Ruiz Almendral 2002.
38  The dissimilarity of powers is not typical of federalism. Aja 1999, 240.
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Basque Country sʼ autonomy is extremely broad in this context.39 The attitude of the 
Basque political leaders and the PNV in particular to the EU has, in the long run, 
been tied to the question of representation.40 From the point of view of other EU 
member countries, such as Finland, an essential question is that if an autonomous 
39  For the exceptionality of the system in the EU context see, for example, Van Miert 
2000, 59–60. See also his article published in El País 5.5.1999; Zubiri 2000; Montero 
1998, 94; from the Finnish point of view see Autonomies in the European Union: The 
Special case of the Åland Islands 2002.
40  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas, 1994, 4 & 10. The PNV 
hoped that beside the State sʼ representatives those of the Basque Country would be 
present when issues linked to the region sʼ competences were dealt with in the various 
EU meetings. The PNV referred here to the practices of member countries like Germany 
or Belgium; according to the PNV, the representatives of the regions even participate in 
ministerial meetings; see also Deia 18.11.1998; Anasagasti 2004, 214.
Figure 6. The fi nancial relations between the political institutions in the Autonomous 
Basque Community in 1998.
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 Diputación Foral Diputación Foral  Diputación Foral 
 de Álava de Guipúzcoa de Vizcaya
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region has not followed the acquis communitaire, the role of defendant in the 
case is reserved for the member country in question. The EC/EU affected the 
PNV sʼ use of power in different ways and presented a signifi cant challenge to 
the PNV sʼ politico-economic strategy and methods. This question has not so far 
been discussed extensively in historical studies; my study shows how empirical 
political history is a viable approach in this context as well.
1.2. The concept of politico-economic power and prerogatives 
in the context of the Basque Country
Since my study interfaces with political science, it is important to specify the 
defi nitions of economic policy and politico-economic power (1) in general, and 
(2) in the context of the Basque Country particularly in order to clarify the special 
nature of the region sʼ politico-economic position. This is also necessary because 
my approach is close to political economy,41 which recognizes the political nature 
of decision-making and discusses the infl uence of politics on economic choices in 
society.42 It takes into consideration the political cycles and the effect of elections 
on politico-economic decisions, differentiating it from research in empirical 
political history.
(3) The question of public fi nance, always linked to the delegation of 
administrative powers, must also be discussed. The Basque Country offers 
a perspective on the development of the system of regional fi nance in Spain. 
However, my thesis is not an investigation into the history of politico-economic 
thinking, nor is it a study on the theory of federalist economic policy.
1.2.1. The concept of economic policy
The concept of economic policy generally relates to choosing the means 
and methods by which to achieve set objectives, within the limits of existing 
institutions and external circumstances, and according to which the turn of 
events and changes in the economic and political environment are dealt with. 
The way governments react to short-term economic fl uctuations can coincide with 
structural adjustment policies, though their compatibility in a particular economic 
41  Traditional economics analyses the optimal use of limited resources. Political 
economics has a special meaning during periods of transition; i.e., when one social and 
economic system changes into another. For political economics in its current form, see 
Drazen 2000.
42  Politics is being used here to mean infl uence and ability to achieve results that 
correspond to the objectives set by those who exercise power. Ranki 2000, 20–21. The 
subject of Rankiʼ s doctoral thesis is the Finnish ministerial committee for economic 
policy in 1987–1991, a good example of how research on economic policy can make use 
of economic policy analysis of political sciences. Political cycles are used for fl uctuations 
caused by elections. The theories of political cycles have also been analysed empirically. 
See, for example, Alessina, Roubin & Cohen 1997; Ranki 2000, 23 & 25.
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situation is not without its problems.43 Economic policy is divided into fi nancial 
or fi scal policy carried out through state fi nances (as well as municipalities and 
social security funds); monetary policy, which affects interest rates and the money 
supply, exchange rate policy, and incomes policy. In a broader sense, it can also 
include commercial and industrial policy; instead of the macro-level regulation, 
structural policy concentrates on the micro level (i.e., the corporate level).44
1.2.2. The concept of politico-economic power in the context 
of the Basque Country 
What are we talking about when we discuss politico-economic power and its 
use in the context of the Basque Country? Power and authority in the region is 
regulated and defi ned by Spain sʼ 1978 Constitution and the Basque Autonomy 
Statute of 1979. Article 2 of the Constitution declares the indivisibility of the 
Spanish nation, but at the same time “recognizes and guarantees the right to 
autonomy of the nationalities and regions integrated therein and the solidarity 
among all”.45 Article 143, written for the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, 
describes how the so-called historical regions, which have common “historical, 
cultural and economic”46 characteristics, have the opportunity to form autonomous 
communities and approve themselves a statute of autonomy. In the Constitution, the 
autonomy of Álava, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Navarra was intended to be anchored 
in the traditional system of provincial rights and privileges (provincial charters, or 
fueros) in the Basque Country by “protecting and respecting the historical rights” 
of the foral communities, which include an economic agreement.47 Despite the 
many interpretations of “the historical rights,” the fi nancial aspect was already 
43  Ranki 2000, 30; Forssell 1981, 278.
44  It depends on the emphasis on policy goals, whichever policy sector is in the forefront 
of an economic policy model, and how it is being used. Such goals can include employment, 
the exchange rate, the infl ation rate, the current balance payments, and the public defi cit. 
Ranki 2000, 30–31; for a general overview of and insights into economic growth, see the 
recent publication by the OECD, Understanding Economic Growth 2004.
45  Article 2: “La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación 
española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el 
derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad 
entre todas ellas.” CE:BOE 1983, 19; Loughlin 1999, 114; Powell 1999, 251; Tusell 1999, 
167–168.
46  Articles 144 and 151 were created for the other regions. The gradually progressive 
nature of the Constitution was emphasised in the formulation of Article 143, which indicates 
that the historical regions “may accede” to self-government and become an autonomous 
community. Article 143. CE:BOE 1983, 85–86; the same section of the constitution enacts 
the regional structure of the state. Chapter VIII, sub-chapter 1, Article 137. Op. cit., 83; 
the Constitution also enacts the procedure to establish autonomous administration. The 
Constitution explicitly prohibits the autonomous regions from creating a federation of 
self-governing communities. Article 145.1. Op. cit., 86.
47  Op. cit., 107.
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included in the Constitution.
From the politico-economic point of view, the Spanish constitution includes 
four main aspects: (1) it is a combination of basic economic principles; (2) it 
includes a group of defi nitions for the planning and development of the economy; 
(3) it regulates public fi nances and the basis for the relations between the industrial 
structures of the different regions, as well as (4) the economic regionalism of 
Spain.48 The Constitution lists the powers delegated49 to the autonomous regions, 
including, among other things, powers over regional infrastructure, fi shing 
and agriculture as well as the authority to “enhance economic development in 
the region within the conceded framework of national economic policy”;50 a 
formulation open to interpretation. The state continued to oversee monetary policy 
and the general planning of economic policy and its coordination as well as the 
state sʼ fi nancial administration.51 The Constitution sʼ defi nition of decentralization 
of powers was, however, complicated. Consequently, it lists the powers that can 
belong to the autonomous regions, and are to be acquired gradually, including 
the right to develop the economy of the region following the principles settled 
in the national economic policy.52 The determining factor is that the central 
government held back the possibility to regulate the transfer of powers, which 
depends on political agreements. The politico-economic relationship between the 
central and regional administrations is therefore, according to the Constitution, 
characteristically bilateral by nature. On the other hand, the relations between 
the regional governments and particularly the sectoral conferences remained 
underdeveloped between 1980 and 1998. What is important is that the Constitution 
did not specify a legally defi nitive model for a new a kind of state,53 the system of 
autonomies being left open to change.
The decentralization of power, as the contemporary history of the Basque 
48  Tamames 1993, 808; Tamames & Rueda 1998, 517 & 529–530.
49  Articles 148.–150. CE:BOE 1983, 88–90.
50  Article 148.1. Op. cit., 88.
51  Article 149.1. Op. cit., 90–94.
52  Other such areas include the right to legislate on soil, housing, public works, railroads 
and communications, the road network and transport traffi c, telecommunications and 
airports, as well as agriculture and dairy farming in the harmony with the state-level 
policies. Article 148. Op. cit., 88–89; according to Article 149.1. the areas exclusive to the 
state include international relations and trade, customs, the monetary system and defence. 
Article 149.3 lists the powers which do not explicitly belong to the state level and can 
belong to the autonomous regions through their statute of autonomy. However, the powers 
that have not been conceded to an autonomous region in its statute will belong to the state. 
The Spanish parliament was authorized to deliver powers to an autonomous region to 
decree laws for itself in an issue regulated by national law. (Article 150.1.). Op. cit., 94; the 
state can also always transfer those powers to the autonomies by law that do not belong 
to the group of “exclusive” areas. The state is expected to transfer public fi nancing and 
fi nancial auditing (Article 150.2.) Op. cit., 94–95.
53  Loughlin 1999, 114.
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Country reveals, was not a process without problems. The Constitutional Court 
(Tribunal Constitutional) arbitrates between the State and the Autonomous 
Communities in questions of the competence to approve a law or a by-law. Since 
the decision is based only on law (the Constitution or the Statute of Autonomy in 
question) the role of the Constitutional Court is that of a conciliator.54
In any case, the Constitution defi ned economic and fi nancial autonomy 
(autonomía fi nanciera) and included a confi guration for the system of fi nancing 
of the autonomies (fi nanciación autonómica), leaving the details and further 
elaboration to future political negotiations, however.55 Although the duty of the 
state was also to transfer the funding needed, the Constitution did not explicitly 
refer to the division of powers in tax collection (corresponsabilidad fi scal), 
which was also left for future handling.56 The autonomous communities are being 
given the right to their own share of fi nancing and its expenditure in their own 
region. Based on this principle, two different basic systems of regional funding 
were created: a general model (el Régimen Común or LOFCA) and a model based 
on separate economic arrangements, which applies to the Basque Country and 
Navarra.57 The Basque Country is, therefore, an exception among the autonomous 
communities, because of its own arrangement, which resembles a small national 
54  Aja 1999, 127.
55  Articles 156.–158. CE:BOE 1983, 100–101; Article 156 covers a region sʼ economic 
authority to fulfi l its own tasks, and Article 157 establishes the autonomiesʼ own share of 
taxation (50–57%) in their budgets, their own fi scal supplements, and a defi nition of local 
taxes and charges as well as a state level compensation fund (Fondo de Compensación 
Interterritorial). The article defi nes a three-step process for the general scheme of regional 
funding, which would lead to a situation in which a region would have the right to its own 
tax revenue.
56  To implement the shared tax liability would mean extending the powers of an 
autonomous community; in the case of other autonomous regions than the historical 
regions, the sharing of fi scal responsability became reality through LOFCA (Ley 
Orgánica de fi nanciación de las Comunidades Autónomas) only in 1997. Informe sobre 
la Financiación de las Comunidades y Ciudades Autónomas Ejercicio 1997, 1999.
57  The fi nance and property of the autonomous communities consist of (1) taxes levied 
fully or partially by the state (i.e., taxes that form part of Government revenue and other 
state subsidies); (2) their own tax revenues, levies and remunerations; (3) transfers from 
the inter-regional compensation fund and other income transfers related to the State 
Budget; (4) the region sʼ own property or entries of revenues based on their own rights; 
(5) earnings from credit granting. The autonomous regions get resources from income 
tax (IRPF, Impuesto sobre la Renta de Personas Físicas) when the state tax passes a 
predetermined level. If that level is not reached, the state will disburse the difference. 
Articles 156.–158. CE:BOE 1983, 100–101; see Tamames & Rueda 1998, 530; Articles 
137 and 138 include the so-called “principle of joint responsibility”, which aimed to avoid 
a situation where some of the regions would end up in a worse economic situation than the 
others; it took shape only in the form of the fund of compensation. Article 139 regulates 
that the interregional economic arrangements must not violate the free trade and the 
movement of goods at the state level. Tamames & Rueda 1998, 528.
26
economy. In the latter part of the 1990s, the concepts of fi scal or economic 
federalism were used in referring to the politico-economic part of the Basque 
autonomy.58
1.2.3. The Basque System of Finance
The Statute of Autonomy (Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco or Euskal Herriko 
Autonomia Estatutoa),59 approved in the Basque Country in a referendum60 in 1979, 
establishes the economy and public funds of the Autonomous Basque Country in 
section 3, according to which the region has its own independent economy and 
assets and liabilities. Article 41.1 states that the tax relations between the state 
and the Basque Country are regulated by the foral system based on the traditional 
provincial rights and privileges in the form of an economic arrangement or 
agreement.61 Important for future developments was that the competent Institutions 
of the Historic Territories may maintain, establish and regulate, within their own 
territory, the tax system, bearing in mind the general tax structure of the State, 
the rules contained in the Economic Agreement itself for co-ordination, fi scal 
harmonization and collaboration with the State, and those to be issued by the 
Basque Parliament for the same purposes within the Autonomous Community.62 
Politico-economic powers, and signifi cantly, the right to regulate taxes, had thus 
58  Aja 1999, Muguruza Arrese 1997 & Tusell 1999.
59  The statute consists of 46 articles, which have been divided into fi ve sections: an 
introduction or the preliminary section and four main sections. Moreover, it includes 
an Additional Provision (Disposición adicional) and Transitory Provisions for the 
transition period from the pre-administration to the new one. The fi rst section explains 
the jurisdictions of the Basque Country, the second chapter regulates the powers and 
defi nes the main institutions of the region. Section three explains the region sʼ fi nances and 
property, and the fourth includes the principles of amendments to the statute and how to 
change or modernize the statute. EA:BOE 1986, 19–21; LPV 1991, 75–102; Aja 1999, 87; 
Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 180.
60  In the October 1979 referendum on the Basque Autonomy Statute, the combined 
turnout of the Basque provinces was 58.9 percent. The affi rmative vote reached the level 
of 90.2 percent of votes cast, the negative vote was 5.2 percent, and the informal votes 4.6 
percent. However, 40.2 percent of voters abstained. Importantly, there were signifi cant 
regional differences within the Basque Country. BOE no.269, 9 November 1979; see 
Table 1; the statute was supported by the PNV, PSE, ESEI, EE, UCD, PCE/EPK, Partido 
Carlista (PCE-EKA), the ORT, and the PT. The Communist LCR/LKI, EMK and radical 
HB abstained. The right-wing AP Alavesa and the PPA, as well as the radical right voted 
against. Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 159; Oña Gómez & 
García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 180; Prego 2000, 94.
61  Concierto Económico or Convenios. The latter one is for Navarra; Article 41.1. LPV 
1991, 96.
62  Article 41.2a; a law concerning the Economic Agreement must always be passed. The 
translation here is by the Basque regional government and published in Euskal Herriko 
Autonomia Estatutoa 1983, 184.
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already been extended to the provinces. Despite the state sʼ intention to harmonize 
taxation between itself and the Basque Country, the Statute emphasized the future 
role of negotiations between the Basque regional government and representatives 
of the provinces to determine the real division of powers. A more detailed division 
of politico-economic powers within the Basque Country understandably became 
a bone of contention between the political forces in power; it had also been heavily 
dependent on the outcome of that struggle since the beginning of the autonomy.
1.3. Elton sʼ theory of political history and Foucault sʼ analysis 
of power examined
What are the congruences and differences between Elton sʼ research method and 
Foucault sʼ analysis of power, and what are the problems that these two approaches 
contain? Why is it reasonable to assimilate and combine them, particularly in this 
context? In other words, what is it in the contemporary political and economic 
history of the Basque Country that makes them indispensable methodological tools 
for my study? I analyse these questions by taking into account (i) the relationship 
between power and administration and (ii) study of the use of politico-economic 
power and the factors infl uencing it.
Accommodating Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ theoretical elements forms the basis 
of my research method. Firstly, their defi nitions offer a way to analyse the use of 
power and factors that infl uence it. Secondly, they clarify the links of my research 
subject with administrative history, political economy and political sciences. In 
order for Elton sʼ theory of history to play the role that I have reserved for it in my 
thesis, I fi nally discuss the challenges that his explications pose to a historian. I 
also emphasize empiricism, narrativeness and criticism of sources in my study.
1.3.1. The relation between power and administration
Elton sʼ defi nition of political history, presented in his book of the same name63 is 
concise: “political history is the study of that dynamic activity in the past experience 
of human societies which has direct relevance to the organizational aspects of 
those societies”.64 The work of Elton is resonant, since he shows how politics can 
be analysed by traditional methods used in historical study. Since the essential 
theme of political history is power and the way it is striven for and used within 
and between societies,65 it is about dynamic activity and action. In my Licentiate 
thesis, I demonstrated how Elton sʼ empirical research method was suitable for 
the analysis of a bounded political environment since the structures of power and 
63  Elton sʼ work Political History was written as a result of a dispute concerning the 
nature of historical study. Elton 1970; Kouri 1990, 104; cf. also in this respect Elton sʼ 
work The Practice of History. Elton 1967.
64  Elton 1970, 4.
65  Elton 1970, 4; see also Häikiö 2003, 90.
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their contexts are essential in the contemporary history of the Basque Country.66 
According to Elton, the study of political history should become absorbed in those 
structures and analyse the functioning of the administration that exercises power. 
A historian must, fi rst of all, be familiar with the way this happens, and “needs 
to understand and relate the elements that produce given political structures in 
particular and ascertainable circumstances”.67 Secondly, he must “understand the 
machinery which made possible the translation of power into action”.68 Elton sees 
administrative history as a part of political history.69
The key issue in Elton sʼ version of political history is the concept of power and 
its relationship to administration. The dynamic action examined by a historian 
“depends on the presence of a force – on the employment of energy – and the 
force applicable to political action is power: the power to do things for, or to, other 
people.”70 A historian is interested in (a) the struggle for power, and, (b) the active 
exercise of power. For Elton, power has no meaning, unless “it is exercised over 
others, contested with others, won or lost to others”.71 Political history concentrates 
on analysing power and its uses in human social relationships.72 Elton underlines 
that the struggle for power, as well as its use, takes place through organizations such 
as political parties and social power structures, within and between societies.73
Foucault, who analysed “power” in the humanities, seems to have interfaces 
with the general theory formulated by Elton. Moreover, he advocates Eltonʼ s 
empirical method. In Foucault sʼ writings, two questions can be distinguished: 
(1) the relationship to power, that is, what conceptualizes it, and (2) power sʼ 
relationship to administration. The fi rst is closely related to the task of the historian 
who critically utilizes Foucault sʼ ideas and must distinguish between (i) “power” 
and its appearance in Foucault sʼ research work and (ii) the way Foucault explains 
power, or what it is.
(1) Foucault was not attempting a theory of power, but an analysis of it.74 He 
66  HYHL: Nordberg 2001.
67  Elton 1970, 10–11.
68  Op. cit., 28; an essential question in analysing a policy of a particular government is 
what its freedom of action was, so that administrative and constitutional history became 
parts of political history.
69  Elton sʼ thorough approach is illustrated by his requirement of including economic 
questions in the analysis of political history. Op. cit., 7 & 8.
70  Op. cit., 4.
71  Op. cit., 5.
72  Op. cit., 8.
73  Op. cit., 4 & 10; according to Elton, a society sʼ internal structures are dependent on 
how power is available and active. A historian who analyses political history must also be 
able to lean on results from research into social structures and attitudes. Op. cit., 38−39.
74  Foucault 1980, 145; scholars have emphasized how Foucault sʼ analysis of power was 
constantly developing, and is not a problem-free road-map for the researcher. See, for 
example, Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 205.
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considered the theory under construction to be more a logic of the specifi city of 
power relations and the struggles surrounding them.75 Power should therefore be 
seen as an open, more or less coordinated nexus of relations. While Foucault sʼ 
concept of power is essentially collective by its nature,76 he claims that the analysis 
of power − including history writing on the use of political power − should be 
more empirical in that: power exists only when it is being used. The exercise of 
power is an inclusive and comprehensive structure. Nevertheless, according to 
Foucault, “power” is not so much a confrontation between two parties, as a way 
of directing the conduct of individuals, groups or organizations and “a question 
of government”.77 “Power relation” is not, however, for Foucault, an expression 
of consensus or stasis, but an “action upon an action”.78 This aspect is also 
characteristic of (i) the internal (politico-economic) power relations in the Basque 
Country where powers have been delegated from the regional government to the 
provinces and (ii) the hegemonic party sʼ relation to these governing bodies.
(2) More important than the views concerning the reasons for the use of power 
is Foucault sʼ idea that the aspiration and striving for power will normally manifest 
itself more through institutions than individuals. Though Foucault sʼ reasoning 
appears self-fulfi lling and includes the danger of taking freedom of choice away 
from individuals, his analysis expands on the defi nition of power and, above all, 
defi nes how the use of power and the structures of governance are present in the 
empirical history reading. “The internal structure of states depends on the manner 
in which power is made available and active”,79 Elton claims. He also claims that 
decision-making and policy-making are separated from administration, although 
they are linked to its structural characteristics. My argument is that Foucault sʼ idea 
that power and institutions are not the same thing can be endorsed because he still 
admits that power relations are close to institutions.80 The structures emphasized 
by Elton are thus not in any way absent in Foucault sʼ pronouncedly empirical 
viewpoint.
An important observation for the subject of my study is Foucault sʼ view that 
power is productive.81 He underlines that political technologies cannot be identifi ed 
as pertaining to particular institutions. Power and power relations always exist 
downwards and upwards. His observation is particularly important to my study 
because, in the context of contemporary Basque political history, regional and 
local levels are interlocked and also strongly affected by the national and EU 
75  Foucault 1980, 145.
76  Väyrynen 1992, 101.
77  “A question of government”. Foucault 1982, 220–221.
78  Op. cit., 220.
79  Elton 1970, 10.
80  Foucault 1982, 222. 
81  Foucault 1980, 119.
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politics. For Foucault, power is manifested as a productive network82 that more 
or less pervades the whole society. This view is also important for my analysis 
of the PNV sʼ use of power and its relation to the administration. According to 
Elton, political history is concerned about activities, but the institutions have 
their impact on the events of political history. Recognizing the administrative and 
political structures is not an end in itself. For a historian, a thorough knowledge 
of the components and actors of a system is a prerequisite for an analysis of the 
change in time, the core problem.83
The use of political power in the Basque Country has been regulated by the 
fundamental characteristics of the region sʼ political system, such as the tensions 
between the provinces and the regional administration. Even the analysis of the 
use of politico-economic power is essentially about describing, understanding 
and analysing the active interaction84 that Foucault describes as the “strategic 
relationship”.85 The institutional structure of representative democracy and the 
politico-economic power structures and their limits are relevant to the political 
history of the Basque Country, which follows Elton sʼ theory and Foucault sʼ 
thinking. My thesis reveals that, beside understanding the functioning of the 
government and the administration, political history must analyse the effects of 
these activities, thus transcending the limits of purely administrative history.
1.3.2. Analysis of the use of politico-economic power
To know and recognize the mechanisms of exercising power86 is for Elton 
a prerequisite for untangling and explaining causality and consequences in 
contemporary political history. Foucault also intends that the analysis of 
administration and government must be augmented by research into mechanisms; 
82  Foucault sʼ idea is linked, however, to power mechanisms. He mentions state apparatuses 
developed in the Classical period, such as the army or fi scal administration; these allowed 
the effects of power to “circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted 
and ʻindivualisedʼ throughout the entire social body.” Foucault 1980, 119.
83  Fogel & Elton 1983, 112.
84  Elton 1970, 8.
85  Foucault 1980, 142 & 145.
86  Cf. Risto Rankiʼ s thesis on the work of the ministerial committee for economic policy 
issues in prime minister Harri Holkeriʼ s government sʼ (1987–1991). It is a combination 
of political science and economics, but as an administrative comparison it has also 
characteristics of administrative history. Ranki 2000, 42; an interface can be found here 
with Foucault sʼ thinking. For Foucault, analysis of technologies and mechanisms of 
power is possible, and is not the same thing as a theory of power. Foucault 1980, 116; the 
encounter between thinking and mechanisms in economic policy has been analysed. See, 
for example, the economist Peter Miller and sociologist Nikolas Rose sʼ study Governing 
economic life, which refers to such historical events as the French national planning 
project, developed under Jean Monnet, through which “political language a variety of 
concrete and micro-level issues were to be thought about and acted upon”. Miller & Rose 
1993, 86–87. 
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i.e., methods of infl uence.87 The term used by Foucault, governmentality,88 is 
being embodied in innumerable attempts to create, develop, locate and use the 
mechanisms of government. The process by which power becomes an instrument 
and is made viable therefore includes a technological form.89 The variety of 
mechanisms should be regarded as a broader repertoire, including direct and 
indirect means by which the rulers try to infl uence the units and processes of 
the economy.90 Foucault sʼ idea that the rulersʼ  means of infl uencing such things 
as the economy are manifold can be accepted and exploited in empirical history 
research.91 In fact, I think that the research into the dynamic functioning of 
societies and pursuit of policies defi ned by Elton and my PNV-related focus even 
require that kind of viewpoint from a historian.
Just as Foucault sees power relations as intentional, political actors are 
always conscious of their own actions. When we analyse a political situation, 
we always see its logic and objectives.92 Elton divides historical causes into two 
main categories: (1) the “situational causes” which provide conditions for the 
production of a given event, and (2) the causes which directly produce it. This 
latter group can be subdivided into (a) intentional, and (b) unintentional causes; he 
again divides the last one into those (i) where unintended results were produced 
by an act of will, and (ii) those causes in which no act of will was involved.93 
The main issue is that Elton recognizes the problem of causation: “the diffi culty 
of establishing independent or objective criteria for judging between one alleged 
cause and another”.94 However, he points out that the argument against cause and 
motive “dangerously removes man from … history”.95 In the empirical analysis of 
87  Miller & Rose 1993, 102.
88  Foucault 2000a.
89  Foucault refers to this using the term government. Foucault 1986, 225–226; Miller 
& Rose 1993, 82; the historical analysis of political power is not a sub-science of the 
theory of power or the history of political thought, although the signifi cance of language 
and political statements in the administration and use of power is present, for example, 
in the analysis of economic policy. See also op. cit., 80; although Foucault sʼ idea (based 
on discourse) of the political discussion sʼ signifi cance for economic policy would not be 
accepted as such, it is clear that intentionality can be shown through political statements 
as well as seeing signs of economic policy change.
90  Miller and Rose, who have applied Foucault sʼ analysis of power, point out that 
in economic history, the economic policy changes of the 1960s have been seen in 
many cases as a demonstration of the state sʼ growing planning and regulatory power 
in the national economy. Still, it would be misleading to juxtapose an interventionist 
and a non-interventionist state in the historiography. Miller & Rose 1993, 89–90; the 
conceptualization was applied in order to help the administration. See also op. cit., 92.
91  Morris & Patton 1979; see also Miller & Rose 1993.
92  Foucault 1980, 145.
93  Elton 1970, 138.
94  Op. cit., 119.
95  Op. cit., 120.
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politico-economic power this would lead a historian to inaccurate interpretation. 
Here it is important to see that in Foucault intentionality is refl ected in the use of 
power, so that power is always used for a certain purpose and to gain something.96 
His idea that there is no clear subject for the use of power can be explained by the 
practices themselves.
In Foucault sʼ concept of causality, two questions can be distinguished. 
His emphasizing the diffusion and complexity of power has been criticised in 
comparative studies on theories of power for not meeting the most important 
criterion that the effects of the use of power cannot be trivial.97 For Foucault, 
the power of directing and infl uencing, or governance, is the same thing as 
strategic directing and exertion of power. This, I think, is an interesting question 
for the analysis of the PNV sʼ relationship to the regional administration during 
its long period of ascendancy. Secondly, Foucault sʼ analysis of power includes 
workable elements for the study of politico-economic history, since it separates, 
recognizes and analyses the network of relations. Since, as Elton points out “there 
is no politics without contact”, political history requires understanding of the 
system within which this contact between the political elements takes place.98 
In order to understand the historical causality properly, the links between the 
Basque economy and regional politics must also be included in the analysis.99 
Elton and Foucault follow that logic in demanding that the study of actual events, 
as effects and as a causes of further effects, must disentangle the background and 
the contexts of those events.
The study of decision-making is a challenging part of political history. In a 
democratic system, government decision-making and economic policy-making 
is in fact a process, not an isolated event. This process consists of fact-fi nding, 
charting possibilities, preparing the public and one sʼ own supporters for the future, 
convincing and persuading governmental and political parties, and making those 
who are de facto responsible for the decision commit themselves to this end.100 
According to Elton, the historian must therefore ask (1) how decisions were arrived 
at, and (2) how they were carried into action. The fi rst question includes two other 
questions: (a) who contributed to this decision-making, and (b) what conventions 
96  Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 187.
97  The obvious problem is how to talk about a strategy without one, or intentionality 
without a subject. Foucault emphasizes strategic relationships, but his analysis of 
power has been criticized in comparative studies of theories of power for stressing the 
decomposition and complexity of power and not meeting the criteria for the signifi cance 
the exercise of power. In other words, when power is used, its effects cannot be trivial. 
See, for example, Väyrynen 1992, 102.
98  Elton 1970, 9; this is, in fact, the core question in Zirakzadekh sʼ analysis of the 
relationship and interaction between the Basque businessmen and PNV in the late 1970s. 
Zirakzadeh 1985 & 1991.
99  The analysis of economic life and the circles which infl uence it is the key to 
Zirakzadeh sʼ analysis of the PNV sʼ internal ideological tendencies. Zirakzadeh 1991.
100  Ranki 2000, 40.
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of thought and attitudes conditioned it?101 Foucault stresses that although in a 
political system it is always possible to point out who occupy the leading positions, 
who the so-called “decision-makers” are, the decision-making itself, and why and 
how these decisions were taken is still not known. The solution he proposes is 
to investigate strategies, mechanisms and techniques of power, without which a 
particular decision could not have been taken the way it eventually was.102 My 
investigation thus concentrates on the grouping, in other words, the strategy of the 
PNV and its governing body, the EBB.
An exact analysis of decision-making discloses the close relationship of my 
empirical study with political economy. Consideration of the latter recognizes 
the political nature of decision-making and assesses the impact of politics – i.e., 
the infl uence and ability to achieve results which correspond to objectives – on 
economic choices in a society.103 The basis for decision-making in economic policy 
consists of information on past events and assessment of future developments.104 
Thus, analysing economic policy must include the information and scenarios 
available at that time, how the decision-makers knew to react to them, and what the 
possible limitations in the choice of measures were. By following Elton sʼ theory, 
my own thesis takes into account, above all, the limits of politico-economic power 
and the components of administration which created them at different times. 
However, I also explore the use of that power as a process, since I believe that 
the actions of the PNV are also better understood as such. Understanding the 
interaction between Basque politico-economic power and politics in the 1980s 
and 1990s requires one know the whole sweep of Basque politics and the changes 
occurring, as well as the economic indicators. This is why it is necessary to know 
the Basque Country sʼ economic history and structure.
An important constraint of empirical history writing is that one can only be 
certain of what actually happened. On the other hand, empiricism is an obvious 
challenge to political history, coercing the historian to take different views on the 
institutions and mechanisms of government and political decision-making; all this 
is necessary when I assess the internal, multi-stage administration of the Basque 
Country. Empiricism does not therefore mean that the historian is not analytical. 
The essential element here is to specify the concepts and the research subjects; 
the historian must also distinguish the information from the sources, which is 
101  Elton 1970, 29.
102  Foucault 1988, 103–104. 
103  It is important to emphasize that traditional economic science includes the idea that 
fi nding an optimal solution can also lead to its realization. Political economy recognizes 
that political restraints might lead to a situation in which the policy chosen is not the 
optimal one. Ranki 2000, 20; Pekkarinen & Vartiainen 1993; see also Williamson 1996, 
Hall 1986 & Drazen 2000.
104  The prognosis can be divided into (1) a normal short-term prognosis; (2) a longer-
term scenarios based on different alternative presumptions, and (3) impact assessments of 
alternative actions. See, for example, Ranki 2000, 121.
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signifi cant regarding these concepts and subject.
It is essential to Foucault sʼ empiricism that the use of power is not just a 
relationship between the parties, individuals or societies, but a way in which 
different actions shape each other. The core in Foucault sʼ thought is that power 
exists only when it is being used, not just held. He is an empiricist in two respects: 
through the idea of the “concreteness” of power, and in his power-analysis, he 
declares himself an empiricist.105 For him, the theories are therefore just an 
instrument. Political struggle should be analysed strategically, and this analysis 
should be historical.106 A fundamental question in this study of the behaviour of 
the PNV is what the strategic road in economic policy was in the 1980s and 1990s 
between (a) the Basque regional administration and the central government, and 
(b) the regional and the provincial politico-economic prerogatives.
The challenge of empiricism is linked particularly to the “problem” of 
narrativeness raised by the post-modernists.107 When the historian analyses a 
historical process, the research subject is the change which occurs. According to 
Elton, individual historical events such as political crises can be treated without 
telling the chronological story, but by trying to explain what happened in a 
crisis and why, simply dismantling “the circumstances and events which led to a 
particular main event”.108 The danger in doing this, however, is that the “narrative 
turns into a piece of journalistic reporting, unable to isolate and account for the 
real points of issue”.109 I thus conclude that Elton sʼ reasoning is that he warns us 
that while political history is about explaining a sequence of events, it does not 
confi ne itself to a superfi cial exposition of those events and what lay behind them. 
His underlying aim is to draw a distinction between the professional historians 
who use scientifi c methods, amateurs, and those who popularize history.110 This 
means that, I am interested in events as part of a process in my thesis.
The goal of Elton sʼ method is to discover the essential; an analysis concentrates on 
what happened, but, in my case, examines economic policy and politico-economic 
power within a stipulated time period. The order is still clear: the historian moves 
from an individual case to general developments, not vice versa.111 The application 
of Elton sʼ ideas means that the ultimate goal of history writing is not to generalize 
105  Foucault 1988, 106.
106  Foucault 1980, 145.
107  E.g., Appleby, Hunt & Jacob 1994, 231.
108  Elton 1970, 163.
109  Ibid.
110  For “amateur” historians, see Marwick 1993, 208; Marwick cited in Kouri 1990, 
109.
111  Cf. Häikiö 2003, 90, Häikiö, a Finnish historian, who assesses the history-writing 
genre represented by the British historian Eric Hobsbawm in particular.
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about the man or society.112 Without considering the critical relationship of post-
modernists to narration at more length, it needs to be pointed out that Foucault 
makes an exception in this,113 since his thought is based on narrative and action. 
Foucault does not see any “direction” in history,114 a problematic point. In other 
words, the effects of the use of power cannot be seen as meaningless for the user 
or the object of his action. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Foucault 
still accentuated the intentionality of the use of power.
The analysis of political history is ultimately always the interpretation of a 
chain of events.115 Political problems call for analysis rather than a narrative, but 
this does not mean that political history does not take an analytical point of view.116 
The type of history writing Elton represents includes narrative characteristics 
because of the nature of political events.117 Historical analysis does not exist 
without narration.118 It can be combined with analysis, since analytical political 
history deals with time and change. An analysis which excludes change is no 
longer history writing. Despite the discussion started by postmodernists on the 
effects of narration on historical research, “history, politics, and narrative are still 
the best tools available for dealing with the world and preparing for the future,”119 
as Appleby, Hunt and Jacob have stated. In fact, it is a story about “how change 
works”.120
112  However, factors that affect history, like innovations, complex human behaviour, and 
the restraints set by different conditions, must form part of the analysis. This is Häikiö sʼ 
approach to the differences between so-called “progressive” and “objective” history 
writing. Häikiö 2003, 90.
113  Cf. Foucault sʼ way of associating identity with historical processes is particularly 
apparent in the case of the PNV, since the party utilized the local identity and consciously 
built on it. Foucault 1980, 118.
114  For him history is ultimately a non-continuity. Philp 1985, 79−80; in this he differs 
from Hobsbawm.
115  Elton 1970, 163.
116  Op. cit., 160–163.
117  Evans 2000, 2 & 268–269. Evans sʼ interpretation of Elton is that Elton sees “real” 
historical analysis as always including narration. Elton is not alone in this argument; see, 
for example, Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 3–4.
118  According to Elton, “a good deal of the history still to be discovered and told is still 
political, and not only in recent history where obviously the advance of time continuously 
enlarges the area to be worked”. He also points out that “narrative history is usually 
political history because narrative records movement, and the dynamic life of society 
(as I have stressed several times) equals political life”. Elton 1970, 156–157; description, 
analysis and synthesis are the preconditions for Elton sʼ version of political history. Elton 
emphasizes how the mistakes in analysis are more fatal than those in narration. He also 
warns about superfi cial narration and over-rationalization. Sources and their lacunae also 
create pre-conditions for the narration. Op. cit., 161, 163−164 & 177.
119  Appleby, Hunt & Jacob 1994, 236.
120  Ibid.
36
While it is diffi cult for a historian to demonstrate the motives of political actors 
using his sources, knowledge of the context and the background are, notwithstanding, 
fundamental to successful analysis. The historian must show and understand the 
contexts of the Basque economy and politics, because they reverberated to the 
PNV sʼ use of power and, moreover, explain the acts of certain local interest 
groups. For example, the lobbies enter the political process with their activities 
and become signifi cant to political history.121 Although, Zirakzadeh recognizes the 
infl uence the Basque business elites had on the PNV and the regional government 
dominated by the party, we should also see what those elites were composed of 
in that context, and what they strove for. In the business circles of the Basque 
Country, the economic characteristics of and differences between the provinces 
were apparent. The interaction between striving for economic power and politics 
cannot be understood without knowledge of Basque politics, and of the infl uence 
of various advocacy groups. According to Foucault, modern politics should be 
seen as an indefi nable fi eld of power relations or strategies of dominance, not as a 
confl ict.122 How the state codifi es these relations and how its own actions depend 
on power relations is a different thing.123 This becomes a special challenge in a 
political environment like the Basque Country, which was characterized in the 
1980s and 1990s by the structurally complex political institutions,124 a pluralistic 
society, a heterogeneous party system, political polarization and dissidence 
and violence. All these factors had an infl uence on the complex structure of 
administration, relations between the political parties and the voting behaviour of 
the region sʼ inhabitants.125 Naturally, they also infl uenced the use of power.
According to Elton, when the historian phrases a question, he must take into 
account the structures that affect policy-making; the treatment of the research 
subject must still support the study of political relations.126 A theory must not offer 
answers prepared beforehand; the answers must be based on historical sources. 
From Foucault sʼ point of view, only critical and empirical research which aims to 
describe the evolution of complex relations is meaningful.127 Although Foucault 
is often associated with research into micro-power, his studies are about state 
121  Elton 1970, 8.
122  Foucault 1988, 106; Foucault 1980, 123.
123  Foucault 1980, 122; About limits on freedom of action of political decision-makers, 
compare Elton 1970, 28.
124  This structural complexity, which has its roots in the system based on the provincial 
laws, or fueros, called the foral system, was given form in the Ley de Territorios Históricos 
law or LTH of 1983 which regulates the internal division of power and the fi nancial, fi scal 
and administrative relations between the regional and provincial institutions. Ley 27/1983, 
de 25 de noviembre, de “Relaciones entre las Instituciones Comunes de la Comunidad 
Autónoma y los Organos Forales de sus Territorios Históricos”, LPV 1991, 251–275. 
125  Llera Ramo 1998, 414.
126  Elton 1970, 43.
127  Foucault 1980, 142.
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governance and the relationship between the economy and politics.128 Foucault sʼ 
idea of the use of power as the history of a “strategic relationship”129 visible in 
the society is applicable to the politico-economic history of the Basque Country, 
because the regional powers gradually extended in this process. The transfer of 
power to the regional level was not, however, automatic or regular. The PNV, 
as the leading party, strove for more political power for the region and its parts 
(provinces), which it then also used. This raises the question of what the strategy 
of the Basque Nationalist Party was. Elton sʼ approach to analysing this process 
is functional, even if Foucault sʼ strategic analysis of power that describes the 
conditions for the research of the use of power replenishes it. In historical analysis, 
the PNV sʼ struggle for politico-economic power and its use can be seen as a 
strategic relationship. From that relationship, the analysis must distinguish why, 
how and for what that power was used, and what it achieved. Thus my argument 
and conclusion is that the historian considers the dynamics and strategy of the 
situation: the strategic element facilitates the study of the motives of the use of 
power.
1.4. Sources
As those postmodernists who have criticized Elton – even Evans, who has taken a 
more constructive attitude towards Elton sʼ writings – have emphasized, the sources 
and their criticism are a pronounced element in Elton sʼ theory. What they seem 
to fi nd particularly annoying is that the historian should look for the “historical 
truth” in the sources.130 According to Evans, “that past only speaks through the 
sources when the historian interrogates them”.131 Elton sʼ critics tend to forget that 
in the end he also emphasizes the questions – which lead to further questions 
– that the historian must ask in going through his sources.132 For Elton, this is 
linked to the essence of professional history writing in that the historian must be 
familiar with his sources, be systematic, avoid hit-and-miss methods, and identify 
128  See, for example, Foucault 2000a; Foucault sʼ analysis of power is a demonstration of 
the existence of different opinions and standpoints within so-called postmodernism (and 
post-structuralism). The English historian Evans stresses the signifi cance of this, and how 
the infl uence of postmodernism appears in the science of history through the emphasis 
placed on language, culture and ideas. Evans 2000.
129  Power is not an institution or a structure for Foucault, not even a given power, but a 
complex strategic relationship within a certain society. Foucault 1980, 142 & 145; Mark 
Philp claims that Foucault sees power as an inborn element of social relations. See Philp 
1985, 20 & 75. According to the philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus and the anthropologist 
Paul Rabinow, Foucault sʼ goal was to “isolate, identify, and analyse the web of unequal 
relationships set up by political technologies which underlies and undercuts the theoretical 
equality posited by the law and political philosophers”. Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982, 185.
130  Elton 1967, 88 & 95.
131  Evans 2000, 271.
132  Elton 1967, 32.
38
the essential information for his own research. Methodologically, Elton puts the 
historian on the spot: “the historical record always leaves it to the historian to 
discover the causes of action and motives of men”.133
In Elton sʼ method, the analysis of the use of power must recognize the 
institutions and the mechanisms of political decision-making and governance. 
Foucault focuses on (i) recognizing the use of power, and (ii) strategic analysis 
of a political struggle. For Elton sʼ method, the key question is to identify the 
historical change that took place. An analysis of the effects of the governance and 
the use of power is central for both of them. To be able to answer this question, all 
the substantive information must be found in the relevant sources. This method is 
laborious because it means in practice that an exhaustive knowledge of extensive 
archival materials and sources must be gained, and these documents must be 
collated for the purposes of the historian sʼ research.134 In areas with abundant 
material, the real work of discovering “historical truth” must still concentrate 
upon particular studies of restricted problems.135
Elton skilfully divides the sources of political history into (a) narratives of 
events, (b) documents or records of these events, and (c) comments and refl ections 
upon the events. Moreover, he points out that there is a sub-group of material 
which is linked to the subsidiary structures of political history, namely (d) the 
records of government, institutions, law, and fi nance.136 This also includes 
statistics. Documents form the most important group of sources for a historian. 137 
The political historian in particular depends on previous accounts of the events he 
is analysing but, in contemporary history, historians must do their own research 
and reading and not depend on the structures erected by other historians.138 In this 
respect, Elton is again uncompromising. He also points out how important it is to 
work through all the relevant material when the actions of a particular government 
or administration are being analysed, because these sources can reveal to the 
historian important information on the motives behind the decision to archive 
these materials.139 The analysis and reading of political decision-making must in 
any case be based on suffi cient historical evidence. This is important because 
political decision-making and the effects of politics cannot be researched simply 
on the grounds of the materials of constitutional and administrative history. 
When the historian makes use of administrative material, there is a danger that 
133  Elton 1970, 168; See also Elton 1967, 33.
134  The sources of political history are often “exceptionally massive”, and their utilization 
“demand[s] ... manifold abilities, insights, and skills from the historian”. Elton 1970, 
108.
135  Elton 1967, 95.
136  Elton 1970, 74.
137  Elton divides them into sub-groups of documents concerning decisions, consequences, 
counter-actions, and reactions. Op. cit., 94–108.
138  Op. cit., 74.
139  Elton 1967, 93.
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he will not be writing political history.140 For this reason, the sources must include 
newspapers and narratives written by contemporary political actors.
Before I start to enlarge on my sources, it is necessary to discuss certain aspects 
of the historical evidence. First of all, one important factor is that after the death of 
Franco in 1975 the political life of Spain and Basque politics were characterized 
by strong political rhetoric. The relationship between this, ideological defi nitions 
of policy, and actual political decisions is a key issue in the study of the PNV, and 
is linked to the methodology of my thesis. The historian must aim to see behind 
that rhetoric as well as recognizes the use of power and separate out the factors 
which infl uenced that activity, trace its strategy and consequences, and create a 
synthesis in the end.
It is also noteworthy that in political science, research concerning political 
parties representing western European minority nationalisms has traditionally 
been restrained by two factors:141 (i) the assumption that regional political parties 
lack political weight, and (ii) the limited availability of sources on them. Spain, 
with its regional political parties,142 the PNV in particular, form an obvious 
exception to this rule.143 My argument is that the Basque Nationalist Party sʼ long 
and uninterrupted period of ascendancy since 1980 in fact requires this subject 
to be analysed. One positive consequence of the PNV sʼ institutional position and 
political activeness is that there is plenty of material for historians who want to 
study the history of its actions at regional level.144
Despite the existence of historical sources, criticism of those sources is strident 
in the contemporary political history of the Basque Country. In the period of 
my study, the newspapers, and the press in general, were extremely politicised 
in Spain. The historian must therefore be careful and maintain a critical eye in 
using them as sources and basing his conclusions on them. Indications of this 
problem can be seen, for example, in Finnish studies that take a general look at 
the contemporary political history of Spain, and in which the Basque Country has 
seldom received professional treatment. Basque politics may have been described 
by using incidental or adventitious public statements from the extreme ends of the 
140  Cf. Evansʼ afterword in the second edition of Elton sʼ The Practice of History. Elton 
2002, 180–181.
141  Müller-Rommel 1998, 18.
142  Historically, the most signifi cant are the PNV in the Basque Country, and Convergència 
i Unió (CiU) in Catalonia.
143  Granja, Beramendi & Anguera 2001, 289.
144  According to Elton, “political action, being of all actions the most self-conscious, 
reaches the record more systematically and more plentifully than all other human 
activities”. Elton 1970, 83.
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political spectrum as examples.145 The problem of rhetoric has not been tackled 
suffi ciently by the authors of these works. The Basque Country and the Basque 
nationalism, not to mention the Basque Nationalist Party, are described in a 
stereotypical way. The manner of representation makes it even more diffi cult to 
further describe and analyse Basque politics and its history. These writings are 
mainly a compilation of disconnected and inaccurate information, not a sound way 
for the historian to assess and provide information on the relationship between the 
political and economic development of Spain and the Basque Country. In this type 
of political analysis, as in journalism, it sometimes seems diffi cult to explain the 
complex causal connections in the region briefl y.146 Research and journalism are 
intermingled, consequently suffering from the signifi cant problem of which Elton 
warns.147 In these cases the criticism of sources has not worked, or not even been 
applied properly, and the writings do not transmit convincing knowledge of the 
historical characteristics of their subject. This is a serious problem, because the 
premises for historical assessment and analysis are completely lacking.
In addition, the political statements of the PNV and its representatives make 
the historian sʼ task challenging and diffi cult. He must know the concepts used and 
the various interpretations and connotations linked to them. In Basque politics, 
there are many terms and names which are being deliberately used. Moreover, the 
historian must know the history of the PNV thoroughly and understand its internal 
power mechanisms and processes. Generally, the time that the historian has spent 
on and in the region benefi ts the end product, whether it is question of an article or 
a more extensive work. For the contemporary historian, it is especially important 
to experience and understand how interpretations of the political history of the 
Basque Country differ from each other, and how they are connected to political 
standpoints, or how these concepts were used in the daily politics of the 1980s 
or 1990s. The time spent in the region may cause its own problems in that the 
neighbourhood and immediate surroundings begin to affect the researcher sʼ point 
145  See, for example, Helminen, Korppi-Tommola & Korppi-Tommola 1994, whose 
non-scientifi c work Espanja - diktatuurista demokratiaan, directed to a larger Finnish-
speaking audience, is a short introduction to the society and history of Spain, although 
concentrating on the events of the 1980s and the 1990s. The book briefl y describes the 
recent development of Spain and its autonomous regions, but in the case of the Basque 
Country it mainly deals with radical nationalism in the region. The book also gives 
some information on the PNV and moderate Basque nationalism. However, it conveys a 
stereotypical picture of the region and Basque nationalism. The format makes it diffi cult 
to explain the complex recent history of Basque politics, so that in this respect the book is 
merely a collection of imprecise and fragmentary information on the Basque Country. It 
does not offer a clear picture of the relationship with the politico-economic development 
of the rest of Spain.
146  See, for example, Helminen 1999; also see the reply to this article, written by the 
geographer Pauliina Raento. Raento 1999b.
147  Elton 1970, 163.
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of view.148 There are several examples of this in political science. However, it is 
still possible to achieve a solid historical viewpoint on the political and economic 
history of the Basque Country and, in fact, the sources help in this. The criticism 
in this case is always based on an exhaustive knowledge of the Basque history, 
economics and geography, particularly political history.
Particular problems occur in considering the PNV sʼ use of power. The subject 
is political by nature, and the events I discuss relatively recent, which factors 
create additional pressure for objectivity. Partly because of this, the sources 
that describe the regional political structures and are typical of administrative 
history have a special place among my sources. I have, without exception, used 
the Spanish versions of this material.149 The question of language, as I have noted 
previously, is complex in the context of the Basque Country. Apart from the fact 
that political and cultural terms are often mixed with each other, or, for example, 
used in maps to promote certain political goals,150 the language used – Spanish or 
Basque (Euskara) – can also be interpreted in the Basque Country as a political 
statement. In this context, the discipline of the researcher and his background is 
also signifi cant. The most important thing is that the historian is aware of these 
factors and is consistent in his practice, as well as always trying to see behind the 
text, in other words, practices stringent criticism of sources.
In addition to the challenge that the short time-perspective of my thesis creates, 
I have to take into account another problematic feature of the history of Basque 
autonomy and the whole structure of autonomies in Spain. The 1980s and 1990s 
are part of an evolutionary process of a structure which is still developing.151 It 
proceeds on the basis of political agreements. The questions the political historian 
poses must therefore take into account the discussion that emerged during the 
period of my study and that concentrates on the possible federalist traits of the 
so-called state of autonomies (el Estado Autonómico). Offi cially, Spain is not a 
federal state; nonetheless, Spanish experts on constitutional law, such as Eliseo 
Aja, pointed out in the late 1990s that its structures resemble those of the current 
federal states.152
The powers of the Basque autonomous community are extremely extensive, 
particularly in economic policy, not just in the context of Spain but also in 
148  See, for example, HYPL: Pohjanheimo 1996, 3.
149  It could be interpreted as a political choice, and a sign of an interpretation which 
favours the political views of the central government at that time. This is not my intention. 
There is always a Basque language (or Euskara) version of the administrative, legislative 
and political documents of this sort.
150  See, for example, Hall 1981, 320–322; Monmonier 1996; Kosonen 2000.
151  My interview with the Finnish Ambassador Pekka J. Korvenheimo. Korvenheimo 
2000; for the constitutional changes in the system created in the Constitution of 1978, 
see Aja 1999, 13–14; on the term el Estado Autonómico which does not exist in the 
Constitution, see ibid, 33–34; see also Mur 1999, 21; other examples can be found in 
jurisprudence. See BOPV nº 40/1995, 1860–1889.
152  Aja refers here particularly to European federal states. Aja 1999.
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the continental EU context. The growing regional politico-economic power 
is part of the contemporary history of the region, but also an essential part of 
the contemporary history of Spain and its state structure.153 All this makes the 
historian sʼ job even more demanding, but again, this is a challenge he must face. 
Elton sʼ method will help me in this: the contexts, the causalities, as well as the 
consequences must be clearly indicated and understood. The historical analysis 
must not content itself merely with scratching the surface of its subject.
The sources of my thesis can be divided into the following groups: (1) the 
documents of the PNV, (2) documents of the regional government and parliament, 
(3) the newspapers and the press, (4) texts and works of contemporaries, (5) 
statistics and, as secondary sources (6) academic research literature, and (7) other 
literature. The fi rst four groups are the most important.
(1) The core of my sources consists of the material produced by The Basque 
Nationalist Party itself from 1980 to 1998, including a few documents from the 
years immediately preceding the current regional autonomy. The defi nitions of 
PNV policy and its actions are explained primarily through its own political 
publications, communiqués and announcements. Here lies the signifi cant 
difference from the sources and the research angle of my Licentiate thesis, where 
these sources were not crucial. From the point of view of my present thesis, 
the electoral manifestos for regional and local elections are the most important 
documents among the political publications of the PNV. The manifestos of general 
elections are also relevant in some cases.
My main focus is on such valuable written material as the bulletins of the 
PNV (Alderdi Berriak) and particularly the communications issued in the name 
of the party (Comunicados; Aberri Eguna). They are particularly interesting for 
the study of the role of the EBB, the leading organ of the party. All this material, 
as well as the party programmes and platforms, can be found in the EBB sʼ archive 
in Bilbao. However, the minutes of the weekly meetings of the EBB were not made 
available for my study.154 Some of the most important PNV documents have been 
edited, but only to a limited extent, by the historians Pablo, Granja Sainz and Mees 
(1998).155 This particular material is only a fraction of the sources I have used in my 
thesis, which includes documents that have not previously been used on this scale. 
The reason for this lies in the problems I have already explained. These sources 
contain valuable information, but the historian must be aware of many factors at 
the same time in order to use these documents carefully and critically.
153  In the theories of economic liberalism, a federal state is seen as an intention to 
solve the problems of a nation-state. This scheme of things relates the functionality of a 
federal system to the maintenance of its membersʼ identity. Kaarlejärvi 2001, 339–340; 
Rosamond 2000, 24 & 30.
154  Letter of the EBB Centro de Documentación of 28 April 2004; there is no relevant 
material for my study from the time of the current autonomy in the historical museum and 
archive of the PNV, Fundación Sabino Arana (Artea, Vizcaya).
155  Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998.
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Here I have applied the reasoning of Elton that the political historian is not 
writing about the history of ideas but “his task is to understand the ideas and 
feelings which contributed to political action or reaction or comprehension”.156 
The political historian does not look for opinions, but tries to discover events. I 
use these documents when I consider the stages preceding decisions. Although the 
“why” remains the most problematic and disputable part of the political historian sʼ 
work,157 it is the goal of my thesis.
In any case, the material produced by the PNV also tells us how the party aimed 
to become more open and strengthen its communications and public relations in 
the 1990s with the help of the EBB sʼ communiqués and the more visible role of 
its presidents in public. The other political parties often criticized the EBB for not 
necessarily having listened to the opinion of the party membership before taking 
decisions, or for not having traditionally bothered to explain those decisions in 
public.158 It must be remembered that the role of the PNV sʼ provincial councils 
in the EBB and the election process of its president is particularly strong. The 
separate role of the party leader arises because the person in charge of the regional 
government cannot be a member of the party leadership at the same time. However, 
he would normally attend the EBB sʼ weekly meetings.159 This fact was portrayed 
particularly well in the press at the time. Interviews and public comments of party 
leaders are considered a good source for the analysis of defi nitions of policy,160 the 
political history of the Basque Country being no exception.
(2) The second group consists of material produced by the regional 
administration, led by the Basque Nationalist Party, and the regional parliament, 
covering the years 1980−1998. The latter sub-group includes documents that report 
the work carried out by the parliament and its committees. The offi cial journals 
and publications of the Spanish State and the Basque autonomous community also 
belong to this group. All the politico-economic legislation of Spain and the Basque 
Country, including the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Basque Autonomy 
Statute of 1979, are included in this group. In the case of the Basque administration, 
like the PNV and the EBB, the historian faces the problem of accessibility to these 
documents. The general principle of confi dential information, linked to the every-
day work of government, determines what material about those actions is public and 
what is not, and is based fi rstly on the general constitutional structures. Secondly, 
that confi dentiality is due to the party-political structure of the governments, a 
factor that hinders openness and transparency. The basic form of parliamentary 
cabinet is a ministerial government formed by one political party that does not 
156  Elton 1970, 166.
157  Op. cit., 93–94.
158  See, for example, the article written by José María Benegas, published in El País 
1.11.2002.
159  The only exception to this was the time before lehendakari Garaikoetxea resigned.
160  For the best example of this, see Moreno del Río 2000, whose analysis covers the 
years 1986−1996.
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want to reveal its internal disagreements or the consideration of choices that 
preceded decision-making to its opponents. The principles of internal solidarity 
and collective responsibility include a government standing unanimously behind 
its policy wherever or in whatever order the decisions have been taken.161 Coalition 
governments also attempt to maintain confi dentiality and the charade of unity by 
concealing disputes. The Basque government is no exception to this principle, and 
this fact is refl ected in the sources available.
To compensate for this obvious lack of sources, answers must be found in 
other sources, such as parliamentary documents and the analyses and publications 
of the research unit of the government sʼ fi scal department and the institute of 
Basque public administration (Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública – 
Herri-Arduralaritzaren Euskal Erakundea; IVAP). These are documents which 
precede the decision-making of the Basque government and can help to trace 
the various views that prevailed in the regional administration.162 Naturally, since 
public discussion on economic policy questions is not limited to the parliament 
or the cabinet meetings, I have used all the possible material on this subject. 
When the historian analyses the economic policy, actions or the decision-making 
of a government, the government programme can be used a starting-point. In 
the Basque Country, as well as in the Spanish central government, this means in 
practice that the new prime minister will give his inaugural speech, but it is not 
always published and printed as in Finland. The programme includes the agreed 
goals and policies of the new government, but also refl ects elliptical ways of 
thinking which differ from time to time.163 Directing the economy is not, however, 
the same thing as implementing government programmes or making the dreams 
of those who drafted it come true.164 In the end it is always a question of political 
choice.
As Elton stated, the selection of sources is not the same thing as the 
conclusions that have been made in assessing them.165 In the conclusion to my 
thesis, I emphasize the recognition of the limits of power so that the link with 
the constitutional and administrative history can be clearly seen in my sources. 
The politico-economic powers of the Basque government are established in the 
Spanish Constitution and the Basque Autonomy Statute.166 Studies of the Statute 
and its various interpretations is a subgroup of its own. Despite the legal and 
administrative historical nature of that sub-group, it is clearly linked to the study 
161  Nousiainen 1992, 10.
162  Elton 1970, 93−94.
163  Ranki 2000, 110.
164  “Programs constitute a space within which the objectives of government are 
elaborated, and where plans to implement them are dreamed up.” However, the techniques 
of implementation do not always work. Miller & Rose 1993, 88.
165  Elton 1967, 94.
166  Constitución Española 1978 CE:BOE 1983; Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco 
1979. LPV 1991.
45
of the contemporary history of the Basque Country and the Basque nationalism.167 
These law texts and the politico-economic legislation approved by the regional 
parliament have been a part of the process in which politico-economic powers 
were transferred gradually to the region in the 1980s and 1990s. The economic 
agreement, signed by the central and the regional governments and the documents 
concerning the cupo fi nancial instrument also belong to this group.168 All these 
documents are keys to the political and administrative structures of the Basque 
Country and to its regional economic and fi scal policy. They do not describe 
political events directly, but are the results of the actions of the politicians and 
establish the limits of action in economic policy. The political historian must be 
familiar with these documents in order successfully to assess the use of politico-
economic power.
Similarly, the offi cial journal published by the regional parliament169 becomes 
part of the documentation, as, for example, does the material concerning the 
parliament sʼ work during legislative periods.170 This material provides information 
for research into economic policy decision-making at regional level as well as 
inter-institutional relations. The material includes information on all the laws 
and the private member sʼ bills, and the results of the work of parliamentary 
committees. I have used the diaries of the economic and treasury committee 
sessions especially.171 These all help me to trace the internal tendencies of the 
regional government.
Together with the material produced by the PNV, these sources are records of 
events that tell us about actions, i.e., decisions taken, and the discussions concerning 
those decisions. There are also records of consequences, and counteractions or 
reactions. Records of discussions are the most problematic for the historian, which 
means that the stages before political decisions remain the most problematic, 
uncertain and controversial in history writing.
(3) The third, a very important group of sources, is made up of the newspapers 
and magazines published during 1980–1998 in the Basque Country, and 
elsewhere in Spain, and in some cases even outside the country. This group also 
includes publications that mainly concentrate on economies and economic policy. 
Newspapers, beside beings records of the events of a day or a week, are closely 
linked to the everyday expression of opinion and the shaping of the world-view 
of readers. The most important newspapers for my research are the daily Deia, 
167  Granja, Beramendi & Anguera 2001, 289.
168  See, for example, Normativa Básica sobre el Modelo fi nanciero vasco 1991; Ley 
14/1997. BOPV 196/1997.
169  Boletin Ofi cial/Aldizkari Ofi ziala or BOPV.
170  See, for example, Memoria Txostena 1987–1988, 1987–1990, 1991–1994, 1995–1998.
171  Batzordearen bilkuren aldizkaria / Diarios de Comisiones; Ekonomi, ogasun eta 
aurrekontu batzordea / Comisión de economía, hacienda y presupuestos. The committee 
also assembled in mixed compositions with other parliamentary committees during the 
fi rst legislature. PV:SC:CEHM & PV:DC:CEHM.
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which is published in Bilbao and represents the views of the Basque Nationalist 
Party, and the independent Bilbao daily, El Correo, and the San Sebastián daily 
El Diario Vasco, published by the same publishing house.172 The newspapers 
are in a very special position as regards the political debate, since all the public 
comments and statements were purely political in the political environment of the 
Basque Country in the 1980s and 1990s. The newspapers are an important tool 
for the historian who needs to study the Basque political culture. The importance 
that newspapers play as a source for political history is that they cannot have 
been changed or composed afterwards. The politico-economic discussion of the 
period can also be traced and followed in the journal Ekonomiaz, published by the 
regional administration. Many of the lectures given at the Royal Basque Society 
of the Friends of the Country (La Real Sociedad Bascongada de los amigos del 
País)173 that have been published also became part of the public discourse on 
economic policy. A good example of a newspaper specializing in economics is 
the nationwide Cinco Días. The economic development and politics of Spain and 
of the Basque Country were also monitored closely and analysed in the pages of 
the London-based weekly, The Economist, which offers an additional perspective 
on the subject.
(4) At least as important as the previous groups is that formed by memoirs, 
autobiographies, and edited and published interviews of Basque and Spanish 
politicians. The number of these narratives and accounts by contemporaries is, 
however, limited,174 one reason being that the events are quite recent. On the other 
hand, the local political culture does not favour memoirs.175 I also include a number 
of narratives and public interventions from the 1980–1998 period. The authors 
include ministers or offi cers of the regional government, journalists specializing 
in economic policy,176 social scientists177 and commentators. Some political or a 
personal bias is, however, normally apparent in these writings. The facts should be 
172  Other newspapers published in the Basque Country which I have used include Egin 
and La Gaceta del Norte.
173  For the history of the society, which was founded in 1765 and was the fi rst combination 
of Basque commercial, ecclesiastical, military, and administrative interests, see Douglass 
& Bilbao 1975, 104.
174  See, for example, Carlos Garaikoetxea sʼ memories, Garaikoetxea 2002; Mario 
Onaindía sʼ Guía para orientarse en el Laberinto Vasco (he was an ex-member of ETA, 
later joined the EE, and became a PSE-EE senator ). Onaindía 2000; see also the book by 
the independent member of the Basque General Council (1978–1980), José Manuel López 
de Juan Abad, entitled La Autonomía Vasca. López de Juan Abad 1998; the writings of 
prominent PNV politicians such as Joseba Arregi and Iñaki Anasagasti, should also be 
mentioned here. Arregi 2000 & Anasagasti 2004.
175  Cf. for example, the comment by Juan María Leizaola (PNV) in 1980. Deia 
16.12.1980.
176  For example, Copa 1989, and Nuevos Extractos de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de 
los Amigos del País 1998 (I).
177  Such as, Llera Ramo 1994, and Llera Ramo & Uriarte 1994.
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checked against documentary evidence. However, the arguments, information and 
the explanation of motives that can be found in these writings is of interest.
The narratives and memoirs of contemporaries involved in national Spanish 
politics and economic life,178 can also provide valuable information about the 
actions of the PNV. Because of the centre-periphery relation, the region sʼ socio-
economic problems, and the persistent political violence, the Basque Country was 
one the most diffi cult issues in Spanish politics in the post-Franco era.179 However, 
the focus of my study – the use of politico-economic power – means that no 
more than a fragment of the material available concerning the Basque Country 
is relevant. It must also be stated that this type of narrative sources should be 
judged on the strictest criteria, based on the knowledge of contemporary history 
of Spain and the Basque Country. The interviews with previous ministers of the 
regional government, conducted in 1998 and published later by the IVAP,180 are an 
extremely important source. These interviews cover the period my study covers, 
and I have been comparing their contents to the picture that the newspapers of the 
same time convey.
The historian must be careful here as well. These sources pose problems in 
their use and interpretation, since they are mostly accounts by somebody else 
than a historian, and in many cases intended to serve other purposes, such as 
partisan politics or accusations, or simply self-defence. Still, they contain a lot 
of information that the historian must analyse critically. The essential questions 
are what the author or the person interviewed could have known, what they were 
trying to do and what can be established about their personal competence and 
opinions.181
(5) The statistics concerning the Basque and the Spanish economy that I have 
used are naturally necessary for my thesis. The important sub-groups here are 
the statistics provided by the Basque Offi ce of Statistics (EUSTAT), the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas), 
the Spanish National Administration of Labour (Instituto Nacional de Empleo, 
INE) and the material published by the European Union Offi ce of Statistics 
EUROSTAT.182 These fi gures make it easier to follow the developments in the 
Basque economy, and make it possible to compare them to developments in the 
Spanish economy in general, and in some cases to the EC/EU context.183 
For the reason that I have already mentioned, the historian must be cautious 
178  For example, Calvo Sotelo 1990, and Almunia 2001.
179  My interview with the Finnish ambassador Pekka J. Korvenheimo. Korvenheimo 
2000.
180  Historia del Gobierno Vasco contada por sus consejeros, HGV 2001, I & II.
181  Elton 1970, 77.
182  The EUROSTAT sʼ statistics on the regional differences can also be found on the web 
page of EUSTAT. See EUSTAT: EUROSTAT 1998.
183  For the analysis of the regional effects of the structural change in the Spanish 
economy see, Cuadrado Roura 1991.
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with statistics concerning the Basque Country. They can and have been used for 
political purposes in many publications, particularly newspapers. It is always 
necessary to base historical analysis on the original fi gures provided by the 
offi cial statistical centres. One good example is the regional unemployment rate. 
The relatively high unemployment fi gures of the Basque economy in the early 
1980s and again in the early 1990s appeared to have been rounded up in some 
cases to support the conclusions of some newspapers or magazines which tried to 
infl uence public opinion.
All the information I have used in the tables has been calculated from the 
original, absolute fi gures given in offi cial statistics published by the autonomous 
or central government. I have done this to make the data comparable. However, 
in some cases, the methods of calculating the percentage of the voting rate for 
political parties varied, even in the offi cial publications, from one year to another. 
In addition, the numbers concerning cupo that have been published in newspapers 
suffer from inaccuracy and are not reliable. The offi cial fi gures published in the 
offi cial journals and by the regional government are also needed.
(6) The sixth group of sources consists of academic research literature. My thesis 
cannot be based on other scholarsʼ studies, but must present my own interpretation. 
It is still necessary and useful to be familiar with previous studies of the Basque 
history, economy, and society. Moreover, there is a need to make comparisons 
between them and my own analysis both in content and methodologically. Previous 
research essential for my thesis includes particularly the analysis of regional 
economic policy and the PNV. The research literature I have used can be divided 
into (i) the Spanish studies, particularly those carried out in the Basque Country 
and published in Spanish, and (ii) the Anglo-American studies in the humanities 
and social sciences. The most important and infl uential examples for my thesis 
in the group of analyses on the PNV done in the Basque Country are those by 
the economic historian Corcuera Atienza, and the historians Granja Sainz, Pablo, 
Mees, and Rodríguez Ranz.184 Their assessments and conclusions concerning 
the Basque Nationalist Party and its policies are exemplary and demonstrate the 
functionality of the empirical method in contemporary political history in the 
Basque Country. Among the Anglo-American studies, or in those done elsewhere 
in Spain, the questions of economic policy and the PNV have been dealt with or 
at least touched upon by the sociologist Zirakzadeh, the social scientists Clark and 
Cesar Díaz López,185 and by the economic historians Harrison and Jordi Palafox 
Gamir.186 Clark and Zirakzadeh have been particularly instrumental in establishing 
the focus of my thesis because they emphasize the historical point of view and 
empiricism in their studies and in the selection and use of their sources.
184  See, for example, Granja & Pablo 2000, and Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 1999 & 
2001.
185  Díaz López 1985.
186  Palafox Gamir 1989.
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1.5. Merits and problems of previous studies on The PNV
The academic research literature cannot form the basis for my own construction 
of the history of the PNV sʼ use of power. There are several reasons for this as 
I have previously explained in discussing my sources. However, in this section, 
I concentrate on the various ways the PNV has been seen by scholars and how 
their works deal with the interesting relationship between the party and politico-
economic power and its history.187 In this way, I shall indicate what questions should 
inform the analysis of the PNV; in other words, what aspects and viewpoints have 
so far been bypassed in the historiography of the Basque Nationalist Party and its 
use of power. This clarifi es the place of my thesis among the studies of the party.
Those who have considered the question of politico-economic power in this 
context have mainly been interested in the relationship between the PNV and 
the business elite, but less in how it actually affected policy-making. The latter 
question is, however, linked to my objective of ultimately tracing the strategy of 
the PNV sʼ use of power, which is essential to the historical picture of the party 
and its actions. Naturally, the issue of interrelationship between big business and 
the government is not a new one.188 Still, two different lines of interpretation 
in the studies on the link between the party and the business elites can be 
distinguished. Those works which recognize the infl uence of those elites on PNV 
policy concentrate predominantly on particular occasions and limits this type of 
infl uence to short periods of time. In many cases, the previous studies have not 
explained, or even considered, the differences between the economic structures of 
the Basque provinces, and how they affect the different interests and priorities of 
the provincial business elites. Moreover, most attention has been given to times of 
economic change when the signs of these contacts are more visible. The situation 
is similar to that seen more generally in the works on the history of the Basque 
Nationalist Party. There is some basis for this analysis, but despite the many 
merits of the previous historiography, it is still not congruent, and there are some 
disconnected arguments and results.
Among the Anglo-American scholars, Clark especially has succeeded in 
demonstrating how the regional politics of the late 20th century were full of 
pragmatism and calculation.189 The question of the economic policy of the PNV 
is not the main interest of his studies, but when he analyses the changes in the 
strategies of the Basque political parties and their actions and decisions, he takes 
the changes in the economy into account.190 Clark has researched the PNV using 
empirical methods, concentrating particularly on its policy in the 1980s. His 
187  Here I do not consider the large fi eld of works concerning ETA and radical Basque 
nationalism.
188  For the relationship between the economy and the political elite in Spain, see Sánchez 
Recio & Tascón Fernández 2003 (eds.); cf. the analysis of the same relationship in the 
USA; see, for example, Phillips 2002.
189  Zirakzadeh 1991, 14 & Clark 1987.
190  For example, Clark 1987.
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observations, which are based on sources like newspapers and the PNV sʼ own 
material, corroborate my earlier claim that in skilful hands the motives behind the 
PNV sʼ actions can be coherently analysed. He has also dealt with the historical 
relationship between the supporters of the PNV and European integration, and 
the changes in the policy defi nitions of the PNV caused by Spain sʼ membership 
of the EC/EU.191 Apart from Clark, a clear division can be seen in the Anglo-
American studies: while Stanley G. Payne openly undervalues the role of the 
economy in the contemporary Basque history, Zirakzadeh, who considers Clark 
as his model, represents the view that the historical role of the economy was 
crucial. His approach is successful – when applied to the history of the PNV –192 
in indicating the historical changes in the party and their link with the Basque 
economy.
For their part, Corcuera Atienza and Jean Claude Larronde consider that 
the PNV and its founder Sabino de Arana, were subject in its early stage to the 
infl uence of various interest groups and political tendencies.193 This is an important 
observation. Zirakzadeh follows the same line, emphasizing the infl uence 
of the leading Basque businessmen on the ideology and policy of the PNV at 
the beginning of the 20th century and again in the 1970s, during the political 
transition in Spain. The businessmen who were also party activists infl uenced 
party policies so that “by the 1930s the anti-commercial rhetoric of the early 
years had almost completely disappeared”.194 Zirakzadeh sʼ work sheds light on the 
internal tendencies in the party and the links between those economic visions and 
the persistent differences in the party sʼ supporters in the Basque provinces.
The economic historian Joseph Harrison (1977) had already noted, before 
Zirakzadeh, that the representatives of the business world had maintained 
cordial relations with the PNV since before 1920. According to Harrison, the 
Basque Nationalist party embraced the useful parts of two antagonistic worlds by 
seeking support in the conservative countryside, as well among the ranks of the 
industrialists in Bilbao.195 Harrison sʼ view is that the capitalist and anti-capitalist 
factions cooperated within the party.196 This seems a sound argument if we take 
into account the demographic and regional scale, the local social culture, class 
and ethnic links, and, for example, the strong infl uence of catholicism.
Zirakzadeh underlines that the PNV had used its policies to facilitate and 
contribute to the development of capitalism since the beginning of the current 
191  Clark 1987.
192  Zirakzadeh 1985.
193  Corcuera Atienza 1979 & Larronde 1977.
194  Zirakzadeh builds his views on Larronde sʼ work. Zirakzadeh 1991, 102; Larronde 
1977, 279 & 361.
195  Harrison 1977, 379; see also Harrison 1983, where he defi nes the historical picture of 
the Basque industrialistsʼ infl uence on Basque politics.
196  In the sub-group of historical analysis done in the Basque Country, Elorza considers 
that such cooperation never existed there. Elorza 1978, 252–253; Zirakzadeh 1991, 14.
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autonomy.197 He calls for a more nuanced picture of the PNV and its various 
internal ideologies.198 Among other things, the dispute concerning the system of 
fi nancing in the Basque Country199 in the early 1980s is for him the PNV sʼ internal 
battle between the anti-capitalist tradition and a more modern vision on economic 
policy questions.200 He holds that the economic policy of the regional government 
in the early years was dictated by the interests of one sector of industry and 
followed the ideas of the modernist faction.
Zirakzadeh sʼ conclusions concerning the use of politico-economic power in 
the early 1980s have not been much criticised and remain relevant. He outlined 
the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, but his intellectual structures concerning 
the motives behind the actions are occasionally quite general. He succeeds in 
combining Harrison sʼ and Jordi Palafox Gamir sʼ conclusions with his own, but 
does not consider the changes in the ideology of the PNV further, or the effects 
that politico-economic power had on its other policy statements. In any case, he 
demonstrates how the internal problems of the party in the 1980s can be analysed 
with its visions on economic policy and development, thus reinforcing the reading 
that the political and economic power structures were in interaction in the Basque 
Country. He also diversifi es the historical picture of the PNV and its links with the 
corporate elite. He does not yet draw conclusions or make a synthesis of the PNV sʼ 
use of power as a historical process or the role of that process in the changes that 
the party lived through. In this respect, his analysis differs from mine in my 
thesis. My argument is that it is important always to keep in mind that the party 
was traditionally a mouthpiece for the petit bourgeoise in Basque society. The 
so-called “Spanish” period in Arana sʼ thought and political career testifi es to the 
political success of that group within the party.
The model constructed by Zirakzadeh, which emphasizes the role of economic 
policy questions in the PNV sʼ internal disputes in the 1980s and in which he 
presents those disagreements as a fundamental division between the group of new, 
liberal members of the regional administration and a more traditional group of 
party activists, is not in all respects a complete one. The traditionalism which 
was strongly present in the party ranks and in party ideology was intermingled 
with economic policy. This is a complex pattern in which the historical politico-
economic roots and objectives of the PNV must be remembered, since they 
197  Zirakzadeh 1991, 102.
198  One of the underlying reasons was that the 1970s was a time of economic uncertainty 
for Basque businessmen, and the general view in the region was that some kind of autonomy 
would be introduced in the Basque Country. Moreover, the PNV and the Socialists last 
became the leading parties in the region in 1979. Op. cit., 103.
199  Ley de Territorios Históricos (LTH).
200  The traditionalist wing, or the so-called Aranaists or aranaistas, and the modernist 
wing, which supported the rapid industrialization of the Basque Country, the so-called 
euskalerriacos. The roots of the latter can be found in the moderate liberalism which 
existed in the Basque Country before 1873. Corcuera Atienza 1979, 141.
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infl uenced the decisions of the PNV and consequently the internal, politico-
economic structures of the Basque Country. In some respects, the problem of 
Zirakzadeh sʼ analysis of the PNV is the lack of historical focus, i.e., what the 
process was and what its results were. Naturally, his works are not fi nally about 
the history of actual decisions and use of politico-economic power.
The previous works on the PNV, and particularly those of Corcuera Atienza, 
have demonstrated how the party used fueros and the economic agreements in its 
own ideology and policy-making in an instrumental way. A longer historical period 
shows the infl uence of the economic lobbies on the PNV. The party itself became 
an instrument in this process, and the shortcoming of the historical analysis of 
Harrison and Zirakzadeh relates to this aspect. It is partly a consequence of the 
shortness of the periods they analyse. A study on a longer, uninterrupted period like 
that in my thesis, reveals the party sʼ links with various sectors of Basque society. 
This offers a new dimension and much needed information for the construction 
of a more coherent historical picture of the Basque Nationalist party. The crucial 
thing in Zirakzadeh sʼ and Harrison sʼ detailed studies is that they do not entirely 
follow the path shown by Corcuera Atienza, where the structure of the PNV201 is 
the key element in analysing its policy and decisions. The way Corcuera Atienza 
frames his question makes it possible to show what relationship the provinces had 
with the internal disagreements of the PNV, and its long-term quest for power. 
This is precisely the essential element in the theoretical framework based on 
Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ reasoning. My thesis continues, therefore, from the point 
where Corcuera Atienza leaves off. The works of Zirakzadeh and Harrison are, of 
course, also in a special position in my research literature.
There are practically no examples of the study of economic policy or the use 
of politico-economic power of the PNV among the Spanish scholars. The closest 
examples are the historians Juan Pablo Fusi and Javier Tusell who have written 
on the regionalist movements. Nevertheless, they represent the tradition that 
does not consider the changes in the national or regional economy or wealth as 
signifi cant for the history of regionalist parties. They concentrate on the elements 
of the nationalist ideology and whether the Basque nationalists strive for regional 
autonomy or independence, and where the line between them and other political 
groupings goes in the context of the Basque Country and elsewhere in Spain. In 
Fusiʼ s writings, the PNV is present as a party that, in the 1970s, supported the 
idea of regional autonomy as a way of rectifying the abolition of the regional 
laws, the fueros.202 Tusell and Fusi have both touched upon the Basque political 
history, the role of that region in the context of the Spanish quasi-federal system of 
autonomous communities. Fusi does not provide a complete analysis of the PNV sʼ 
history in the 1980s, though the role of the PNV was important in the gradual 
201  For the PNV sʼ structure as a party, see Esteban & López Guerra 1982, 179–182; for 
the differences between the PNV and the EA, see Acha Ugarte & Pérez-Nievas 1998.
202  Fusi 1984 & 2000, and Tusell 1999; for the PNV sʼ internal interpretations of this, see 
Arregi 2000, 110.
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process of empowerment of the region, and in the rapid development of the whole 
system which made the Spanish case exceptional in the context of Western Europe. 
It is also strange that the contexts and the limits of the regional powers became 
apparent in that process; the historical fueros of the Basque provinces, which 
Fusi has dealt with, concerned the same question of the powers, and their limits 
and contexts.203 The same issues come up in the economic and political history 
of the Basque Country through the system of fi nancing and Spain sʼ membership 
of the EC/EU. The role of principal negotiator for the economic agreement was 
transferred to the PNV, the leading force of the regional government, but the 
potential mingling of its ideology and strategy during the history of the Basque 
Country is not thoroughly explained by Fusi and Tusell.204 The analysis of the PNV 
remains general: although they emphasize the intention of the party to enhance 
the bilateral negotiation channel with the central government, they still do not 
analyse the underlying reasons.
It is interesting to notice how Fusi believes that the local businessmen generally 
had a negative attitude towards the PNV.205 A problematic part of Fusiʼ s view is 
the Basque business elites as a politically homogenous group. This has not been 
the case during the existence of the PNV. This is particularly surprising if we take 
into account Fusiʼ s own background as a social scientist and historian. Fusi, like 
the sociologist Juan Linz and the historian Stanley G. Payne, stresses macro-level 
changes in Basque society, and offers a modernist point of view on its history 
which, according to Zirakzadeh, denies the local institutional settings.206 For Fusi, 
big historical changes are relevant in the history of the PNV, as well; his studies 
thus do not offer tools for a detailed analysis of the Basque economy and politics. 
The nuances in the actions of the PNV, which I believe say more about the party 
and its politics, are not the focus of his works. The same applies to the historian 
Fernando García Cortázar, whose various works on the contemporary Basque 
history are not PNV-oriented. When he discusses the PNV, he presents it as a 
movement with an ideology based on artifi cial mental structures of a national 
Basque identity and the region sʼ political status. In his works, the role of the PNV 
in the 1980s and 1990s is reduced to striving for maximum benefi ts.207
Elsewhere in Spain, scholars like the economic historian Palafox Gamir 
and the social scientist Cesar Díaz López have discussed the liaison between 
regionalist movements and economic policy, as well as the politico-economic 
203  Larrazábal Basáñez 1997; see also Tocqueville 1981, 188; Tocqueville referred to the 
fueros as an exceptional arrangement.
204  This question, however, became relevant through the economic agreement, fi scal 
arrangements and the question of the representation of autonomous communities in the 
EU context.
205  Fusi 1984.
206  Zirakzadeh 1991, 7.
207  For example, García de Cortázar 1998, 393–407 & 423–433; García de Cortázar & 
Azcona 1991.
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aspects of the centre-periphery relationship. Palafox Gamir sʼ approach to the PNV 
is similar to Clark sʼ: they approach it through the changes in the economy and the 
expectations of Basque voters in relation to the economic policy of the PNV. The 
PNV, together with other regional parties such as the CiU of Catalonia, are at the 
centre of Gamir sʼ studies. The sociologist Juan Díez Medrano continues Díaz 
López sʼ analysis of the centre-periphery relation within Spain, and its historical 
development,208 making comparisons between Basque and Catalan nationalism 
and discussing their relation to the region sʼ history and economic development, 
including the underlying role of the middle class.209 Díez Medrano relies heavily 
on Zirakzadeh sʼ idea that the Basque businessmen had a powerful infl uence on the 
politics of the PNV in the 1970s.
Among the works written in the Basque Country, a major interpretation and 
the most complete account of the emergence and early years of the PNV is still 
that of the economic historian Corcuera Atienza.210 His writings also offer a clear 
historical picture of the fueros, removing the political imprint the nationalists have 
imposed on them. The historian Antonio Elorza (1978) concentrates on Aranaʼ s 
ideas and the permanent role those ideas had in the ideology of the PNV. The 
ideology-centred nature of Elorza sʼ accounts leads him to believe that there was no 
cooperation between the PNV and the business elites.211 It is true that references to 
economic policy are extremely limited in Aranaʼ s work, and that in the early 20th 
century, the businessmen were just one of the infl uential groups behind the PNV. 
This takes us to the basic setting of Elorza sʼ work: the ideological comments and 
publications of the PNV do not fully refl ect the complex and manifold relationship 
the Basque business executives had with the Basque Nationalist Party. Once in 
power, the actions of the PNV reveal much more on this issue. Besides, this type 
of focus does not help us to see how the party itself was instrumentalized. As 
I shall demonstrate in this study, analysis of the exercise of politico-economic 
power by the PNV which takes into account the power structures emphasized 
by Elton and Foucault offers a solid way to treat these questions. The research 
must also include administrative sources and a wider selection of newspapers and 
narratives by contemporaries, as Elton points out in his methodology. They must 
be assessed critically, taking into account the history and the internal political 
and economic tensions of the region, not forgetting the politicized nature of these 
sources either. 
Signifi cantly, Corcuera Atienza sʼ studies on the establishment and the early years 
208  Díaz López 1985.
209  Díez Medrano 1999.
210  Corcuera Atienza 1979.
211  Elorza sʼ Ideologías del Nacionalismo Vasco, 1876–1937 sees the dualist (pro-
independence, pro-autonomy) ideology of the PNV as the rationale for the party sʼ very 
existence before 1936. Elorza 1978; in his Basque Nationalism, Stanley G. Payne analyses 
the establishment of Basque nationalism and its early years. In the history of the party, it 
covers the time until Franco sʼ rise to power. Payne 1975.
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of Basque nationalism are based on documents, newspapers, and other traditional 
historical sources of the party and its founders. His work is characterized by the 
re-examination of this evidence and discovery of new points of view, and the 
creation of a comprehensive interpretation of it. The analysis by Corcuera Atienza 
is not mental history like Elorzaʼ s writings, though it does reveal the slow mental 
changes in the region in the longer term, and particularly in Vizcaya. As opposed 
to Elorza, the basis of Corcuera Atienzaʼ s analysis is always historical with an 
empirical tone, where the sources and the solid way they are used guarantees the 
depth of analysis.
Elorza succeeds in creating a historical picture of how the PNV carried out 
the instrumentalization of the rural culture and idyll to promote its ideology and 
politics at an early stage. Unlike Corcuera Atienza, however, he does not touch 
upon the question of how the party was able to achieve popularity in the rural 
areas, particularly Vizcaya. Appealling to rural romanticism, or merely trying to 
provoke a counter-reaction to the new social class of immigrant workers and the 
threat they posed was not enough to vote for the nationalists. In order to attract 
votes in the countryside, the PNV needed a political programme they could 
support. Although it took many years to formulate the party programme, it was 
created out of the fueros and their defence.212 They also included an economic 
aspect, which was precisely what made them a useful instrument; Elorza does not 
analyse this much. Elorza later (2001) defi nes the image of the PNV as a political 
movement which actively sought for support in different parts of society. He 
attaches the concept of political religion to Basque nationalism, and concentrates 
mainly on creating a picture of its ideological development in the 20th century.213 
The biggest problem in Elorzaʼ s analysis is his way of seeing Basque nationalism 
as unitary, which it has not always been, with the exception of its early years 
when the movement was strongly identifi ed with its founder, Sabino de Arana. In 
spite of the differences between the various alignments in Basque nationalism, 
Elorzaʼ s goal is to make a synthesis of them. Elorza concentrates on the ideology 
of the PNV, but refl ects only occasionally on the behaviour of the party and its 
way of operating, and seeks as well as stresses the common ground between the 
moderate and radical nationalists. This approach does not, however, explain fully 
the actions and political choices of the PNV.
In terms of the precision and scope of their analysis, the historians Granja 
Sainz and Pablo succeed in getting very near to Corcuera Atienza, and are almost 
his match as examples of empirical study on the PNV.214 Their studies include 
a historical assessment of the internal, ideological groupings of the party and 
its policies. Moreover, in the joint works of Pablo, Mees and Rodríguez Ranz, 
the actions of the PNV are presented in relation to its history. This is justifi ed 
212  The PNV emphasized these factors specifi cally as differing ones in the region sʼ 
relation to the rest of Spain. Corcuera Atienza 1979 & Mieza y Mieg 1984.
213  Elorza 2001.
214  For example, Granja Sainz & Pablo 2000.
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because many concepts of history are central to the comments and rhetoric of the 
PNV sʼ representatives.215 They do not confi ne themselves to this, but also offer 
a synthesis of how two main visions existed within the party and were at work 
simultaneously: the line that supported full independence and that which aspired 
for regional autonomy. They put the individual political actions of the party into 
this context.
Critical examination will reveal elements for the creation of a more coherent 
picture of the relationship between the economy and the political leadership and 
their infl uence on the PNV sʼ exercise of power. For example, the Guggenheim 
museum, which was inaugurated in autumn 1997 in Bilbao, was an important 
chapter in the economic history of not just the city or Vizcaya but of the whole of 
the Basque Country, where it stands out as a signifi cant separate public investment 
project. It is also a part of the history of the regional government sʼ economic 
policy. In addition to economic journalism, the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao 
has given rise to studies that help the historian complement and improve his 
assessment of contemporary economic and political history. Analysing the political 
context of this project, the geographer Donald McNeill indicates how cities have 
an important role in globalisation. His particular interest is the relation between 
that phenomenon and national identity.216 McNeillʼ s contribution to economic 
and political history is to show how urban change might be related to changes in 
political strategy. He also describes the technique that was used to get the PNV-led 
regional administration to direct wealth to the local level, and from one sector of the 
economy to another. In essence, the study deals with the use of power and its effects. 
The impact of the Guggenheim museum on the regional economy and its economic 
context have been addressed in political economics by UPV sʼ economist Beatriz 
Plaza Inchausti.217 Some works on the history of Bilbao or of the Basque Country, 
which are directed to the general public, have also touched upon the political events 
linked to the launching of the project, and indicate the role of the PNV as the leading 
215  Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 1999 & 2001; see also the article written by 
Granja Sainz in El Correo 16.1.2000; all these works tend to leave aside the concept of 
“protonationalism” (Hobsbawm 1994, 44–45 & 74–75); for the surveys of the PNV sʼ 
history see also San Sebastián 1984, and Barandiaran Contreras 1995 (in Euskara); 
Sainz sʼ work El Nacionalismo Vasco: un siglo de historia, published for the centenary of 
the PNV in 1995. Granja Sainz 1995.
216  McNeill 2000.
217  She has analysed the regional government sʼ instruments directed to industry and the 
regional economy. Plaza 2000; for the economic analyses and surveys of the so-called 
Guggenheim effect, after the fi rst year of the museum (1997–1998) see, for example, 
Plaza 2000, Esteban 1999, El Semanal 20.2.2000 and Impacto de las actividades de la 
Guggenheim Bilbao Museoaren Fundazioa en Euskadi 1998.
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political force and the party exercising power on that occasion.218
In selecting bibliography on the historical relationship between the PNV and 
politico-economic power for my thesis, the question of the economic effects and 
consequences of political violence turned out to be particularly problematic;219 
there is a limited number of studies or even literature on that subject. Politicians 
and various writers have, in any case, indicated the effect of terrorism on the 
Basque economy. In my thesis, it is also one issue in the contemporary economic 
and political history of the region. This question was increasingly discussed in 
public, and cannot be left out of the scope of my study.
So far, the politico-economic picture of the PNV has been fragmented in 
historical studies. It is true that mastering the complex networks and levels of 
power and administration that Elton and Foucault call for in their writings is a 
challenge to the historian; particularly so for the PNV and the Basque Country. 
Still, there are examples of extremely infl uential and excellent interpretations in 
this fi eld, like the work of Corcuera Atienza. It is important to note that since the 
politico-economic point of view in the analysis of the PNV is not, according to 
the previous studies, artifi cial, it cannot be considered as an irrelevant basis for the 
study of the history of the Basque Country in the 20th century. On the other hand, 
it is true that only on a few occasions has the PNV been put into the framework of 
economic policy, although the historians are generally aware of the importance of 
the economy in the region sʼ history and politics.220 If we accept the basic idea that 
a government has a crucial role in capital transfers,221 the politico-economic power 
in the context of the extensive powers of the Basque Country is an important 
subject for research. Power and authority did not lose their meaning in the history 
of the region from the late 19th century to the 1980s. The previous works partly 
218  The anthropologist Joseba Zulaika sʼ work Crónica de una Seducción, which is 
ultimately directed to the more general audience, describes the PNV sʼ use of power in 
the context of the Guggenheim museum project. In any case, Zulaika sʼ book helps us 
to follow the economic policy discussion concerning that project, and demonstrates the 
interaction between the business world and the regional political leadership in the Basque 
Country. Zulaika 1997; see also El milagro Guggenheim, which was written by a group 
of journalists of the independent Bilbao daily El Correo. Esteban & González Carrera & 
Tellitu 1997.
219  Calling the political violence of ETA terrorism may be interpreted by radical 
Basque nationalists as a political decision. However, ETA is on the EU sʼ list of terrorist 
organisations, and in the EU sʼ justice and home affairs cooperation the term terrorism 
is a legal and technical defi nition not connected to historical background or the political 
opinions underlying terrorism. In my thesis, which concentrates on the history of economic 
policy and politico-economic power, and which is not a study of ETA or radical Basque 
nationalism, I use that term for manifestations of political violence such as bomb attacks. 
For the EU context, see, for example, Wallace & Wallace 2000, 496 & 515.
220  For example, Lluch (et. al.) 1998; Montero 1998; see also Rivera 1998.
221  For example, the American political journalist Kevin Phillips. Phillips 2002, 200; 
see also Sánchez Recio & Tascón Fernández 2003.
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cover the development of the relationship between administration and wealth in 
that period. A major problem of those studies is that the fundamental role and 
infl uence of the regional government and administration gets less attention. There 
have been few accounts of the intention of the PNV to keep relations with the 
central government as bilateral as possible while the party advocated creating 
functional mechanisms for cooperation among the autonomous regions in Spain. 
One reason for this may be that assessing this issue requires knowledge of the 
history of the PNV and the Basque administration and its structures, as well as the 
economic history of the region, and of Spain. For example, Zirakzadeh recognizes 
the role of the structures, but does not consider them further. His work helps, in 
any case, to understand the interrelationship between the economic and political 
history of the Basque Country and how the local structures infl uenced the use of 
power. He does not, however, discuss in more detail how this was manifested, and 
what the consequences were, as I will here.
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2. THE PNV AND THE HISTORICAL CHANGES IN 
THE BASQUE ECONOMY
Basque politics is infl uenced by a number of complex factors and relationships 
that can be traced back in its history. Historians usually recognize that when the 
liberalization of trade encouraged industrialization in the Basque Country in 
the latter part of the 19th century and the sudden rise in industrial jobs attracted 
emigration from other parts of Spain, nationalist ideas emerged among the Basque 
middle class as a reaction to this major social and economic change. However, 
as I pointed out earlier in this study, only some observers, like Zirakzadeh and 
Clark, take the regional and local economic conditions and the contemporary 
economic history fully into account. Although I concentrate on 1980–1998, in 
this chapter consider (1) the economic context of Basque politics and (2) the 
historical politico-economic roots of the PNV. In this way, I shall demonstrate 
the continuing links between the PNV and the changes that took place in the 
economy of the Basque Country in the 19th and 20th centuries. The long-term 
links between the PNV and these structural changes are essential for my study 
because this element pervaded the party sʼ way of using politico-economic power 
in the 1980s and 1990s becoming apparent on various occasions, and thus should 
not be ignored by the historian.222 This question is closely linked to the history of 
the party organization. Analysing and understanding the contemporary history 
of the use of politico-economic power thus requires familiarity with the long-
term economic frame of reference of the region and its relation to the history and 
actions of the PNV.
Although cultural, ethnic and historical ties such as a common language and 
cultural and social traditions bond the historical Basque provinces, there are 
signifi cant differences between them in geography, their economy and customs.223 
My investigation understandably puts the emphasis on economic geography. The 
coastal areas of the Basque Country of Spain became industrialized in the late 
19th century, whereas the other areas started their industrialization process only 
after the Second World War. The coast, where basic industry dominated, was 
undergoing another major economic transformation at that time. In the years after 
the Second World War, the whole Basque economy experienced great changes 
again. From 1940 to 1975, the population growth was the second highest in 
Spain, and it was a question of domestic immigration within Spain. The people 
who moved in were attracted by jobs in industry, but they also contributed to 
the region sʼ wealth. By 1959, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the 
Basque Country was the highest in Spain, and no less than 95 percent of the 
average in Western Europe. After a long period of economic growth, the change 
in GDP during 1975–1985 was negative and the lowest in Spain. Although the 
Basque Country was no longer a “promised land” of immigrants in the 1980s, 
222  Corcuera Atienza 1979 & 1991, 30–33.
223  Douglass & Bilbao 1975, 13−16; Raento 2002, 102−103.
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the GDP per employee was relatively high and linked to export and trade.224 The 
role of the Basque country in Spanish trade, particularly exports, and as a transit 
route, and the dependence of regional economy on the changes in trade flows 
were foregrounded in the 1990s when the upswing in the economy started. The 
traditionally strong Basque industry and the financial institutions located in the 
region also played an important part in the economic foundations of the Basque 
Country.
When I apply the ideas of Elton and Foucault, the most visible things in the 
political history of the Basque Country are the structures of the use of power, their 
relations and limits as well as their stratification. The Basque Nationalist Party, 
like the other parties in the region, tried to take these factors into account and 
capitalize on them politically as much as possible. Analysis of these structures 
reveals that the struggle for power of the Basque provinces was, during the period 
224  Domínguez Martín 2002, 296; for the GDP of the Basque provinces in 1980–1998, 
see Figure 7.
The GDP per capita in the Basque Country 1980-1998
Figure 7. The economic growth in the Basque Country 1980–1998.
Source: EUSTAT: Cuentas económicas y sector público: PIB 1980-1998 per capita (euros) 
por territorio y periodo. Base 2000.
225675 Nordberg.indd   60 27.06.05   12:42:36
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covered by my research, linked both to their economic interests and to their 
differences (Figure 7). Since the differences were an important factor in the use 
of power of the PNV at regional level, we must consider this situation in detail by 
analysing the region sʼ economic sub-regions and the economic context of Basque 
politics. Knowledge of the geography and economy of the Basque Country are 
key factors in understanding the historical and economic causal connections of 
the region, and must be kept in mind in assessing historical change in economic 
policy. This is a prerequisite for understanding the history and evolution of the 
contacts between the Basque politicians and the representatives of the commerce 
and industry in the region.
2.1. The economic context of contemporary basque history
2.1.1. The Basque Country from the economic point of view
The geographical area of the Basque Country is 7,234 km², which is 1.5 percent 
of the total surface of Spain. By the end of the period of my study, 1998, the 
population of the community was 2,098,628 people, 5.4 percent of the total 
population of Spain. The population density was 290.1 inhabitants per square 
kilometre (km²), where the equivalent in Spain was 79.5,225 and almost half lived 
in towns of 10,000–100,000 inhabitants. Nonetheless, differences between towns 
remained considerable, some being modern centres and others fairly agrarian. The 
province of Vizcaya still had the biggest population (1,137,000 inhabitants), ahead 
of Guipúzcoa (677,000) and Álava (less than 300,000). The biggest cities of the 
region were the provincial capitals, Bilbao (Bilbo; 371,000 inhabitants, and almost 
one million in the Bilbao metropolitan area) in Vizcaya, San Sebastián (Donostia; 
180,000) in Guipúzcoa, and the administrative capital of the autonomous region, 
Vitoria-Gazteiz (214,000) in Álava.226
In the context of Spain, the Basque Country is small in population and total 
area. However, it has economic importance in that context. The Basque Country 
contributed about 6 percent to the Spanish GDP.227 Although the estimates of the 
economic effects of the geographical location of the Basque Country varied during 
the 1980s and 1990s, the benefi ts from transit traffi c were obvious, particularly 
in 1998.228 At the end of the 1980s, the Basque Country was still seen as a 
living example of economic regression, and as a de-facto industrial graveyard, 
with limited prospects for the future.229 It was considered extremely diffi cult to 
implement the necessary structural changes and the re-direction of the regional 
225  España en Cifras 1997.
226  Manual del Estado Español 1999, 598–609.
227  Figure 9.
228  Differing interpretations are linked to the time of analysis. See, for example, Euskadi 
en el Proyecto Europa 1991 & Raento 2002.
229  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991; The Economist 3.7.1993, 12.
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economy, which suffered from high unemployment (Figure 8). In this sense, it 
is interesting to compare the role of the Autonomous Basque Country with the 
cultural-historical Basque Country: the autonomous region, though smaller in size 
than the Foral Community of Navarra (population of 530,811; surface area 10,391 
km²), is more important demographically and in industrial production. On the 
other hand, Navarra, as a frontier region, became an important channel for Spain sʼ 
foreign trade, and showed great potential in attracting foreign investment in the 
1990s. In the east, the autonomous Basque Country borders on the French Basque 
provinces, which were still pronouncedly agricultural in the 1990s.230
Since the late 1970s, the effects of oil crises, the problems of the traditional 
heavy industry in the region, the diffi cult employment situation and the protracted 
economic recession characterized the Basque economy.231 Although the economic 
230  Raento 2002, 95.
231  Zirakzadeh 1985 & 1991; Cuadrado Roura 1991; Harrison 1983.
Figure 8. The problem of unemployment in the Basque Country and Spain 1980–1998
Sources: EUSTAT: EPRA (http://www.eustat.es/spanish/estad/tablas/tbl0000300/tbl304.
html); INE: PAE003T00000001 & PAE693T00000001 
(http:www.ine.es/tempus/cgi-bin/itie); GV/EJ: Economía Vasca 1998, 66.
The Unemployment rate in the Basque 
Country and Spain 1980 – 1998 
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crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the socio-economic changes that European 
integration brought affected the structures and relative position of the Basque 
industry and economy, many key factors and conditions still did not change. The 
economic pressures on regional politics are based on the uneven distribution of 
wealth and displacement of production and production methods to other regions, 
and the consequent disappearance of jobs.232 Despite the volume of its industry 
and the famous local fi nancial institutions, the resources of the Basque Country 
are limited. It is a frontier region and retains several economic core areas and 
hinterlands.233
The main economic contexts of the Basque Country nowadays are Spain 
(Figure 9) and the EU. Although European integration has brought well-being to 
the region and new opportunities for its economy, the differing local and regional 
232  Zirakzadeh 1991, 17–18.
233  Raento 2002, 95.
Figure 9. The Basque Country in the Spanish economy 1980-1998
Source: my own elaboration from INE: Economía. Cuentas Económicas. Contabilidad 
Regional de España. Base 1986, Series 1980-1996 & Base 1995, Series 1995-2003. (http://
www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um?M=%2Ft35%2Fp010&O=inebase&N=&L=0)
The Basque Country ratio of the Spanish GDP
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views and the national (autonomous communities) as well as international (state 
borders) division cause problems.234 In the latter part of the 1990s, the economic 
position of the Basque Country was defi ned by signs of recovery, the growing 
importance of the new port of Bilbao, technology parks,235 cross-border trade and 
cooperation between Spain and France, and transit traffi c. Structural problems, 
the paucity of new jobs created annually, high unemployment among people 
with higher education qualifi cations, and pressures to bring the educational and 
vocational training systems closer to the needs of commercial life in order to 
develop service and technology sectors were still the main economic concerns in 
the 1990s. The proportion of industry remained high in the region sʼ GDP, and the 
structural change in local industry was still in progress.
The division between town and countryside in the Basque Country is as 
important in its economic geography as is the contrast between the coast and the 
hinterland. In 1980–1998, the GDP per capita was consistently highest in Álava 
and lowest in the most densely populated province of Vizcaya.236 The regional 
location of production followed the provincial borders, so that at the end of the 
1990s, Vizcaya was still heavily industrialized, whereas small and medium size 
enterprises characterised Guipúzcoa. Cooperative movements also fl ourished in 
Guipúzcoa from the 1970s onwards.237 Álava was the province of new technology 
entrepreneurship, and intensive, large-scale, mechanized and commercial 
agriculture.238 Whereas agriculture in the coastal and mountain regions of the 
Basque Country was mainly concerned with beef production and sheep breeding, 
production on the plains of Álava consisted of large-scale cultivation of cereals 
and vegetables.239 The average estate size in the Basque Country was still small in 
the 1990s. From the 1960s, the trend had been towards fewer, but bigger farms.240 
In comparison to other parts of Spain, a relatively large part of the cultivated 
area was occupied by cereal crops and grapevines rather than fruit.241 Agriculture 
and fi shing employed few people in the Basque Country, and only 3 percent of 
234  Raento 2002
235  The three technology parks of the Basque Country are Zamudio (Vizcaya), Miñano 
(Álava), and Miramón (Guipúzcoa). Noticias de Euskadi 1998:9.
236  EUSTAT: Cuentas económicas. PIB per cápita por territorio. Valores corrientes 
(euros). Figure 7.
237  The most prominent one is Mondragón, which later became an important conglomerate 
in Basque terms. Conversi 1997, 199–200. 
238  This can be seen clearly in the export statistics of the provinces. EUSTAT: Comercio 
Exterior 1998, 14.
239  Zirakzadeh 1991, 20.
240  Álava sʼ agriculture commercialized rapidly after the Second World War, when it 
produced groceries for the growing markets in the cities. As elsewhere in the Basque 
Country, the farmers suffered during Franco sʼ period when the prices of agricultural 
products did not rise at the same rate as those of industrial products; industrial products 
were exported in growing quantities in the 1960s. Op. cit., 38–39.
241  España en cifras 1997, 30.
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the active population worked in those sectors in 1998, whereas the service sector 
accounted for 60 percent and industry and construction for 37 percent. Still, it 
must be remembered that in the 1980s and 1990s the fi shing fl eet of the Basque 
Country was among the biggest in the EC/EU.242
The best-known example of the economic juxtaposition in the Basque Country 
is the relationship between Bilbao and Vitoria-Gazteiz. Bilbao is the historical 
power-house of the Basque economy, which traditionally still weilds considerable 
economic and politico-economic power. The support for the PNV has traditionally 
been strongest there, and the party has been politically well represented. The city 
with its neighbouring areas suffered, however, during the economic depression of 
the 1990s, and the economic recovery has been slower than expected. The port 
traffi c in Bilbao comprised a huge portion of the Spanish export and import trade. 
Vitoria-Gazteiz is the administrative centre of the autonomous community with 
an ambitious and nuanced cultural and regional identity. The 1980s and 1990s 
saw favourable development in the city, which benefi ted from the various EC/EU 
funds and other opportunities.243 
2.1.2. The Basque economy in relation to Spain and the EC/EU
The most important context of the Basque economy is naturally Spain. This 
framework accentuates the fact that practically all through the 20th century, the 
Basque Country was one of its wealthiest regions.244 For example, in 1995, the 
proportion of the Basque Country in the total Spanish GDP was 6.1 percent, and 
this fi gure did not change greatly when the economic boom, which touched all the 
autonomous communities in the country, started in 1996.
In terms of GDP per capita, which is a revealing fi gure, the Basque Country 
was the fourth richest autonomous community in Spain in 1998, only Madrid, 
Navarra and Catalonia being more so.245 The seriousness of the economic turmoil 
of the early 1990s was refl ected in the fact that in 1994–1996, when the basis 
for the new economic boom was created, the growth in the region was still the 
lowest in Spain.246 Only during 1997–1998 did the industry of the region regain its 
traditional leading position in the Spanish economy, mainly because of economic 
recovery in general, better prospects for foreign trade,247 and the emerging, new 
242  Wallace & Wallace 2000, 363; for the role of fi shing in commercial and trade policy, 
see Clark 1987.
243  Zirakzadeh 1991, 20; Raento 2002, 106; for example, the Guichet programme for 
border regions.
244  Tamames & Rueda 1998, 526.
245  See http://www.eustat.es/spanish/estad/tablas/tbl0000700/tbl730.html. EUSTAT:
EUROSTAT 1998.
246  Informe Económico Financiero de las Administraciones Territoriales 1998, 33–34.
247  In 1997–1998, the export fl ow which went through the Basque Country was directed 
mostly at other EU countries, like Germany and France, which remained the most 
important markets for Spanish-made products. EUSTAT: Comercio Exterior 1998. 
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structures of production. In 1997, the GDP growth was 4.9 percent in the Basque 
Country, whereas the corresponding fi gure in the Spanish economy was 4.0 
percent.248 In 1998, the growth rate was 5.9 percent, which was 1.6 percent higher 
than the Spanish average (4.3). This was the highest annual growth rate in the 
Basque Country in over ten years (Figure 10).249
The great structural changes experienced during the previous years had left 
their mark on the Basque economy: in 1998, the unemployment rate was 17.8 
percent,250 which was still slightly lower than the Spanish average (18.1).251 
Signifi cantly, the productivity rate per employee in the region was higher than 
anywhere else in Spain in the 1990s.252 Despite the persistent economic problems, 
the Basque Country was able to maintain a higher growth rate in 1980–1998 than 
the other autonomous communities, particularly in increasing productivity. In 
this sense the Basque economy253 differed from the rest of the Spanish economy, 
which suffered from slower growth in productivity and production effi ciency. This 
was one of the factors that also drew foreign investment to the region.254
Direct foreign investment by the Basque Country grew, especially after the 
middle of the 1990s, representing 7.8 percent of overall Spanish foreign investment 
in 1998.255 At that time the infl ation rate in the Basque Country came close to the 
Spanish average (in 1997 the infl ation rate in the Basque Country was 2.3 percent, 
248  El País Semanal 18.10.1998.
249  Figure 10.
250  In the Basque Country, 30,000 new jobs were created in 1998. World Urban Economic 
Development 1999, 2.
251  Figure 7; for the statistics of INE, see http://www.ine.es/tempus/cgi-bin/itie; the 
statistics of EUSTAT, see http://www.eustat.es/spanish/estad/tablas/tbl0000300/tbl304.
html. INE:PAE:Parados nacional tasas & Parados País Vasco tasas; EUSTAT:EPRA: Tasa 
de actividad y paro OIT de la población de 16 y más años según Territorios Históricos 
(%).
252  For example, the fi gure of the Basque Country was 116.1 in 1996, when the Spanish 
average was 100. Informe Económico-Financiero de las Administraciones Territoriales 
1998, 295.
253  The overall budget (total), about 737 billion pesetas (about 4.4 billion euros) of the 
Autonomous Basque Country in 1998, was 7.5 percent of the sum total of the budgets of 
the autonomous regions. The public debt was 344.5 billion pesetas (less than 2.1 billion 
euros), being the sixth region on the list of the “most in debt” regions in Spain. Catalonia 
(6 million inhabitants) was top, having four times more public debt than the Basque 
Country (2 million inhabitants). Informe sobre la fi nanciación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas. Ejercicio 1997, 137; El País 1.3.2000, 19; Aja 1999, 113; public debt in the 
Basque Country was 13.7 percent of GDP in 1998. The public defi cit in the region was 
then only 0.3 percent. Noticias de Euskadi 1998:4.
254  In 1997, 5.2 percent of all foreign private investment in Spain was directed to the 
Basque Country. Op. cit., 9.
255  Only the regions of Madrid and Catalonia were ahead of the Basque Country in 
investments made in other countries. Ibid.
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and in Spain 2.5). A revealing piece of information is that in 1998 the investment 
in research and development was 1.2 percent of GDP, when the Spanish average 
was 0.8. Approximately a quarter of the budget of the regional government was 
spent on education, the larger spending per capita in education and health being an 
example of the larger budgetary potential of the region.256
If we compare the economic structures of the Basque Country to the overall 
picture in Spain in the late 1990s, it is signifi cant that the proportion of the Basque 
GDP represented by the primary sector is relatively low. The Basque Country was 
not a big producer and exporter of vegetables and fruit, like many others parts of 
Spain. It produced 80 percent of all the engine parts produced in Spain, 70 percent 
256  Noticias de Euskadi 1998:9.
Figure 10. The GDP of the Basque Country and Spain in 1981-1998
Source: INE Cuentas económicas. Contabilidad regional de España. Base 1986 & 1995. 
Producto Interior Bruto a precios de mercado. Precios corrientes. (http://www.ine.es/
inebase/cgi/um?M=%2Ft35%2Fp010&O=inebase&N=&L=)
GDP growth in the Basque Country and 
Spain in 1981-1998 (constant prices)
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of all industrial electronics, and 40 percent of domestic electronics, however.257 The 
consumption level remained lower than in other communities, mainly because of the 
relatively low level of public spending. However, the regional administration tried 
to increase consumer demand by its own policies. Despite the high unemployment 
rate, the proportion of earned income was, historically, high in the GDP of the 
Basque economy.
The economic cooperation between the Basque Country and Navarra was 
hindered by disagreements concerning the relations between the autonomous 
communities at national level. The Basque economy still suffered from the basic 
problem of the Spanish “non-institutional” federalism in the 1990s,258 there being 
no mechanisms for the relations between the regional governments of the 17 
autonomous communities.259 The border between Spain and France, together with 
the political, administrative, cultural and societal reality of the historical Basque 
Country affected the profi le of the economy on both sides of the border.260 Border 
cooperation was not easy for technical reasons, such us the different rail gauge 
and bureaucracy. At state level, there had also been problems in fi shing.261
On the other hand, when Spain became a member of the EC/EU, the customs 
border between Spain and France disappeared; many jobs were lost temporarily in 
the border region, because the traditional border trade ceased, but new jobs were 
created in other sectors and areas within the region.262 Many entrepreneurs moved 
to the coastal areas of the Basque Country or to the emerging innovation centres. 
With the help of the EU, the industry of the region was diversifi ed in the 1990s. 
The Basque Country was entitled to receive funding from the EC/EU structural 
funds reserved for supporting the economic and social renewal of regions in 
diffi culty, then the objective 2 and 5b programmes.263 Particular objectives were 
to reduce pollutant emissions caused by industry, diversify the regional economic 
structure, and promote rural tourism.264 In the European context, the image of 
the Basque Country was still linked to industry in 1998, the proportion of the 
industry component of the regional GDP (37 percent) being higher than the EU 
average (30 percent).265 The per capita GDP was practically at the level of the 
EU average,266 but the unemployment rate (17.8 percent in 1998) exceeded the 
257  Noticias de Euskadi 1998:9.
258  Colomer 1998.
259  The senate did not turn out to be a useful channel for discussions or negotiations 
between the state and the autonomous regions. Aja 1999, 38–39; Díaz López 1985, 252..
260  Raento 2002.
261  Ibid.
262  Raento 1997, 244–245; Raento 2002, 96.
263  Nowadays they are included in the target programme 2. EU-rahoituksen opas 2000, 3.
264  Ibid.
265  El País Semanal 18.10.1998.
266  The EU average was represented by the fi gure 100, and the Basque Country sʼ fi gure 
was 99. EUSTAT: EUROSTAT 1998.
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community average (10.1 percent).267
After a somewhat uncertain period, the geographical location of the Basque 
Country in the continental context turned out to be an asset for attracting signifi cant 
transit traffi c in the 1990s. This development saw the road network improve with 
EU funding,268 which emphasized the role of the Basque Country as a transit area 
between the industrial centres of Central Europe and the most important metropolises 
on the Iberian Peninsula even further. Transport from Portugal and other parts of 
Spain uses the main roads and railways of the Basque Country. The Basque Country 
also has good connections with the coastal areas and metropolises of Cantabria and 
Catalonia.269 In 1998, 94 percent of the products passing through the port of Bilbao 
were heading to or coming from external markets.270 The port was then second in 
Spainʼ s foreign trade after Algeciras, which indicated that Madrid and Saragossa, 
together with South-West France and Northern Portugal, had become linked to the 
Basque economy.271 The better communications attracted increasing interest from 
transport companies in the region. Because of this, a need for new infrastructure 
and useful know-how had become major challenges at local level.
2.2. The politico-economic roots of the PNV
2.2.1. Traditionalism and bourgeoisism
When we look at the reasons for the emergence of Basque nationalism, the 
changes in the Basque economy and their societal effects come up. In order to 
understand them, one needs to know the reasons for changes. Basque nationalism 
began at the end of the 19th century in a diffi cult combination of traditional and 
bourgeois elements. A new industrialized society was established as the old social 
system of the Basque Country faced a crisis. The old society sʼ link with the PNV 
was still to infl uence its political and politico-economic defi nitions. Two factors 
underlying the early history of the Basque nationalism can be distinguished: (i) the 
relationship between the central government and the Basque Country, especially 
the question of the economy and the fueros before 1839, and (ii) industrialization 
and society from the middle of the 19th century onwards. The broad question of 
national identity enters my analysis only when it has motivated or affected the use 
of politico-economic power.
One historical fact in the relationship between the central government and the 
Basque Country is that the Spanish kingdom, formed under Castilian leadership, 
was not traditionally dependent on the limited resources of the peripheral Basque 
Country. The only exceptions to this were iron production and shipping, the two 
267  Figure 7 & EUSTAT:EUROSTAT 1998.
268  For example, the Guichet programme.
269  Raento 2002, 96.
270  Noticias de Euskadi 1998:2.
271  Raento 2002, 96−97.
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pillars of the region sʼ economy.272 The harbours of the Basque Country were an 
important route for the wool export of inland Castile.273 The mountainous Basque 
provinces were an ethnically and culturally distinct region, with a strategically 
important location, being Castile sʼ gateway to the Pyrenees. However, Castile 
remained a weak central power for a long time, and the Spanish kings one after 
another committed themselves to respect the Basque laws, i.e., the fueros,274 and 
the provinces enjoyed extensive freedom.275 It is important to note, as William A. 
Douglass and Jon Bilbao underline, that “the Basques were not citizens of a reign 
of Castile; they were citizens of a land that had accepted the king of Castile as 
its sovereign”.276 In practice, this meant that the Basque loyalty to the Castilian 
kings depended on “the monarch sʼ respect for local autonomy and tradition as 
formalized in the fueros”.277 The fueros, consisting of a collection of local laws 
and customs together with special economic and political liberties,278 established 
the basis for the economic and political activities in the Basque provinces, and 
practically made it a free-trade area with a customs border with the rest of the 
kingdom.279 Nonetheless, the Basque Country was not a united entity; the fueros, 
in fact, emphasized the sovereignty of the provinces.
Although the economic resources of the provinces were limited, the mobility 
of the Basques was considerable. Primogeniture prevailed, but the oldest child was 
obliged to fi nance the schooling of the other children. Because of this, many Basques 
were clerics, seamen or mercenaries.280 Despite the fact that farming was modernized 
and blacksmithing work and forging were developed in the region at the end of the 
18th century, the economic situation was diffi cult, particularly in the rural areas. This 
led to a growing contrast between the countryside and the cities. The inheritance laws 
led the farmers to incur debts. Normally, land had to be sold to pay these debts, which, 
together with the growth of population and years of crop failure caused a dramatic 
272  Douglass & Bilbao 1975, 49–50 & 67.
273  Particularly to Flanders. Douglass & Bilbao 1975, 57.
274  The name of the fueros comes from Latin, forum. Puig y Scotoni 1986, 38.
275  Aja 1991, 173.
276  Douglass & Bilbao 1975, 63.
277  Ibid.
278  HYPL:Pohjanheimo 1996, 20; HYHL: Jalas 1992.
279  Even Tocqueville noticed this fact in the 1830s, referring to it in the fi rst part of De 
la Démocratie en Amérique. Tocqueville 1981, 188; the Basques were exempted from 
military service, but they had to maintain the border and patrol the coast. García de 
Cortázar & González Vesga 2000, 345; for the fueros, see also Larrazábal Basáñez 1997, 
31–79.
280  Basque fi shermen were whaling as far away as near Newfoundland. Basques played 
an important role in Castile sʼ overseas conquests and in the administration of these 
possessions. Douglass & Bilbao 1975.
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decline in the number of land-owning farmers in the 18th century.281
All Basque provinces had their own representative institutions, a popular 
assembly, the Juntas generales, or legislature.282 The position of the Basque 
aristocracy did not resemble the feudal system, but was more like a clan system.283 
The Catholic Church had a strong position in the Basque Country, and its infl uence 
on local politics was signifi cant.284 The Basque Country also differed from its 
neighbouring areas linguistically, Basque-speaking people accounting for 54 
percent of the population in the Basque provinces of Spain. The confl ict between 
the Spanish and the Basque language, Euskara, was minimal till the end of the 
18th century.285
The crisis of the fuero system was part of the crisis of the Old Spanish regime; 
the fact that the province of Guipúzcoa decided to join the republic of France 
during the war of Spain and the French national convent (1793–1795) was an 
important impetus for the crisis.286 After the war, Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa refused 
to pay taxes and supply soldiers to Spain; the ruling Bourbons of Spain then 
started an extensive campaign against the fueros. The situation culminated 
in 1804 when royal troops occupied Vizcaya and their commander ousted the 
provincial council. The relations between the Basques and the central government 
deteriorated markedly during the so-called Carlist wars (1833–1840 and 1872–
1876). In the Spanish context, these were civil wars between the Carlists, i.e., 
supporters of Don Carlos, who was the brother of Ferdinand VII, and the liberals, 
led by Isabella II. The wars, in which the Carlists were defeated, took place to a 
great extent in the Basque provinces, where the majority of the rural population 
supported the Carlists. The cities, however, supported the liberals. The fueros 
281  Emigration from the countryside to small inland towns created a new group of 
craftspeople. Eibar, Mondragón and Placencia are examples of this type of urban centre. 
Heiberg 1989, 28–30; for the historical background of the demographic evolution and its 
consequences in the Basque Country, see Fernandéz de Pinedo 1974. 
282  See, for example, Douglass & Bilbao 1975, 105; the most famous is the assembly 
of Vizcaya, which had its meetings under the old oak-tree of the town of Guernica 
(Gernika).
283  In the 16th century, a privilege was included in the fueros of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, 
according to which all their inhabitants were considered noble.
284  An example of famous Basques is the founder of the Society of Jesus, Ignacio de 
Loyola (1491–1556) and Juan Sebastián Elcano. Puig i Scotoni 1986, 41; the church was 
the only institution in the Basque Country after the fi rst half of the 16th century that used 
Euskara, both in writing and speech. Op. cit., 21.
285  Sullivan 1988b, 13. I have used the Spanish version of Sullivan sʼ book, which was 
originally published in English. See Sullivan 1988a.
286  Guipúzcoa decided to replace the arrangement by which the Spanish crown announced 
its respect for the fueros with an agreement with the French Republic. Granja, Beramendi 
& Anguera 2001, 31.
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were cut short by law in 1839, after the fi rst Carlist war ended.287
In the second Carlist war (1872–1876), the setting was similar to the fi rst: 
liberalism against traditionalism represented by the Carlists; the cities against the 
countryside. The situation was even more complicated than in the previous war, 
because there were also some people from the urban middle class and craftsmen 
among the ranks of the Carlists. On the other hand, the previous unanimous 
support for Carlism in the rural areas not longer existed. Consequently, men were 
dragooned into the Carlist troops.288 The central government abolished the fueros 
and the customs border defi nitively in 1876.289 The political alignment intended to 
restore the fueros, the so-called fuerismo, had its roots in the 1870s and 1880s; at 
the end of the second Carlist war. The defence of the fueros united all the political 
forces in the Basque Country.290
At that time, the Basque Country was facing an unavoidable change: a crisis in 
the structure of the old society and the emergence of a new one. In the middle of 
the 19th century, a period of intense industrialization started in the Basque Country, 
particularly in the city of Bilbao. Iron, which was exported, triggered the industrial 
revolution in the region. In the area of Vizcaya, there was plenty of iron, wood 
and water-power, but not enough workers to meet the needs of the rapidly growing 
industry. Because of this, increasing numbers of people moved to the region from 
other parts of Spain. Industrial ship-building and metallurgy developed in the 
Basque Country, which rapidly emerged as an important industrial centre of Spain, 
and in European terms.291 In Vizcaya, the developing economy benefi ted from the 
new fi nancial institutions, which became signifi cant on a national scale.292
The traditional social structure changed in the Basque Country when the rural 
population moved to work in factories, and people from Álava and Navarra moved 
to the coast in search of jobs. The population of Vizcaya grew at the end of the 19th 
century, whereas that of the inland provinces remained practically unchanged. 
Hostile reactions towards workers from other regions appeared, particularly among 
the original Basque-speaking population. Nationalism grew as a reaction of the 
287  Ley de 25 de octubre de 1839 sobre los Fueros. Documentos para la historia del 
nacionalismo vasco 1998, 23; Mieza y Mieg 1984, 119–121.
288  See the article by Manuel Montero published in El Correo 19.3.2000; for an extensive 
account of Carlism and its history, see Canal 2000.
289  Ley de 21 de julio de 1876 sobre los Fueros. Documentos para la historia del 
nacionalismo vasco 1998, 24. 
290  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 581.
291  The ship-building industry of the region developed rapidly and specialized in 
steamships. Vicens Vives 1959, 668 & 691.
292  Op. cit., 729 & 732; after Spain had lost Cuba in 1898, many returnees moved to the 
Basque Country as well. The capital they brought with them rapidly started to make an 
impact in the regional economy.
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middle classes in the face of the pressures of social change.293 In Spanish politics, 
some sectors of the middle class eschewed the political push for a constitutional 
monarchy. In the Basque Country, this politically excluded and frustrated group 
consisted of middle-class people and the rural population. Representatives of big 
business in the Basque Country, who favoured monopolies in the economy, were 
not a part of this group. Thanks to caciquism and the consequent monopolisation 
of political representation, the upper middle class in the Basque Country was 
able to benefi t practically exclusively from the economic agreement (concierto 
económico), which was granted to the region in 1878 after the abolition of the 
fueros.294 At that time, it was possible to distinguish the difference between big 
business and the provincially defi ned middle class.
Hobsbawm, who has recognized the existence of different kinds of nationalism, 
includes Basque nationalism in the ethnic group which affect “populations living 
on large territories or even in dispersion, and lacking a common polity”,295 and in 
the case of the Basques he also refers to the concept of proto-nationalism.296 The 
cultural-historical background of the Basque provinces, and the state borders 
which are not consistent with this background, support his argument. Hobsbawm sʼ 
defi nitions still need to be refi ned. Firstly, following the ideas of Benedict Anderson, 
an anthropologist and scholar of nationalism, we may note that the nationalistic ideas 
responded to questions that the new ideological constructions of the 19th century, 
bourgeois liberalism and Marxism, were not able to answer.297 Basque nationalism, 
like the concept of mentality, comes down to the question of people reacting to 
structures which are imposed from the outside and which condition their actions.
Secondly, Corcuera Atienza sums up the most important reasons for the 
emergence of Basque nationalism as economic change and the fi nal abolition of 
the foral system.298 The Spanish ruling class was unable to become the leading 
national class in the 20th century; moreover, it had become detached from the 
national reality. In the Basque Country, as well as in Catalonia, the lower middle 
293  Corcuera Atienza 1979; Hobsbawm 1994, 44–45 & 74–75; the PNV was, according 
to Hobsbawm, also an answer to the fear of the spread of socialism. He does not explain 
the later infl uence of the upper middle-class on the PNV sʼ policy and actions. Op.cit., 
153–154.
294  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 581; the economic agreement had previously (1878) been a 
new kind of political and historical formula for regulating the politico-economic relations 
between the region and the central government, whose signifi cance as a legal cornerstone 
in that relationship cannot be underestimated. It was a way of creating certain principles 
which must be respected by the political leadership in its economic policy. An entirely 
different issue is how big business dominated the political power in the Basque Country 
in practice in the 1870s, and benefi ted most from this arrangement.
295  Hobsbawm 1992, 64.
296  Ibid.; for “proto-nationalism” see op. cit., 46–79; Anderson discusses nationalism as 
particular cultural artefacts. Anderson 1991, 4.
297  See ibid.
298  Corcuera Atienza 1979.
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class challenged this reality and showed signs of frustration with its own position. 
Despite the universal male suffrage, it felt excluded from power in the 1870s.299 
In the Basque Country, political “Basque” identity was seen as the antithesis of 
the liberalsʼ  intention to impose their own Spanish nation. For various reasons, 
a large proportion of Basque society identifi ed the defence of their own interests 
with the defence of the old regime. The fueros were tied to traditionalism and 
religion. In this situation, “Basqueness” emerged, and was therefore experienced 
as the antithesis of liberalism.300
The historically strong cultural identity of the Basque Country was at work 
in various strata of the society, not just among the middle class or the rural 
population. Although the political attitude and reasoning of the representatives 
of big business followed that of Spanish nationalism, that group did not want its 
pro-Basque attitude to be called into question. The representatives of big business 
marketed a picture of themselves as “the true defenders of the Basque Country”301 
with pleasure, which succeeded in gaining the economic agreement for the region. 
Even though this group had already abandoned fuerism in the 1870s, it did not want 
to leave the defence of the legitimacy of the fueros in the hands of just anybody. 
Simultaneously, the growing nationalism in Europe and cultural romanticism also 
reached the Basque Country. The upper middle classes in the urban areas, the great 
majority of whom did not speak Basque any longer, began to show an interest in 
the traditional Basque culture and language. However, politics and nationalism 
were used to foster traditional culture and folklore at the same time. The fi rst 
manifestation of Basque nationalism became apparent just as the old Basque 
Country was disappearing. The crises of society were a result of industrialization 
and the disappearance of the foral system. The strong infl uence fuerism had on 
the PNV later relates to this combination. The PNV sʼ interpretation of the fueros 
changed, however, into an imaginative one, and did not simply follow the idea that 
the fuerism of the Basques was an antithesis of Spanish liberalism.
According to Sabino de Arana (1865–1903), the father of Basque nationalism 
and the founder of the PNV, the salvation of the Basque Country from the 
danger of secularization, capitalism and “mixture of races” was only possible 
through political independence. He considered that the Basque provinces had 
been independent before 1839 through their fueros.302 For him, true fuerism was 
separatism. In 1895, Arana founded the fi rst political grouping, which later became 
299  Corcuera Atienza 1979
300  Op. cit., 581.
301  Op. cit., 582; the Hobsbawm book, which is a general account of nationalism, does 
not consider the PNV sʼ complex relationship with the bourgeois elements of Basque 
society. Hobsbawm 1992, 119−120.
302  Granja, Beramendi & Anguera 2001, 84 & 89.
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the moderate Basque Nationalist Party, the PNV.303 Aranaʼ s political activity took 
place when the Basque Country was becoming wealthy; the iron produced there, 
particularly in the province of Vizcaya, was sold profi tably to Britain, and the 
leading industrialists of the Basque coast were the most homogenous and powerful 
group of industrial proprietors in Spain in the early 20th century.304 This new wealth 
was still not distributed equally; though this did not mean that the region had been 
exploited economically. The Basque Country had become a centre of capitalism, 
where many parts of society, such as farmers and petit bourgeoisie felt they had 
suffered from these economic changes. These groups became the foundation of 
the supporters of the PNV and its executive group.305 The PNV adopted ideas 
which opposed economic liberalism. It saw that the industrial revolution in the 
region happened “against the region sʼ own laws”, since the fueros would not 
have allowed the export of iron.306 For example, Hobsbawm sʼ view that the PNV 
consciously abandoned the interests of big business in the Basque Country which 
were associated with the pan-Spanish monarchy and that the PNV was responding 
to the fear of the spread of socialism,307 is insuffi cient. Hobsbawm deals with 
big business in the Basque Country as a politically homogenous group308 without 
taking into account the later infl uence of the business elites, particularly that of 
the ship-owners, on the PNV and its policy. Nor does he consider the interest of 
big business in the Basque Country in using “Basqueness” to legitimize its own 
power. The local businessmen were certainly not willing to be accused of serving 
simply the interests of Spanish or international capitalism.
In the early years of Basque nationalism, its basic ideas consisted of opposition 
to liberalism and caciquism, strong Catholicism and nation-centred thinking. 
Later, an independence movement called bizkaitarrismo followed, which stressed 
the interests of Vizcaya over other provinces; Arana complemented this tendency 
with his ideas about uniting all the Basque provinces into a confederation. He saw 
the threshold question for the “Basquesʼ freedom” as to regain “purity of blood”, 
303  Its predecessor was Euzkeldun Batzokija, established in 1894, which defi ned 
itself as a “recreational society” (sociedad de recreo). Documentos para la historia del 
nacionalismo vasco 1998, 8.
304  Zirakzadeh 1991, 21.
305  Díez Medrano 1999, 2. 
306  See the interview with the leader of the PNV, Xavier Arzalluz, in the book by the 
journalist Tom Burns Marañon. Arzalluz explains how the Basque nationalists saw the 
“representatives of liberalism” follow the interests of Madrid instead of the regional ones, 
by monopolising iron production and exporting it. Burns Marañón 1997, 216; see also the 
pseudonym, Vicente Copa, on the fact that the Basque Country was not ever, not even in 
the 19th century, an object of economic exploitation. This is not often indicated in political 
discussion. Copa 1989, 11.
307  Hobsbawm 1992, 119.
308  Op. cit., 140–141.
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because without it the political control of the region had no meaning.309 “Racial 
purity” also required that the immigrant workers originating from other regions 
and their socialist organizations be fought. Arana stated indirectly, however, that, 
apart from the nationalists, the socialists were the only ones to oppose electoral 
caciquism and all forms of exploitation of the poorest. This did not mean, however, 
that the nationalists were profoundly anti-capitalist at the grass-roots level, and 
defi nitively not in their leadership.310 The socialists were not, according to Arana, 
a potential political alternative to the patriotic working-class population, since they 
did not accept the nationalist doctrine and they were “anticlerical”. Consequently, 
Aranaʼ s objective was to create a nationalistic trade organization.311 Interestingly, 
the PNV also warned that socialist rule would mean higher taxation in urban 
areas and on industrial property.312
In the course of time, the policy of the PNV developed and its political 
demands were partly replaced by more pragmatic ideas, which originated with 
the few but wealthy new bourgeois supporters of the party. The Basque Country 
was economically dependent on the Spanish domestic market, so it was more 
profi table to strive for autonomy.313 Simultaneously, the party experienced many 
changes. The group called euskalerriacos,314 which was formed by upper middle-
class people who were close to industry and who represented fuerism, affi liated 
with the party in 1898. Their infl uence became apparent in 1902−1903. The so-
called “Spanish” period and a change in Arana's political thinking was the result 
of a long-term evolution.315 The bourgeoisie that supported the PNV and were 
fi rmly entrenched in its hierarchy needed a legal party to lobby for its interests.316 
This regionalist tendency was motivated by the economic welfare of the Basques 
and the Basque Country, and the economic arrangements.317 While regionalism 
gained strength in Aranaʼ s thinking, the need for the organisational development 
309  According to Arana the independent province of Vizcaya should fully implement the 
old laws, as well as old traditions and customs, which would ultimately require complete 
isolation of the euskarian race (raza euskeriana). This would make the race “immune to 
foreign infl uence”. Documentos básicos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 8.
310  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 511.
311  The fi rst nationalist syndicate was founded in 1911. Op. cit., 9.
312  Op. cit., 496−497.
313  Op. cit., 530, 538 & 555; Zirakzadeh 1985 & 1991, 111–144.
314  Granja, Beramendi & Anguera 2001, 86 & 286; Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 
1999, 46–47.
315  Arana, however, claimed that this was not the case. Corcuera Atienza 1979, 513.
316  Op. cit., 589.
317  Op. cit., 540; a long-term, 25-year arrangement, which included the annual share 
of tax revenue to be paid to the state, was mentioned in the programmes for electoral 
cooperation drafted by the PNV in 1903. Op. cit., 501–502 & 526; Sabino de Arana sʼ 
regionalist tendency also included external relations: the Basques of Bidasoa were 
sympathized with more than previously, and the other regionalist movements in Spain, 
especially the Catalonian nationalism, were addressed more clearly.
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of the party grew. Arana increasingly stressed the federal party structure, based 
on the four Basque provinces (Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Álava, Navarra) and the 
sovereignty of the party assembly (asamblea de afi liados). His goal was that the 
assembly should approve a party platform,318 which would consolidate the image 
of the PNV as a legal political party. The most important thing for the bourgeoisie 
supporters of the party was that the political movement had a viable and legal 
organisation.
The fi rst political programme of the PNV (1908) included the declaration that 
the most important goal was to achieve the complete restoration of the fueros in 
the Basque Country.319 There was a juxtaposition of alignments within the party 
even then, one for independence and the other, a more moderate one, for autonomy. 
Scholars have considered this historical dichotomy as a historical guarantee of 
the organizational unity of the party: strongly differing interpretations of Aranaʼ s 
ideology and political writings were left aside.320 The nationalistic bourgeoisie 
was more interested in leading the PNV than reformulating Arana sʼ doctrine. 
The passiveness of the middle-class in formulating theoretical defi nitions meant 
that the traditional elements, despite all the pragmatism, remained in the political 
programmes and publications of the PNV.321 The inability of the bourgeois 
members of the party to defi ne their own nationalistic ideology therefore had 
important and far-reaching consequences.322
Before and during the First World War, the PNV acquired a leading political 
position in Vizcaya, and its support grew signifi cantly in other Basque provinces of 
Spain. In 1917–1919 the party aimed, for the fi rst time in its history, at achieving 
regional autonomy for the whole Basque Country of Spain. The PNV assumed 
an extremely moderate role in order to secure the support of the other Basque 
political groups and even the monarchists in the Basque Country.323 After the First 
World War, the region experienced a new economic boom. The nationalist trade 
union of the Basques (Solidaridad de Obreros Vascos; SOV) refused to join the 
general strikes that spread all over Spain, which consolidated the image of the 
Basque nationalists as defenders of social order and national wealth. In the early 
1920s, Basque nationalism even adopted features suggesting the infl uence of the 
political left. The military coup of general Primo de Rivera in 1923, however, 
forced the PNV and all other parties to isolate themselves from politics. Only 
the declaration of the Second Republic of Spain in 1931 made the activities of 
318  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 539−540.
319  Manifi esto del PNV aprobado en la Asamblea de Elgoibar 18.10.1908. Documentos 
para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 51−53.
320  Sullivan 1988b, 19.
321  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 587.
322  Op. cit., 589−591.
323  The PNV, at that time called the CNV (Comunión Nacionalista Vasca), adopted 
regional autonomy as its goal. Politically, the party had become a defender of the interests 
of the whole nation (nación). Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 1999, 119–120. 
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political parties possible again.324
In 1932, the PNV adopted the idea of constitutional autonomy,325 and moved 
ideologically from the right towards the political centre.326 During the time of 
the Second Republic (1931–1936), the PNV was the indisputable leader of the 
nationalist front in the Basque Country, and became the most important party of 
the region.327 The PNV had become a movement of the masses, a communal party 
with a totalitarian political persuasion. Its internal structure followed the basic 
partition of the four historical Basque provinces of Spain, that is, it maintained 
a regional council in each.328 The leading organ of the party was called Euskadi 
Buru Batzar (EBB). The PNV had its catholic trade union, renamed Eusko Langile 
Alkartasuna/Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (ELA-STV)329 behind it.
The Basque Autonomy Statute, formulated by the Spanish popular front, was 
approved in a referendum in the Basque Country in November 1933.330 However, 
it had to wait for the approval of the Spanish parliament. The PNV had previously 
rejected the offers of cooperation from the radical leftist groups,331 but when the 
Spanish Civil War started in 1936, the party was obliged to choose. The PNV 
decided to support the popular front government of Madrid, and in October 1936 
the Spanish parliament approved the Autonomy Statute for the Basque Country. 
The PNV formed the fi rst regional government with the support of the popular 
front, and adopted a moderate government platform. The regional government was 
led by a president – or in Basque, lehendakari – José Antonio Aguirre. The Basque 
Country, the centre of the metal industry in Spain and a nationally important 
place of business for notable fi nancial institutions, did not experience the same 
social revolution as other parts of Spain during the Second Republic. The Catholic 
324  The party was an ally of the republican-socialist block, and participated in the formation 
of a new administration in 14.4.1931. Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 1999, 195–208.
325  At the time of the inauguration of the Second Republic of Spain (1931), the PNV 
briefl y maintained a cooperative relationship with the Carlists, and committed itself to 
the goal of making the Basque Country an ecclesiastical state (the so-called Declaration 
of Estella). The strong reaction within the PNV, however, led it cancelling the decision. 
Granja & Pablo 2000, 178.
326  Tusell 1999, 138; Granja & Pablo 2000, 177.
327  The PNV won the general elections in the Basque Country in 1931 (in coalition with 
the Carlists), 1933, and 1936. By then, the party consisted of several political, professional 
and cultural organisations.
328  That is, Araba Buru Batzar (ABB), Bizkai Buru Batzar (BBB), Gipuzko Buru Batzar 
(GBB), and Napar Buru Batzar (NBB).
329  The ELA-STV did not, however, bring ideologically working-class elements to the 
PNV, and the party did not turn out be a revolutionary movement. Fusi 1984, 60.
330  In Álava, however, the number abstaining was high. Op. cit., 175.
331  After the electoral victory of the popular front in the general elections of 1936, the 
PNV gave its support to Manuel Azaña, when he was elected prime minister, and later 
president of the republic. Viñas 1999, 117.
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Church also maintained its position there.332 The Aguirre government fl ed the 
country after the troops of General Francisco Franco captured Bilbao in June 
1937; thanks to the decision of the Basque nationalists, the industrial complex 
of Vizcaya was handed over to Franco intact. The same year, Franco abolished 
the economic prerogatives of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, which had supported the 
Republic, but preserved the economic agreements of Álava and Navarra,333 wanting 
to reward the latter for opposing the political actions of the Basque nationalists 
and the Republican side during the war.334
Under Franco sʼ rule (1939–1975), Spain experienced an energetic and 
systematic cultural harmonization and unifi cation policy, which was linked to 
the intention of centralizing and unifying regional legislation.335 In those days, 
the Basque nationalists in Spain had to opt for exile, underground activity, or 
prison. They long hoped that the Allies would remove Franco from power after 
the Second World War. Although the leadership of the PNV, exiled in France, lost 
strength, the Basque nationalists continued determined resistance on the cultural 
front.336 After the Second World War, a considerable economic expansion started 
in Spain, and, a second industrialization process began in the Basque Country 
in the 1950s,337 the region becoming the destination of unprecedented migration 
from other parts of Spain.338 The strengthening of the alignment that supported 
regional autonomy was linked to economic developments within the PNV in 
the 1950s, since the industry of the region was dependent on the export trade of 
Spain.339 This was used to justify autonomy as being the only way of politically 
and economically integrating the Basque Country into the rest of Europe.
Franco sʼ policies radicalized Basque nationalism.340 In 1959, Euskadi Ta 
332  Fusi 1984, 26; Viñas 1999, 113; while Aguirre was already in exile, he criticized the 
policies of the Second Republic for having extremely little tolerance and lacking a social 
programme. Tusell 1999, 138; the German Condor legion bombed Guernica on 26 April 
1937. Viñas 1999, 124; Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 16; see 
Raento & Watson 2000.
333  Payne 1985, 209; Larrea Angulo 1991, 11; see also Aguilar 1998, 9–11.
334  Corcuera Atienza 1985, 55–89.
335  Fusi 2000, 257.
336  The death of President Aguirre in 1960 provoked a strong popular reaction in the 
Basque Country, which did not, however, become violent. See the article by the historian 
Manuel Montero in El Correo 26.3.2000; Granza Sainz, Mees & Rodriguez Ranz 2001, 
237–238.
337  García de Cortázar & González Vesga 2000, 614–616.
338  The Basque culture and language, Euskara, survived, to a great extent owing to the 
work of the representatives of the Basque church, and cultural life as well as scholars. 
The anti-Franco opinions grew stronger in the 1960s in the ranks of the Basque clergy. 
Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 8 & 14–17.
339  Granja Sainz, Mees & Rodriguez Ranz 2001, 208.
340  Clark 1979, 153–187; Jáuregui Bereciartu 1981; Sullivan 1988b; Payne 1975.
80
Azkatasuna or ETA was founded.341 It later defi ned itself as the movement of 
the national liberation of the Basques.342 Third-world liberation movements of the 
1960s were an examplar for ETA, which adopted the idea that the Basque Country 
was a region “occupied” by Spain and France and that it was in the position of a 
“colony” from Aranaʼ s ideology.343 From 1968 onwards, the organization adopted 
violent struggle as its way of action, by which it aimed to free the Basque Country 
from Franco sʼ dictatorship. Franco sʼ answer to ETAʼs armed struggle in the Basque 
Country was a strongly oppressive policy.344 After the death of Franco (1975), 
when political party activities were allowed, the PNV returned to public life, 
again becoming the most important Basque party. In the general elections of 1979 
there were new Basque parties on the political scene as well, the most signifi cant 
of them being Herri Batasuna (HB),345 markedly more radical than the PNV.
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 was the fi rst to recognize the historical 
background of the administration of Basques and, signifi cantly, it was born of 
the consensus between the most important parliamentary groups instead of being 
imposed on the country by some ruling political force. The PNV reacted to the 
fi nal version by counselling its supporters to abstain in the referendum on the 
constitution.346 The radical HB voted against it. In the Basque Country, only 
30.8 percent of the electors voted for the constitution. The abstainers accounted 
for 55.3 percent, and 10.5 percent of the people entitled to vote voted against.347 
Therefore, calculated by percentage, the Basque Country has been interpreted 
as not having accepted the new constitution. It is important to note that the 
differences between the provinces were signifi cant, refl ecting the internal 
diversity of the region. The strongest support for the constitution came from 
341  ETA was formed as an association by some students in the catholic university of 
Deusto (Bilbao). Jáuregui Bereciartu 1981.
342  In Spanish Movimiento vasco de liberación nacional or MVLN. For its structure, 
see Mata López 1993 or Núñez Seixas 1999.
343  Jáuregui Bereciartu 1981.
344  In 1973, ETA killed admiral Carrero Blanco, who led Franco sʼ government and was 
his intended successor, in a bomb attack in Madrid. One of the most famous examples 
of Franco sʼ reprisals was the so-called trial of Burgos in 1970, at which several members 
of ETA were sentenced to death. This trial grabbed the headlines outside Spain, and was 
strongly opposed in the Basque Country. When Franco died (1975), there were about 400 
Basque nationalists in the prisons in Spain, and about 500 in exile in Southern France. 
Moreover, many of them lived in the countries of Latin America. See Fusi 2000, 258–
259.
345  At that time, the situation was already characterised by a multi-party system. Llera 
Ramo 1994; Fusi 2000, 260.
346  García de Cortázar & González Vesga 1999, 631; Powell 1999, 253.
347  Montero 1998, 110; López de Juan Abad 1998, 177.
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Álava, and the weakest from Guipúzcoa.348
The PNV thought that to accept the legality of the constitution would have meant 
giving up important political objectives.349 The reason was the indeterminacy of 
the constitution in defi ning the future rights of the Basque Country.350 The attitude 
of the party can also be analysed in the light of events at the end of the 1970s: after 
having recognized the special position of the Basque Country and Catalonia, the 
central government, in offering other regions the possibility of gaining autonomy, 
simultaneously sought to equalize the differences between them.351 On the other 
hand, the conclusion of the historians Pablo, Mees and Rodríguez Ranz is that (1) 
the PNV was simply frightened, because the decision to support the constitution 
would have been unprecedented in the history of the party. The PNV explained 
its opposition beforehand by recalling that Basques had not voted for any other 
Spanish constitution or basic law and that the PNV did not intend to this time 
either. The PNV also (2) possibly underestimated the constitution because it did 
not believe that the future autonomy statute would really give broad powers to 
the region.352 This was certainly based on the “hollowness” of the powers of the 
temporary autonomous administration, the Basque General Council (Consejo 
General Vasco; 1978−1980),353 and the fact that it was led by the Socialists at the 
outset.
The Basque government in exile in France, where it had enjoyed diplomatic 
status, decided to dissolve itself once the Basque Autonomy Statute came into 
force in December 1979.354 This statute, approved in the Basque Country the same 
year by referendum and applied since the beginning of 1980, was elaborated on 
348  In Guipúzcoa, the Constitution was supported by 27.8 percent of the electors, 13 percent 
voted against, and the abstainers accounted for 56.6 percent. In Vizcaya, 30.9 percent voted 
for, 9.4. percent against, and abstentions accounted for 55.4 percent. In Álava, 42.3 voted 
for, 11.4 percent against, with 40.7 percent abstaining. In Navarra, the Constitution was 
supported by 50.4 percent, 11.3 percent voted against, and 33.4 percent abstained.
349  If the objectives of the party had been achieved, the Basques would have been entitled 
to decide on the political structure of the region. The abstention was explained in the 
name of EBB. Nota del EBB del PNV ante la Constitución española (1978). Documentos 
para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 157−159. Barbería 1996, 425–426; Corcuera 
Atienza 1998, 145.
350  Conversi 1997, 145; Barbería 1996, 425–426; Corcuera Atienza 1998, 225–228.
351  The minister for the regions, Clavero, was personally responsible for drafting Article 
151 of the Constitution, which allowed the other regions to fi rst have a referendum on the 
transfer to autonomy, and then on the approval of the autonomy statute. Bassets 1996, 
423; Prego 1999, 83.
352  The EBB stressed that the real substance of “historical rights” cannot, in practice, be 
estimated beforehand. Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 365−366.
353  Garaikoetxea 2002, 52.
354  Fusi 2000, 269.
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the basis established in the Constitution of 1978.355 When we assess the roots of 
the PNV economic policy before the current Autonomy, it is fi rst of all surprising 
how ideologically the party used the fueros, which historically were not a means 
to political independence, but economic autonomy. The complex infl uence of both 
traditionalism and bourgeois ideas on the party sʼ ideology can be distinguished 
particularly through economic policy issues such as the economic agreement. 
Secondly, though the PNV quickly harnessed those issues to further its own 
policy, this did not mean that there was only one congruent party line on whether 
the economic well-being of the Basque Country required full independence or 
regional autonomy. The fraction that strove for independence emphasized that 
Franco sʼ system exploited the Basque Country economically; the more refi ned 
argument was that the tax revenue collected in the region was not returned in 
proportion in the form of public investment. Those who advocated an autonomous 
Basque Country thought that since the regional economic structures had become 
extremely dependent on the Spanish national economy and its development since 
the 1950s, full independence would not have been a sound or successful solution 
economically. The European integration was also touched upon in internal party 
discussions; in exile, the party supported possible rapprochement of Spain with 
the rest of Europe. From a historical point of view, European integration was both 
a political and an economic question for the PNV. When pondering the issue of the 
most benefi cial solution for the region, the bourgeois infl uence can again be seen 
to have affected the party line. These ambiguities and even contradictory elements 
were all present when a new historical chapter began with the introduction of 
regional autonomy. These questions should be further analysed, so that the internal 
networks, pressures, and their manifestations can be fully understood.
2.2.2. The attitude of the PNV towards the economic policy issues 
in the Statute of Autonomy 
The attitude of the PNV towards the emerging autonomy, and particularly to 
its politico-economic implications, and the party sʼ objectives concerning the 
regional politico-economic powers, must be investigated for several reasons. This 
will help us to understand the economic policy of the regional government in the 
early 1980s, as well as the very different opinions about it within the party itself. 
It also tells us about the political adaptability and capacity of the PNV, and its 
rapid activation in economic policy. When the PNV announced its position on the 
new Constitution (1978), it committed itself to participate in the negotiations and 
the implementation of the future statute of autonomy, referring explicitly to its 
politico-economic clauses.356 This clearly shows the underlying pragmatism of the 
party sʼ behaviour. The most important factors underlying the party sʼ position were 
355  The gradual extension of the powers began; its powers are also wide-ranging in the 
EU context. Montoro 1998, 94.
356  Nota del EBB del PNV ante la Constitución española (1978). Documentos básicos 
para la historia del nacionalismo vasco, 157–159; Prego 1999, 76.
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(1) the external pressure directed at the PNV, and (2) the historical opportunity 
that opened up for the party to seek exclusive politico-economic powers for the 
region.
Firstly, (1) concerning the external pressures, Zirakzadeh notes that the 
representatives of big business who supported the aims of the PNV explained that 
autonomy was a prerequisite357 for stopping the economic tailspin in the late 1970s. 
Zirakzadeh also points out that the local business world also seemed to have more 
or less accepted that the Basque Nationalist Party might lead the region in the 
near future.358 Decentralization was demanded on the basis of the ineffi ciency of 
the central government, and because the Basque Country was a net payer in the 
national taxation in the 1970s. The corporate world thought that the state actually 
hindered it from making a profi t and long-term investment.359 They noted that 
there was an opportunity to make changes in the labour market, something that 
the most libertarian euskalerriacos supported.
The assessment of the situation by the Basque businessmen was similar to 
that of the PNV: the new regional government could have far-reaching powers 
in economic policy, and the restoration of some kind of economic agreement 
was close. The PNV rapidly adopted a policy by which the economic agreement 
was described as a lifeline for the Basque economy,360 but why did the local 
businessmen support the PNV? In the eyes of Basque businessmen, the PNV was 
more attractive than the Socialists (PSE-PSOE), who recognized the severity 
of the economic situation in the region, but stated their concern about potential 
misapplication of the possible future powers in regulating taxes, and emphasized 
the economic solidarity between the various regions of Spain.361 This did not 
interest the local corporate world, which had seen the impressive average annual 
growth of of 7.75 percent in the Basque economy in the 1960s and early 1970s 
become negative by the end of the 1970s. Above all, Basque industry hoped for 
fl exible and effi cient regional economic policy, because the overall economy was 
extremely diffi cult and getting worse. Something that Zirakzadeh does not state 
clearly in his analysis is the interesting fact that, in comparison to the Franco 
era, industry suddenly emphasized the regional level, thinking that its economic 
problems could best be solved by the leaders and administration of the regions 
themselves.362 The comments of those businessmen calling for labour market 
reforms as much as for a liberalized open economy, suggest that, despite a long 
period of growth, the Spanish government had been incapable of creating a stable 
macroeconomic policy to sustain growth. External economic issues such as oil 
357  Zirakzadeh 1991, 106; Deia 17.6.1977.
358  Zirakzadeh 1991, 103.
359  Op. cit., 105–107.
360  See, for example, the interview with the PNV parliamentarian Josu Elorriaga, from 
Vizcaya. Deia 10.5.1979.
361  See the article of Paxto Unzueta. El País 17.10.1979.
362  Cf. Sánchez Recio & Tascón Fernández 2003.
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crises affected the Spanish economy greatly and it suffered from stagnation in 
the 1970s. Macroeconomic stability was needed to start structural reform. In 
conclusion, the PNV received support from many distinguished sectors of Basque 
corporate life, but not all. The party, however, did not come into power simply 
with the help of businessmen in trouble.
Secondly, (2) at the end of the 1970s, the PNV was offered an opportunity to 
become an active player in regional politics to benefi t from its political position 
and to infl uence the substance of the future Autonomy Statute. The passive attitude 
adopted by the Socialists in the Basque Country in drafting the details of the 
statute underlined the historical picture of the PNV sʼ activity even further.363 The 
effi ciency of the PNV as a political movement could not be questioned, as the party 
had already proved its ability to achieve political power during its early history. 
With the transition to democracy and a representative parliamentary system, the 
need to be profi led as a pragmatic, active and multifaceted defender of the rights of 
the Basque Country put further political pressure on the PNV. The party succeeded 
in including an additional provision (Disposición Adicional) in the draft text of 
the statute: “The acceptance of the system of autonomy established in this Statute 
does not imply that the Basque people waive the rights that as such may have 
accrued to them in virtue of their history and which may be updated in accordance 
with the stipulations of the legal system.”364 The PNV did not want to resign its 
own model for the political regime of the region.365 For my investigation, it is an 
important and essential piece of information that the PNV, which had confi rmed 
its position as the leading political force in the Basque Country in the general 
election in spring 1979, was simply better able to enhance its interests concerning 
the Autonomy Statute and the economic agreement.366 Contemporary opinion was 
that the bilateral negotiations between the Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez (Unión 
del Centro Democrático, UCD) and the PNV sʼ Carlos Garaikoetxea, who had 
become the leader of the temporary Basque General Council in 1979, were in a 
363  The cooperative body of Basque parliamentarians (Asamblea de Parlamentarios 
Vascos) had agreed that all the political parties in the region could participate in the 
negotiations on the statute. On the basis of the preparatory work of the Basque General 
Council, the parliamentarians appointed 17 members as the representatives of the Basque 
Country (Ponencia): fi ve from the PNV, fi ve from the PSE, three from the UCD, two from 
the EE, and one representative from the ESEI and the AP each. The PNV parliamentarians 
gave their individual approval to the draft version on 29.12.1978. Oña Gómez & García de 
Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 179. The HB abstained, on its own account, from the negotiations. 
López de Juan Abad 1998, 212–213 & 237.
364  The translation published in Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutoa 1983, 188.
365  The PNV wanted to assure that it was not giving up its own view concerning the 
political regime of the Basque Country. Onaindia 2000, 54–55; López de Juan Abad 
1998, 241; Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 377.
366  The PNV was given the presidency of the council, which it had wanted. The party sʼ 
president, Carlos Garaikoetxea, was appointed to this task. López de Juan Abad 1998, 
238; Prego 1999, 84–85.
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Table 1. Results of the Referendum for the Basque Statute of Autonomy (October 25, 1979)
Source: BOE n° 269, 9 November 1979; 
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/elecciones/referendos/ref_p_vasco.htm
key position to prepare for the approval of the Statute and fi nd solutions to the 
problematic questions.367 In the referendum on the Statute organized in the Basque 
Country in October 1979, the combined turnout of the provinces was 59.8. Of 
those who voted, 90.2 percent voted for the Statute, 5.2 percent against and 4.6 
percent abstained (Table 1).368 The support for the Statute was strong.
The third section of the Autonomy Statute (Estatuto de Autonomía)369 concerns 
the fi nance and property of the autonomous region, which has its own autonomous 
economy and property. Article 41.1 explains how “tax relations between the 
State and the Basque Country shall be regulated by the traditional system of 
367  The negotiations between the central government and the Basque representatives 
were complicated by the chapters in the draft version that were in contradiction with 
the Constitution. The PNV maintained the attitude that the statute would be a minimum 
defi nition for autonomy. Fusi 1984, 181 & 281; López de Juan Abad 1998, 238 & 244; El 
País 24.10.1999. Calvo Sotelo 1990, 105; Garaikoetxea 2002, 87–112.
368  The abstention rate was 40.2 percent. The PNV, the PSE, the ESEI, the EE, the 
UCD, the PCE/EPK, Partido Carlista (PCE-EKA), the ORT, and the PT were in favour of 
approving the statute. The communist LCR/LKI and the EMK as well as the radical HB 
encouraged voters to abstain. The conservative AP Alavesa and the PPA, like the radical 
right voted against. Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 159; Oña 
Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 180; Prego 2000, 94.
369  EA:BOE 1986, 19–21; LPV 1991, 75–102; Aja 1999, 87; Oña Gómez & García de 
Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 180.
Province Electoral 
roll
Votes 
cast
Yes No Blanks Voids
Álava 174,930 110,609 
(63.23%)
92,535 10,023 6,363 1,688
Guipúzcoa 507,002 302,847 
(59.73%)
278,399 12,290 9,018 3,140
Vizcaya 883,609 507,980 
(57.49%)
460,905 25,216 16,038 5,821
TOTAL
% of electoral roll
% of votes cast
1,565,541 921,436
58.86
831,839
53.13
90.28
47,529
3.04
5.16
31,419
2.01
3.41
10,649
0.68
1.16
86
the Economic Agreement or Conventions”.370 Important for the future was that 
according to Article 41.2.a:
 “The competent Institutions of the Historic Territories may maintain, 
establish and regulate, within their own territory, the tax system, bearing 
in mind the general tax structure of the State, the tax rules contained in 
the Economic Agreement itself for co-ordination, fi scal harmonisation and 
collaboration with the State, and those to be issued  by the Basque 
Parliament for the same purposes within the Autonomous Community. The 
Economic Agreement shall be approved by law.”371
The part concerning the jurisdiction of the Basque Country, which explains how 
economic policy will be carried out in practice “in accordance with the general 
planning of the Economy”,372 is a good example of a fl exible formulation in the 
Statute. Such formulations made the completion of the negotiations possible. At 
the same time, it was open to various interpretations, and extremely political.373
The attitude towards economic policy questions also developed and evolved 
within the PNV itself. Accentuation of the regional politico-economic powers was 
also infl uenced by some representatives of the euskalerriacos, who had strong 
views on social policy: the labour legislation of Franco restricted employers 
too much, and the regulated internal market limited the freedom of action of 
the middle class and, consequently, the development of the Basque economy.374 
This was seen to be particularly harmful for the industrialized Basque Country. 
Zirakzadeh points out that there were also emerging intentions to liberalize 
social and economic policy, as well as the euskalerriacos aiming to improve the 
historical position of the middle class in Basque politics.375 However, he does not 
mention that these changes in the economic policy of the PNV were rapid, and its 
politico-economic position was formulated very quickly; it must be remembered 
that the conclusions of the party conference in 1977 were still considered by some 
370  LPV 1991, 96; English language from Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutoa 1983, 
184; The economic agreement of Navarra is called Convenio.
371  LPV 1991, 96; English translation from Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutoa 1983, 
184; The Socialists and the UCD also emphasized that the agreement was always only 
valid after a law has been passed on it. The PNV emphasised that it was a political 
agreement. See Deia 3.5.1978.
372  Article 10.25. English translation from Euskal Herriko Autonomia Estatutoa 1983, 
171.
373  Garaikoetxea 2002, 127−128.
374  Zirakzadeh 1991, 119.
375  Zirakzadeh thinks that the most prominent person within the party in that sense 
was Juan Beitia, who represented the new, 1960s generation of the euskalerriacos. He 
regarded the regional government as a historical opportunity, but also emphasized the 
restoration of the fueros, from the view-point of restoring the position of the Basque 
middle-class at the same time. The EBB, however, did not support Beitiaʼ s ideas. See op. 
cit., 118–119; Pablo, Mees & Rodriguez Ranz 2001, 355.
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members as “socialist”.376 I think it is important that the euskalerriacos group 
and the parts of the Basque middle-class that supported the party still did not 
form a uniform group in composition or thinking. The views of big industry and 
the small and medium size enterprises were, however, temporarily unanimous, 
because of the conjunctures of the economy. There were more company-specifi c 
than sectional interests and opinions in Basque industry.377 At that time, there was 
no such thing as a united regional interest group for business either.
In its own statements, the PNV capitalized on the fact that the Basque taxpayersʼ  
money was not returned to the region in the form of public investment.378 The 
region was a net payer in the Spanish budget. The rapid economic decline at 
the end of the 1970s and early 1980s consolidated the view current among the 
nationalists that the Basque Country was economically discriminated against. 
On the other hand, the Basque industry was facing a structural change after the 
hefty public industrial subventions of Franco sʼ years and the regulated domestic 
market prices disappeared. The emerging regional administration was to react to 
this situation. As all this demonstrates, the politico-economic pressures on the 
PNV were signifi cant. It was the dominant political force in the region, and in 
the Basque General Council it obtained the role of the leading regional exponent 
in economic policy questions.379 It was openly perturbed when the intention to 
restore the economic agreement did not seem to proceed during the years of the 
pre-autonomy administration.380 The PNV wanted to avoid the possible political 
risk inherent in that situation; it defended returning the economic agreement to all 
the Basque provinces, since sustainable economic development was a prerequisite 
for a solid regional administration.381 Broad economic autonomy was thus visibly 
linked to the question of political stability in the region, the question of politico-
economic power emerging as an important element of the PNV strategy.
376  It stressed solidarity and referred to the nationalisation of big business. Garaikoetxea 
considers these so-called progressive policies a result of the general political atmosphere 
in Spain at the time. Garaikoetxea 2002, 26; the interview with the minister of justice and 
economy, Sabin Intxaurraga Mendibil of 18.8.1998. HGV 2001, 1491; the interview with 
the lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea of 23.7.1998. Op. cit., 104; Asamblea de Pamplona, 
marzo de 1977. Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 151−153.
377  The interview with the minister for industry (1980–1983) and vice-lehendakari for 
economic issues, Javier García Egotxeaga, of 25.6.1998. HGV 2001, 162.
378  See, for example, Payne 1991; CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1978 & 1979.
379  Cf. Ajuriaguerra sʼ (PNV) objectives when the mixed commission started its work. 
López de Juan Abad 1998, 100.
380  Garaikoetxea 2002, 65; the members of the temporary pre-autonomy administration 
understood that they were going to be criticized soon, because their administration 
remained devoid of power. In any case, the political parties were able, at least in theory, to 
practise policies that would make it possible to create a common institutional structure for 
the region. Historically, it had never had one before. Garaikoetxea 2002, 52; the interview 
with the minister for industry, Javier García-Egotxeaga of 25.6.1998, HGV 2001, 163.
381  Garaikoetxea 2002, 56.
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The inchoate strategy of the PNV must also be seen in the light of the 
comments made by the rising political force, the PSOE. Although the socialists 
urged politico-economic autonomy for the Basque Country, they saw how the 
provinces were put in a very strong bargaining position for future negotiations on 
the economic agreement and the cupo with the help of the PNV.382 They criticized 
the PNV for interpreting the negotiation process of the Statute as recognition of its 
policy by the state; according to them, the PNV also had a tendency to present the 
Statute as a political agreement between itself and the state,383 and to regard the 
content of the agreement as renegotiable, in case the political violence ceased.384
While the Constitution of 1978 and the Autonomy Statute of 1979 meant that 
pluralism in Spain had come to signify economic and politico-economic pluralism 
as well,385 it was already clear when the new autonomy came into force in 1980, that 
the scope and extent of regional politico-economic powers would be determined 
by political agreements between the central and regional representatives.386 
The economists considered the model established in the Constitution as clear: 
public expenditure had been decentralized; next it would be time to decentralize 
taxation, in other words, revenue.387 Politically, this was a more diffi cult question. 
In Spanish politics, the atmosphere was rapidly changing, and not positively for the 
goals of the PNV. At the turn of the decade, the UCD suffered increasingly from 
internal disputes, the political position of Suárez sʼ government was not strong, 
and the main opposition party, the PSOE, had abandoned its previous defence 
of federalism. The Socialists now favoured legislation that would harmonize the 
process of decentralization. The line of the central government was to unify the 
formation of autonomous regions and to ensure that no region would be left with 
a lower status.388
The relation between the PNV and the new autonomy was also basically 
ambiguous, due to the wording of the Constitution, the judgement the Constitution 
gave to the question of sovereignty389 and the extension of autonomous regions to 
382  See, for example, El País 17.10.1979.
383  Onaindia 2000, 51 & 55–57; El País 24.10.1999.
384  See the statement of Arzalluz in 1979. Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 378–379.
385  Tusell 1999, 178.
386  See, for example, Hierro 14.3.1980.
387  Gallastegui & Gallastegui 1984, 16.
388  For example, Deia 20.6.1980; El Correo 20.6.1980; La Gaceta del Norte 25.6.1980; for 
the public discussion on the LOFCA, see Deia 25. & 26.6.1980; Diario Vasco 25.4.1980.
389  In the hands of the PNV, the fueros had become a title used for a different kind of 
autonomy in the latter part of the 1970s in comparison to the other regions of Spain. 
Arzalluz (PNV) emphasizes that “for the Basques, the fueros were a degree of political 
power and its availability; it was never connected to the integrity of the Spanish crown”. 
Corcuera Atienza sees that the PNV proceeded successfully until the negotiations on 
the statute, with an alternative idea in which the king would not have been linked to 
the fueros. “The autonomy would have thus been created on a more federalist basis.” 
Corcuera Atienza 1998.
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other parts of Spain. Some party activists, however, openly supported the statute390 
and even had high hopes for autonomy. Some members of the euskalerriacos group 
actually considered the creation of a regional administration as an opportunity 
to advocate middle-class principles and to enhance regulatory reform and free-
market values in the Basque Country.391 Institutionally, the regional parliament 
was seen as a signifi cant future source of power as well as a channel for political 
infl uence by many members of the PNV. At the same time they understood that 
the common political will of the central government and the regional leadership 
would largely dictate how the statute would be interpreted.392
When we assess the question of the role of the economic agreement for the 
PNV, it must be kept in mind that in the PNV sʼ ideology the Basquesʼ  right to self-
determination was older than any economic arrangement or agreement between 
the Spanish crown and the Basque Country.393 The economic agreement was 
originally a secondary goal in the PNV strategy in comparison to the question 
of sovereignty. The attitude of the PNV towards the autonomy defi ned in the 
Constitution still contained an economic dimension, which in practice reveals 
the motives behind the party sʼ later active role in the process of restoration of 
the economic agreement. Simultaneously, when the PNV declared the fueros a 
symbol of the previous, imaginary independence of the region and strengthened 
its self-image as a defender of the fueros in the late 1970s,394 it presented the idea 
of returning the economic agreement as comparable to the restoration of fueros.395 
The way of presenting politico-economic independence as an ideologically 
signifi cant achievement and as part of the “liberation of the Basque Country”396 has 
its roots in the need to show within the party how successful the road to political 
autonomy could be. Equally, it was actively denied that the economic agreement 
was a privilege for the Basque Country. The agreement was even presented as a 
technical arrangement, and it is remarkable how seldom the political will of the 
interlocutor, i.e., the central government, in public was referred to. For all these 
reasons, the negotiations for the economic agreement and the regional politico-
390  El País 24.10.1999.
391  See Zirakzadeh sʼ analysis of this. Zirakzadeh 1991, 118–120.
392  Garaikoetxea admitted publicly (1979) that the political future of the Basque Country 
did not look easy in this respect; guessing that it might become even more diffi cult than 
the negotiations on the statute were. See the speech by Garaikoetxea in Guernica on 
16.12.1979, when the legal powers were transferred from the Basque government in exile 
to the Basque Council. Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 160.
393  Corcuera Atienza 1998, 288.
394  Corcuera Atienza has emphasized how the new institutions and the administrative 
structure in the Basque Country enjoyed the support of the majority of the population of the 
region. Corcuera Atienza 1998, 223 & 230; the task of fuerism would be to guarantee the 
materialization of democracy in the Basque Country with the Constitution. Op. cit., 228.
395  Deia 10.6.1978, 11.6.1978, 18.2.1979 & 10.5.1979; El Correo Español 11.6.1978; 
Diario 16, 12.6.1978.
396  The article written by Andoni Olabarri (PNV). Deia 3.5.1978.
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economic legislation grew into characteristically PNV-bounded projects and, like 
the Autonomy Statute, were to a great extent political successes for the party. 
All this reveals how rapidly the PNV, once in power, was able to re-direct its 
policies, show pragmatism and actually deliver realpolitik in its decisions and 
behaviour. It also shows the internal complexities of the party. At the end of the 
1970s, the position of the PNV was infl uenced by diverging views on questions 
like economic policy. The diversity of those visions was not diminishing, as I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter.
From my empirical point of view, it is crucial to note that just as the Council 
transferred the powers to the new institutions at regional level, there was a visible 
(i) ideological element, as well as (ii) a pragmatic one in the actions of the PNV. 
(iii) Moreover, since the problems in the regional economy and the infl uence of 
the business elites affected the actions of the PNV, the conclusion here is that 
the party was already deeply engaged in the economic policy when the regional 
government was formed for the fi rst time in 1980, and started to strive for and use 
its powers.
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3. THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE REGIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 1980–1998
In this chapter I use Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ empiricism to explicate the economic 
policy of the regional governments as a historical process: (1) when and how 
politico-economic power was used; (2) what the changes were that took place 
in it, and (3) how the PNV sʼ and the Basque Country sʼ internal power structures 
infl uenced it. It is important to demonstrate the tactical decisions of the ruling 
party when it exercised its power. This empiricism is a prerequisite for the analysis 
of the PNV as the principal politico-economic power in the Basque Country.
The government platforms and political target programmes have not been a 
starting-point for my analysis. The reason is that in Basque politics, as in Spanish 
politics in general, the way a new government presents its political agenda 
is more announcement-like.397 However, the regional governments had been 
coalition governments since the middle 1980s which had to defi ne their economic 
policy even more clearly; a change in government platform required consensus 
and the approval of all parties concerned. Importantly, the change to coalition 
governments showed up in the PNV sʼ electoral programmes as better-identifi ed 
economic policy questions and promises. This material change in Basque politics 
eventually became more visible in the decisions taken by the regional government 
and in statements and comments by the representatives of government parties 
than in their programmes. The electoral and political programmes of the PNV 
cannot and must not be ignored here. In the end, I am still analysing the PNV sʼ 
action once in power.
The pre-autonomy administration, or the Basque General Council, that existed 
in 1978–1980 had only limited powers and was mainly a supervisory body, although 
the PNV had been given the treasury portfolio by that time.398 Despite the fact 
that the political achievements of the pre-autonomy administration were modest 
and a disappointment to all the political parties in the Basque Country, it cleared 
the way for future self-government.399 The Basque autonomy extended gradually 
when the central government transferred powers to the regional administration 
in 1980–1998. The politico-economic powers of the regional government grew, 
but at the same time some of that power was again transferred to the provincial 
institutions. The PNV contributed visibly to regional law-making concerning the 
internal fi nancing system of the region in the 1980s, which reinforced the role of 
the provinces in tax collection, public fi nance and public control of the economy.
The agreements between the different levels of administration were an obvious 
factor in the implementation of the administration in the Basque Country, as 
397  For example, Bar 1988, 111–112.
398  Mesa 2000, 49 & 53; the PNV sʼ Juan María Ollora from Álava was responsible for 
the treasury and fi scal affairs in the Basque General Council; for the PNV sʼ economic 
policy goals, see Hoja del Lunes 1.9.1979, El País 17.10.1979 & Deia 17.10.1979.
399  Mesa 2000, 56–57.
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they were in the Spanish autonomous regions as a whole.400 In the 1990s, the 
far-reaching autonomy in economic policy guaranteed the functioning of the 
fi nancial administration in the region in any case, creating the conditions for 
economic prosperity when the general economic outlook became brighter from 
the mid 1990s onwards. The economic and social consequences and changes 
caused by Spain sʼ membership of the EC (1986–) would constitute a subject in 
itself. In this chapter, I assess that question only in general terms, and consider the 
EC/EU-membership as a part of the history of the Basque government sʼ economic 
policy-making and how it affected the fundamentals and substance of that policy, 
concentrating on the use of politico-economic power.
In the studies by Spanish scholars, the history of the current autonomous regions 
since 1980 has normally been divided into two periods: that characterized by the 
confl icts between the different levels of administrations (1979–1984), and the time 
of delegation of responsibilities (1984–).401 The political history of the Basque 
Country and the history of its politico-economic power are in general more fi ne-
grained and do not in every aspect follow that development and periodization. A 
new era has been seen as starting in Basque politics along with the closer political 
cooperation between the PNV and the Basque Socialists (PSE), which changed 
from regional parliamentary cooperation to the regional governmental coalition in 
1986. The transfers of power also form their own chronology. The responsibilities 
of the regional government in economic policy grew bigger which called for new 
operational abilities from the PNV as the leading regional power. In this chapter 
I consider that dynamic action, my objective being to see it as a process in which 
the party had to make choices, cooperate with other parties and form coalitions.
3.1. The beginnings of the economic policy
3.1.1. Deliberations of the Basque Economic Agreement
The PNV, which took the leadership of the new regional administration in 1980, 
was a powerful participant in economic policy for several reasons: (1) it was the 
major political force in the region, (2) it received support from the Basque business 
elites, and (3) it acted as the major defender of the region sʼ economic interests. On 
the other hand, the worsening economic outlook in the Basque Country led to 
growing pressures and expectations from various sections of society; the PNV was 
supposed to meet these politico-economic claims just as the new administrative 
structures were to be built.
The PNV received 38.1 percent of the votes (25 seats out of 60) in the regional 
elections of March 1980. The radical HB came second with 16.5 percent (11 seats), 
400  See, for example, the case study on social politics Gómez Uranga & Etxebarria 2000, 
and Mondragon 1998, 221. 
401  Mondragon leans here on the analysis by R. Agranoff (1993) and F. Morata (1991). 
Mondragon 1998, 221.
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and the PSE-PSOE third with 14.2 percent (9 seats).402 When the representatives 
of HB did not participate in the parliamentary business, the PNV had an absolute 
majority in the 60-seat regional parliament.403 The PNV formed the fi rst regional 
government and Garaikoetxea was nominated the fi rst lehendakari on 9 April 
1980.404 Given its electoral support, the position of the fi rst PNV-led single party 
minority government was relatively stable, but the challenges were still great and 
numerous. Garaikoetxea stated that the most important goal of his cabinet was to 
end the economic crises by modernizing industry.405 The economic situation in 
the region was dire; as many as 3,922 bankruptcies affecting 127,792 employees 
were registered in 1980. The annual economic growth was –2.7 percent, where 
the corresponding fi gure for Spain was 1.5 percent. The offi cial unemployment 
fi gure was 12.8 percent (the Spanish average 11.4), but in reality it was estimated 
as nearly 17 percent.406 The economists called for signifi cant investment from 
the regional government to enhance technology and development, develop the 
educational system, re-organize industry and take fi rm leadership in the economy 
in order to win the battle against economic recession.407 At the same time, however, 
it was pointed out that economic crises were not the best moment to concentrate 
on starting structural adjustment.408
The fact that the regional government, together with the regional parliament, 
had to start creating regional economic laws, elevated the position of economic 
policy in the PNV agenda even more. This situation was important when the new 
premier, Garaikoetxea, chose his cabinet, the aim being to guarantee the greatest 
possible economic expertise. The internal differences of the PNV in economic 
policy questions appeared almost concurrently.409 Those different views concerned 
means of supporting the economy as well as the question of who would fi nally 
exercise politico-economic power in the Basque Country. Although the negotiation 
of the economic agreement was a primary objective for the party and the regional 
government led by it, the economic policy decisions did not automatically follow 
402  The EE got 9.8 percent (6 seats), the UCD 8.5 (6 seats), the right wing AP 4.8 (2 seats) 
and the Communists (PC) 4 percent (2 seats). Table 2.
403  The number of parliamentary seats was raised to 75 in 1984. Llera Ramo 1998, 414.
404  Esteban & López Guerra 1982, 181; López de Juan Abad 1998; Prego 1999, 85; 
Arroyo 2000.
405  For example, according to Fusi, at the time of the general election of 1979, the Basque 
Country was about to collapse socially and economically. This was a result of terrorism, 
political frustration and the still open question of police authority, which remained 
confused in 1978–1979. Fusi 1984, 214. 
406  Figure 10; Zirakzadeh 1991, 105; Soto 1998, 197.
407  Economists, like so many others in the region, criticised the regional government 
particularly for its lack of leadership. Pérez de Calleja Bastarrechea 1984, 81 & 100.
408  For example, the statement of the economist Victor Serna. Deia 24.5.1980.
409  On this, see the discussion on the newspapers. Deia 21. & 25.6.1980; ERE, number 
9, 11.11.1979; the varying views were less apparent in the EBB sʼ declarations of Aberri 
Eguna. See, CD/PNV: Comunicados Aberri Eguna 1981 & 1982. 
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the views of the different interest groups infl uencing the party. The policy line 
taken by the administration was soon considered too liberal by many in the PNV. 
In conclusion, the strong government position did not guarantee peaceful times in 
adumbrating economic policy.
The leading exponents of industry and business supported the new government, 
but were concerned about the deteriorating economic outlook and even demanded 
that the Spanish central government should direct special funding to resuscitation.410 
The public subsidies the local industry hoped for were no longer part of the UCD-
led central government sʼ liberal politico-economic thinking. In fact, their goal 
was to end the large subsidies, which had been typical of the economic policy 
of the Franco years when the only aim was to grow production capacity not to 
intensify investigation and development work.411 Garaikoetxeaʼ s cabinet adopted 
the policy of directing the subventions only to dynamic sectors such as the 
electronics industry. The regressive sectors such as metallurgy were not to receive 
anything. The power in the regional government was in the hands of people who 
had a liberal view on industrial growth and how to direct it.412 As Zirakzadeh 
points out, the region sʼ business community was divided as to the right solutions, 
as was the PNV itself. The government sʼ strict prioritization in its subsidy policy 
was criticised by both sides.413 The situation was seen to become even worse 
because of these decisions. The thinking of the regional government, which was 
based on the idea of reducing public subsidies, was still parallel to the policies 
that the UCD central governments had adopted in the late 1970s.414 Naturally, 
they were tied to the intention of changing the structures of the Spanish economy 
and thus moving closer to the framework of its Western European neighbours. 
Garaikoetxea and his cabinet followed that same philosophy which saw foreign 
trade as the cornerstone of regional economic growth. It also included pushing 
for more power, and maintaining that power at the regional level rather than 
decentralizing it to the provinces. The representatives of the PNV in the provincial 
governments, who signifi cantly were also mainly members of the euskalerriacos 
wing of the party, did not see the regional government as doing enough to help 
410  Zirakzadeh 1991, 105–107.
411  Industry minister Javier García-Egotxeaga sʼ interview of 25.6.1998. HGV 2001, 164; 
the strong economic growth of Spain in the 1960s hindered seeing the real problems 
of its economy, and the distorting nature of state subsidies. They were not directed to 
modernizing the structures of Spanish industry, but to increasing its production volume. 
Salmon 1991, 5.
412  I.e., the so-called euskalerriacos wing of the party. It was opposed to the so-called 
aranaists, who maintained a negative attitude towards industrialization. Zirakzadeh 1991, 
119–120.
413  Interview with the industry minister Javier García-Egotxeaga of 25.6.1998. HGV 
2001, 162; Deia 21.6.1980; The Economist 11.2.1978, 90; 23.9.1978, 100; 13.9.1980, 53 & 
81−82; 10.10.1981, 83−84.
414  The Economist 18.8.1979, 64; the article by the minister García-Egotxeaga published 
in Actualidad Económica 16.4.1981.
95
the small and medium-size businesses in their provinces.415 They represented 
provincial aspirations for power, but were also signifi cantly representatives of the 
middle-class, which traditionally supported the PNV.
The key fi gures in Garaikoetxeaʼ s cabinet, such as minister for the economy 
and the treasury Pedro Luis Uriarte, minister for industry Javier García-Egotxeaga 
and minister for trade and tourism Carlos Blasco de Imaz were characteristically 
technocrats with close ties to the business world and were professionally respected, 
though not entirely politically independent as has been occasionally suggested.416 
Although the selection of cabinet ministers was not always applauded by the 
ranks of the PNV,417 it has been estimated that it made Garaikoetxeaʼ s fi rst term in 
415  Zirakzadeh here emphasises the infl uence of the local entrepreneurship on the PNV. 
Zirakzadeh 1991, 141; cf. Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 71. Also the Basque businessmen, 
which started to unionize and organize themselves at regional level, stressed the role of 
the small and medium size businesses.
416  See, for example, the interview with treasury minister Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 313 & 343. Uriarte says that the PNV sʼ leadership was not pleased to know he took 
politically independent economists to work in his department.
417  El Correo 26.3.2000; Zirakzadeh 1991, 140–141; Lucas Murillo de la Cueva 1990, 
226.
Table 2. The results of the regional elections in the Autonomous Basque Country 
1980–1994.
Source: GV/EJ: Archivo de resultados Electorales. Departamento de Interior, Dirección 
de Procesos Electorales y Documentación
(http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.asp).
  1980  1984  1986  1990  1994 
Party  %  of votes (seats)
PNV 38.1 (25) 42.0 (32) 23.7 (17) 28.5 (22) 29.3 (22)
EA   –    –  15.8 (13) 11.4 (9) 10.1 (8)
EE   9.8 (6) 8.0 (6) 10.8 (9)   7.8 (6)   –
HB 16.5 (11) 14.6 (11) 17.5 (13) 18.3 (13) 16.0 (11)
PSE–EE 14.2 (9) 23.1 (19) 22.1 (19) 19.9 (16) 16.8 (16)
AP/PP 4.8 (6) 9.4 (7) 4.9 (2)  8.2 (6) 14.2 (6)
UCD/CDS   8.5 (2)   –   3.5    0.7    –
PCE/IU   4.0 (1) 1.4   0.6   1.4    9.0 (6) 
UA –   –    –    1.4    2.7 (5)
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offi ce politically easier despite the gloomy economic outlook.418 His ministerial 
choices were supported in the Basque Country even by the UCD and the right-
wing Allianza Popular (AP).419 The PNV-led regional government received the 
backing of other parties in the regional parliament in 1980 and, for example, 
the fi rst budget was approved unanimously.420 Signifi cantly, in the parliament sʼ 
economic and fi scal affairs committee, led by a representative of the PNV, only 
the Socialists actively advocated the opposition policy at that time.421
The work of the regional government was complicated because it had to 
simultaneously, (i) proceed with the creation of regional administrative structures, 
(ii) resuscitate the local economy, particularly industry and (iii) act as the politico-
economic trendsetter. The weak political position of Suárez sʼ government was the 
reason that the central government did not seem to start the transfers of power 
at all in 1980.422 There also were economic reasons for this. In the division of 
politico-economic powers423 based on the Constitution, the central government 
had a clear economic edge in the situation where the taxes collected by the state 
were used as basis for the tax collection of the region and the provinces.424 For 
example, Álava, which was the only Basque province which had maintained the 
economic agreement, paid a portion of its tax revenue to the central government, 
but it was not in proportion to the real cost of the public sector maintained by 
the state in that province. Those costs would fall with the transfers of power and, 
according to the plans of the regional government, the new economic agreement 
was to tackle that issue.425
The work of fi nding a solution was commenced by restarting the negotiations, 
which had been at a standstill since the time of the Basque General Council.426 
418  El Correo 26.3.2000.
419  Zirakzadeh 1991, 140.
420  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 
334. He describes the launching of the regional institutions as a rewarding but diffi cult 
task. Arroyo 2000, 30–31; Presupuestos Generales de Comunidad Autónoma del País 
Vasco para 1981. Ley 8/1981 de 16 de julio. BOPV 48/29.07.1981
421  Memoria Txostena 1980–1981 (I), 33, 38 & 49; Memoria Txostena 1981 (II), 50–51.
422  Garaikoetxea 2002, 128.
423  Articles 148.1 and 149.1. CE:BOE 88–93.
424  Here it was a question of the difference between the estimated (atribuible) and the 
real (obtenible) tax accrued. Beldarrain Garin 1998, 12.
425  See the interview with the treasury minister, Pedro Luis Uriarte of of 24.7.1998. 
HGV 2001, 318–319.
426  The negotiations on the economic agreement were started within a month of the 
new regional government sʼ appointment; these negotiations were started in the mixed 
committee (La Comisión Mixta Negociadora del Concierto Económico), of which both 
treasury ministers were members. Lámbarri Gómez & Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña 1994, 
43–44; the province sʼ representatives on that committee had already participated in the 
negotiations which started in the pre-autonomy years, the time of the Basque General 
Council. El Correo & Deia 16.5.1980.
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Though it was politically important for both sides to agree on this issue,427 it was 
diffi cult according to Uriarte to assure the other party that it was not a question 
of “ancient arrangement or a privilege”.428 The cupo issue caused problems on 
both sides.429 The PNV representatives saw that it was fi nally Suárez himself 
who pushed through the model they proposed, against the opposition and views 
of the other members of his cabinet.430 In previous times, the provinces had to 
deliver to the central government all that tax money remaining after their fi nancial 
commitments were met. In the new system it was to be agreed annually between 
the Basque Country and the central government how much the actual cost of the 
remaining State services in the region and State spending programmes such as 
foreign affairs or defence was. The portion of the Basque Country corresponded 
to its estimated percentage of the Spanish economy and was settled at 6.24 
percent, the amount the region was supposed to contribute annually to the central 
government sʼ kitty.431
The regional government sʼ negotiatiors had not only to solve technical 
problems, but also face the tense political relations and competition between the 
Basque provinces. Treasury minister Uriarte was aware that the goal set by the 
Basque negotiating team would be diffi cult to achieve, since the new arrangement 
was to cover all three provinces. However, it would not be technically similar to 
that in force in Álava, so that the new enlarged autonomy would be refl ected in the 
taxation. The new arrangement must not worsen Álavaʼ s position in comparison to 
its previous one either.432 The political importance of Álava in this context can be 
explained by remembering that since the PNV sʼ support was there not nearly as 
427  See the interview with treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte, in which he states that 
this issue is a priority for both parties. Deia 4.7.1980.
428  Deia 2.2.1981; Deia 26.6. & 4.7.1980; the arguments for this also underlined that the 
Basque taxpayers would continue to pay their taxes after an agreement was reached. See 
the comment of the economist Ernesto Lejeune. Deia 2.6.1981.
429  For example, El Correo 11.9.1980 & Deia 11.9.1980.
430  The economic agreement sʼ political signifi cance was revealed in this situation, 
where it still was not clear whether it would be approved by the Spanish parliament. 
Garaikoetxea indicated to King Juan Carlos bilaterally that the monarch sʼ visit to the 
Basque Country would not be a success before the agreement was approved. The King 
postponed his visit. Barbería 1996, 424–429; Fusi 1984, 231–232; Garaikoetxea 2002, 
96; the parliament sʼ discussion on the LOFCA also delayed these negotiations. For a 
contemporary assessment of the situation, see Deia 5.7.1980.
431  Article 53. of the Economic Agreement refers to this question, but article 7 of the 
Cupo aproved by law in 1988 includes the percentage. LPV 1991, 440–441; Ley del 
Estado 44/1988 de 28 de diciembre; see the interview with treasury minister Pedro Luis 
Uriarte of of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 318–319.
432  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 
317.
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strong as in Vizcaya,433 its activists in Álava had a lot to lose in these negotiations. 
But the PNV had to continue in order to maintain its political credibility by 
seeking implementation of article 41.1 of the Constitution, which stipulates the 
economic agreement be based on the foral system.
The ministers fi nally signed the economic agreement on 29 December 1980.434 
The economic part of the agreement came into force from the beginning of 1981, 
although it only became legal after the Spanish parliament had approved it in 
April 1981.435 The law covering the agreement applied for 20 years ending in 
2001. It confi rmed the relations between the two sides in taxation law and was to 
be followed immediately by the agreement on cupo that would defi ne what the 
Basque Country had to pay to the State.436 Uriarte considered that the agreement 
surpassed the expectations of the Basque negotiators. However, the diffi cult 
negotiations had convinced them that it was more important to assure the political 
power and potential gained for the regional institutions than the short-term 
fi nancial benefi t or underscoring the political victory.437 Signifi cantly, after the 
signing of the agreement, the Basque representatives maintained a businesslike 
approach and generally underlined the value of political negotiations rather 
than ultimatums in their public appearances.438 This showed an understanding 
that the relations between the regional and State levels were heavily dependent 
on the political will of the sides and therefore extremely vulnerable. In fact, the 
agreement was a major politico-economic achievement for the PNV. It appeared 
retrospectively to be a positive thing for the Basque side that the agreement was 
reached before 1981 when an attempted military coup took place and the Law 
for the Harmonisation of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA) was approved by the 
Spanish parliament.439 It would have been relatively more diffi cult for the Basque 
side to negotiate an advantageous agreement in those circumstances, but I will 
discuss that later.
The economic agreement is a negotiated arrangement between two institutional 
entities, which must be approved by a law that functions as a legal sanction against 
433  In the regional elections in 1980, the PNV received 40.1 percent of votes in Vizcaya, 
but in Álava only 30.2 percent. GV/EJ: Archivo de resultados electorales. Departamento 
de Interior, Dirección de Procesos Electorales y Documentación. Elecciones Parlamento 
Vasco 1980. (http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.apl)
434  These negotiations were started on 16.10.1979. For a round-up and an assessment on 
the negotiations see La Gaceta del Norte 18.10.1981.
435  Larrea Angulo 1991, 9; Ley 12/1981 de 13 de Mayo BOPV no. 25; Beldarrain Garin 
1998, 151–204; for a general analysis of the economic agreement, see Lambárri Gómez 
& Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña 1995.
436  Beldarrain Garin 1998, 19; BOPV no. 25, 1008; the cupo of 1981 was fi nally 38.596 
million pesetas; Article 48. LPV 1991, 438–439.
437  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 
324−325.
438  Op. cit., 324; see, for example, El Correo Español 30.12.1980.
439  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 323.
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any breach of contract. A basic characteristic of the agreement is the unilateral 
risk which it creates. In other words, since the amount of agreed cupo always 
depends on the expenditure decisions taken by the State, the Basque institutions 
alone are responsible for their good or bad fi scal administration and policy.440 In 
theory the Basque provinces might not have been able to achieve their goals in 
tax collection in a diffi cult economic situation to pay their contribution to the 
State sʼ expenditure. With the exception of Álava, which had also maintained its 
economic agreement during the Franco years, the Basque provinces had technical 
problems in carrying out their duties at fi rst.441 The provincial parliaments (Juntas 
Generales) and governments (Diputaciones) have their powers in the two main 
areas of tax policy: (i) the right to regulate taxes, which would gradually extend 
according to the transfers of power and (ii) authority concerning all phases of 
tax collection. The provincesʼ  right to regulate taxes, outlined in the economic 
agreement since 1981 applied to (1) income tax, (2) property tax, (3) corporate tax, 
(4) inheritance tax and (5) indirect taxes.442 The agreement does not cover issues 
of regional questions or sharing the tax burden belonging to the State sʼ authority. 
The text of the agreement defi nes who is subject to its fi scal regulations. Income 
tax affects actual persons with their domicile in the Basque Country – and within 
that the actual persons living in the provincial councilsʼ  tax levy district. Corporate 
taxes are imposed on those companies whose place of assessment is the Basque 
Country and at least 25 percent of whose business operations or sales takes place 
there.443 The agreement was also based on the general system of Spanish regional 
fi nancing (LOFCA), in so far as the latter does not violate the agreement.444
Naturally, the economic outlook in the Basque Country in the early 1980s made 
tax collection diffi cult, and the political and economic risks were high. Still, the 
Basque negotiators considered the arrangement clearly achieved more politically 
and economically than the general fi nancing model for the autonomous regions, 
since the Basque Country was no longer bound to the incomes and expenditure 
policies of the Spanish state.445 They were also aware that the cupo arrangement, 
by which the region paid for the actual cost incurred by the State administration, 
440  Lámbarri 1994, 91; the interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 
24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 326.
441  Interview with the treasury minister Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre of 5.8.1998. 
Op.Cit., 710–711.
442  Consequently, the right to regulate concerned most of the taxes collected in the 
region and which belong to the Spanish tax system. Lámbarri 1994, 92; Beldarrain Garin 
1998, 22–23.
443  Larrea Angulo 1991, 23.
444  For example, the basic principles of autonomy in economic policy mentioned in 
the LOFCA, such as solidarity, coordination and suffi cient fi nancing, also affected the 
arrangements based on agreements such as the Basque case. Larrea Angulo 1991, 24.
445  The interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 
326−327.
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meant that the system was exceptional in the European context and even beyond.446 
When taxation is considered, the Basque Country hence became a model for other 
national tax regimes. In a broader sense, all the models of federalism determine 
the model of fi scal federalism, in other words a decentralized system of fi nancing 
guaranteeing suffi cient economic resources at various levels of authority.447 In 
the Basque case, the procedure, however, was that the existence of the regional 
politico-economic powers or its right to its own fi nancing was recognized fi rst. The 
authority itself was transferred only later. The regional government underlined the 
fl exible nature of the 1980 agreement, and that all political groups in the region 
supported its restoration.448 Even the central government recognized that this 
politico-economic solution was benefi cial for the Spanish domestic policy.449
The regional government sʼ view was that the functionality of the economic 
agreement was especially linked to its historical background. The agreement 
of 1980 had some resemblance to that of 1878, which followed the abolition of 
the fueros,450 the main difference being that the new agreement was legally and 
politically tied to the Autonomy Statute. As such it was one part of a normative 
entity, but also an agreement between two legal parties.451 Through the new 
agreement, the Basque Country became a macro-level taxpayer which started to 
deliver a stipulated annual disbursement to the State. It came down to a question 
of agreeing on public revenue and administrative decentralization. Through its 
own incomes, tasks requiring public spending were also developed in the regional 
administration. These tasks produced agreements between the central and regional 
governments concerning the transfers and delegation of powers.452 The agreement 
also created portions to be fi nanced for the authority the Autonomy Statute 
446  The interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 324.
447  Larrea Angulo 1991, 10; Oates 1972.
448  Larrea Angulo 1991, 11; Moreno del Río 2000, 135–136.
449  For example, La Gaceta del Norte 18.10.1981; the agreement created a situation in 
which the state sʼ and the Basque Country sʼ systems of taxation co-existed. Beldarrain 
Garin 1998, 20.
450  Larrea Angulo 1991, 11. The agreements, which applied to all the Basque provinces 
were reached in 1878, 1887, 1893, 1906, 1925, and 1936.
451  The economic arrangement in the 19th century confi rmed that the Basque Country 
belonged under the tax levy. The decentralization of the tax collection was not therefore 
a consequence of the decentralisation of public expenditure, but a political and technical 
issue. Op. cit., 76–77.
452  The compensation for the expenditure, carried out by the regional administration, 
was realised via the cupo. The basic principle was that the compensation to the Basque 
Country was proportional to other region sʼ similar costs, and the calculated benefi t was 
added. Ibid.
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recognized.453 However, the detailed agreement on cupo was left to be negotiated 
in the near future; it was still recognized by the Basque side that the agreement 
commenced an evolution which would theoretically lead to a situation where the 
sum of cupo could be zero. In that case, the remaining State level spending would 
be up to the regional authority to fi nance.454
The institutional changes concerning the taxation system are always economic 
policy decisions with long-term effects. Thanks to the economic agreement, funds 
which had previously been delivered to the State kitty now started to circulate 
within the regional economy. Garaikoetxea later considered that this also helped 
the Basque Country in the diffi cult situation of the early 1980s.455 In 1982–1983 
there was a slight upturn in the Basque Country sʼ GDP, approaching the Spanish 
average.456 The economic policy goals of the Spanish central government were to 
control the unemployment fi gures, de-regulate short-term interest rates, redirect 
the production of the industrial sectors in crisis and speed up the negotiations for 
Spanish EC membership.457 The economic review of the Bank of Spain listed the 
main problems in the economy as low economic growth and the partial failure in 
the fi ght against infl ation before the 1982 Spanish general elections. The balance 
of payments, however, had begun to look brighter and the job loss was slowing.458 
While the main economies of Western Europe had accommodated to the situation 
of the early 1980s, a similar process in the Spanish national economy was still 
underway, so that the liberalization of the fi nancial market already begun suffered 
considerable delay.459
3.1.2. The creation of the regional structures of politico-economic 
decision-making
In order to understand the changes in the power structures of the Basque Country 
in the 1980s, it is important to realize that the regional government was originally 
453  It was technically an improved version of Álava sʼ agreement in 1952. The new 
agreement did not include social security, which was technically and politically a complex 
issue. Op. cit., 77–78.
454  The methodology of the economic agreement was built on the idea that the cupo sʼ 
sum might be zero, or start even with a plus. The transfer of power in health care was to 
mean a signifi cant cash fl ow to the regional administration sʼ revenue. VAT was also to 
have a similar infl uence. Larrea Angulo 1991, 79.
455  Garaikoetxea 2002, 108; this view was shared by other parties as well. See the 
interview with Marcelino Oreja (AP), ABC 29.12.1980.
456  Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 57; for the GDP in the Basque Country and Spain see 
Figure 10.
457  It also included the continuation of a moderate policy on salary increases and the 
continuation of the tax reform.
458  The central bank considered the growing defi cit, to be the worst problem, due to lack 
of control over infl ation. Soto 1998, 127.
459  Sáez Lozano 2000, 37–39.
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given a relatively strong institutional position in its relationship with the regional 
councils. Garaikoetxeaʼ s government tried to make it even stronger.460 During the 
fi rst two years of the new autonomous administration (1980–1981), the roles of 
the main players in the Basque economic policy, the lehendakari, the regional 
government and parliament and a new organ, the labour market council (Consejo 
de Relaciones Laborales), became clearer.461
Their position as governing institutions for the whole autonomous region 
was raised in relation to that of the historical institutions of provinces, i.e., the 
councils and parliaments or assemblies.462 The intention was to make the common 
regional institutions as modern as possible in contrast to the administration of the 
Franco era and to generate a modern administrative culture for it. The opportunity 
beckoned since the number of people working in the pre-autonomy administration 
had remained very low and consisted in practice of the members of the Basque 
General Council.463 There also was a strong political will to start a new period in 
the regional administration, not least in the PNV.
Ultimately, the lehendakari is responsible for the economic policy of the 
regional government. His position resembles the position of the Spanish prime 
minister (presidente del gobierno). He is also the leader of the institutional 
aggregate of the region and the statutory representative of the state authorities in 
the Basque Country. The role of the lehendakari, who is elected by the regional 
parliament,464 is strengthened by the history of his offi cial rank, its legitimacy in 
the institutional and symbolic level being similar to that of the Catalonian regional 
president (el president de la Generalitat).465 The lehendakari sʼ role is therefore 
closer to a head of state than a prime minister. Institutionally it is described by 
the rationalized and clearly bounded nature which was to characterize the whole 
new Basque regional administration. The incumbent lehendakari is not allowed 
to occupy other public offi ces or confi dential post at the same time, or positions 
in the corporate sector or industry, or carry on a trade. The only exception is 
460  Garaikoetxea sʼ government proposed a version of the LTH in 1982–1983, which 
would have strengthened the position of the regional government. Oña Gómez & García 
Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 187–188.
461  All the powers except those of the council for labour market affairs, are regulated in 
the law concerning the Basque administration (Ley de Gobierno) approved in June 1981. 
The Autonomy Statute regulates only the basic structure of the administration, and the 
regional parliament sʼ task was to legislate on the details. Ley de Gobierno, 30.6.1981. 
LPV 1991, 103–132; BOPV n° 46/1981.
462  Aja 1999, 184; Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña 2000, 187–188; see Figure 3.
463  Interview with the minister of industry, Javier García-Egotxeaga, of 25.6.1998. HGV 
2001, 163.
464  He is appointed by the king of Spain. Ley de Gobierno. Article 4. LPV 1991, 105.
465  The PNV and the CiU sʼ idea on history is that the Constitution of 1978 returned the 
legality of the Second Republic. The other regions closely followed the administrative 
structure of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Onaindia 2000, 49.
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the membership of the regional parliament.466 The lehendakari is responsible for 
relations with the central government, other autonomous regions and the internal 
institutions of the Basque Country.467 He leads and coordinates the function of the 
regional government, defi nes the government platform and both appoints the cabinet 
members (consejeros) or ministers as well as removing them from offi ce and sets 
out their tasks. Moreover, he coordinates the implementation of the government 
platform and the decisions taken by the cabinet and its committees.468
It is also important to understand the role of the vice-lehendakari 
(vicelehendakari) and the changes it experienced. He is appointed by the 
lehendakari, who also defi nes his duties.469 When the role of the lehendakari 
became a more political one, the vice-lehendakari was responsible, in close 
cooperation with the minister for economic policy and treasury and the coordination 
of the work of the cabinet and particularly coordination of the budget papers. 
The vice-lehendakari was heavily involved in the decisions on public spending 
and, from the beginning, his position had signifi cant politico-economic weight. It 
even increased in the following cabinets, since the holders of this offi ce were also 
responsible for regional economic planning.470
Every cabinet member heads his or her own ministry-like department. The 
law on regional government (Ley de Gobierno), which also specifi es its politico-
economic powers, stipulates that the cabinet introduces government bills to the 
regional parliament and implements the national laws in the region according to 
the Constitution. The law provides (Article 18.h) that the government prepares 
the budget and presents it to the regional parliament for its approval. The cabinet 
also controls the administration of public services (article 18.ñ), which in practice 
concerns those public corporations and companies that depend on the regional 
466  Ley de Gobierno. Article 3. LPV 1991, 104–105.
467  The laws and regulations approved by the regional parliament are published by the 
lehendakari in the Offi cial Journal of the Basque Country, and in the Offi cial Journal 
of Spain. The lehendakari can also dissolve the regional parliament on the regional 
government sʼ authority. Ley de Gobierno. Article 7. LPV 1991, 106.
468  He also signs the decrees issued by the regional government, and is responsible for 
their publication. Ley de Gobierno. Article 8. Op. cit., 106–107; the same law also lays 
down the procedures should lehendakari resign or be suspended from offi ce. Articles 
9.–11. Op. cit., 107–108.
469  Estatuto de Autonomía. Article 19. Op. cit., 96.
470  The vice-lehendakari in the early 1980s was normally responsible for a particular 
portfolio. He also participated in negotiating the economic agreement. See the interview 
with the vice-lehendakari and minister for labour, Mario Fernández Pelaz of 23.10.1998. 
HGV 2001, 85; a separate post of vice-lehendakari was created in 1986, when the PSE 
formed a coalition government with the PNV. Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña 2000, 189.
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administration according to the Constitution or the Autonomy Statute.471 The 
actions of the regional government and its members are ultimately defi ned by the 
political program and the policy of the party or parties in government.472 Beside 
the cabinet meetings, economic policy questions were dealt with separately in 
the ministerial committee for economic policy (Comisión Económica), which 
was not, however, a steering committee concentrating on technical questions. It 
formed the fi rst of the government meetings where economic questions were dealt 
with.473
The internal power relations of the Basque Country were balanced so that 
the number of members of the regional parliament – 60 in 1980–1984, and 75 
from the regional elections of 1984 onwards – is not determined by the number 
of inhabitants, but according to the number of members on the regional councils 
elected by the municipalities.474 Consequently Vizcaya, the most populous province 
and the power-base of the PNV, was not over-represented, but the signifi cantly less 
populous and politically more demanding region for the party, Álava, was. As a 
result of this, the political voice of Álava which included historical antagonism to 
Vizcaya, infl uenced the regional parliament within the PNV, thus infl uencing the 
decision-making. The lehendakari, Garaikoetxea, originally had high expectations, 
particularly concerning the role of the regional parliament, and this attitude can be 
seen as refl ecting the general views within the PNV at that time.475 The legislative 
powers of the parliament have developed greatly, since the provinces must follow 
its rules for the tax levy and for coordination and harmonization cooperation in 
their taxation.476 The parliament also has legislative authority over the savings 
banks (Cajas de Ahorro) of the provinces, the region sʼ internal commerce and 
other trade arrangements. In the end, the existence of legislative powers makes 
the difference between political and administrative autonomy;477 consequently, 
it facilitated economic policy-making at the regional level from the beginning of 
autonomy.478
471  Articles 16.h and 16.j. (Ley de Gobierno). LPV 1991, 110–111; in economic policy 
questions the same procedure is valid as in other cases: the minister presents the decrees 
of his own area of responsibility for the government sʼ approval (Article 26.3.), and also 
prepares the government bills in that area (Article 26.8.). Appointments are also among 
the regional government sʼ powers. Op. cit., 113.
472  Lucas Murillo de la Cueva 1990, 187
473  For the question of founding a separate, technical economic policy committee was taken 
up again in 1993, in the context of the general administrative reform. Mesa 2000, 266.
474  Aja 1999, 89.
475  El Correo 26.3.2000.
476  Estatuto de Autonomía. Article 41.2ª. LPV 1991, 96.
477  Aja 1999, 94.
478  For the regional parliaments committees, and the approval of the Basque Country sʼ 
budget, see Estatuto de Autonomía. Article 41. LPV 1991, 96–97; Reglamento del 
Parlamento. Articles 123.–126. Op. cit., 172–174.
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Although the PNV sʼ representatives who supported a modern and liberal 
economic policy were in majority in the regional government, parliament and the 
provincial institutions in 1980–1981, the opinions on how to make the economic 
recovery possible varied greatly within that group. The biggest differences still 
concerned the Garaikoetxea cabinet sʼ intention to coordinate industrial policy in 
the provinces as well. The economic policy disputes in the Basque Country were 
strongly dissenting opinions between the representatives of the euskalerriacos 
group, which was divided not just between the regional and provincial levels, but 
also between the provinces. In many cases there were disputes between incompatible 
personalities. Most signifi cantly, it naturally refl ected the tension between the new 
regional administration and the province sʼ historical institutions. In the provincial 
parliaments and councils, many of the PNV activists saw Garaikoetxea and his 
cabinet ministersʼ  approach as “interventionist” or “socialistic”.479 In reality, the 
regional government enhanced the interests of the local business in many ways, 
effectively negotiating the economic agreement, trying to preserve industry by 
identifying the industries that could be saved, and establishing a law concerning 
the purchasing collectives which covered many signifi cant sectors of the Basque 
economy.480 After having acquired regional power, the PNV sʼ differing internal 
views on economic policy and contradictory provincial interests based on unequal 
wealth were becoming more pressing in the public discussion.
The capitalist and free-marketeer spirit of the regional government was not 
limited to the way it acted, but was also introduced into its inner functions. The 
structure of the new regional administration was manifestly rationalized and 
it adopted strict budget rules.481 The representatives of the new administration, 
many of whom came from the business world, argued that from now on the same 
amount of tax money gave better results and “more effi cient administration”.482 
They would not just be more sensitive to regional interests and needs, but their 
goals and criteria for action also evidenced the corporate world sʼ infl uence.483 One 
of the main objectives was to try to avoid the historical characteristics of the 
Spanish central government, such as infl exible structures and hierarchical order.484 
479  Zirakzadeh 1991, 141; Acha Ugarte & Pérez Nievas 1998, 92–93.
480  “Ley de Cooperativas”, 1/1982, de 11 de febrero. BOPV A12.2 17.03.1982.; Aja 1999, 
92; the law was redefi ned in 1993. Ley 4/1993, BOPV n° 93/1993, 5934–6026; purchasing 
collectives such as Mondragón, had a traditionally strong position in the Basque economy 
and corporate life. Their business potential was good, because many invested in new 
technologies and training of human resource at an early stage. Oña Gómez & García de 
Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 198.
481  Interview with the treasury minister, Pedro Luis Uriarte, of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 
330−331.
482  Deia 2.6.1981.
483  For example, the interview with the minister for industry, Javier García Egotxeaga, 
of 25.6.1998. HGV 2001, 163.
484  Espanjan hallinto. Diktatuurista demokratiaan 1996, 12.
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Personal relations became an important way for politicians and functionaries 
when they wanted to achieve desired objectives within the administration.485 This 
was no surprise taking into account the population scale of the region.
The regional government reinforced the rules of the national economy by creating 
the separate council for regional labour relations (1981) already mentioned, which 
also institutionalized the negotiations between the labour market organizations 
in the Basque Country. This was a viable solution for the PNV since the biggest 
trade union in the region, the ELA-STV, thus had better ways to infl uence labour 
market relations and the national economy. In the early stage of the autonomy, 
the government also created consultative committees which included trade union 
representatives to facilitate the work of economic planning. The economic policy 
committee of the regional parliament naturally took an essential role. However, it 
was clear that the roles of various consultative committees would change according 
to the number of parties in government. The later changes in the composition of 
the cabinet affected the work of these committees. In the one-party cabinets the 
PNV had primarily to take its own internal differences and to a less extent the 
other partiesʼ  policy defi nitions into account. Signifi cantly, it intended to respond 
these factors with its own strategy and decisions.
3.2. Troubled waters
3.2.1. The PNV and the nationwide LOAPA law
The Constitution of 1978 started an unforeseen regionalisation process in Spain. 
Article 151 fast-tracked autonomy for the historical regions of the Basque Country 
and Catalonia access to, but fi ve more, Andalusia, Galicia, the Canary Islands, 
Navarra and the Valencian Community, then obtained almost the same status as 
the two most prominent historical regions by 1982. The rest of the autonomous 
regions were to take a slower route to gaining autonomy with lesser powers 
according to Article 143. The central government tried to bring some organisation 
in this process and the UCD government and the PSOE agreed in summer 1981 
that all opportunities to harmonize the autonomy process should be capitalized 
on.486 The Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (Ley Orgánica de 
Armonización del Proceso Autonómico; LOAPA) was approved in June 1982 by 
the Spanish parliament. Although it was an attempt to prevent the non-historical 
485  Interview with the minister for industry, Javier García-Egotxeaga, of 25.6.1998. HGV 
2001, 163.
486  The negotiations between Suárez and the PSOE leader González on the agreement 
on the autonomous region sʼ development, the so-called El Pacto Autonómico, took place 
in spring 1981. It was signed on 31.7.1981, and included the principles for the control of 
the autonomous region sʼ development and the process of decentralization. These ideas 
were transformed almost unchanged to the LOAPA, approved by the Spanish parliament 
in June 1982. Calvo Sotelo 1990, 104; Ysás 1998, 75.
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regions achieving their power,487 it was also a major national level political 
challenge for the PNV and the Basque regional government. For the political 
objectives of the PNV, it was worrying news in a situation where the transfers of 
powers depended on political agreements. This law worsened inter-governmental 
relations and in practice the transfer of authority stopped entirely.488 Where cupo 
had not been negotiated it was to be determined by an estimation. Within the 
circles of the PNV, this was publicly announced to be economically better for the 
central government.489 In the atmosphere created by the LOAPA, there were few 
signs of being able to advance in the negotiations in the immediate future.
If the LOAPA was not a result of sudden political actions, nor was the 
agreement between the major political parties in Spain without politico-economic 
implications. The section of the agreement concerning economic policy questions 
was intended to re-interpret the Basque Country sʼ economic agreement; something 
which the Basque government and the PNV considered alarming.490 The mutual 
political understanding of the UCD and the PSOE was realigned in the LOAPA. 
Before that, the central government had been undermined, for example, by the 
way Andalusia had obtained greater autonomy than the central government would 
have preferred to deliver in 1981.491 One of the underlying reasons for the law was 
the unsuccessful military coup of February 1981 and the intention to maintain 
the functional and operative premises of the central government.492 The regional 
nationalist parties were strictly against the law, but could only vote against it 
in the Spanish parliament without any results. However, the law had to remain 
on hold, because the autonomies submitted a complaint to the Constitutional 
Court, which gave its verdict a year later (1983). The Court said that the LOAPA 
487  Magone 2004, 118–119.
488  Figure 4.
489  Deia 2.6.1981.
490  Interview with the vice-lehendakari and minister for labour, Mario Fernández Pelaz, 
of 23.10.1998. HGV 2001, 80.
491  Magone 2004, 120.
492  Prime minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo has denied that the LOAPA would have been 
a gesture towards the group sʼ responsible for the unsuccessful military coup. Calvo-Sotelo 
1990, 104; according to vice-lehendakari Mario Fernández Pelaz, it was a direct result of 
that particular event. Interview with the vice-lehendakari and minister for labour, Mario 
Fernández Pelaz, of 23.10.1998. HGV 2001, 82–84; see also Ysás 1998, 75; the minister 
for the interior in Suárez sʼ government, Martín Villa recalls that when he was appointed 
minister in September 1980, he proposed consultations between various political forces 
in order to coordinate the development and functions of the autonomous regions as well 
as decentralisation. Martin Villa 1984, 185 & 188.
108
included regulations that contravened the Constitution,493 and that the law made 
interpretations of the Constitution the exclusive right of the Court itself.
Despite the court decision, this law had had time to direct the process of 
autonomy and the restrictions it would have created were taken into account in 
those autonomies which were established during 1981. By the time the Court 
handed down its decision many of the issues of the LOAPA were already outdated. 
The statement made by the then PNV member of the Spanish parliament, Marcos 
Vizcaya,  during the parliamentary debate concerning the LOAPA was emblematic: 
the law was “unnecessary since it won all the battles before it was even passed”.494 
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the Spanish prime minister after Suaréz in 1981–1982, 
considered that the law virtuously ended the situation which had been created 
by the “dramatic Autonomy Statute negotiations”495 of the Basque Country and 
Catalonia. According to him this could have been repeated in every later case. 
Calvo Sotelo also criticised the way in which the national parties concentrated 
on one particular autonomy statute to raise their support in that region during the 
negotiations.496
The basic attitude of the PNV to this law was negative, both ideologically and 
substantially. The PNV interpreted the LOAPA as the central government sʼ way 
of trying to limit the process of autonomy and the transfer of powers by defi ning 
limits from its own standpoint.497 The sociologist Luis Moreno, who has studied 
the process of regionalisation, underlines the contradiction which was formed by 
the untimeliness of the LOAPA and the elements of harmonization it included; it 
was simply a “political impossibility”.498 In his view, the assertion of the structure 
of autonomous regions could no longer be based simply on the criteria specifi ed 
by the central government at that stage.499 Moreover, since the basic centralist 
structure of the Franco system remained almost untouched, the regional parties saw 
the LOAPA as a practical demonstration of a new, emerging centralism. The cases 
which the central government had taken to the courts at the beginning of the 1980s 
493  The verdict considers the law to include seven sections which are in contrast to the 
Constitution; moreover, eight other sections are partly in contrast with it. La sentencia 
del Tribunal Constitucional 76/1983 del 5 de agosto 1983. BOE Suplemento al núm. 197, 
18 de agosto 1983, 29–66; according to Moreno, this decision confi rmed a federalist 
reading of VIII section of the 1978 Constitution. Moreno1997, 81. According to Powell, 
the Constitutional Court still accepted in principle the uniformity of different autonomies 
as a fi nality. Powell 1999, 255; see also Almunia 2002, 148; Prego 2000, 149–153.
494  Cited in Calvo Sotelo 1990, 117; see also the interview with minister of labour and 
cabinet minister Javier Caño Moreno 20.7.1998. HGV 2001, 38.
495  Calvo Sotelo 1990, 117.
496  Op.cit., 107; for vice-lehendakari Mario Fernández Pelaz sʼ interpretation on the 
UCD sʼ policy, see his interview of 23.10.1998. HGV 2001, 82.
497  Calvo Sotelo considered it to be his own achievement, having reached an agreement 
with the PSOE on the current number of autonomous regions. Prego 2000.
498  Moreno 1997, 81.
499  Ibid.
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where the functioning of the autonomous regionsʼ  institutions was questioned also 
suggested this. Interestingly, the regional nationalist parties like the PNV even 
considered the LOAPA to be contrary to the European integration process.500 The 
statements of Calvo Sotelo are proof that the central government was not far away 
from intending to limit autonomy uniformly. The LOAPA was, both in spirit and 
in practice, against the further development of the autonomous regions.501 It would 
have restricted the future transfers of powers by political agreements in advance, 
ensured the best possible result from the central government sʼ point of view, and 
regulated the development of the autonomous communities in the long term.
The PSOE pressured the UCD government, which negotiated on the Basque 
cupo for 1982–1986 at the same time. The socialists proposed that in the Basque 
case, when the transfers of powers were negotiated, other negotiation procedures 
and different negotiating teams should be used from those mentioned and regulated 
in the Basque Autonomy Statute. This caused vigorous opposition in the PNV.502 
The PSOE also emphasized strengthening the state sʼ tax planning and coordination 
as well as the fi nancial balance between the regions. This was politically useful 
rhetoric for the PSOE in Spanish politics, but also brought it into confrontation with 
the PNV. When the PSOE won the general elections in 1982, the PNV sʼ relations 
with the new government could not become automatically better than during the 
immediately preceding years. Although the dialogue between the two cabinets 
was diffi cult,503 Garaikoetxeaʼ s government reached a consensus with the PSOE to 
the effect that in the future structural change in industry must be carried out only 
by helping some sectors, such as the electronics industry.504 This demonstrates 
how Garaikoetxeaʼ s cabinet basically saw the Basque economy sʼ development and 
structural change as possible only if the link with Spanish commercial life was 
easy and was enhanced even further. The objective of Garaikoetxeaʼ s government 
was the economic progress of the Basque Country.
The socialist politician and long-time minister in the central government, 
Joaquín Almunia, later stated that because of the LOAPA the small nationalist 
parties lost their confi dence in the new PSOE government sʼ policy concerning 
autonomy. He admitted that the LOAPA went too far politically: concern over the 
500  The aftermath of the LOAPA was long, even overlapping with voting for the EC 
membership. The regionalist parties considered that since current EC member states had 
transferred more powers to autonomous regions, the LOAPA was against the European 
trend. Quintanilla Navarro 2001, 193; the EC was at that time politically a clearly positive 
thing for the PNV, responding to the party sʼ defi nition of the national state as a non-
functional power structure. Op. cit., 194–195.
501  Rivera 1998, 89.
502  Egin & Deia 7.7.1981; La Gaceta del Norte 13.7.1981.
503  See the interview with the vice-lehendakari and minister for labour Mario Fernández 
Pelaz of 23.10.1998. HGV 2001, 84.
504  Zirakzadeh 1991, 141–142.
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political stability of Spain led to “badly chosen methods and instruments”505 and 
infl uenced the political atmosphere for many years. Because of the LOAPA, the 
PNV sʼ long-term political commitment to developing autonomy via the Autonomy 
Statute weakened. According to Garaikoetxea, at that stage the PNV had already 
started to look for “other attributes of self-government”.506 This cannot necessarily 
be seen in its economic policy, but it must be remembered that the PNV was 
prodded into this type of thinking by the institutional and political situation in the 
Basque Country in the early 1980s. It had a strong hold on power in the regional 
and provincial administrations as well as the most important city and community 
councils.507 The policy of the PNV appeared to be benefi cial in a situation where 
the central government pushed the LOAPA forward and the ETA terrorist attacks 
increased as the organization tried to aggravate the already diffi cult domestic 
political situation.508 The transfers of powers to the Basque Country had ceased509 
and the Basque Country did not follow the general trend for the PSOE government 
to continue to transfer powers to the other regions.510 The LOAPA proved to be 
politically useful for the Basque Nationalist Party. The majority of voters there 
considered the PNV as a “centrist” political party. The fear that the recently gained 
economic agreement would fall fl at infl uenced Basque politics to the advantage 
of the PNV. The political opposition in the region nevertheless blamed the PNV 
for stigmatizing the new regional institutions according to its own objectives. 
It must be remembered that the PNV traditionally aimed to present itself as a 
party which would be the “heart of the Basque state”511 and as more than just a 
political movement defending the ideology of some social group. The opponents 
of the PNV saw it as trying to create a regional administration by “supplementing 
its own insuffi ciencies”.512 In fact, the PNV secured its political power through 
the institutional structures which were being developed. This situation was still 
new for the party and led to growing differences between the views of the PNV 
activists in the regional administration and the party machine.
505  Almunia 2002, 148.
506  Garaikoetxea 2002, 149−150.
507  In the municipal elections of 1983, the PNV sʼ total share was 39.2 percent in 
Vizcaya, 40.2 in Guipúzcoa and 38.6 in Álava. GV/EJ: Archivo de resultados electorales. 
Departamento de Interior, Dirección de Procesos Electorales y Documentación. 
Elecciones Municipales 1983.(http://www1.euskadi.net/emaitzak/datuak/indice_c.apl)
508  In the Basque Country, the opposition accused the PNV of “monopolising” the 
decentralization process in the early 1980s. Onaindia 2000, 62–63 & 80.
509  Figure 4.
510  Magone 2004, 124.
511  For the opposition sʼ criticism of the PNV, see Onaindia 2000, 59–60.
512  Op. cit., 63.
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3.2.2. The politico-economic dimensions 
of the Law of Historical Territories
In November 1983, the regional parliament approved the Law of Historical 
Territories (Ley de Territorios Históricos, LTH).513 This law was in many ways 
a turning point in the politico-economic history of the Basque Country. The 
passage of the law and its economic consequences had substantial implications on 
Basque politico-economic history. The scholarsʼ  interpretations of these events, 
however, have signifi cant disparities. Very seldom have the differing comments of 
contemporaries been extensively analysed and compared. The politico-economic 
goals of the provinces and their effect on the PNV sʼ policies in this case in 
particular have not been emphasized. The institutional point of view must be 
complemented according to the thinking of Elton and Foucault by an analysis that 
takes into account the internal power relations of the Basque Country. This is also 
a way to investigate PNV sʼ strategy in this particular situation. 
The LTH that had long been drafted was meant to regulate the division of 
powers between the regional government and the provincial councils. It was to 
contain the model for the internal system of fi nancing by distributing the right to 
levy tax between those institutions. The provincial councilsʼ  historical right to tax 
collection was maintained in the Autonomy Statute, and the economic agreement 
emphasized the role of the provinces when it ordered the regulation of the taxes 
to be transferred to them. The internal disagreements of the PNV affected the 
drafting of the LTH and the parliamentary proceedings concerning that law. The 
model for regional fi nancing and the fi nancial management became a political 
tool in a situation where the rival internal views concerning the power of the party 
surfaced. The large-scale changes the PNV had experienced, such as moving from 
exile to public political life and the need to be re-organized as well as become 
responsible for collective political risks, had increased the internal tensions in 
the party. These factors also infl uenced the restoration of the organisational and 
political tradition within the party itself.514
In the LTH, the PNV activists in Álava515 wanted a solution that would make 
the province less dependent on the regional structures. The political anticipation 
concerning Álava had already been apparent during the negotiation of the economic 
agreement, but now the leadership of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, which were in the 
513  Ley de “Relaciones entre las Instituciones Comunes de la Comunidad Autónoma y 
los Organos Forales de sus Territorios Históricos. “ LPV 1991, 251–275; Ley 27/1983, 
BOPV n° 182/1983.
514  Pérez-Agote sees this organisational crisis as the main reason for the PNV sʼ problems 
in the early 1980s. Pérez-Agote 1987, 121 & 123.
515  As the most important of them, the provincial council head Emilio Guevara (PNV), 
who was considered as the PNV sʼ, but not the regional government sʼ, best expert on the 
economic agreement in the early 1980s. Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis 
Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 334.
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hands of the PNV, also underlined their politico-economic autonomy.516 The 
regional government led by Garaikoetxea did not, however, support that type of 
confederal model517 and was fi nally defeated in this battle.518 The Basque council 
of public fi nances (Consejo Vasco de Finanzas Públicas) was to elaborate detailed 
instructions on the distribution of resources and the premises for participation in 
common projects. In practice, the provinces were given considerable autonomy in 
their management of fi nances and the details of their tax collection.
The relations between the leader of EBB, Xavier Arzalluz, and lehendakari 
Garaikoetxea worsened during the parliamentary proceedings of the LTH.519 
Relations in the PNV between the two tendencies that had traditionally co-existed 
– one supporting regional independence and the other more autonomy-friendly 
– became tense. There were also disputes between conservative and progressive 
trends in ideas. In this context, the PNV activists in the regional government who 
pushed the interest of large industries and the cabinet sʼ own power to direct the 
local economy were confronted with party colleagues who sat in the provincial 
institutions and represented the foralist and small and medium size business related 
wing of the PNV.520 Signifi cantly, the opinions of the euskalerriacos were also split 
on this occasion.
Until now, analysis of the LTH and the dispute concerning it has seen, fi rst 
of all, signs of (1) a power struggle between the traditional aranaists and the 
euskalerriacos.521 This ideological point of view, which is also linked to economic 
policy visions, is evidenced by the fact that Garaikoetxea emphasised a clear 
political direction which would be supported by economic and fi scal policies,522 not 
provincially fragmented policies. His critical attitude and that of his treasury minister, 
Uriarte, became obvious at an early stage. Garaikoetxeaʼ s statements calling the 
LTH s a temporary arrangement irritated the leadership of the PNV. The leadership 
of the provinces called his opinions centralist. Correspondingly, other parties in the 
Basque Country considered the views of Garaikoetxea and his cabinet members 
strange since the supremacy of the PNV was seen to be based on the existence of 
the provincial councils. Garaikoetxeaʼ s thinking contravened the PNV sʼ traditional 
and ideological idea of economic agreement as a traditional right of the historical 
516  HGV 2001, 333–335.
517  Onaindia 2000, 81.
518  The fi rst section concerns the authority of the common institutions. The second 
explains that of the provinces, and its decrees concern the central Basque fi scal 
administration and the fi scal offi ces of the provinces (or the historical regions), and the 
division of resources between them. LPV 1991, 251–276; Copa 1989, 22.
519  Onaindia 2000, 84–85.
520  De Esteban & López Guerra 1982, 181.
521  Zirakzadeh 1991.
522  Garaikoetxea was worried about the extensive authority given to the provinces to 
enhance economic development in their own area by whatever means they chose. The 
interview with the lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea of 23.7.1998. HGV 2001, 119.
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provinces. The PNV activists who criticized Garaikoetxea saw him endangering 
the foundation of the party ideology, while his supporters thought that he was 
simply trying to make the regional administration more functional. According to 
the cabinet members, a “nation” could not be built on provincial or decentralized 
basis, though foralism would require this. Their interpretation was that the historical 
rights were “modernized” by the Autonomy Statute.523
From the point of view of the PNV, the provinces were to be secured politically, 
so that the party would begin to prepare itself for possible loss of the regional 
government. It must also be remembered that since the death of Franco there had 
been no coalition governments in Spain, either central or regional. Although the PNV 
later showed pragmatism in forming coalitions at different levels of administration, 
the idea of a coalition government was probably not considered at this stage. Without 
overemphasizing it, this may partly explain the EBB sʼ simplifi ed way of seeing the 
struggle for power at that time.
The LTH fault-fi nding group within the PNV, lead by Garaikoetxea, set the scene 
for a more active internal discussion on foralism.524 Its supporters considered that 
it had clearly recognizable characteristics, one of them being the institutions of the 
historical territories which were basically representative bodies. The most hard-line 
supporters of foralism hoped that the provincial institutions would gain more power 
and that reciprocal co-operation would have a central role in Basque politics. There 
were also foralists in the ranks of the UCD and the conservative AP. The UCD 
had already emphasized during the negotiation of the economic agreement that the 
provinces had an important role and that the regional government sʼ task was to act 
as a “referee”.525 According to the vision of the foralists, the implementation of the 
Autonomy Statute would mean giving signifi cant powers to the provinces. In the 
situation of the early 1980s, the fueros still faced the unavoidable problem that Basque 
society was different from what it had been in the latter part of the 19th century when 
the fi rst economic arrangement was created. For practical reasons, foralism could not 
therefore be implemented as such, although some of its supporters hoped so.526
Garaikoetxea wanted clearly defi ned limits to the powers and economic 
resources of the provinces, because he was afraid that the rivalry between them, 
which had already surfaced in the Basque council of public fi nance, would lead to an 
unwise economic policy. Extensive powers would also easily lead to contradictory 
523  Interview with the minister of labour and the minister in the cabinet, Javier Caño 
Moreno, of 20.7.1998. HGV 2001, 41.
524  Copa 1989, 25–28; for Garaikoetxea foralism was a disruptive factor in the Basque 
Country. The interview with the lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea of 23.7.1998. 
Op. cit., 118.
525  The article by Senator Martin Fernandez Palacio (UCD). Deia 3.5.1980.
526  This view was however in contrast with the idea promoted by the Basque nationalists 
on the nation, and against the traditional nationalist thinking. The latter included 
administrative-technical approach and trust that the “light” application of the fueros 
would offer the best circumstances for good governance. Copa 1989, 28–30.
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and competing economic policy decisions between the different levels of 
administration.527 The EBB counter-argument was that the actions of the party itself 
would guarantee harmonious functioning of the system and a consensus between 
the provinces, and eventually the maintenance of one coherent line in economic 
policy.528 The party thus took some of the power to itself and the result of the LTH 
was that a party-bounded system was implemented. The supporters of Garaikoetxea 
claimed that the interpretation of the law cannot be dependent on the referee role of 
some political party or the power relationship the law itself had made possible. The 
legislation must be generically applicable in all situations. Garaikoetxea stated that 
the institutions could not be dependent on one party only.529 Although this problem 
was institutional, the dispute concerning it was political and even appeared within 
one political party, the PNV.530 The culmination of this issue was that in order to 
approve the LTH in the regional parliament, the PNV sʼ leader, Arzalluz, joined 
forces with the conservative AP.531 Because of the internal situation of the PNV 
Garaikoetxea announced his willingness to resign in 1983 although he did not carry 
out his threat then.532
Secondly (2) it was, as the sociologist Alfonso Pérez-Agote has pointed out, a 
question of a dispute between two groups: those who wanted to (i) decentralize 
power through political institutions which contained the idea of a strong regional 
administration disconnected from the party sʼ grip; the other group aimed to (ii) 
decentralize power through the party which would create decentralized institutions 
led by the party. 533 In the early 1980s, an accelerated race was taking place within 
the PNV between these two views which prioritized the institution they governed. 
The executive body, the EBB, was levelled with a strong regional government that 
aimed for a version of LTH which would have given it a powerful position in relation 
to the provincial institutions in economic policy issues. The historically signifi cant 
thing was that the regional government, which was out of reach of the PNV sʼ party 
discipline, meant in practice the initiation of a new political class in the Basque 
Country. The party was also aware that if a person who was not fully under the 
control of the party was appointed as lehendakari, that person would control the 
party from the government.534
527  Interview with the lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea of 23.7.1998. HGV 2001, 118 & 
120−121.
528  Garaikoetxea 2002, 210−211.
529  Op. cit., 211 & 236.
530  Uriarte sʼ successor as treasury minister, Joaquín Ochoa Sarachaga, claimed later 
that the “brutal confrontation” linked to the parliamentary procedure of the LTH, was not 
repeated on any other occasion during the period of my thesis. Interview with the treasury 
minister, Joaquín Ochoa Sarachaga, of 12.6.1998. HGV 2001, 652.
531  Onaindia 2000, 87.
532  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 187–188.
533  Pérez-Agote 1987, 125–126.
534  Ibid.
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It is important to note that the strong need to centralize political decisions 
in the hands of the EBB, which seemed to be at work within the PNV, emerged 
in the situation the PNV surprisingly found itself in the early 1980s. When the 
Basque Country, with the rest of Spain moved to democracy and representative 
parliamentarism, a contradiction existed between the PNV sʼ populist and 
traditionally democratic structure and the government responsibilities it had 
received. Seen from within the PNV, the politically safest solution was to tie 
the substantial regional politico-economic powers transferred to the region and 
negotiated via the economic agreement to the party as effectively as possible. The 
power-sharing, which would have been best from the economic and fi nancial point 
of view, and was promoted by Garaikoetxea and his ministers, must take second 
place. What has not been indicated in the previous studies is that fi scal federalism 
became reality within the Basque Country through the internal decentralization. 
The amount of tax revenue that was now in the hands of the provincial councils 
made the temptation to direct public subventions to the community, real. The 
approach of Pérez-Agote is partly linked to a strategic point of view, but not a 
suffi cient one for a historian.
My approach utilizes the thinking of Elton and Foucault to produce a third 
(3) viewpoint: the LTH law shows in a practical way the power of the provinces 
within the PNV and in Basque politics. Taking into account the internal power 
structures in the Basque Country, as Elton and Foucault stress, it is clear that 
not even profound political development in the region would easily change the 
real power relationships between the provinces. The whole strategy of the PNV, 
including economic policy, was linked to this fact. As during the negotiation of 
the economic agreement,535 fi nance minister Uriarte stressed that the development 
model according to the Autonomy Statute presumed that the common regional 
institutions must be strengthened. Such a version of the LTH law that would 
strengthen the provincial institutions would mean losing a political line gained 
in the negotiations of the economic agreement.536 This argument was not however 
effective within the PNV, where various sectors were strongly predefi ned 
according to the provinces. The LTH law thus had a strong link with the internal 
centre-periphery struggle characteristic of Basque politics.537 The power of one of 
the internal alignments, bizkaitarrismo, which is named after Vizcaya province, 
became apparent. In this situation, the bizkaitarrismo stationed itself with all 
its power against the line defended by the regional government and its premier, 
Garaikoetxea.538 The power of the lehendakari, the highest leader in economic 
policy in the region, was not questioned by the opposition, but by his own party, 
535  For example, La Gaceta del Norte 30.11.1980.
536  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV, 
2001, 335.
537  Llera Ramo 1994, 17; for the bizkaitarristsʼ relations to Garaikoetxea, see his 
interview of 23.7.1998. HGV 2001, 112.
538  Interview with the treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. Op. cit., 338.
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in which he had lost his leading position. The bizkaitarrismo wing of the party 
particularly criticized Garaikoetxea, since he no longer participated in the weekly 
meetings of EBB, and he was accused of autocracy.539
My argument is supported by the fact that in the case of the LTH law the business 
elites stood out markedly according to their provinces. It had been thus at the time 
of the formation of the PNV, but in the 1980s, the rapid post-war industrialization 
of all the provinces, not just Vizcaya, was visible in the partition between the 
industrial Basque circles. This reveals how some businessmen would not comply 
with everything the euskalerriacos of the regional government proposed. In the 
higher living standard province of Álava, the PNV had to be adroit in gaining the 
support of the centre-right voters, and economic policy was always important in that 
struggle. The euskalerriacos with their ideas of further regional industrialization 
were able to recruit immigrant politicians in Álava for leadership posts.540 Further 
industrialization was seen as benefi ting the whole Basque Country. However, 
different views within the euskalerriacos group were not limited to the question 
of choosing between a laissez-faire or more concentrated regional government 
intervention in industry; it was even linked to the question of maintaining the 
special status of Álava in economic policy. Additionally, it was more important 
for the euskalerriacos of that province to have a strong party on which to lean 
on than support a strong regional government which might favour other poorer 
provinces economically and fi nancially and would not take the special economic 
policy needs of Álava into account. The differences in the economic wealth and 
structures of the provinces thus prevailed the economic policy positions of the 
PNV. In Álava, the PNV could only defend the special economic and historical 
status of the province. In conclusion, this reveals the internal power structures and 
economic policy tensions of the Basque Country. 
Elton sʼ view requires that one additional aspect also be included. Administrative 
history explains how the LTH was an important step in the institutional development 
of the region, but was also the underlying reason for many completely new 
problems. As a result of the LTH, (i) the region had a middle-level administration, 
unlike the other autonomous communities.541 It was also to a great extent a 
fi nancial administration. Since the provincial councils preserved their historical 
structures, political tensions were appearing between them and the regional 
government. Moreover, tensions existed between provinces which were different 
in terms of economic wealth. The support of the PNV also varied greatly between 
provinces, which did not make things easier in the relations between the councils. 
(ii) The relations between the various parts of administration were in the hands 
of collegial organs. The economic policy issues were dealt with fi rst of all in the 
Basque Council of Public Finances, then again in the regional parliament. The 
transfers from the regional government to the provinces were discussed in a mixed 
539  Zirakzadeh 1991, 142.
540  Op. cit., 139.
541  Administración intermedia. Aja 1999, 99 & 242.
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commission (La Comisión Mixta de Transferencias). Disputes concerning these 
transfers were to be dealt in a separate administrative organ to be established in the 
future.542 No wonder the members of the regional government also saw the LTH 
as an institutional problem543 and that the regional administration lost plenty of its 
previous rationalized nature. Elton sʼ theory, which includes administrative history 
in political history analysis, reveals the philosophy of the LTH: the law created 
a situation where the competing internal structures of the Basque Country were 
heavily concentrated in the core of the administration. Moreover, the PNV was 
increasingly obliged to try to adapt these complex interrelations and overlaps.
After the approval of the LTH, the economic and fi scal policy scene remained 
problematic. The regional government accused the provinces of not following 
a law that “favoured them”.544 These disputes were directly linked to politico-
economic power; for example, Vizcaya carried out its own industrial projects to 
the regional government sʼ annoyance.545 The latter intended to explain in public, 
with the help of economists, what the economic consequences of this state of 
affairs were.546 At the same time, when it considered that the Basque economy 
did not yet fulfi l the criteria of a decentralized system of fi nance in the Spanish 
context,547 an economically effi cient decentralized public sector did not even 
exist within the Basque Country. The regional government sʼ opinion was that 
this imbalance would lead to negligent regional level spending, where decisions 
were not taken on the basis of economic criteria and the debit-side would increase 
rapidly.548 This situation was further worsened by the economic outlook.549 The 
economic recession strained the public sector heavily and its margin for manoeuvre 
and genuine opportunities to revitalize the economy were few. In addition, in 
1983–1984 it became obvious that the previous yearsʼ  subventions dedicated to 
542  Copa 1989, 23. He referred to the provincial councilsʼ tendency to mediate their 
disputes in a particular conference (Conferencias de Diputaciones) in the 19th century, 
and the way the anti-LTH people intended to polemicize relations between the provincial 
councils.
543  Interview with the treasury minister, Joaquín Ochoa Sarachaga of 12.6.1998. HGV 
2001, 650 & 652.
544  The interview with the treasury minister Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
Op. cit., 704.
545  Ibid.
546  See, for example, the works of the María Carmen Gallastegui and Inmaculada 
Gallastegui, where they ask whether the Basque Country sʼ internal fi nancial 
administrations fulfi ls the criteria of good governance or not. Gallastegui & Gallastegui 
1984, 16–17 & 20.
547  There were no transfers of power in 1983–1984. See Figure 4.
548  The question of the administration sʼ independence is linked to the control of public 
incomes (revenue). The central government sʼ control in a system of decentralized public 
incomes was seen here as unnatural to the decentralisation process. Gallastegui & 
Gallastegui 1984, 29.
549  Op. cit., 73–74.
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re-direction of the Basque industry had not achieved the expected results.
Garaikoetxea understood the Basque economy sʼ dependence on the evolution 
of the Spanish economy and in order to guarantee investment and additional public 
fi nancing his goal was to maintain good relations with the Spanish business elites 
as well as with the central government. This infuriated his opponents even more 
and the criticism from within the PNV at the provincial level was strident. The 
party activists wanted the regional government to help small and medium size 
businessʼ interests more.550 Garaikoetxea and his cabinet were caught in cross-
fi re which was distinctively politico-economic in nature. My conclusions here 
are based purely on analysis in terms of the history of politico-economic power. 
It is a fact that the political line of the EBB won, but it is more important to 
notice that the party – and more precisely the EBB – took a strategic decision and 
chose a particular direction for the future internal institutional development in the 
Basque Country. The PNV now defended a political line which would lead to the 
provinces acting like members of a federation and a structure that could be called 
fi scal federalism. The need for an arbitrary institution to deal with the disputes 
between the regional government and the provinces thus became apparent. After 
all, historically this again was not such an unexpected turn. Taking into account 
the structure of the PNV and the political process that had started after the death 
of Franco, the strategic choices of the EBB were few. Had it taken the regional 
government sʼ side in this dispute it would have taken certain risks concerning its 
own powers and the overall support of the PNV. Since the decision of the EBB 
was not to start skating on thin ice, economic policy had to take second place.
3.3. The economic policy of the coalition governments
Despite the internal tensions, the PNV won the regional elections of spring 
1984 overwhelmingly receiving 42 percent of votes and 32 seats in the regional 
parliament.551 Garaikoetxea formed a new one-party minority government in 
April, but by the next autumn it was already clear that the single-party government 
could not continue its work.552 The situation in the regional parliament, which now 
had 75 seats, was deadlocked. In December, Garaikoetxea started negotiations 
with the PSE, which had 19 seats, on parliamentary cooperation.553 However, 
only a couple of weeks later he renounced offi ce at the request of the EBB and 
the party chose the moderate José Antonio Ardanza as his successor.554 Ardanza 
was then premier of the provincial council of Guipúzcoa, but had also been a 
550  Zirakzadeh 1991, 142.
551  See Table 2.
552  See the interview with the vice-lehendakari and minister for labour, Mario Fernández 
Pelaz of 23.10.1998. HGV 2001, 87.
553  Op. cit., 88–89.
554  Lucas Murillo de la Cueva 1990, 228−229.
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businessman.555 In spite of the diffi cult beginning, Ardanza rapidly established 
himself as lehendakari and stabilized the position of his government. He was also 
able to reach an agreement with the Socialists on parliamentary cooperation.556 
On the other hand, this limited freedom of action of his cabinet and the PNV 
in comparison to the previous years. The PNV had to take into account that the 
Socialists also had their own historical spheres of infl uence in the region. The 
PSE enjoyed strong support, especially in Guipúzcoa. The PSE also had a close 
relationship with the main Socialist trade union confederation of UGT, although 
in the Basque Country it was not nearly as strong as the nationalist trade unions. 
For the PSE it was naturally an asset that the PSOE had taken over the central 
government. In Basque politics, the strengthening role of the Socialists and 
its historical consequences can be seen through the point of view of Elton and 
Foucault, which emphasizes the power structures. This also offers an insight into 
the limits of the growing Socialist power in the region.
The deepening crisis in Basque industry speeded up the growth of 
unemployment in the region.557 The signifi cance of the industry of the Basque 
Country in the overall picture of the Spanish economy had slightly diminished: in 
1984; the Basque industry sʼ proportion of the Spanish total was 9.9 percent, where 
in 1975 it had been 10.22 percent.558 One of the last decisions of the Garaikoetxea 
government aimed to enhance communication in the labour market by establishing 
a new council for economic and social policy issues (Consejo Económico y 
Social) in November 1984559 which took over the role of the council for regional 
labour relations. The latter had already institutionalized the negotiations between 
the industrial unions and the associations of employers. This new body consisted 
of 28 members from the labour market organizations and interest groups from 
Basque commercial and social life. It also included a number of independent, 
special experts. Its purpose was to participate in drafting government bills and 
to act as an economic and social policy lobby. The institution consulted the 
regional government and the parliament in economic policy issues with a view to 
reconciling the visions of the various interest groups. The councilʼ s task was to 
participate in public sector economic planning, and the regional government had 
to deliver a report to it on the regional economic situation and its own economic 
policy regularly.560 Foucault sʼ model of analysis helps us to see that the essential 
change the council brought was its role as an initiator and developer of projects in 
economic policy as well as a body for the follow-up and analysis of the cabinet sʼ 
economic policy. This shows again how the PNV government was constantly 
555  See, for example, Almunia 2002, 279.
556  Ibid.
557  The contemporary view was that in reality industry jobs had decreased in 1975–1983 
no less than 24.5 percent. Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 58.
558  García-Egoecheaga Manzano 1984, 114; see Figure 9.
559  Ley 4/1984, BOPV n° 207; LPV 1991, 241–250.
560  Op. cit., 241–243.
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intending to build bridges to commerce and aid its interests.
Economic policy coordination in the regional government was made more 
effective by further developing the role of the vice-lehendakari, which changed 
from general political coordination towards more economic policy and budgetary 
coordination. Garaikoetxeaʼ s minister of industry, García-Egotxeaga Manzano, 
was appointed the new vice-lehendakari and was specifi cally responsible for 
economic policy issues (Vicelehendakari de Asuntos Económicos).561 According 
to the treasury minister in Ardanzaʼ s fi rst government, Fernando Spagnolo de la 
Torre, the government sʼ most important economic policy challenges in 1985 were 
(1) to resolve the dispute between the government and the provincial councils 
over the provision of collected taxes in that year; (2) to create a solid basis for the 
relationship between these two levels of administration; (3) to start the transfers 
of power according to the LTH to the provinces; (4) to respond to the problems 
caused by the economic crises, and (5) to adapt the taxation procedures to the 
recently introduced value-added tax (VAT).562 All these issues promised diffi cult 
times again for the regional government. One additional factor complicating the 
situation further was that although the LTH transferred taxation powers to the 
provinces, more than half of the tax revenue was under the authority of the regional 
government. The government tried to resolve this situation by a separate law (Ley 
de Aportaciones) which specifi ed a system for dividing resources.563 The biggest 
problems in the application of the LTH were linked to the powers in industrial 
policy where Vizcaya intended to be particularly active. 564 The confl ict between 
the cabinet and the provinces was related to the allocation of tax revenue and the 
political choices made there more than anything else.565 This made attempts at 
policy coherence diffi cult.
In the 1985 budget, Ardanzaʼ s government adopted two main lines: developing 
infrastructures and streamlining industry.566 The industrial policy remained a 
polemic issue because in the metallurgy and shipbuilding industries which were 
561  He had to answer for the unity of the regional government sʼ economic policy and for 
budgetary control. Mesa 2000, 109–110.
562  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 702.
563  Ley 7/1985. BOPV no. 219, 28.10.1985; the law, approved in 1985, required that 
about 65 percent of the revenue belonged to the regional government, 35 percent to the 
provincial councils and 20 percent to the city and municipal councils. Interview with the 
treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 703.
564  See interview with  the minister for industry and commerce José Ignacio Arrieta 
Heras of 26.6.1998. Op. cit., 447.
565  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. Op. 
cit., 704.
566  Op. cit., 709; for example, the session of 28.6.1984 at the Commission of Economy 
and Treasury of the regional parliament. PV:SC:CEHP: 02\06\02\03\0002; the session of 
13.3.1985 of the same commission. PV:SC:CEHP: 02\06\02\03\0008.
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traditionally pillars of the Basque economy, the job losses continued to be heavy.567 
The structures of industry were also to be modernized since it looked increasingly 
probable that Spain would soon become a member of the EC. In general, since 
the competitiveness of Spanish industry was known to be weaker than that of its 
West European neighbours, it was feared that the economic depression would only 
accelerate if the country joined the EC. While the traditional sectors of industry 
in the Basque Country reduced production, the regional government strove for 
an answer to the situation in special industrial projects. These were meant to 
enhance the establishment of new industrial sectors, create new jobs, and reform 
the production system. One of the most ambitious projects was the ZUR (Zona 
de Urgente Reindustrialización)568 created to help the industry cluster which was 
situated on the bank of the Nervión River in Bilbao. The regional government 
cooperated here with the PSOE central government, which included this project 
in its own economic policy priorities in 1985. The primary aim was to attract new 
industry to the area and give new work to those who were laid off. The results of 
the sub-projects of ZUR were uneven: some of the companies that moved to the 
area brought high technology but needed less workforce.569 The services sector 
was thus not able to develop at a suffi cient speed.
After the transfers of power, the regional institutions were substantially 
responsible for the design and implementation of the projects concerning 
structural and commercial policy intended to improve the economic outlook. 
They were not just managing the strategy but also the execution, which however 
stumbled over particular projects.570 The regional institutions adopted a line that 
favoured sectoral projects and subsidies. This could still not substantially improve 
the growth of new small and medium size business in the Basque Country, one 
reason being the predominant model of family business that invested modestly in 
outside services.571 The growth of demand for services remained low in the 1980s. 
In 1985, the GDB of the Basque Country was 6.1 percent of the total Spanish 
GDP; industry and construction still covering about 48 percent even as regressive 
sectors, and the services sector was nearly 50 percent of the Basque GDP. The 
corresponding fi gures for Spain were 32 percent and almost 62 percent.572 In the 
567  See, for example, the EE sʼ bill on industrial re-conversion and Minister García-
Egotxeagaʼ s reply in the regional parliament. PV:DS II Legislatura, Núm. 14. 22.3.1985, 
1–37.  
568  The ZUR projects were launched in many parts of Spain, such as Madrid and 
Catalonia. See Velasco Barroetabeña & Plaza Inchausti 1998, 409.
569  Altogether 76,000 million pesetas (456 million euros). Oña Gómez & García de 
Vicuña 2000, 202.
570  Plaza Inchausti & Velasco Barroetabeña 1999.
571  Uriarte Santamaría 1984, 130.
572  Agriculture and fi shing was slightly more than 2 percent. At state level, the fi gures 
were: agriculture and fi shing 6.4, industry 26.5, construction 5.6, and services 61.5 
percent. Tamames & Rueda 1998, 526.
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Basque Country, industry was still an important employer and there seemed to be 
few signs of an immediate change in that respect.
Spain signed the treaty of accession to the EC in June 1985. The impact of 
the EC and later EU membership on Spanish society and economy was strong,573 
though its economy cannot be said to have been isolated from the context of the 
Western European countries during the years prior to accession.574 On the eve 
of EC membership in 1985, the Spanish parliament approved the VAT law that 
meant replacing some regulations in the revenue laws with new ones. The Basque 
economic agreement was changed as well.575 Membership also affected cupo, 
which was still a subject of negotiation, through VAT; in practice the regional 
administration sʼ tax revenue would increase. The negotiations between the two 
governments concerning VAT were again extremely diffi cult. Finding a solution 
to this issue was of the utmost importance for the continuation of cooperation 
between the PNV and the PSE.576 The Basque treasury minister Spagnolo de la 
Torre was personally involved in these negotiations and considered the original 
position of the PSOE government that VAT could not be decentralized, as a major 
infraction against the economic agreement, a view he brought up explicitly in his 
public statements.577 The PNV indicated to the PSOE that this issue endangered 
the functionality of its cooperation with the Socialists at regional level. Finally, 
the central government had to cave in to the regional government since it did 
not want to re-negotiate the economic agreement which Spagnolo de la Torre 
systematically invoked.
If the economic outlook was bleak when regional autonomy was introduced, it 
was also so when Spain joined the EC at the beginning of 1986. There was no sign 
of a rapid improvement. One reason for the low growth in industrial production 
was the poor prices of the products of Basque industry. This was particularly true 
in the case of metal industry products.578 The economic outlook was complex and 
even paradoxical, because the period of 1985–1990 was a time of recovery in the 
Spanish economy. The GDB in the Basque Country grew strongly in 1987 and 
573  For the economic consequences of EC membership, see the work of the economists 
Tamames and Rueda. Tamames & Rueda 1998, 535–560.
574  For example, García Delgado emphasises that the economic developments in Spain 
after Franco sʼ death should be seen in the light of the previous economic policy and 
history, without forgetting the continental context. García Delgado 1996, 240.
575  The regulations concerning luxury tax and company acquisitions had to be changed. 
Beldarrain Garin 1998, 43–46.
576  See the interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 
5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 705.
577  El Diario Vasco 10.6.1985, and the interview with the treasury minister Fernando 
Spagnolo de la Torre of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 706; for the central government sʼ position 
on the possible decentralisation of the VAT, and how that position changed, see El Correo 
12.4.1985.
578  The average rise in industrial product prices was 344 percent in 1983. See García-
Egotxeaga 1984, 114.
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1988.579 The unemployment did not decline, because structural change decreased 
the number of jobs in the latter part of the 1980s.580 The economic growth did not 
represent new jobs, but a growing workload for those who maintained their jobs. 
So far no real modernization had been achieved in industry and the potential for 
growth in the services sector was not augmented, nor was the supply of services 
diversifi ed.581 This latter fact was extremely important for the business and industry 
services sectors. The regional administration still did not believe in possibility of 
improving the situation via tourism. It simply did not have experience of this since 
during the previous decades the industrial areas of the coast experienced mainly 
business travel. Recreational tourism was not seen as a solution because of the 
gloomy image of the Basque Country as a region of sunset industry. All in all, 
the Basque Country had lost its central position in Spain sʼ international trade by 
the end of the 1980s and, despite its location, was in immediate danger of being 
displaced in the national as well as the continental context.582
While the internal situation of the PNV remained diffi cult, Ardanza was 
compelled to order new regional elections in November 1986. The PNV now had 
to compete with the splinter party Eusko Alkartasuna-Solidaridad Vasca (or 
Basque Solidarity; EA). Garaikoetxea had helped found the party, which defi ned 
itself as a nationalist and social-democratic party.583 The PSE became the biggest 
party (19 seats), though the PNV (17 seats) still received more votes than any other 
party. At fi rst the Socialists tried to cooperate with the EA (13 seats), but when 
this did not succeed Arzalluz, the leader of PNV, agreed on political cooperation 
with the PSE.584 This agreement enabled cooperation between the two political 
groups at every level of Basque politics. According to the socialist Llera Ramo, 
this policy585 signifi ed the end of the previous “politics based on confrontation, 
579  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991, 280; see Figure 10.
580  Figure 8.
581  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 202–203.
582  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991, 268–269.
583  The EA approved its fi rst programme only in spring 1987. Ideologically, the EA was 
more radical than the PNV, and its goal was more explicitly a united, independent Basque 
Country and the recognition of its sovereignty. Programa de Eusko Alkartasuna. Congreso 
Constituyente, abril 1987. Documentos básicos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 
1998, 166–168; Acha Ugarte & Pérez-Nievas 1998; after the 1986 regional elections, the 
EA and the PSE negotiated on the possibility of forming a coalition government, with 
Garaikoetxea as lehendakari.
584  For the agreement of cooperation, see El Correo 28.2.1987.
585  This faction was later (1988) named “Spirit of Arriaga”, which refers to the Arriaga 
theatre in Bilbao, where the PNV held an extraordinary general assembly in January 
1988. It has been also called “autonomous philosophy”. The idea was that in order to be 
a Basque, one did not have to be a Nationalist. See the speech by Arzalluz of 9.1.1988. 
Documentos para la historia del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 168–170; for contemporary 
descriptions, see Onaindia 2000, 87 & Almunia 2002, 270.
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artifi cial one-party majorities and isolation”.586 Political cooperation became closer 
in 1986 when the PNV and the PSE formed a governmental coalition. Except for a 
short break in 1990–1991, this political alliance continued in the form of various 
coalition governments until summer 1998. The governmental coalition gave both 
parties an opportunity to develop their own theoretical and ideological defi nitions 
of the policy. Extension of political cooperation to all levels of the administration 
in the Basque Country meant that a new way of seeing and understanding politics 
had been introduced to the region.587 The Socialists had now a stronger position 
in the Basque administration and were more strongly present in Basque politics. 
The coalition government, which was the fi rst of its kind in Spain since the death 
of Franco, was not free of internal tensions. In the end, the scholars have claimed 
that this situation strengthened and practically confi rmed the end of the fi rst phase 
of political transition in the Basque Country when it moved to democracy after 
the death of Franco.588
The PSE, which had became an important factor in Basque politics in the 1986 
regional elections589 also hoped to infl uence the regional economic policy via its 
cooperation agreements. The gradually emerging new administration structure 
which had a clear legal basis made this theoretically possible. However, the PNV, 
which maintained the portfolios of lehendakari and the treasury minister in 
Ardanzaʼ s second cabinet was not willing to hand over power that easily. This 
was particularly the case in economic policy issues. The Socialists obtained, the 
posts of economic planning and education, among others, but the PNV named 
established professionals in the most important posts in the cabinet and most 
importantly maintained control of economic and fi scal policy.590
In general terms, the economic policy of the regional government followed 
the direction indicated by Garaikoetxeaʼ s cabinets, and the Basque government 
intended to revitalize the local economy in cooperation and in parallel with the 
central government. One factor which hindered the intentions of the PSE to 
change the direction of the regional economic policy was the persistence of the 
region sʼ economic problems. The fi rst coalition government therefore represented 
continuity in its economic policy,591 the main target of its budgeting being further 
infrastructure development and the modernization of industry.592 The Socialists 
thought that the EBB intended to be the major power by trying to change the 
586  Llera Ramo 1994, 18.
587  Rivera 1998, 90–91; Llera Ramo 1998, 418–419.
588  Rivera 1998, 90–91.
589  See Table 2.
590  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 189; Lucas Murillo de la Cueva 
1990, 228.
591  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre. HGV 2001, 
708–709.
592  Ibid. The names of the programmes of economic revitalization could change. For 
example, El Plan de Relanzamiento Empresarial, PRE.
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nature of the regional government more towards a body of civil servants.593 This 
claim needs to be assessed, since it is linked to the question of power structures 
and their complexity in the Basque case. Keeping in mind the events that led to 
the departure of Garaikoetxea in terms of Foucault sʼ analysis of power makes it 
apparent that many of the original powers of the cabinet were actually transferred 
elsewhere. On the other hand, the extensive powers of the autonomous community 
affected its public administration so that it had a more stable and professionalized 
civil service. The rapid incrementalism in its establishment also led to politicisation 
of its high levels.594 The way the EBB openly defended the treasury ministers and 
their positions in their negotiations with the central government representatives 
shows us how the party tried to be the guarantor of the economic agreement and its 
substance. Another thing is that the PNV treasury ministers unavoidably gathered 
growing know-how on fi scal policy and revenue issues from the early years of 
the administration onwards. To some degree, their image and professional profi le 
changed during the 1980s towards a more senior functionary type. However, 
this did not actually mean that they were politically independent. Some of them 
had worked in the regional administration since the beginning and belonged to 
a new class of professionals in regional fi nancing and economic policy issues. 
The newspapers and programmes of the PNV reveal that the party deliberately 
referred to their role as distinguished professionals and then backed them in 
public. Interestingly, the party programmes developed to gradually include more 
detailed, sometimes even technically coloured economic policy thinking and 
goal-setting in the 1980s. The main economic policy questions and objectives 
listed in the political manifestos and communiqués of the PNV were also obvious 
in the public appearances of the treasury ministers. All this gives us a complex but 
fi rm picture of the power relation between the PNV and its executive organ and 
the regional government treasury ministers.
Since the Basque Country was a region that suffered a structural change, it 
was allowed to use public subsidies again in 1988 and a large industry program 
was started, especially to assist the heavy industry of Bilbao.595 The European 
Social Fund, which aimed to assist among other things employment and 
entrepreneurship, contributed 3.4 billion pesetas (20.4 million euros) altogether to 
Basque government projects in 1986–1989. These included the projects targeted 
to enhance re-employment, and the proportion of the community funding rose 
593  According to Onaindia, a change took place in the image of the regional government 
in a more bureaucratic direction, and he emphasises the more civil servant role of the 
ministers. Here he also mentions the way some of them, after their political careers, 
ended up as leaders of public companies in the region. Onaindia 2000, 91.
594  Magone 2004, 129–130.
595  It lasted 36 months, and investments of the value of 37.000 million pesetas (about 
222 million euros) were subsidized with 5,000 million pesetas (about 30 million euros). 
Marzo 1994, 48.
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almost to the half of the total.596 The region also received community aid for its 
agriculture and fi shing industry which were meant to develop rural tourism, and 
the appropriate schooling and training. The fi shing industry, which was only a 
fraction of the Basque economy but had an important role in traditional Basque 
culture, was also in decline. The problem of the Basque fi shing fl eet, which had 
only a small role in Spainʼ s fi shing industry, was its relatively strong presence in 
EC waters. The Basque government also fi nanced the modernization of the fi shing 
fl eet.597 The region also received aid from the community structural funds, though 
the target programs in question were relatively small in their effect (target programs 
2 and 5b).598
The PNV and the PSE government coalition was consolidated when health care 
was transferred to the region in 1987.599 The social and health costs in the Basque 
Country were now covered partly from state funding (the social security levy) and 
partly from Basque tax revenue.600 This resulted in a signifi cant cash fl ow from the 
central government to the regional administration601 and one positive consequence of 
the increase in local tax revenue was diminished pressure on borrowing. In the long 
term, this was instrumental to progress, which meant that the accumulation of debt 
could not become as bad a problem as in other autonomous communities, not even 
in diffi cult times. The decision on meeting health system expenses also enhanced the 
still unfi nished negotiations on cupo. It is interesting to see how the Basque Country 
achieved the same health care powers many years later than Catalonia (in 1981), or 
the stronghold of the Socialists in Spain, Andalusia (in 1986).602 The PSOE did not 
want wilfully to make any concessions to the PNV; the Basque Country was not able 
to obtain the powers in question until the Socialists started to gain better positions 
in the regional power structures. This again confi rmed how the decisions on the 
transfers were politically motivated and not so much related to fi nancial management. 
An additional proof of this was that the transfers of authority were not necessarily 
followed by cost cuts or reductions in the central government structures.
596  The regional development of the Basque Country was funded, for the costs of 
geographic and sectoinal structural adjustment or development projects at an average 
level of 50 percent. Marzo 1994, 65.
597  Deia 28.11. 1986; For more information on the events of 1986 concerning the Basque 
fi shing industry and what its role in the economic relations between Spain and France 
was, see Clark 1987, 11–25.
598  These were later included in the target 2 program. EU-rahoituksen opas 2000, 3.
599  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 706.
600  Almunia 2002, 280–281; instead of the calculated proportion of 6.24, which was 
used in the economic agreement and the cupo, the state spending on health-care in the 
Basque Country had been only about 5.4 percent. Interview with the treasury minister, 
Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 706.
601  Larrea Angulo 1991, 79.
602  Rico, Fraile & González 1998, 186; Andalusia had been a stronghold of the Socialists 
since the late 1970s. Montabes Pereira & Torres Vela 1998, 21.
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3.4. The agreement on cupo
The cupo agreement which was achieved after long negotiations in 1987 was 
itself a major economic policy achievement for the regional government. It was 
important not just for the sake of the stability of Basque public fi nances but also for 
the political standing of Ardanzaʼ s cabinet and the regional political atmosphere. 
The delay was due to differences of opinion concerning the details of cupo.603 
Consequently, Spain sʼ preparation for the EC membership604 and the lack of cupo 
had hindered the implementation of the economic agreement and retarded the 
transfers of power. The temporary public fi nance arrangements had also created 
a confl ict situation in Basque politics.605 The agreement of 1987 replaced all the 
previous temporary arrangements of 1981–1987 based on estimated amounts; 
it included a defi nitive accounting method and brought fi nancial stability. The 
cupo specifi ed the proportion of every unit of accounting that was agreed and 
also defi ned the amount which the regional government would pay to the central 
government sʼ kitty for those administrative structures it would still maintain in 
the region; in other words, authority that had not been transferred to the regional 
government under the cupo arrangements.606 Along with cupo, the central 
government would not suffer economic loss if the regional tax receipt was less 
than expected. After the cupo arrangement the impact of the economic policy of 
the regional government would be even stronger in the Basque economy.
Moreover, the cupo agreement included the remission of the debts from the years 
1981–1986, and agreeing on the basis of calculation for the next fi ve years.607 The 
signifi cance of the new cupo was in the fact that it complemented and reinforced 
the Basque economic agreement technically and politically. The agreement was 
economical for the region; this caused criticism in the Spanish opposition and 
public envy in the ranks of the CiU, the dominant party in Catalonia. However, the 
Basque administration and local parties understood that the economic agreement 
had already given the region an advantage over the central government in their 
bilateral economic relations in that the details of cupo must always be defi ned in 
bilateral negotiations and the central government could not decide it unilaterally. 
The Spanish parliament was given only the opportunity to approve or reject the 
negotiated result. The PNV was aware that in this pattern it had the additional 
advantage that in these parliamentary proceedings the big national parties had 
603  Lámbarri Gómez & Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña 1994, 184.
604  El Correo 12.4. & 26.4.1985.
605  Almunia 2002, 277; interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la 
Torre, of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 704–705.
606  It is also simultaneously a “machinery of solidarity” on the behalf of the state, since 
the agreement also defi nes the state sʼ share of those public expenditure items, which do 
not belong to the regional government. Larrea Angulo 1991, 79 & 105; interview with the 
treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 704–705.
607  The regional parliament was now able to close the public accounts of the previous 
years (1981–1985) at once. Memoria Txostena 1987–1988, 43.
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to take into account their electoral base in Basque politics.608 Depending on the 
power balance at the time, the PNV might reap the benefi t of the internal tensions 
of the major parties. Understandably, this situation in which the role reserved for 
the Spanish parliament was clearly defi ned did not please all the political groups 
either nationally or in the Basque Country. The left-wing nationalist party EE in 
particular criticized the settlement system between the provincial councils and 
the regional government, which was established in the agreement. The reason was 
that according to the LTH, the Basque council of public fi nances had the right 
to decide the relative size of payments of the provinces, instead of the regional 
parliament. This matter was examined even by the Constitutional Court of Spain.609 
The situation was clarifi ed in 1988, when a Court of Auditors subordinated to the 
regional parliament was fi nally established.610
It was apparent that cupo sʼ calculated value, which functions as a vertical 
repair method, would decrease as the funding of the powers transferred to the 
region grew.611 The Basque government was at last, thanks to cupo, capable of 
carrying out long-term as well as short-term economic planning.612 One surprising 
consequence at this stage was that those power transfers which had not been 
realized became suddenly more relative in comparison to the complete economic 
agreement. The Basque economy worked the same way as in previous periods in 
history: the share of the basic funding, which was derived from expenditure was 
as big as in other parts of Spain. The complementary fi nancing was derived from 
income, which in the case of the Basque Country was to be determined in relation 
to the government revenue collected in other regions.613 Other factors such as 
European integration also emphasized the role of taxation and its regulation. In 
608  For the long negotiations on the cupo, see El Correo 15.10.1986, La Gaceta del Norte 
17.10.1986, and El Diario Vasco 4.10.1987; on the PNV sʼ point of view see, for example, 
Deia 27.10., 26.11. & 4.12.1987; on the EE sʼ criticism of the way the PNV carried out the 
negotiations, see El Diario Vasco 18.11.1987. 
609  The EE would have wanted to negotiate the annual settlements from the provinces 
to the regional government, according to their share of the public service costs of 
maintenance and public investment, paid to the central tax offi ce of the Basque Country 
(Hacienda Central de la Comunidad Autónoma). El Correo 14.10.1986, El Diario Vasco 
16.10. & 7.11.1987; Copa 1989, 58–59.
610  Tribunal Vasco de Cuentas Públicas. Ley 1/1988. LPV 1991, 223–240; the Court of 
Auditors is not an institution mentioned in the Statute of Autonomy, but it was anticipated 
in Article 65 of Ley 12/1983 de Principios Ordenadores de la Hacienda General del País 
Vasco. BOPV no. 99, 6.7.1983; Article 30 of the LTH. BOPV no. 182, 10.12.1983.
611  The cupo changed methodologically from the version in Álavaʼ s Franco era 
agreement: in no longer defi ning every item (payment) of the provincial tax levy. These 
items are defi ned by other variables, which are sources of funding for the provincial 
council and the whole Basque Country, i.e., exist in the state budget as well. Lámbarri 
Gómez & Larrea Jiménez De Vicuña 1994, 44.
612  Copa 1989, 53–55.
613  Larrea Angulo 1991, 99.
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the relations between the central and regional government, the agreement on cupo 
helped achieve a more stable basis in 1987–1988.614 The cupo system also facilitated 
economic integration between those two levels of administration and guaranteed 
the implementation of the solidarity principle incorporated in the Constitution.615 
On the other hand, the politico-economic powers of the Basque Country and the 
question concerning their limits became more signifi cant for Spain.
Despite these politico-economic leaps, the economic crises in the Basque 
industry deepened. The problem of unemployment was diffi cult to resolve when 
alternative production areas were lacking, since the labour force was not being 
directed to other sectors. Moreover, industry could not modernize rapidly with 
the help of new technology and automatisation, since investment in research 
and education or training remained low.616 This was a general problem in the 
Spanish economy, where the investment did not traditionally go into upgrading 
the technology of companies, but tended to take advantage of the low labour 
costs. That tradition was partly a heritage from the Franco years, but was even 
strengthened by the increasing amounts of foreign investment, which were also 
directed to speculative sectors such as the construction industry.617 When the 
Spanish economy was starting to show signs of take-off, the Basque economy and 
industry saw very little improvement.
In addition to the transfers of power in 1987,618 which included health care, there 
was agreement concerning the transfer of powers in employment administration 
and job training.619 The Basque Country remained dependent on the export trade 
and needed companies to bring jobs and tax revenue. The central government did 
not however invest as much as the Basque government wished in communications 
and harbours, which remained under its control.620 The regional government and 
provincial councils aimed to cooperate621 in modernizing the road network so 
that transit communications would be strengthened. The telecommunication 
network and the supply of gas were also improved to reduce the costs of the 
614  Fusi 2000, 270–271.
615  The latter is based on the fact that the cupo defi ned the Basque Country sʼ contribution 
as a region which retains and uses fi scal capacity, in line with the general state economy 
– not on a minor or a superior scale – and as the other autonomous regions do.
616  Pérez de la Calleja Bastarrechea 1984, 100–102.
617  Magone 2004, 190.
618  For example, the PSE politician, José Maria “Txiki” Benegas, later emphasised how 
these transfers were to the credit of the prime minister González. Benegas 2002; for the 
development of the transfers at that time, see Figure 4.
619  The basic problem was how to adapt the main principles of the economic agreement 
to the Spanish system of social security, which remained to be funded at the state level 
(the so-called caja única). Almunia 2002, 284.
620  For criticism of the central government, see, for example, Copa 1989, 307.
621  In 1989, a joint project called Europa-93 founded by the regional government and the 
provincial councils.
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local business world. In the face of the protracted economic depression and local 
opposition pressure – particularly from the nationalist parties, the EA and EE,622 
taxation became fi nally the most important instrument in economic policy. The 
provinces concentrated on attracting investment by applying tax incentives; the 
Basque policy-makers recognized that the Basque Country was now following a 
different fi scal policy line from the central government.623 Importantly, the EBB 
had been publicly advocating the use of tax incentives as an effi cient available 
instrument.624
Simultaneously, the role of taxation was further underlined politically and 
technically by the supranational economic integration. It is noteworthy that when 
Spain prepared itself for the EC membership it was already obvious that becoming 
a part of the internal market also meant changes in taxation and fi scal legislation.625 
The PNV and the regional government considered that the central government 
had not actually delivered the rights to taxation, but that the Basque provinces 
originally had those rights and the Constitution of 1978 had only recognized 
their existence. The economic agreement from 1981 and the cupo of 1987 were 
agreements between the central government and the Basque provinces concerning 
the coverage of the costs incurred by the remaining state administration. It was 
thus not a question of delivering constitutional rights or sovereignties within the 
Constitution as in a federal system. For the PNV, the right to regulate taxes was 
fundamentally a way of using the legal and historical powers which applied in 
the provinces. Consequently, tax regulation was linked to the status of the region. 
This background must be kept in mind when a historian analyses the decision 
to regulate taxes. One of the underlying reasons behind those decisions was the 
simplistic view of the PNV that only the legal rights of the Basque provinces were 
to be applied.
In the regional government, the PNV kept the more political portfolios where 
the Socialists were responsible for more practical sectors. Both parties soon 
recognised that one of the major problems in their coalition government was their 
inexperience in real cooperation. The administrative structures also remained to 
be strongly linked to the PNV.626 The cooperation between the two parties helped 
to stabilize the institutional development of the Basque Country considerably 
622  BOVP 1987 B-IV-31, BOVP 1988 B-IV-54 & B-IV-83; Memoria Txostena 1987–
1988, 157, 163 & 169.
623  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 711.
624  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1985, 3.
625  According to Beldarrain Garin, seen from the regional government sʼ point of view, 
the economic agreement was still an one between the state and the authorities responsible 
for tax levy (i.e., the provinces), not delivery of constitutional authority or sovereignties 
in the framework of the 1978 Constitution as in federalism. Beldarrain Garin 1998, 101–
102.
626  Interview with the minister for the economy, Juan Atienza Serna, of 6.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 784−785.
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and, by the end of the decade, important laws like those concerning the public 
sector sʼ functions and harmonization, coordination and cooperation in fi scal 
issues were approved in the regional parliament.627 In spite of these developments, 
in 1988 the EBB complained in public that the advent of the Socialists in the 
Basque government had not signifi cantly improved economic coordination with 
the central government.628 The representatives of the PNV were annoyed by the 
tough line adopted by the PSOE ministers on such issues as regional differences 
in taxation.629
Although in Basque politics the EA then had a signifi cant role as a recognized 
challenger to the PNV, the Socialists considered the EA a more insecure 
alternative.630 The PSE thus did not actively seek an alternative coalition partner. 
The regional government gave the Socialists larger access to Basque society than 
ever before,631 their asset being the working dialogue and cooperative connection 
with their party colleagues in the central government. Still, where fundamental 
issues of the Basque Country sʼ politico-economic power as the economic agreement 
or cupo were discussed at the negotiating table with the central government, it was 
the PNV representing the regional government, not the PSE.
Spain sʼ EC membership started an evolution in public fi nance which was 
originally described as a slowing increase in public expenditure and entrenchment 
at the annual level established during the 1986–1988 period. The process was even 
enhanced by the economic boom in Spain at the end of the 1980s. The economic 
growth was not, however, uniform between sectors or regions. The central 
government was also obliged to seek solutions to the challenges brought by the 
EC membership, such as increasing competition in foreign exports, the problems 
of agriculture, negligible increase in industrial productivity effi ciency and only 
slowly decreasing unemployment.632 The result was that the public defi cit kept 
growing despite the upswing in the economy. The time of economic speculation 
was also linked to social problems in the form of worsening relations between 
the Spanish government and the trade unions.633 The labour market remained 
unchanged during the 1980s.
The marked increase in unemployment exacerbated social tensions in the 
627  Ley 6/1989 de 6 de julio “Función Pública Vasca”. BOPV no. 144, 28.7.1989; Ley 
3/1989, de 30 de mayo “Armonización, coordinación y colaboración fi scal”. BOPV no. 
109, 9.6.1989. 
628  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1988, 8.
629  For example, El Correo 18.9.1988.
630  Interview with the minister for the economy, Juan Atienza Serna, of 6.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 785.
631  Almunia 2002, 282.
632  European Economy 1995.
633  García de Cortázar & González Vesga 2000, 637–638.
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Basque Country while the market economy fl ourished in the region.634 The 
fi nancial institutions – the commercial banks as well as the public savings banks 
which were in the hand of the regional administration – had been practically the 
only sector making profi ts during the diffi cult years of the early 1980s. The two 
big banks of the region, the Banco Bilbao and the Banco Vizcaya, merged in 
1988, becoming the BBV (Banco Bilbao Vizcaya). Simultaneously, the regional 
government launched talks concerning the possible fusion of the provincesʼ savings 
banks, which resulted in the creation of one larger entity in every province instead 
of the previous two.635 In practice, these public fi nancial institutions were under 
the control of the PNV and the EA but, owing to the internal problems of the PNV, 
this issue was also handled in the EBB.636 The public discussion then continued 
with the possibility of creating one large fi nancial entity by merging all three. 
This project did not proceed since the political parties whose representatives sat 
on the boards of those institutions could not agree. It is necessary to understand 
that these major changes in the Basque banking sector took place before the 
mergers and obligatory re-organisations of banks all over Spain which was to a 
great extent a consequence of the economic depression cycle of early 1990s. The 
Basque banking sector had nevertheless started to consolidate itself before that.
Despite the practical and political problems of the re-organisation among the 
public fi nancing institutions, it was an economic policy victory for Ardanzaʼ s cabinet 
and the PNV. The politico-economic power of the party and the determination 
of the then treasury minister, Alfonso Basagoiti, as well as his good personal 
relations with the leadership of the BBV bank enabled the Bilbao stockmarket to 
remain independent.637 Finally, the infl uence of the Socialists was limited in all 
these arrangements, just as in the regional government sʼ budgets during the years 
of Basagoiti.638
The economic policy objectives of Ardanza sʼ government were intended to 
enhance social cohesion and to increase social solidarity by defi ning a minimum 
wage and improving the social services network.639 Several reasons for this 
policy can be found. The political programme of the PNV in 1987 included a 
634  Montero 1998, 117; the decrease in the population in the Basque Country was 
historically a new phenomenon. 
635  In Vizcaya Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK), Álava Caja Vital-Vital Kutxa, and 
Guipúzcoa La Kutxa. Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 204.
636  Before the merger, the savings banks in Vizcaya were under the control of the PNV; 
in Guipúzcoa both were under the control of the EA, while in Álava one was controlled 
by the PNV and the other one by the EA. See the interview with the treasury minister, 
Alfonso Basagoiti, of 15.6.1998. HGV 2001, 848–849.
637  The Bilbao stock market was founded in 1890. Salmon 1991, 160; Basagoiti has since 
explained that the changes in the banking sector were possible in the latter part of the 
1980s because the necessary regional administrative structures had already been created. 
Interview with treasury minister Alfonso Basagoiti of 15.6.1998. Op. cit., 849 & 851.
638  Interview with treasury minister Alfonso Basagoiti of 15.6.1998. Op. cit., 858−859.
639  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 203.
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defi nition that emphasized the promotion of the values of a welfare society.640 The 
consequences for the individual and families of unemployment were highlighted 
and the economic policy decisions were justifi ed by appeal to the fi ght against 
unemployment in the region. The scope of the social security was linked to this 
process. The party programme mentioned social welfare when public spending 
was planned,641 an approach which has been called “welfare nationalism” by 
scholars.642 The reasons behind it, however, have not been thoroughly analysed 
before. My argument is that it was not a coincidence but a conscious choice, 
based on particular conclusions drawn by the party. The PNV was obliged to fi nd 
an answer to the ideological challenge from the moderate Basque nationalism 
represented by the EA,643 including strong economic policy features. The EA 
listed the defence of the region sʼ economic freedom among its objectives. It also 
declared its commitment to the traditional social democratic policy goals in 
its party programme, including the fi ght against poverty and the redistribution 
of wealth. The self-defi nition of the EA which was made to a great extent in 
economic terms was a consequence of the party sʼ need and willingness to fi nd its 
place in the Basque political scene. First and foremost, it wanted to differentiate 
itself from its closest rival, the PNV.
The economic dimension should not be however underlined too much in 
the ideology of the EA; the party was mainly situated on the centre-left at its 
inception.644 The differences in economic policy issues between the PNV and the 
EA were not fi nally crucial. The heterogeneous background of its founders645 and 
the more communal view of the Basque economy generally infl uenced the EAʼs 
economic policy orientation. The EA adopted a more positive attitude towards 
European integration from the beginning. According to the EA, it was more 
640  CD/PNV: Nacionalismo para el 2.000 – 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas 
y Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 293–295 & 321–322; 
for the “social welfare sʼ legitimacy as an item of public expenditure” see also Programa 
electoral. Por una Euskadi mejor. Elecciones generales ´93, 87–101.
641  CD/PNV: Nacionalismo para el 2.000 – 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas 
y Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 321–322.
642  “El nacionalismo del bienestar”. Núñez Seixas 1999, 166.
643  For the PNV sʼ ideological answer to the EA, see, for example, CD/PNV: Comunicados: 
Aberri Eguna 1987; Acha Ugarte & Pérez-Nievas 1998, 93–97.
644  Acha Ugarte & Pérez-Nievas 1998, 96.
645  Signifi cantly, there were both modernists and traditional aranaists among them. 
Op. cit., 93.
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benefi cial to the Basque Country if the cooperation crossed the national borders.646 
The EA took an active role in economic policy issues in the regional parliament, 
as was shown in the form of numerous private membersʼ  bills it proposed on 
economic policy issues.647 The role of welfare state and the defi nitions linked to it 
can be explained by the societal development of Spain and its autonomous regions 
as well as the effects of the European integration process. We must not forget the 
situation concerning the transfers of powers in the latter part of the 1980s either 
when the transfer of health care was negotiated – it was important for the PNV to 
stress the role of the social sector and to try to increase political pressures on the 
Socialists in its relations with the central government and in the region as well. 
After this transfer, the economic policy responsibility of the regional government, 
and thus the PNV, was again increased since the regional administration was 
responsible for public services in the Basque Country to a signifi cant extent. The 
need of the PNV to compete effectively with the Socialists and the EA splinter 
group led to a programme stressing welfare issues; this was also again as much a 
consequence of the PNV sʼ social sensitivity.
3.5. The quest for new economic policy solutions
In the regional elections of 1990, the PNV won back its position as the leading 
party (22 seats) whilst the PSE sʼ support fell (16 seats). The PNV eventually 
benefi ted from the years of the fi rst coalition government (1986−1990) more 
than the Socialists, who considered that the cabinet had been identifi ed with the 
persona of lehendakari Ardanza.648 The PNV also took care not to hand over 
political power to the PSE in the latter part of the 1980s. The PNV built up fi rst 
a coalition government with the EA and the EE, while Ardanza continued as 
lehendakari. In economic policy, the new government ambitiously set the goals of 
creating a Basque central bank,649 integrating municipalities more closely with the 
regional and provincial economic arrangements, and enhancing the integration of 
646  The differences between the EA and the PNV have been thought to originate in the 
different institutional positions of the parties rather than ideological differences. The EA 
received 10.9 percent of the votes in the regional elections of 1986, gaining 13 seats in 
the regional parliament. The party was popular, particularly in Guipúzcoa and outside the 
autonomous region in Navarra (Garaikoetxeaʼ s home province). In the elections of 1988, it 
got 15.8 percent and in 1990 only 11.3 percent of the votes. In the regional elections of 1994 
its support decreased again, amounting to 10.1 percent. Table 2; Núñez Seixas 1999, 131.
647  See, for example, Memoria Txostena 1987–1988.
648  For the PNV sʼ and the administration sʼ relations and linkages, see the interview with 
the minister for the economy and PSE politician, Juan Atienza Serna, of 6.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 781–782 & 801.
649  It remained one of the goals of the PNV during the 1990s. CD/PNV: Programa 
electoral. Por una Euzkadi mejor. Elecciones generales ʻ93. EAJ-PNV, 18.
135
the town councils into the work of the Basque council of public fi nances.650 The 
PNV kept the treasury portfolio,651 while the post of the minister of the economy 
and planning, given to the EA, was deprived of authority.652 The relations between 
the PNV and the EA remained tense, and the PNV attempted to ally itself with the 
PSE in the municipalities so that the EAʼs position would decline in Guipúzcoa, 
its strongest power-base.653
This experimentation between the moderate Basque nationalist parties failed 
and the regional government resigned in late 1991, to be replaced by a government 
coalition of the PNV, the PSE and the EE. Later this became a two-party coalition 
when the Socialists and the EE merged (1993).654 The PNV again got the politically 
most signifi cant posts: lehendakari, minister assisting the lehendakari, the 
treasury and fi nance, minister for industry and energy and minister of the interior. 
The previous treasury minister, José Luis Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña (PNV), 
continued and the PNV also took the post of fi rst vice-lehendakari, responsible 
for the economy.655
The beginning of the 1990s was gloomy in the Spanish economy, 1991–1995 
being worse than the EC/EU average.656 GDP grew by an average of 1.3 percent and 
infl ation by 5.6 percent, while the corresponding fi gures for the EU were 1.5 and 
4.1 percent. Unemployment in Spain fell –0.5 percent and in the EU –0.4 percent. 
The increase in productivity in Spain was only 1.8 percent whilst the EU average 
was 2.0 percent.657 In Spain the consequences of the loss of autonomy in budget 
policy became more apparent in 1992–1993, when the international developments 
and therefore problems in export trade led to a new economic depression. In 
the face of decreasing tax revenue the public expenditure in particular had an 
impact on the growing public defi cit. At the moment of deepest recession, public 
expenditure reached a historical 49.7 percent of the GDP. The public defi cit also 
reached a record fi gure of 7.5 percent in 1993 and its burden on the economy 
was signifi cant. The ratio of public debt was almost 59.8 percent in 1993.658 The 
Spanish economy sʼ dependence on foreign investment had also grown rapidly 
650  Mesa 2000, 120; for the process of forming the government, see Deia 23.1.1991.
651  José Luis Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña, who had been a close aid of the previous 
ministers, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torrea and Alfonso Basaigoiti, was appointed treasury 
minister.
652  Mesa 2000, 122; for a good analysis of the politico-economic powers of the other 
political parties in the Basque Country, see Mauleon 1993.
653  Mesa 2000, 121.
654  Montero 1998, 117.
655  Mesa 2000, 125.
656  The European Union was founded by the Treaty of Maastricht signed in February 
1992, which came into force from the beginning of 1993. Kemppinen 1999, 2.
657  Tusell 2000, 59.
658  European Economy 1995, 10.
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since joining the EC.659 Just as the pressures on economic structures grew, the 
government of prime minister González had less room for manoeuvre since the 
PSOE sʼ support diminished continuously.
When the prolonged economic recession of the 1990s began in Spain, its social 
consequences began to show even more clearly in the Basque Country. The high 
unemployment there had not decreased, even during the previous economic boom 
(1985–1990).660 The analyst of The Economist claimed that the Basque Country 
in 1992 experienced the biggest industrial turmoil since the period of 1975−1982, 
which had already caused the disappearance of about 100,000 industrial jobs.661 
The steel industry urgently needed for complete overhaul of its production 
infrastructures. An example of the structural changes that sector lived through 
is the crucial metallurgy company Altos Hornos de Vizcaya (AHV), which had 
a history of almost a hundred years and employed 13,500 people in 1972. In the 
1990s it was replaced by Acería Compacta de Bizkaia (ACB), which employed 380 
people. The protests of the metal trade unions did not affect this development.662 
The unions claimed that the Basque businessmen, as a result of their short-term 
thinking, had left the trade unions and the regional government alone in their fi ght 
for the Basque economy and in the search for solutions.663
The Basque government started several regional programs and special 
initiatives which aimed to create a new, high-tech industry in the ruins of the old 
heavy-industry. This strategy in which the regional government tried to coordinate 
with the provincial councils also sought to create a new model for economic 
development, investment in technology and modernization of infrastructure being 
659  In 1986−1992 imports continuously outgrew exports. The Economist 25.4.1992, 
9−10; The Economist 21.8.1993, 38.
660  See Figure 8.
661  The Economist emphasised the need to further streamline and intensify the local 
steel industry, referring to the theories of the economist Michael Portier, according to 
which the region should concentrate even more on some strong sectors, like the production 
of value-added steel products, machinery components, and foodstuffs. The Economist 
25.4.1992, 9−10; see also Portier 1998.
662  Another economically signifi cant and historical company which closed down was 
Euskalduna. Its workers held a protest march, so-called “Marcha de Hierro” all the way 
to Madrid in 1992. The last blast furnace of the AHV company was decommisioned on 
June 1996. Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 204–205; for the coverage of 
the protest march in the Finnish media, see Helsingin Sanomat 2.11.1992.
663  The attitude of businessmen has, however, been explained by the threat caused by 
terrorism. Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 204–205; Pérez de Calleja 
1991; for an exceptionally good defence of the 1980s economic policies of the Basque 
regional government, see Alaez Aller & Bilbao Ubillos 1993.
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given preference.664 So that the isolation of the Basque Country could be avoided, 
in the Spanish as well as in the continental context (the EU) new economic policy 
models and means were needed. However, in the diffi cult economic situation, the 
provincesʼ  independence in tax regulation promoted more daring tax incentives 
for companies.665
In the Basque Country, the economic depression was still accompanied by 
the problem of political violence. Although Uriarte had already defi ned terrorism 
as “a serious problem” in the early 1980s and a considerable obstacle to political 
and social normalisation of the region,666 there was no general public discussion 
concerning the economic consequences of terrorism before the Socialists entered 
the regional government.667 Only then was the EBB forced to speak out more 
openly on the political violence.668 In the early 1990s, the economic consequences 
of terrorism were practically a taboo as a public talking-point and discussing it 
was considered as exaggerating the problem.669 The political leadership, however, 
encountered the economic consequences of terrorism repeatedly when seeking 
new approaches to the economic depression.
The representatives of Basque business life were conscious of the threat the 
terrorism posed to the economic recovery and entrepreneurship, and how political 
violence exacerbated the effects of recession and made matters worse;670 in practice 
it deferred incoming investment, and hindered the decrease in unemployment.671 
They considered that the reasons for the gloomy economic outlook of the early 
1990s, apart from cyclical fl uctuations, were decreased private investment, political 
instability and the harassment of businessmen. ETA ran a protection racket to 
fi nance its operations.672 Local fi rms which neglected to pay were subjected to 
664  Giraldez 1992; Programmes like Plan 3R (Plan de actuación extraordinaria para 
empresas industriales en difi cultades), Plan Garapen, Plan General de Tecnología e 
Innovación aimed to improve competitiveness and to help the industrial companies in 
trouble; the technology centres (Parque Tecnológico) were also created in every province: 
Zamudio in Vizcaya, Miramón Guipúzcoa and Miñano in Álava. Oña Gómez & García 
de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 205–206.
665  For a contrary opinion, see Zubiri 2000, 108–109.
666  Uriarte Santamaría 1984, 153.
667  The EBB briefl y discussed this issue in the statement by Aberri Eguna in 1988. 
CD/PNV: Comunicados:  Aberri Eguna 1988; see the interview with the minister for the 
economy, Juan Atienza Serna, of 6.7.1998. HGV 2001, 784.
668  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1988, 2–3 & 7.
669  For the public comments on the subject, see the independent Bilbao daily El Correo sʼ 
economics journalist Ignacio Marco-Gardoquiʼ s comment of 28.5.1996. Nuevos Extractos 
de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País, 1998, 35.
670  Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 61.
671  Uriarte Santamaría 1984, 152–154.
672  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 205. ETAʼs fi nancing had been based 
on the so-called revolutionary tax (impuesto revolucionario), kidnappings and donations 
since the 1970s. For the kidnappings of businessmen see, Sullivan 1988b, 315.
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malicious damage. In the 1980s and 1990s ETA caused fear in the corporate world 
with kidnappings which produced ransom money.673 Despite its pronouncements, 
ETAʼs hostility towards businessmen was not directly a consequence of its left-
wing ideology, but rather a result of its constant need for money.674 In the ranks of 
ETA and radical nationalists it was, however, understood that harassment of big 
business also included the essential elements of an ideological battle.675 There was 
no direct economic background to the political violence in the Basque Country in 
the 1980s and 1990s, nor did the changes in the region sʼ wealth essentially affect 
the intensity of the political violence and terrorism.676
There are no detailed fi gures concerning the negative effects the political 
violence had on the Basque economy over the years. The direct or indirect 
economic consequences of terrorism were diffi cult to estimate,677 but the political 
violence was known to have affected the decisions of individual companies not 
to invest in the Basque Country; it was even suspected to have been among the 
reasons behind the closure of some big companies.678 In these cases, thousands 
of jobs were involved. The regional government consequently believed that the 
disappearance of political violence could positively affect economic development 
in the Basque Country. The small size of the Basque Country, its economy, 
and its limited human and fi nancial resources even magnifi ed the effects of the 
problem.679 Moreover, its economy was particularly vulnerable because of the 
prolonged recession and was diffi cult to revitalize. The question of the Basque 
Country sʼ image as a regressive industrial region posed the special problem for all 
the revival policies of making the region more attractive to investors.680 While the 
threat of terrorism did not make this task any easier, it did lead to all the economic 
673  In most cases, the victims of these kidnappings were representatives of the wealthy 
industrialist families. Prego 2000, 354–355; Oña Gómez & garcía de Vicuña Peñafi el 
2000, 205; only in the 1990s did ETA start to kidnap offi cials and, instead of ransom 
money, pressured the state to move ETAʼs imprisoned members from the prisons in other 
parts of Spain to the Basque Country sʼ prisons. Prego 2000, 355.
674  Sullivan 1988b, 296–299; for the Finnish media, see Helsingin Sanomat 15.4.1996 & 
27.7.1996.
675  The newly-founded Basque business interest group CONFEBASK sʼ leader took note in 
the early 1980s of how the radical nationalists tended to use the faults in the actions of some 
company, which had been extorted by ETA, “as excuses for characterising the whole societal 
system as unjust”.Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 61; Sullivan 1988b, 274; Confebask 2003.
676  See Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003.
677  For example Plaza 2001; analysis of the economic effects of terrorism is extremely 
diffi cult. See the work of OECD in 2002. Lenain, Bonturi & Koen 2002; Abadie & 
Gardeazabal 2002.
678  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 204–205.
679  Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 60–61.
680  For example, the economic development of the Basque Country of France is facilitated 
by the region sʼ more stable political situation in comparison to the Basque Country of 
Spain. Raento 2002, 100.
139
policy decisions which could improve things.
There are no documents which would demonstrate that the problem of 
terrorism was one of the reasons behind the growing use of tax incentives in the 
Basque provinces in the early 1990s, or at other times. If we take into account the 
statements of the politicians and the political and electoral programmes of the 
PNV as well as the scale of the region sʼ economic diffi culties, it is hard to believe 
that it did not infl uenced the economic and tax policy-makers on some occasions. It 
is also diffi cult to show that it had nothing to do with those decisions. In historical 
analysis the tax incentives therefore probably had a political connection with the 
additional economic burden caused by terrorism.
The moderate Basque nationalist and major Spanish national parties 
alike suffered in the early 1990s from a severe credibility gap which brought 
additional pressures to fi nding new alternatives in regional economic growth. No 
representatives of the parties had been able to offer real economic or political 
solutions for the Basque Country and the extended powers did not signify real 
economic recovery or the disappearance of social tensions. One of the only positive 
things for the PNV was that the EA was no longer capable of increasing its support 
at the expense of the Basque Nationalist Party. However, unemployment reached 
a new record of 25 percent in the Basque Country in 1994, worse than in the 
previous recession of 1984 when it peaked at 22.3 percent.681 Besides, the different 
working-hour adjustments and stand-downs affected a great number of employees. 
The overall image of the Basque economy was extremely complex; the Basque 
steel industry was even used elsewhere in Europe as an example of a sector kept 
alive purely by public subsidies.682 The regional administration certainly intended 
to ameliorate the effects of the industry sʼ structural adjustment by redirecting 
production to alternative industry sectors. In the hope of quick solutions, it 
facilitated large-scale industrial projects in 1993 and 1994 which fi nally were not 
implemented because of their economically precarious nature. Examples of such 
projects included factories to produce aircrafts parts and vehicles. Despite the crisis 
in the Basque economy, it remained more open than many of its neighbours.683 
That openness only had to be utilized to attract investment so that new companies 
would replace the disappearing industrial structures. The easiest way to do this 
had been tax incentives. However, the need for a change in economic policy 
thinking was becoming obvious. The regional change in industry and production 
681  In 1994 the unemployment rate in the Basque Country was 25 percent, and 23.8 
percent in 1995; see Figure 8.
682  The Economist 3.7.1993, 12.
683  Lámbarri 1994, 89; the deputy-minister of the treasury Carlos Lámbarri pointed out 
that the economic agreement provided the regional government with practically all the 
economic policy instruments that every state has in practice, the only exception being 
monetary policy, which remained exclusively with the Spanish central government in the 
early 1990s. Op. cit., 91; cf. also CD/PNV: Programa electoral. Por una Euzkadi mejor. 
Elecciones generales ʻ93. EAJ-PNV.
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in the Basque Country increasingly emerged as the key factor in returning to the 
path of economic growth and revitalizing entrepreneurship or adding variety to 
production.684 Nonetheless, the obstacles in accepting that reality and adapting to 
it were substantial.
Basque and Spanish politics were more clearly connected in the early 1990s. 
It turned out to be politically benefi cial for the PNV that the PSOE increasingly 
suffered from internal problems and the worst recession in Spanish post-war 
history decreased the Socialistsʼ elbow room. Surprisingly, a consequence 
was that the PNV and the Basque government led by the party found itself in 
a good negotiating position in economic policy issues at both state and Basque 
Country level. This was apparent in 1992 when the economic agreement was re-
negotiated for 1992–2001. This trend accelerated after the general elections of 
1993, when the PSOE became more dependent on the regional partiesʼ  support 
in the Spanish parliament. The CiU of Catalonia and the PNV in particular saw 
their role becoming more important.685 They were easier allies for the PSOE than 
the United Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) since they did not want major changes in 
foreign or economic policies. When the importance of the PNV grew in Spanish 
politics, even the possibility that the party would participate in the Spanish central 
government, holding the portfolio of minister of industry, was discussed in public 
in July 1993. However, this did not came to fruition.686
The Socialist had been able to stay in power in Spain since 1982, because 
of their ability to maintain the regional alliances, broad support, an ability to 
regenerate ideologically and the least possible internal cohesion. The policy of the 
opposition parties traditionally had less effect on the PSOE.687 In this respect the 
situation changed in the 1990s: the main opposition party, the centre-right Partido 
Popular (PP) had a greater choice of political weapons to hand because of the 
deep recession. The obvious strengthening of the PP also increased the Socialistsʼ 
willingness to stay in the Basque government. In spite of the fusion of the PSE and 
EE in 1993, the Socialists were losing ground in the Basque Country.688
The economic agreement for the Basque Country was renegotiated in 1993 
between the central and regional governments, since Spain had increasingly to 
adapt its economic structures to the requirements set by the advancing European 
684  Cf. EUSTAT: Comercio Exterior 1998, 14.
685  The Economist 12.6.1993, 55−56; Helsingin Sanomat 31.5.1993.
686  According to the PNV sʼ long-time parliamentarian in the Spanish parliament, Iñaki 
Anasagasti, the PNV was offered the portfolio of minister for industry and energy in the 
negotiations. However, his interpretation is that the offer was not a serious one. Anasagasti 
2004, 139–155; Montero 1998, 118; Helsingin Sanomat 8.6.1993.
687  Martínez Sospedra 1996, 273
688  Llera Ramo 1998, 425.
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integration and especially the emerging European monetary union (EMU).689 In 
the agreement of 1993, the Basque economic arrangement was accommodated to 
the internal EU market regulations.690 The powers included this agreement and its 
normative content were also updated. The role of the economic agreement and its 
economic potential in the context of the dark economic outlook of the early 1990s 
takes shape when we see that it already covered 86.5 percent of all state taxation.691 
This revised agreement gave the Basque Country the opportunity to decide 
independently on the details of company taxation. The provinces responsible for 
the tax levy established substantial company tax concessions which were called 
“tax holidays”.692 While the underlying reason for this was the deep, persistent 
economic recession, these measures put the regional administration on a collision 
course with the EU institutions. The European Commission had already started 
investigating the Basque provincial tax regulations in 1988 and decided in 1993 
that the regulations were equivalent to state subsidies and therefore against 
article 92.1 of the EU treaty (later article 87.1). The representatives of the Basque 
Country pointed out that the Commission decision did not spell out whether 
these regulations could also possibly be interpreted as state aid on other grounds; 
for example, because they changed the taxation of some company within one 
state.693 The regional government saw this decision as recognizing the existence 
of the Basque system of taxation, and thus as a political victory.694 The regional 
government also intended to simultaneously clarify the situation via closer fi scal 
coordination within the autonomous community.695
The regional elections of October 1994 underscored the fragmentation 
characteristic of Basque politics. The provincial borders increasingly determined 
the support for the parties.696 The Socialists lost more ground, which was also a 
result of the scandals in the party at state level, such as the case of non-police hit 
689  See the presentation by the treasury minister, José Luis Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña, 
on the regional parliamentary committee on the economy, treasury and the budget, 14 
February of 1992. PV:DC/CEHP 14.02.1992, 18−38; The Economist 12.6.1993, 55−56.
690  Lámbarri 1994, 92.
691  Ibid.
692  So-called vacaciones fi scales.
693  These regulations were fi nally abolished in the economic agreement for 1997–2001. 
The incentives were then allowed to all the companies operating in the region. Zubiri 
2000, 192.
694  See the presentation by the treasury minister, José Luis Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña, 
on the regional parliament sʼ committee on the economy, treasury and the budget, 12 June 
1991. PV:DC/CEHP 12.06.1991, 9−28; Muguruza Arrese 1997, 31.
695  See the presentation by the treasury minister, José Luis Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña, 
on the regional parliament sʼ committee on the economy, treasury and the budget, 12 June 
1991. PV:DC/CEHP 12.06.1991, 28.
696  Llera Ramo 1998, 427–428.
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squads that had been used against ETA and party in-fi ghting.697 Moreover, in the 
Basque Country the PSE-EE coalition did not succeed politically. The PNV won 
the elections, but the PP particularly strengthened its position.698 In late 1994 the 
PNV sʼ Ardanza formed a new coalition government with the EA and the PSE-
EE. As in the previous years, the PNV kept the most signifi cant institutional and 
fi nancial administration portfolios.699 The government included only one post of 
vice-lehendakari which involved economic policy powers;700 the treasury minister, 
to which Juan José Ibarretxe (PNV) was appointed. His task was to be accountable 
for the general and sectoral coordination of the government. The internal legal 
and economic control was united and the department led by him also got strategic 
tasks linked to economic policy.701 The aim was to strengthen the coherence of 
the actions of the government and refi ne the economic policy direction. Ardanza 
wanted to set clear goals in order to extend the autonomy in economic policy in 
future negotiations with the central government. In pursuance of the adoption 
of the economic policy objectives, the coalition government parties agreed on 
extensive modernization of regional administration, the intention being to reduce 
the size of the government and its departments.702
The decreasing support for the PSE-EE did not leave it without its own economic 
policy planning on issues such as the resuscitation of Vizcaya and Bilbao. It also 
aimed to change the image of the city and the entire Basque Country,703 but in 
spite of the signifi cant economic projects of the early 1990s, like that to revitalize 
Greater Bilbao,704 the Socialists did not succeed in upsetting the dominance of 
the PNV in Basque public fi nance and economic policy. The minister for the 
economy in Ardanzaʼ s cabinet, Juan Atienza (PSE), had limited powers and the 
PNV was not yet devoted to enhancing the cooperation between state, regional 
697  The growing problems of the Spanish Socialists were also explained in the Finnish 
newspapers. See, for example, Helsingin Sanomat 11.6.1994, 25.9.1994, 31.7.1995 & 
26.4.1996.
698  Table 2.
699  Mesa 2000, 132.
700  See, for example, PV:SC:CEHM: 05\06\02\03\0023. The session of the regional 
parliament sʼ committee on the economy, treasury and the budget of 28.5.1997.
701  Interview with the vice-lehendakari and treasury minister, Juan José Ibarretxe, of 
21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 1478.
702  However, taxation and public administration were put into the same department, 
which, with the department of industry, was the largest one in the regional administration. 
Mesa 2000, 131–133.
703  The minister for the economy, Juan Atienza Serna, commented on this question 
forcefully in public. El Correo 18.5.1990.
704  See the interview with the minister for the economy, Juan Atienza Serna, of 6.7.1998. 
HGV 2001, 793–795; EU funding was channelled for example to the construction of the 
Bilbao metro, and other projects which aimed to modernize the infrastructure; according 
to the Socialists, these in particular created conditions for the later economic growth and 
its rapid effects in the Basque Country.
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and provincial levels, preferring the private sector to take the lead. Interestingly, 
the PNV increasingly concentrated on fi nding new solutions to the recession in 
sectors like culture or tourism and travel. According to the Basque anthropologist, 
Joseba Zulaika, the idea of building a Guggenheim museum in Bilbao was based 
on the possibility of changing the image of the whole region with the help of 
a cultural artefact.705 The museum, which was designed in the early 1990s and 
was built in Bilbao, was intended to be distinct from the old economy and to 
modernize the public image of the region. Contrary to what many thought, it was 
not the fi rst but certainly one of the most visible urban projects in the region and 
was a crucial part of the revitalization of Greater Bilbao.706 The Socialists did not 
support the project being fi nanced by Vizcaya; considering the scale of the project 
it was surprisingly not discussed in the plenary session of the regional parliament 
until other parties requested it.707 The cabinet members responsible for treasury 
and taxation did the fi nancial preparation work for this project and the leadership 
of the PNV gave its approval.
Though the museum in the fi rst place concerned Bilbao and Vizcaya, it 
became a part of the economic and political history of the entire Basque Country. 
This large-scale project was economically big even in the EU context and a great 
economic risk. It was one step more towards the new economy, to which the 
technology parks of the Basque Country were also leading the way.708 It would be 
wrong to imagine that there was no tourism in the Basque Country or in Bilbao 
before an attraction like the Guggenheim, but it was mainly business travel and 
the regional and local administrations were not able or willing to utilize it.709 The 
local leaders lacked experience in marketing their own region, especially leisure 
tourism, which was not helped by the industrial deprivation and the threat of 
political violence.710
The determination of the PNV was manifested when the regional government 
prepared a list in 1995 for the regional parliament concerning the transfers of 
powers not yet carried out, but which it would concentrate on in its strategy. 
The list included full authority concerning the granting of credits and banking, 
insurance, public credit and dealings in securities. Moreover, social security 
remained on the list, but the state was anxious to keep it and not give it to the 
region.711 The arguments of the regional government were (i) that the necessary 
administrative structures had been created and that the remaining authority not 
705  Zulaika 1997, 93.
706  Plaza 2000.
707  PV:PLENO 21.2.1992 04\08\03\00\0025.
708  Plaza Inchausti & Velasco Barroetabeña 2001, 101; Plaza Inchausti & Velasco 
Barroetabeña 1999, 847–848.
709  Plaza 2000, 266–267.
710  Op. cit., 266.
711  Informe prioridades de negociación de las tranferencias pendientes. BOPV nº 40 & 
43–44/1995.
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transferred was becoming a structural problem. (ii) The economic consequences 
were two-fold: (a) the economic agreement could not be applied to all parts of 
public sector and (b) the overlapping of administrations and their contradictory 
measures would produce uneconomical decisions in public fi nance.712 This report 
considered that many of the political decisions needed were already included in 
the Autonomy Statute. According to the regional government, there were hardly 
any substantial reasons not to proceed. The main economic consequence of the 
delay was that the economic agreement could not be applied to all the possible 
sectors of public fi nance.713 In the end the regional government justifi ed its position 
by economic policy arguments and factors that led to such problems as a public 
defi cit. This matter, dependent on political agreement, could not however proceed 
with unilateral defi nitions of policy; there were no transfers in 1995.714
3.6. Pragmatism and the creation of matrices for economic growth
The economic growth in the Basque Country fi nally improved somewhat in 1994–
1995. Despite the slight decrease in unemployment in 1995, when the fi gure was 
23.8 percent, only some new jobs were permanent.715 The long economic crisis 
had left its marks on the Basque economy: where the regional GDP had been 30.5 
percent over the Spanish average in 1980, in 1995 the fi gure was only 15.7 percent. 
The growth of GDP in 1994–1996 when there were clear signs of a new economic 
boom was among the lowest in Spain and manifestly below the national average.
On the eve of the 1996 general elections, the PNV argued cogently that the 
political and administrative distinguishing features of the Basque Country enabled 
larger growth fi gures than in other autonomous communities at a time of economic 
take-off.716 The PNV, which had been heavily involved in the creation of the 
regional administrative structures and in that process advanced its own interests, 
reserved an important role for the public sector in its economic policy strategy. 
The key question here was to fi rmly control public spending and revenue.717 
According to the electoral programmes and public statements, the fi scal policy 
had become again budget policy when the PNV underlined long-term planning 
and economic direction.718
The winner of the 1996 general election was the PP, lead by José María 
712  BOPV nº 40/1995, 1862.
713  Ibid.
714  See Figure 4.
715  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 207.
716  CD/PNV: Euskadirekin. Programa Electoral. Elecciones Generales 1996. EAJ-PNV, 
25. 1996, 25.
717  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones autonómicas 1994. EAJ-PNV, 30.
718  Op. cit., 30–31; the budget defi cit in Spain (5.9 percent) was one of the main economic 
policy issues during the electoral campaign of 1996. See, for example, The Economist 
24.2.1996, 52.
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Aznar, ending the long period of socialist ascendancy (1982–1996) in Spain. The 
electoral victory of the PP was narrower than expected and it did not achieve an 
absolute majority. Like its predecessor, it needed parliamentary support from the 
small regional parties.719 Once Aznar reached an agreement with the CiU and 
the Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria, CC) on that issue, he was no longer 
necessarily dependent on the support of the PNV. There was however perceivable 
support for the agreement within Aznar sʼ government.720 Aznar negotiated with 
the PNV on three occasions during spring 1996, and gave his Basque interlocutors 
to understand that he was prepared to “respect the economic agreement, and 
further develop the Basque autonomy within the Statute of Autonomy”. He was 
not, however, going to abandon the principle of social security funding to be 
maintained at state level (caja única).721 The PNV sʼ interpretation of this approach 
was that Aznar was infl uenced by the national trade unions, the UGT and CCOO, 
which remained in a minority position in the Basque Country. On the other hand, 
Aznar wanted to maintain good relations with the trade unions in order to reach 
agreements with them on labour market issues. The PNV sʼ analysis was that in the 
end the trade unions prevented the most economical and effi cient transfer of power 
– which was even mentioned in the Autonomy Statute – from being carried out.722 
The centrality of the economic policy issues in these negotiations can be seen 
in how Aznar delegated the negotiations to his minister of the treasury, Rodrigo 
Rato. The contracting parties agreed that the central government would transfer 
powers to the Basque Country in certain questions, which then happened in the 
next economic agreement (1997) in terms of wider taxation powers.723
Despite the result, these negotiations concerning parliamentary support were 
described as diffi cult.724 The PP did not need the PNV sʼ support in the end, and 
historically Aznar sʼ party was not an easy partner for the Basque Nationalist 
Party. In the ranks of the PP there were still many previous politicians from the 
right-wing AP, and the PNV was aware of the PP sʼ doubts considering the powers 
719  The PP was generally expected to achieve a position in the parliament where it would 
not be so dependent on the support of the regionalist parties, like the PSOE government. 
Aznar was also believed to be anxious to avoid such a situation. The Economist 17.2.1996, 
46−48; The Economist 24.2.1996, 52; Helsingin Sanomat 5.3.1996 & 6.3.1996.
720  The active person in this situation was the new minister for the interior, Jaime Mayor 
Oreja. He had been a member of the Basque regional parliament and started his political 
career in Basque politics, fi rst in the right-wing AP and later in the PP, founded in the 1980s. 
At one stage, he was also leader of the PP sʼ representation in the Basque Country.
721  Prego 2000, 330.
722  Anasagasti 2004, 209 & 212.
723  Aznar explains to the journalist Victoria Prego how he reminded the PNV sʼ leader, 
Arzalluz, about being involved as a civil servant in the negotiation of the Basque economic 
agreement in the early 1980s. Prego 2000, 330.
724  The PNV sʼ parliamentary groups leader, Anasagasti, saw the main problem as the “mutual 
prejudices and lack of will”. Ibid.; the historian García de Cortázar emphasises exactly this 
agreement in the PNV sʼ history of the 1990s. García de Cortazar 1998, 425–432.
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of the autonomies. In the end, the PNV committed itself only to supporting Aznar 
in the inauguration of his government; in the future it would consider case by case 
whether it would support the government. The differing assumptions of these 
negotiating parties are manifested in the way the PNV analysed the agreement over 
parliamentary support, from an economic and fi nancial point of view. Whereas for 
the PP there was a strong domestic policy element included; within the PP there was 
a willingness to establish good communication with the PNV.725
The PNV was forced to cooperate with the PP mainly because the latter enjoyed 
growing support among Basque businessmen.726 In the Basque Country, it was more 
diffi cult for the PNV to compete with the centre-right PP in economic policy issues 
than it had been with the Socialists. On the other hand, this made things easier for 
cooperation in economic policy between those two parties.727 This situation was 
nonetheless sensitive and diffi cult for the Basque Nationalist Party; a revealing 
proof being the way in which the EBB explained in public how this cooperation was 
possible. It tells us how the EBB wanted to underplay the ideological disharmonies 
and give preference to the economic policy goals of the party. This new cooperation 
was believed to offer opportunities to extend the regional tax collection powers. The 
EBB justifi ed the political agreement with economic policy arguments, saying it 
was defending the taxation rights of the Basque provinces so that they could “levy 
more” in the future.728 The EBB especially stressed the right to regulate income and 
company taxation. It also claimed that this cooperation with the PP would diminish 
the problems the Basque provinces had with the Commission services and improve 
the cooperation between the Basque Country and Navarra in fi scal issues. The EBB 
explained that the centre-right Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN), which was fi rmly 
against the unifi cation of these two communities, affected the PP sʼ views on Basque 
politics without which the PP could have been politically closer to the PNV. This 
argument was intended to make it easier for the PNV activists to understand the 
cooperation. The leader of the PNV, Arzalluz, explained the situation in public so 
that Aznar was only asked to respect the existing agreements rather than make 
new ones.729 Here Arzalluz referred consciously to the historical background of the 
economic agreement. The regional government emphasized that the negotiations 
725  The ministers Mayor Oreja and Alvaréz Cascos succeeded in infl uencing this through 
their personal views. Granja & Pablo 2000, 155–156; Tusell 2004, 143; Anasagasti 2004, 
214 & 240.
726  In the case of the CiU, the growing support for the PP in Catalonia also had infl uence. 
The PP sʼ support grew signifi cantly among the local businessmen. The Economist 
17.2.1996, 46−48.
727  The Economist 28.5.1994, 48−49.
728  Alderdi Berriak n° 0, 18.4.1996.
729  The Economist 16.11.1996, 55−56; the Spanish journalist Victoria Prego emphasises 
the nationalistsʼ “pragmatic” approach to this situation in which it was possible to 
achieve benefi ts for the Basque Country only by supporting the new government in its 
inauguration. Prego 2000, 330.
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of 1996–1997 included the updating of the agreement on European integration; the 
role of taxation had became more relevant in the countries which were preparing 
themselves for the third phase of EMU and the common currency was approaching.730 
The vice-lehendakari and treasury minister Ibarretxe had two major goals in the 
negotiations with his interlocutor, minister Rato: the right to regulate income tax 
and special taxes.
The political agreement enabled the revised economic agreement to cover 
a period of fi ve years (1997–2001).731 This was economically the most benefi cial 
agreement and result for the Basque side so far.732 The new agreement strengthened 
fi scal autonomy, since the provincial councils were entitled to regulate income tax 
(IRPF) and to collect and administer the so-called special taxes such as those on 
petrol, tobacco and alcohol as well as insurance premiums in their area.733 After the 
1997 agreement, tax collection was in practice centralized in the Basque Country 
so that only the revenue from VAT such as import duties, taxation of state offi cials, 
earned income and capital taxation were maintained in State hands.734 According 
to lehendakari Ardanza, the Basque Country was like a member state of the EU in 
fi scal matters thanks to this agreement.735
The economic agreement of 1997 and how it was reached is an example of the 
pragmatic approach of the PNV; the ideological differences did not prevent the 
party from taking advantage of the willingness showed by the PP to start political 
cooperation. Simultaneously, the PNV was in the regional coalition government with 
the Socialists. One example of the pragmatism of the PNV was that the question of 
terrorism, or how to resolve the problem of political violence, was not especially 
included in the political agreement between the two parties.736 Symptomatic of 
the PNV sʼ policy was that it cooperated with the PP-led central government while 
this cooperation could not take place in the Basque Country with the regional 
representatives of the PP. In Basque politics, the PNV even tried actively to “trivialize” 
the PP and the political centre-right it represented as a political alternative.737
730  Interview with the vice-lehendakari and treasury minister, Juan José Ibarretxe of 
21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 1480–1481.
731  The Economic Agreement, May 27, 1997.
732  For example, the PSOE sʼ Almunia describes cooperation with the PNV in the 
1990s as fruitful for the latter. Almunia points out that Aznar sʼ views on the structure 
of autonomous regions had to change in a situation where he needed the support of the 
regionalist parties. Almunia 2002, 415.
733  The regional government was represented by the vice-lehendakari and treasury 
minister, Juan José Ibarretxe (PNV). Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 198; 
PV:SC:CEHM: 05\06\02\03\0023. The session of the regional parliament sʼ committee on 
the economy, treasury and the budget of 28.5.1997; Moreno Portela 1998, 317–319.
734  Mella Marquéz 1998, 366.
735  El País 24.10.1999.
736  The Socialists stressed this question particularly when they criticised the agreement. 
Almunia 2002, 286.
737  Granja & Pablo 2000, 156–158.
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Strategically, the actions of the PNV were closely linked to the relationship 
between the centre and the periphery; in other words, the PNV resolutely defended 
the economic interest of the Basque Country. It aspired to maintain strong, bilateral 
relations with the new PP government, facilitating an agreement biased toward 
economic policy with the central government and dispatching its own interest and 
dominance in Basque politics. Political exploitation of the economic agreements 
remained the property of the PNV. Via the political agreement of 1996 the PNV 
went even further in its cooperation with the PP than the CiU of Catalonia. The 
Economist speculated that the PNV might be able to infl uence the PP politically 
even more in the future.738 The timing of the PNV sʼ tactics was good, because 
at the same time, the PP implemented an overall modernization of the system 
of autonomous fi nancing (LOFCA)739 which granted the autonomous regions 
in general the right to regulate income and inheritance taxes on a contractual 
basis. This reform aimed to tackle the problems that occurred particularly in the 
regional public fi nances.740 As a result of this national reform, all the autonomous 
communities were now responsible for one part of their income for the fi rst time. 
It was also the fi rst time regions other than the Basque Country and Navarra were 
to be given powers over the regulation of certain taxes. Nonetheless, the central 
government still had a leading role in the LOFCA system, the state keeping the 
right to regulate the capital base available. The revision of the Basque economic 
agreement therefore took place in the context of a wider economic reform carried 
out by the Spanish central government. After this, the system of regional fi nancing 
had detectable features of fi scal federalism.741
The stability of the state fi nances is normally measured by the borrowing 
requirement.742 According to the statistics of the Bank of Spain, the public 
738  The Economist 4.5.1996, 48−49.
739  The general system of fi nancing, the LOFCA. In 1996 the law of 1980 on regional 
fi nancing was changed. Ley Orgánica 3/1996. BOE n° 313/1996, 38648– 38652; Ley 
14/1996, BOE n° 315/1996, 39064–39084; see also Anasagasti 2004, 238.
740  Tax reform in Spain 1999, 12–13; this arrangement was later (2000) criticised by the 
central government itself, since this could offer an opportunity to create tax paradises 
within the country. The central government explained the growing wealth of the Basque 
Country by its special fi scal status. See, for example, ABC 9.7.2000. The daily ABC, 
which was close to the central government, used the ministry of treasury and statistics as 
sources in its article.
741  Aja 1999, 110–125 & 239. In the science of comparative law, different models have 
been tried to establish federalist system of fi nance; the most common systems are in 
practice mixed ones, which still include certain basic criteria. The most important is 
that different parts of the federation are given suffi cient fi nancing. In other words, the 
federation cannot pressure them fi nancially.
742  The gross borrowing tells us how much new loan is taken, and the nett borrowing the 
difference between the instalments of the new and the old loans, i.e., the increase in the 
loan stock. The gross borrowing is infl uenced by how long the stateʼ s loan period is: rapid 
circulation keeps gross borrowing high, although nett borrowing is small. Ranki 2000, 117.
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borrowing of the Basque Country was at its height during the recession years of 
1992–1995 when the annual net borrowing averaged 50 billion pesetas (about 30 
million euros). The net borrowing in 1996 was only 33 billion pesetas (about 20 
million euros) and by 1998 it had practically ceased.743 This demonstrates how the 
economic depression of the early 1990s, and the regional structural change strained 
public fi nances in the region long after the economic boom started in 1996. The 
debts of the Basque administration resulted from the large public investments and 
the diminution in tax revenue.744 The take-off of the Spanish national economy 
had its impact in the Basque Country too, which meant fewer pressures for public 
spending. The Basque government sʼ public defi cit of 4.0 percent in 1993 became 
a surplus of 2.8 percent in 1998.745 It is important to notice that, in comparison to 
other autonomous communities, public borrowing was never the major problem 
for the Basque Country that it was for many other regions in Spain.746 For the state 
fi nances this was a worrying question when the country was preparing itself for 
membership of the new euro. The economic boom of the middle 1990s, however, 
changed the situation. The central government sʼ tax revenues started to grow, 
interest rates began to drop and debt-servicing costs fell, which meant a falling 
budget defi cit.
The changes that took place in Spanish politics had their effect on the work 
of Ardanzaʼ s coalition government, though it remained in offi ce for the whole 
1994–1998 term. The PSE kept losing support in the region, which then again 
increasingly affected its relations with the PNV.747 One important reason for the 
Socialistsʼ  inability to greatly infl uence the position of the PNV as the dominant 
force was the PNV sʼ link with the most powerful trade union in the Basque 
Country, the ELA-STV. This made the PNV socially more open and receptive 
than the dominant party of Catalonia, the moderate nationalist CiU.748 In Basque 
politics, the Socialists were thus never able become established as the challenger 
as they were in Catalonia.749
Many factors in Basque politics made the things diffi cult for the PSE-EE. 
743  The public sector sʼ funding need was at its height in 1993, after which it decreased. 
In 1997, a budget surplus was achieved (0.5 percent of the Basque Country sʼ GDP). 
EUSTAT: Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas 1998, XXIII.
744  See the comments of the treasury minister Larrea Jiménez de Vicuña on the regional 
government sʼ strategy in borrowing made at the regional parliament sʼ committee on 
the economy, treasury and the budget, 23.9.1992. PV:DC/CEHP 23.09.1992, 33–41. A 
progress report was presented by the vice-lehendakari and treasury minister, Juan José 
Ibarretxe, in the same committee in 22.3.1995. PV:DC/CEHP 22.03.1995 9–24.
745  EUSTAT: Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas 1998, XXIII.
746  The Economist 12.7.1997, 46−47.
747  For Felipe González sʼ comments, for example, on the GAL, see Prego 2000, 295–
302.
748  Martínez Sospedra 1996, 312–313 & 320.
749  Soler Llebaria 1998, 232–233.
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The party was not the only one striving for support among working-class voters, 
– so did the PNV, the EA, the radical HB and the United Left (Ezker Batua / 
Izquierda Unida, EB-IU). Despite the several projects which were realized partly 
in cooperation with the central government and aimed at rescuing Basque heavy 
industry, the employment rate continued to fall, especially in densely populated 
Vizcaya. The impression of ineffective economic policy, inability to use the regional 
government position effectively and the prolonged industrial crises turned out to 
be more detrimental to the PSE than to the PNV.750 The PNV sʼ politico-economic 
credibility was preserved despite the diffi cult times, because of factors like the 
strong image of its treasury ministers as intransigent defenders of the region sʼ 
rights and welfare. According to the EBB, this also allowed cooperation with the 
PP. The PNV successfully maintained the central-periphery tension in economic 
policy issues. Additionally, it had working relations with the trade unions in its 
main political arena, the Basque Country. Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ analysis suggests 
that the historically determining factor was the successful strategic change in the 
1990s: beside the continuous defence of regional economic interests, a process 
was launched within the PNV in order to create a new image for the whole region. 
The role of the services sector was introduced more strongly to the economic 
thinking of the PNV and tourism was seen as a key issue. Via the economic 
solutions which were to a great extent the results of the PNV sʼ inner workings, 
deeper and structural changes with a new strategic component started to operate 
in the Basque economy and industry, which enabled the region to take advantage 
of the economic boom of the 1990s better than it did in the 1980s in a similar 
situation.
Simultaneously with this development, the PNV sʼ desire to cooperate with the 
Socialists diminished. The uninterrupted leadership of the PSOE at the state level 
had nourished this cooperation since 1982.751 At the regional level, the PNV worked 
in the coalition government with the PSE and successfully made the Socialists 
jointly responsible for policy decisions. During the years of González (PSOE), the 
PSE was in many ways an easier partner for the PNV than the right-wing AP, the 
most important issue naturally being the question of increasing the autonomous 
region sʼ powers. The problems the AP and later the PP faced in Basque politics, 
especially in the 1980s, can be explained by examining the way the regionalist 
parties like the PNV which were close to it in the political spectrum, traditionally 
enforced their own identity specifi cally in relation to the conservative party active 
750  In the electoral and political programmes of the PNV in the 1990s, the question of 
abolishing unemployment and improving the social security, was high on the economic 
policy agenda. See, for example, CD/PNV: Juntos hacia Europa – Elkar-Lanean 
Europarantz. Asa,blea General 11–12.1.1992. Balance ponencias, 66; CD/PNV: Asamblea 
Programa electoral. Por una Euskadi major. Elecciones generales ´93. 29–33.
751  Martínez Sospedra 1996, 272–273.
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in the region.752 However, Aznar succeeded in strengthening the centre-right 
image of the PP in the Basque Country as well,753 where the party intended to win 
the votes of those who had supported the centrist UCD which disappeared in the 
early 1980s. In the 1990s support for the PP showed that it was to be reckoned 
with in regional politics.754 Correspondingly, the support for the PNV in the region 
did not grow very much after the mid 1990s. The visible role of the party in the 
revitalization projects in Vizcaya helped it to maintain its position, but it was not 
getting stronger in the regional elections. The cooperation with the Socialists, 
like the fear of losing votes, led the Basque Nationalist Party to make budgetary 
compromises in social policy issue; for example, in pensions. On the other hand, 
the party itself saw these decisions as matched with its “welfare nationalism” and 
bringing in more votes from different segments of Basque society.755 In the mid 
1990s, the relations between the PNV and the EA showed signs of convergence, 
which also worried the Socialists. The PSE was neither keen to see the PNV 
expressing ideas of strengthening cooperation between all the Basque nationalists 
in the name of the “nation-building” and presenting that as a key to solving the 
problem of political violence.756
In the summer of 1998, the leadership of the PSE decided that the “radicalization” 
of the PNV made cooperation between these two parties impossible.757 The falling 
PSE support and its internal tensions did not make things easier for the party, 
752  Op. cit., 270; on the other hand, the UA, a small province-linked party in Álava, 
was characteristically an anti-nationalist political party. Its support however decreased 
after the PP won the general elections of 1996. Llera Ramo 1998; one reason for this was 
the PP sʼ ability to get rid of the historical burden linked to its role as the political heir of 
the right-wing AP. This happened in the Basque Country, too the reason being the PP sʼ 
policies in the central government. The PP was also seen in Basque politics as a centre-
right party. For the UAʼs relation to the provincial identity of Álava, and its antagonism to 
Basque nationalism, see Raento 1999a, 226–227.
753  Tusell compares Aznar to Suárez sʼ (UCD) way of acting. Tusell 2000.
754  Table 2; Granja & Pablo 2000, 156–157.
755  In relation to Spain and its autonomous regions, the Basque Country sʼ budget of 
1998 was characterized by the large portion of funds directed to capital transfers and 
guaranteeing the basic living standard. See the sessions of the regional parliament sʼ 
committee on the economy, treasury and the budget of 13.11.1997 & 17.12.1997. Memoria 
Txostenak 1994–1998, 102–103.
756  See, for example, Onaindia 2000; for a historical analysis of the PNV policies and 
their main changes concerning political violence, see García de Cortázar 1998.
757  Since 1995 the nationalist-led trade unions, the ELA and the LAB, had supported 
the idea of replacing the Autonomy Statute with another instrument defi ning the status 
of the Basque Country. The discussions between the PNV and the HB were intensifi ed in 
the spring and summer of 1998. The PSE-EE left the regional government offi cially on 
30.6.1998. At that time the regional parliament, on the initiative of the nationalist parties 
and the left-wing IU/EE, discussed whether the Spanish Constitution binds the regional 
parliament. Domínguez Iribarren 2000, 409–411; see also Mesa 2000, 279–280.
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which in the end considered that new policy defi nitions were necessary before 
the regional elections in autumn 1998. In reality, the PSOE sʼ electoral defeat in 
1996 had crucially diminished the Socialistsʼ  ability to infl uence the PNV;758 
the problems of the PSOE were felt more strongly at regional level than during 
the previous years. Additionally, the political agreement between the PP and the 
PNV in 1996 was especially problematic for the PSE, which was supposed to 
successfully represent the regional interests from the regional government, but 
had to face the fact that the PSOE was forced to oppose cooperation between 
the PP and the PNV in opposition in the Spanish parliament.759 The PNV was 
exploiting the political will of the PP under the nose of the Socialists.760
In the end, we must not forget that the coalition governments and the many 
years of cooperation between the Basque Nationalist Party and the PSE did not 
change the rigorous regionalist policy objectives of the Basque nationalists. This 
was particularly the case on issues like the economic agreement, the extension of 
rights in tax collection and obtaining all the powers included in the Autonomy 
Statute. The PSE had at the same time maintained the view that the economic 
agreement was necessary for the region, but must not distort competition or 
increase the economic differences between the autonomous communities. In 
practice this enabled the PNV to exploit it politically, and the party managed to 
present the economic agreement as an essential part of its political project.
It was worrisome for the economic policy goals of the PNV that the mutual 
understanding of 1996 did not last long. This happened despite the fact that the 
relations with the PNV in 1996–1998 were the personal responsibility of the fi rst 
vice prime minister, Francisco Alvaréz Cascos, who was known to have good 
relations with the PNV.761 These relations deteriorated during 1997, because views 
on the ways of ending the problem of political violence differed greatly.762 The 
historically most signifi cant outcome of the political cooperation between the PNV 
and the PP was the Basque economic agreement for 1997–2001. On top of that, 
the transfers of power carried out by the central government before the regional 
elections of 1998 were modest.763 This did not however become the major issue 
in the Basque economic policy discussion, mainly owing to the economic boom, 
which began in earnest after the mid 1990s.764 This meant growing tax revenues 
758  Almunia 2002, 288.
759  For an analysis of the events in the fi scal and economic policies in the Basque Country 
in 1996–1998, see El País 9.9.1998.
760  Aznar later described this political will as “goodwill”, and not “dictated by a 
numerical necessity”. Montero 1998, 118–119; Prego 2000, 329–330.
761  Granja & Pablo 2000, 156; within the PP, the role of Alvaréz Cascos was not seen as 
successful. Cinco Días 2.11.1999.
762  For the different views of the PP and the PNV on how to proceed on this issue, see 
Granja & Pablo 2000.
763  Figure 4.
764  Jiménez 2000.
153
and increased the regional wealth. It also decreased the relative importance of the 
still pending transfers.
From 1996 onwards the parameters of the Basque economy showed signs of 
an starting economic boom and the growth rate of the regional economy was 2.5 
percent. In 1997 GDP grew at a rate of 4.4 percent, and in the following year as 
much as 5.2 percent, nearly twice the European average.765 However, the infl ation 
rate in 1998 was already 2.3 percent, clearly exceeding both the Spanish (1.4 
percent) and the EU infl ation rate (1.3 percent).766 Signifi cantly the proportion 
of the public sector in the national economy fell in 1993–1998 as other sectors 
grew more rapidly.767 However, the regional government offered fi nancial support 
to industry and companies in growing numbers in 1997–1998 via programs like 
ELKARGI or EZTEN, a fund offering risk fi nancing.768 All these included the 
objective of enhancing permanent entrepreneurship in the Basque Country. The 
third Guggenheim museum in the world opened its doors in Bilbao in October 
1997.769 By 1998, the museum had proved to be an economic and political success 
for the PNV, its economic effect extending beyond Greater Bilbao and Vizcaya. 
The museum was considered in many quarters of the Basque society as an 
economic project more than a showcase for modern art.770
Despite the slightly positive economic situation in 1997–1998, the biggest 
politico-economic problems of the regional government were associated with the 
EU. The tax regulations of the early 1990s in the Basque provinces had not been 
bypassed in the European Commission where the dossier was the remit of the 
commissioner for competition, Karel van Miert.771 The Commission considered 
from the start of the investigations that the regulations in question amounted to 
state aid and distorted competition. The fi scal experts in the Basque government 
considered the idea of “regional state aid” baseless for various reasons. Firstly, 
questioning the differences in taxation between the provinces and regions was 
seen as surprising in the context of the EU, where the Basque representatives did 
not see even a minimum of coordination and where the member stateʼ s legislation 
765  GB/EJ: Economía Vasca 1998, 8.
766  The offi cial Spanish infl ation rate was 1.4 in 1998, and the EU average rate was 1.3 
percent. Op. cit., 12.
767  EUSTAT: Cuentas de las Administraciones Públicas 1998, XXII.
768  Velasco Barroetabeña & Plaza Inchausti 1998, 415–416. 
769  El Correo 20.10.1997; McNeill 2000, 489.
770  Onaindia refers here to the important role of Laskurain in this project. Onaindia 
2000, 94–95.
771  The European Commission intervened again in the spring of 1999 by stating that 
certain actions of the Basque provinces can be compared to state aid in their tax levy, and 
concerning certain companies. Moreover, it was a question of incentives given to new 
companies which started their business in the Basque Country. Van Miert admits this was 
politically an extremely diffi cult case. He points out that such cases are more common in 
EU member countries with a federalist or closely similar state structure. Van Miert 2000, 
59–60; El Correo 29.11.1998, La Rioja 17.11.1998 & 3.12.1998.
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included distorting regulations and means.772 They also emphasized that on tax 
issues the EU had adopted the position that all the differences in fi scal matters 
could be allowed as long as they did not affect fi nancial services. Ultimately, the 
Basque side considered that the interpretation of the Commission would have been 
different if it was a question of a state instead of a region. Van Miert stressed that 
the Commission did not question the normative right of the Basque government 
and the provinces in fi scal issues. In the exercise of that power, however, the EU 
treaties, including their regulations concerning the state aid given to the companies 
and its different forms, had to be complied with.773
The Basque government used this case as an example when it argued that 
the autonomous regions must have greater infl uence in the EU.774 In its political 
programs, the PNV admitted that since European integration meant in practice 
enforced harmonization in taxation issues, the economic agreement must also 
be compatible. Simultaneously however, the demands for direct participation 
in European decision-making on these issues increased. The question of the 
representation was systematically linked to economic and fi scal policies in the 
programs and texts of the PNV.775 That line did not make things easier in the 
disjointed relations between the PNV and the PP.
Since the economic agreement of 1993, the Basque Country had had the right 
to regulate and collect almost all the direct taxes. In the Spanish context, the 
importance of indirect taxes, which then remained in the hands of the central 
government, grew. As van Miert stressed, the case of the Basque tax incentives 
revealed how the EMU highlighted the role of taxation, since it was one of the few 
direct ways to infl uence the economy which was left in the hands of the member 
states.776 At the same time it is true that when the Basque autonomy extended in 
economic policy, its political leaders increasingly had to take into account the 
limits of that politico-economic power set by a larger politico-economic aggregate, 
the EU. Moreover, since the details of this dispute touched the regulations of the 
LTH and the question discussed in the early 1980s of the right of the provinces 
to decide on the details of taxation, this case was politically diffi cult for the PNV. 
Here again the subject at issue was the division of powers between the regional 
institutions and the provincial institutions based on the foral system and the 
consequences of that decentralization.
In autumn 1998 Basque politics entered a new period when the nationalist 
parties held discussions on political cooperation and the political alliance between 
the PNV and the Socialists ended. The basic political composition largely created 
772  El Mundo 17.12.1998 & Correo 17.12.1998; Zubiri 2000, 245.
773  See the article written by Van Miert published in El País 5.5.1999.
774  Deia 18.11.1998.
775  CD/PNV: Elecciones Europeas 1994, 39–40; for an indirect way of expressing this, 
see also Anasagasti 2004.
776  See also the interview with the vice-lehendakari and treasury minister, Juan José 
Ibarretxe, of 21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 1479−1480.
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by the PNV was facing changes. The cease-fi re declared by ETA in September 
before the regional elections of the following month caused changes in the political 
scene as well as in the region sʼ economic life.777 It brought obligatory changes to 
all the parties in Basque politics.778 From a politico-economic point of view it was 
becoming clear that the 1990s change in the strategy of the PNV was seen in the 
Basque Country as successful revitalization projects strengthening the politico-
economic position of the party. The Guggenheim museum had been an individual 
large-scale public investment that included public-private cooperation; it had also 
been a hazardous project in economic terms. In 1998 the economic boom and 
its rapid growth rates were a fact in both the Spanish and the Basque economy. 
Although the Basque Country sʼ proportion of Spanish GDP had fallen since 
1980, its role in Spain sʼ foreign trade had increased. The Basque Country was no 
longer a region of sunset industries and in danger of economic displacement. The 
structural change was however still going on.
Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ empirical model of analysis helps us to recognize the 
PNV sʼ way of using its politico-economic power strategically by setting clear 
objectives and goals. The economic agreement and cupo had been realized within 
the regulations of the Statute of Autonomy, but the negotiations were dictated 
by the political will of the parties. Consequently, the Basque Country in 1998 
had the most extensive politico-economic powers of all the Spanish autonomous 
regions, not just in theory, but also in practice. On the other hand, the limits of 
those powers had become more apparent in that the central government did not 
bend in the issue of decentralizing social security, the region had the taxation 
and the revenues in its own hands to a great extent and, the developments in the 
relations between the PP and the PNV in 1996–1998 did not facilitate further 
negotiations on these issues or new transfers of power. The EU Commission had 
challenged some of the tax regulations of the provinces, which would not have 
been possible without the region sʼ internal political structures constructed by the 
dominant political force, the PNV. In 1997, the Basque economic agreement had 
already been modifi ed to follow the EU regulations better, but the pressure from 
the Commission sʼ side did not seem to end so easily. In conclusion, my research 
reveals how the main characteristics of the regional government sʼ economic policy 
and exercise of power in that fi eld were strongly linked to the interests of the PNV 
in 1980–1998.
777  The article of economist and academic Roberto Velasco. El País 23.10.1998.
778  The declaration of Lizarra enabled the political cooperation between the various 
tendencies in Basque nationalism for the fi rst time in history. For a historical analysis of 
the PNV sʼ policy in the late 1990s, see Granja & Pablo 2000.
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4. THE PNV AS A RULING 
POLITICO-ECONOMIC PARTY
4.1. Regionalism, populism and capitalism
The PNV as a ruling party from 1980 to 1998 must be considered in terms of 
its previous history. That history infl uenced the PNV and thus cannot be ignored; 
it helps to understand such abstractions as the fueros, and how and why they were 
included in the strategy of the PNV. The defi nitions and course of the PNV sʼ 
economic policy and use of power were related to certain operational, target-
oriented and ideological characteristics which cannot be understood without 
placing them into a historical context. My thesis reveals that the main emblematic 
factors in the actions of the PNV on economy were (i) regionalism; e.g., the party sʼ 
pursuit of the well-being of the Basque Country, (ii) capitalism, in other words 
enhancement of the market economy and (iii) populism or a suffi ciently popular 
policy. These components became integrated and interconnected in the use of the 
politico-economic power of the PNV.
Instead of recreating a picture of the history of the PNV sʼ tradition in 
regionalism, capitalism and populism, I now consider their manifestations and 
meaning in the actions of the party. Since I examined the history of the Basque 
government sʼ economic policy in the previous chapter, it is easy to recognize 
that the PNV pursued a policy intended to gain benefi ts for the Basque Country, 
especially in fi scal policy issues. However, applying Elton and Foucault sʼ ideas, 
it becomes important to recognize the strategy underlying that policy. Aja, who 
has discussed the structure and evolution of the Spanish State of Autonomies in 
comparative law, concludes that the regionalist parties like the PNV enhanced 
the decentralization of powers in Spain considerably, although they did not 
form a major political grouping when the Constitution of 1978 was drafted and 
approved.779 The consequences and dimensions of the PNV strategy therefore 
require further analysis to create a structured picture of the equation formed by 
regionalism, capitalism and populism.
Having established this, I will move on to the role of the EBB in this process. 
The EBB sʼ decisions concerning the provinces refl ect the evolution of its powers 
(i) with relation to the regional government as well as (ii) the complex relationship 
between the EBB and foralism which included ideological factors and their 
instrumentalization. This has not so far been suffi ciently investigated. These are 
important questions and only through a proper analysis it is possible to create a 
synthesis of their historical effects and to fully understand the actions and strategy 
of the PNV economic policy.
Regionalism was manifested earlier in the party sʼ history as an effort to get 
the voice of the region heard in relation to the central government. This goal 
779  Aja 1999, 190 & 277.
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was tied closely to economic questions and, in the Basque Country, was seen as 
especially underlining the position of the provinces. In the name of that aim and 
the economic benefi t of the Basque Country this was also preparedness to make 
political agreements with ideologically various political; the events of the mid 
1990s showed this well enough. The decisions were even explained and rationalized 
with economic policy arguments. In the PNV sʼ use of power, regionalism differed 
from nationalism, especially in the actual use of power. By gaining more taxation 
powers, the region was better equipped to carry out public investment for its 
own benefi t. The economy of the Basque Country was seen in realistic terms, 
its dependence on the economy of Spain and particularly the evolution of its 
export trade being identifi ed and recognized. Here lies the difference between 
the PNV and the other moderate Basque party, the EA. The latter emphasized the 
Basque economy as an independent unit and tied its economic policy more clearly 
to the question of full independence. The PNV was cautious in this respect in 
1980–1998: national, special characteristics were taken abroad in a populist way 
to support ideologically a policy that remained pragmatic. This predominantly 
meant emphasizing the uniqueness of the economic agreement and its special 
characteristics, such as the right to regulate taxes. The decisions themselves reveal 
that the dependence of the Basque economy on the foreign trade of Spain was not 
ultimately questioned.
In historical terms, it is signifi cant that regionalism came to be part of the PNV sʼ 
policy very early, at the beginning of the 20th century.780 Its growing importance 
was then linked to the extension of relations with the Catalan nationalists, the 
goal being to obtain support from them in the Spanish parliament in Madrid in 
proportion to the political forces representing the central government.781 The 
euskalerriacos wing and thus the middle-class supporters of the party were 
particularly in favour of having close relations with the Catalan nationalists, who 
correspondingly represented the interests of their region sʼ own industry. Sabino 
de Arana also foresaw that the Basque nationalists might need the support of 
Cataloniaʼ s nationalist circles when facing the Country sʼ Central power.
In the long run, regionalism benefi ted both the aranaist and the euskalerriacos 
wing politically since it strengthened the cooperation and common policy 
maintained with the nationalist-minded bourgeoisie. The importance of 
regionalism lay in the fact that the representatives of the euskalerriacos group 
were able to practice politics that did not aspire to independence, within a party 
that supported independence. Likewise, it was possible for the PNV to ally itself 
in the best possible way at various times, as was also the case in the cooperation 
with the bourgeoisie. The political and economic goals of the euskalerriacos were 
therefore strongly apparent in the actions of the PNV.782 The PNV sʼ policy was 
in all but name, as Corcuera Atienza states, antithetical and opposed to its own 
780  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 476–477.
781  Op. cit., 473.
782  Op. cit., 476–478.
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ideology, and particularly to Aranaʼ s.783 The way the party activists understood 
their own party sʼ policy also changed rapidly during the 20th century. Regionalism 
and the importance of economic policy were thus by no means minor factors in 
the history of the PNV before autonomy was established in 1979.
From the beginning of autonomy, the PNV was aware of the fact that 
developments in national politics would refl ect on the Basque politics and the 
economic policy of the party in power in the region. As I demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the PNV sʼ answer to this was regionalism, or strong defence 
of the interests of the Basque Country. Importantly, this policy did not suffer 
when the euskalerriacos started to gradually lose ground in the party, the PNV 
consistently defending the transfer of powers to the region which would be able to 
solve its own economic problems in the best possible way. Moreover, the PNV was 
ready to maintain an appropriate, pragmatic approach to the central government, 
even ignoring the possible contradictions between these actions and the political 
cooperation relationship maintained in regional politics. As a defender of regional 
interests, it was possible for the PNV to act for example in the negotiations 
concerning VAT in the 1980s in a way that would not have suited the PSE. In the 
name of regionalism, the PNV considered itself no less than a defender of a right 
which was even established in the laws concerning the economic agreement.784 The 
PNV practically made it a question of a confi dence motion. This same pattern was 
repeated in early 1997 when the economic agreement was updated. In public, the 
PNV acted in the name of the regional interests, but also intentionally underlined 
the role of the regional coalition government where the PNV and the Basque 
socialists worked together.785 A revealing instance was the way PSE had to state in 
public that the Socialists were not questioning the Basque system of fi nance when 
they were under severe political restraints concerning the PNV-PP cooperation in 
economic policy.786
Basically, the PNV sʼ use of politico-economic power was a defence of 
capitalism.787 Populism had been characteristic of the party since its foundation, 
but it often also led to contradictions with its essentially conservatism. The political 
programme of the PNV included “economic benefi ts” that it started to exploit 
early among various groups of voters. The Basque nationalism which emerged 
from the pressures for change as a reaction to industrialization, made its attitude 
towards industrialization more positive under Aranaʼ s leadership. The infl uence 
of the euskalerriacos grew simultaneously, but the introduction of new methods 
did not mean that the political goals defi ned by Arana, such as independence for 
783  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 476.
784  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 714.
785  Deia 21.2.1997, El Correo 21.2.1997 & 25.2.1997.
786  Deia 19.2.1997 & El Diario Vasco 21.2.1997. 
787  See, for example, the interview with the treasury minister Fernando Spagnolo de la 
Torre of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 719.
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the region, were changed.788 The coalition of aranaists and euskalerriacos within 
the PNV did not mean that those groups could be integrated into a united party 
structure at the beginning of the 20th century.789 It was politically profi table for the 
PNV in many cases to treat the central government of Madrid as a representative 
of the Basque Country and to try to negotiate an economic agreement with it. It 
was thus possible to unite the populism, radicalism and on opportunism that all 
appeared within the PNV under the umbrella of regionalism.
This equation of traditionalists, bourgeoisie as well as conservative elements 
and tendencies interacting was not an easy one for the PNV itself. The internal 
social-economic debate was more diffi cult for the PNV than for many other 
parties.790 At the time of Franco sʼ death, there were in the ranks of the PNV 
both those who demanded nationalization of economic structures and those who 
promoted a traditional market economy and even hard-line free-marketeers. The 
plans for nationalization appeared even in the conclusions of the party meeting 
of March 1977.791 The PNV ultimately still supported the central government sʼ 
policy intended to stabilize the economy of Spain, foster a market economy, and 
converge with other western European countries.792 The slightly anti-capitalistic 
rhetoric was never acted on by the PNV once in power. The PNV redefi ned its 
policy goals in 1977 by (1) seriously considering obtaining regional autonomy 
for the Basque Country, (2) leaning on the so-called historical rights stripped 
away from the Basque provinces with the fueros system and (3) uniting all these 
provinces under one regional political structure. The PNV issued as non-specifi c 
as possible a defi nition of future self-government based on the system of fueros 
beforehand793 This was also linked to the Basque Country sʼ internal regionalism 
and centre-periphery tensions and had its effect on the use of politico-economic 
power in the 1980s and 1990s as I have shown.
In conclusion, the pragmatic approach to the economic and economic policy 
questions and the advancement of capitalism can be thus traced long back to the 
previous history of the party. In applying Elton and Foucault sʼ argument about the 
use of power, the key questions are how regionalism and capitalism were linked 
788  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 458.
789  Op. cit., 478.
790  Support for full independence was strong, particularly in the PNV sʼ council in 
Vizcaya, and caused heated disputes in the late 1970s. The confederative structure of the 
party exacerbated a situation in which these problems were seen as an internal matter for 
the Vizcayan party council, which should also resolve it alone. Garaikoetxea 2002, 74-75; 
Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 367.
791  Garaikoetxea 2002, 26; many contemporaries interpreted the PNV sʼ defi nitions of 
policy as “socialistic”. For example, the minister Sabin Intxaurraga Mendibil indicated 
this in his interview of 18.8.1998. HGV 2001, 1491.
792  The so-called agreements of Moncloa (Acuerdos de Moncloa). Garaikoetxea 2002, 
46−47.
793  Op. cit., 25−26.
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in the PNV sʼ exercise of power and how they affected and coloured those actions. 
The PNV promoted capitalism and public-private cooperation in the Basque 
Country. My view is that the question of how regionalism and capitalism were 
connected to populism should be examined not only generally but also through 
such basic concepts of Basque history as the fueros and economic agreements. 
This is in line with my empirical approach and explains the complex way the 
fueros were intertwined in the PNV sʼ use of power.
My next step is to consider the relationship between the majority version 
of fuerism within the PNV and the actual fueros themselves, how the PNV 
immobilized them to help its policy and ideology, and what the consequences 
were. This will help to understand both the PNV sʼ internal economic policy 
disputes as its way of keeping the fueros and economic agreement as part of the 
political rhetoric and the exercise of power.
4.2. The main concepts of the Basque Country sʼ economic history 
instrumental in the PNV sʼ policy
The historical roots of the PNV are manifest in the party sʼ way of underlining 
the importance of the fueros and the economic agreement. For example, it 
differentiated itself from the moderate Basque party, the EA, and the radical HB 
in the 1980s and 1990s.794 This fact alone demands further investigation of the 
role of these roots in the contemporary history of the PNV. It can be diffi cult to 
understand how the use of power in the last decades of the 20th century could have 
been affected by the fueros, which were not simply old but also diffi cult to re-
establish in a contemporary market economy. Reasons for this must be sought in 
the earlier history of the PNV. It is important to understand that even in the times 
of Arana the propaganda of the PNV was a special mixture of traditional anti-
capitalism and middle-class infl uences; maximizing the “common excellence” 
of the Basques became the party sʼ objective.795 Aranaʼ s view of industrialization 
changed rapidly into the more complex notion that nationalists must strive to 
transfer the industry and capital into the Basque people sʼ own hands. The problem 
was not fi nally capitalism itself, but that it was foreign capitalism, not “Basque 
capitalism”.
Financial resources had a decisive role in a Basque Country changed by the 
industrial revolution. Suffi cient funding was also a pre-requisite for effi cient 
circulation of the nationalistsʼ  own ideology and propaganda. In fact, the future 
success of Aranaʼ s political project depended on this crucial factor. This attitude 
towards industrialization forced the PNV to change its policy at an early stage 
and introduce a new criterion to its supportersʼ  political thinking. The heavy 
industrialization of the region was a demonstration of “the superiority”796 of the 
794  Moreno del Río 2000, 201, 222 & 246.
795  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 472.
796  Op. cit., 476
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Basques. The national economy of the Basque Country was made not merely into 
an instrument but a symbol of the regional uniqueness of the Basque Country.797 
This meant however intensifi cation of the tendency where the countryside idyll 
was in Corcuera Atienzaʼ s words even more “a utopian affi rmation of nationalist 
virtues and a critical reaction to the not nationalized province of Vizcaya”.798 Using 
this in its ideology was also possible in the future,799 but it was hardly adequate in 
seeking support in the cities as well as the countryside. Since Basques faced great 
changes, the political programme of the PNV had to be economically tempting. It 
found the answer in the fueros and the economic agreements.
4.2.1. The signifi cance of fueros to the PNV
Fueros800 once formed the foundations of the economic and political activities 
in the Basque Country and in practice made the Basque provinces a free-trade 
area that had a customs border with the rest of the kingdom.801 As the events 
surrounding the LTH law showed, the meaning and importance of fueros to the 
political views of the PNV became urgent in the organization of the internal 
fi nancial administration of the Basque Country in the 1980s.802 The fueros still 
occupied the political debate, appearing particularly in the political vocabulary of 
the representatives of the PNV.803 The symbolic value of fueros remained strong 
in Basque politics but, in 1980–1998, political standpoints infl uenced the aspects 
of the fueros and the system based on them which were signifi cant on particular 
occasions. The political and economic signifi cance accorded to fueros was, and 
still is, unspecifi c and is linked to the political agenda and aims.804 Firstly, fueros 
must not be confused with the Basque Country economic agreements. Secondly 
the Spanish term fuerismo, i.e., fuerism (or foralism, foralismo), was used at the 
beginning of the 19th century less to refer to a compilation of privileges than as 
797  Moreno del Río 2000, 201.
798  Corcuera Atienza 1979, 468.
799  Elorza emphasises the PNV sʼ nature as a basically urban political movement, but 
which is linked to the countryside: “while the party, in the 1980s, offered a technocratic 
system for the management of the region sʼ economy, it unavoidably defended the rural 
society”. Elorza 2001, 408.
800  The term fueros comes from Latin: forum. Puig y Scotoni 1986, 38; Aja 1991, 173.
801  Basques were exempted from military service, but were responsible for the coast and 
frontier of their region. García de Cortázar & González Vesga 2000, 345; for the mobility 
of the Basques, see Douglass & Bilbao 1975.
802  The LTH law. LPV 1991, 251–275 .
803  The PNV leader Arzalluz explains in the Burns Marañon interview (1997) how the 
PNV sʼ nationalism has “two stronger feet: God and the fueros”. See Burns Marañón 
1997, 212.
804  Corcuera Atienza is critical of fueros and the way they have been exploited in Basque 
politics. See Corcuera Atienza 1998.
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institutions and regulations as an expression of “an original political structure”.805 
Fueros naturally included a clear politico-economic element and the economic 
interest implied made them a useful political instrument for the PNV.806
The relevance of the fueros to the politico-economic reasoning of the PNV 
appears in their historical background. The law of 1839 abolished fueros, but also 
gave certain rights to the provincial councils; the Spanish Government defi ning 
them only later in 1852–1853.807 From then on, the councils were left only with 
the fi nancial administration or management, but they also became an essential 
factor in the direction of the Basque economy. The structure of the regional 
administration changed with the evolution that started from the law fi rst abolishing 
the fueros: the provincial councils, previously only executors of the decisions taken 
by the provincial general assemblies, moved now to the forefront of the regional 
administration. They were only responsible for fi nancial management, but among 
their tasks was the supervision of town councils. The economic responsibility 
transferred to the provincial councils was however unrelated to the original fuero-
based system.808 Gregorio Monreál Cíaʼ s study reveals that the central government 
did not want to transfer legislative powers to somebody else, in this case to the 
Basque Country and the provincial councils. Nonetheless, the central government 
maintained the control of the bourgeoisie, thus preserving a free economy in the 
Basque Country.809 It can be said that the protectionism practised by the Spanish 
crown allowed the monopoly of the Basque bourgeoisie. The wealthiest of the 
bourgeoisie benefi tted both politically and economically. This politico-economic 
power is linked to the concept of neo-fuerism (neofuerismo), which is different 
from the original fueros.
The qualifi ed survival of the system of fueros up to the 1870s resulted only 
from the idea of constitutional integrity which was inherent in it,810 in which 
respect it was coincident with Spanish conservatism. Fueros however became an 
instrument in a situation where the political right in Spain started to push hard in 
the latter part of the 19th century to strengthen the centralized power. In the Basque 
Country, the right transformed into Carlism and in the long run partly converted 
to Basque nationalism.811 In Spain, the old regime of Bourbons (Antiguo Régimen) 
had a different attitude towards fueros from the new right of the 19th century. The 
Bourbon era central government representatives never impugned the legality of 
805  Un cuerpo político singular, and el cuerpo de provincia. Herrero de Miñón 1995, 8.
806  The interview with Professor Rafael Mieza y Mieg in 1999.
807  Mieza y Mieg 1984, 133.
808  Op. cit., 133–134; Corcuera 1985 & 1979, 91–92; Conversi 1997, 47; during the LTH 
procedure entirely contrary views appeared. See, for example, Diario Vasco 29.11.1983.
809  Monreál Cía 1974.
810  Mieza y Mieg 1984, 128–129.
811  The survival of the fueros and how the central government intended to abolish them 
explains why Carlism, which was theoretically a nation-wide movement in Spain, got a 
strong foothold in the Basque provinces. Conversi 1997, 46; Canal 2000, 241–242.
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fueros in their politico-constitutional argument or when they opposed the foral 
regions on some particular issue. The newer, revolutionary idea of the nation 
which gained strength in the 19th century did not accept the existence of separate 
political structures within the nation. In the Basque Country, the defenders of 
fueros, who before the nationalists consisted particularly of Carlists, saw fueros 
and the foral institutions as substantive parts of a historical constitution. For them 
fueros represented consistency and historical identity.812
The concept of historical rights (derechos históricos) belongs to the terminology 
of Basque political history as well. The defenders of fueros referred to the 
recognition of diversity of political structures which were found in the structure 
of a state. The central government and the so-called Spanish political alignment 
offered a region like the Basque Country decentralization of administration with 
the help of their ideologies. Representatives of fuerism demanded recognition 
of a politico-institutional exception when they discussed the historical rights.813 
Spanish legal historian Miguel Herrero de Miñón sʼ claim is that Carlism, which 
dominated among the population in the Basque countryside, was led to the 
political camp of Basque nationalism by these diverging conceptions of the status 
of institutions and the political structure that regulated and legitimated them.814 
This was however hardly the only reason for these developments. One must 
remember that only the representatives of big industry in the Basque Country 
benefi tted from the new economic agreement (1878–) since their tax burden was 
lightest. The countryside and small towns in particular suffered from the pressure 
caused by the new industry and taxation. Therefore, “Basques lent their support 
to any movement which opposed centralism” as a reaction to the abolishment of 
fueros according to Daniele Conversi.815 Conversi does not however discuss how 
the PNV utilized this aspect of the fueros.
Fueros were instruments and symbols of economic self-government,816 but the 
Basque provincial fueros were by no means identical, varying between regions 
and, even more importantly, not conforming to the intention of creating a united 
Basque Country.817 Nor were fueros purely an instrument of democracy: the power 
in the region was ultimately in the hands of propertied classes and the suffrage 
812  Mieza y Mieg 1984.
813  Herrero de Miñón 1995, 19.
814  On the other hand, he considers that these diverging opinions still inhibit the 
emergence of an effective Spanish “supernationalism”. This nationalism would be an 
integrating project, but would respect the specifi c characteristics of different nationalities. 
Op. cit., 20.
815  He links this to the popularity of Carlism in the Basque Country. Conversi 1997, 47.
816  Ibid.
817  Fusi 1984, 173; correspondingly, the recognition given by the king that all Basques 
were noble by birth, was originally interpreted as a way to obtain Basque support for the 
crown. It was not part of any racial theories concerning the Basques.
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was more limited than in most other parts of Spain.818 Sabino de Arana changed 
the Carlist goal of restoration of the fueros into something totally different, a 
demand for the Basque Country sʼ complete detachment from Spain. Arana called 
for the restoration of fueros because he believed that they had at one time been 
an effective instrument of Basque self-government. According to Arana, fueros 
could in the future work as a means to an end, which for him was independence. 
Aranaʼ s concept of fueros was based on political calculation and had little to do 
with the Carlist demands for regional rights to impose duties or the exemption of 
Basques from the military service conceded by the Spanish monarchs.819
The linkage between the fueros and the PNV can be traced back to Carlism, 
although it was originally the main political enemy of Arana. During its fi rst 
years of existence, the PNV had diffi culty in gaining ground in the countryside of 
Vizcaya, where the defence of the traditional Basque culture and the associated 
rural romanticism were not adequate in themselves to attract people to support the 
party. Since the population in the countryside was poor and supported Carlism, the 
PNV had to evolve an economic programme that would pander to them. Fueros 
and the protectionist model820 which they represented became an instrument 
Arana needed. The fueros became an essential concept for Arana for that matter, 
references to economics or economic policy are very few in his political writings. 
The customs borders, which were included in the fueros, had particularly 
benefi ted an economically prominent group in the Basque provinces, where the 
disappearance of the fueros was seen as an economically back-breaking loss.821 
This trend toward using the fueros politically was strengthened when Basque 
nationalism lost some of its support in the urban areas in the early 20th century 
and continued with strong political imposition in the rural areas. The party, which 
had changed its name to Comunión Nacionalista Vasca in 1916, achieved electoral 
victories in 1917 and 1918, especially in rural areas. According to Elorza, Basque 
nationalism had already adopted a line that a farmer was not just a potential voter, 
but a recipient of political benefi ts in a situation where the party was setting its 
818  The general suffrage, which applied only to male citizens, came into force in Spain 
in 1890. Sullivan 1988b, 13; Fusi 1984, 190.
819  Sullivan 1988b, 15.
820  In the interview with the journalist Burns Marañon, the PNV sʼ leader, Arzalluz, 
states how the industrial revolution created a new leading economic group which had an 
anti-fuero attitude: “since the fueros, as a protectionist system, did not allow commerce 
on a large scale”. Arzalluz emphasises that “the interests of the representatives of big 
business and Madrid were congruent”, because he thought the fueros allowed only the 
export and import of particular products. “Liberalism thus broke the previous economic 
arrangement and the actions of the representatives of the capital brought workers and 
immigrants to the region, whose economic position was weak.” Arzalluz admits, however, 
that the fueros did not mean anything for workers in diffi cult living conditions; however, 
he stresses that in the Basque Country “the Socialists, as well as the Nationalist movement 
opposed the collusion of big capital (Neguri)”. Burns Marañón 1997, 216.
821  Sullivan 1988b, 14.
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sights on rising to power in the provinces.822
The PNV, which was cognizant of its power, sought a clause in the Constitution 
at the end of 1970s which would say that the status of the Basque Country would 
confi ne itself to the restoration of the historical rights abolished in 1839 and 
1876. The PNV saw that this would have meant the “restoration of the historical 
sovereignty” of the Basques and enabled the recognition of the right of self-
determination. The PNV sʼ reading was that the monarchy and the structure of 
the state “had made an exception”823 in the case of the Basque Country and the 
fueros had given the region a “distinct status” and sovereignty.824 The right was 
therefore recognized but not given; in other words, a transfer of powers had not 
been involved as in a federal system. Accordingly it was a question of the PNV sʼ 
interpretation of the fueros. The compilers of the Constitution emphasized that 
there was only one sovereign power and that the statutes of self-governance could 
not be automatically considered as constitutional manifestations.825 The PNV sʼ 
negative attitude towards the 1978 Constitution came down to a question of the 
possible limits to the reading of historical rights.826
The idea of restoration of fueros remained on the PNV sʼ political agenda 
and, during the autonomy established in 1979, the party foregrounded it in its 
economic policy.827 When the constitutional basis of that autonomy was created, 
the demand to regain the fueros was heard in the political statements of the PNV.828 
What the independent Bilbao daily El Correo sʼ political columnist pen named 
Vicente Copa, called “the tragedy of the Basque foralism” included an answer 
to the question of what prevented the return of fueros to the Basque provinces 
at the beginning of the 1980s. Firstly, certain characteristics of the foral system 
such as the customs did not sit easily with the new democratic administration. 
The Constitution of 1978 allowed the existence of fueros only when they were 
not contrary to the Constitution. Secondly, fueros had been customary law. The 
special nature of each case should be investigated in order to prove that they were 
822  Elorza 2001, 211–212. 
823  In this case the party received support from the leftist Basque party, the EE. López de 
Juan Abad 1998, 160; Arzalluz particularly supported additional wording in Article 2 of 
the Constitution, concerning the recognition of “the original sovereignty of nationalities”. 
Tusell 1999, 168.
824  A text which would give sovereignty to the people of Spain was to be included in 
the Constitution. The government considered that that recognition and safeguarding of 
the Basquesʼ historical rights should be included in the Constitution, in order to maintain 
unitary sovereignty. The PNV did not want to accept a constitution which would not 
recognize another basis of sovereignty. Fusi 1984, 214; Martín Villa 1984, 180; Burns 
Marañón 1997, 212.
825  Tusell 1999, 170.
826  Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 366.
827  This happened especially with the LTH law.
828  Corcuera Atienza 1998.
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established.829 Moreover, it would have been politically diffi cult to realize. These 
practicalities meant that the fueros continued to be mentioned in particular as 
ideological elements which also meant that the PNV was able to get the maximum 
political mileage out of them.
The way fueros were linked to the political programme and politico-economic 
thinking of the Basque nationalists at an early stage can be compared to the PNV sʼ 
bid for the votes of the working class. The ideas of improving working conditions 
came into Aranaʼ s political thinking via Christianity. This was not socialism, 
with which the founder of Basque nationalism had bad, not to say non-existent 
relations. Fueros consequently became instruments of the nationalistic rather than 
economic policy of the PNV. The economic interest of fueros made them still 
a useful tool for nationalists. At a time of economic change, such as the rapid 
increase in iron exports, the representatives of the PNV invoked the fueros, which 
would not have allowed its export. Since the emergence of fueros as one of the 
cornerstones of the PNV sʼ approach was partly due to the political pragmatism at 
the end of 19th century, it must not be confused with the liberal fuerism which had 
links with Carlism.
The representatives of the PNV still tended in the period of my thesis to 
underline how fueros were non-politicized in the 1870s and the “originally 
temporary intended” economic agreements were part of the intention to wind 
back the previous self-governance.830 Here it is a question of interpretation of 
history. The PNV sʼ way of defi ning the political structure of the Basque Country 
by referring to fueros and historical rights left it unclear what kind of political 
structure it was really seeking. Although in some situations it had been a question 
of the PNV sʼ fear of the political consequences, this impreciseness allowed the 
party room for political manoeuvre in diffi cult times and also allowed party unity 
to be maintained. Besides, the PNV aspired for the largest possible support among 
the voters in the Basque Country. Establishing politico-economic laws in the region 
in the early 1980s meant that fuerism and the tendency which supported the role of 
strong provincial institutions won in the party. At the same time it caused internal 
pressures that fi nally led to the establishment of the EA, after which fueros were 
even more a part of the political ideology of the PNV and its supportersʼ  identity. 
The EA emphasized the historical rights from the beginning in its programmes. 
In the period covered by my thesis, fuerism coloured the politics of the PNV in 
practice, so that the party endorsed a strong role for the provinces. The Basque 
Socialists correspondingly supported strengthening the common institutions of 
the region. The regional representation of the AP, later the PP, came out for the 
provincial institutions to the exclusion of the regional government both because 
829  Copa 1989, 27; Vicente Copa was the pseudonym of José Antonio Zarzalejos, who 
later became chief editor of the nation-wide monarchist newspaper ABC; see Garaikoetxea 
2002, 336.
830  See the interview with the treasury minister, Juan José Ibarretxe, of 21.12.1998. HGV 
2001, 1479.
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of fuerism and because it opposed the growth of the powers of the autonomous 
community in relation to the central government.831 In conclusion, the use of 
fueros to help in politics included clear political goal setting in many parts of the 
Basque political spectrum. It had still its most concrete historical consequences 
via the dominant role of the PNV.
4.2.2. Economic agreement
When the representatives of the PNV publicly urged to recognition of their 
own sovereignty and the self-governance of the Basque Country, they invoked 
the region sʼ characteristics and national identity, in which they also included the 
economic agreement.832 The economy pertains to the Basque Country sʼ national 
identity as the Basque provinces had had a leading position in Spain sʼ economy 
since the latter part of the 19th century.833 The Basque economy was called 
fragmented at an early stage, even though after the abolition of fueros it was more 
clearly interconnected with the Spanish economy. The economic agreement had 
its own infl uence on the economic prospects and social changes in the region. 
The PNV has made them, like fueros, instruments to help its policy-making by 
accentuating the central-regional agreement confi guration they contain. In this 
respect, the economic agreement relates to the populist tradition of the PNV.
In the view of the PNV the Basque self-determination is an earlier factor 
than the economic agreement or any agreement between the king of Spain 
and the region.834 The economic agreement was therefore a secondary goal in 
the PNV strategy in comparison to the question of sovereignty. The active role 
of the PNV in the process leading to restoration of the economic agreement, 
however, demonstrates its signifi cance to the party and the representatives of the 
economy supporting it. The PNV sʼ attitude towards the autonomy described in the 
Constitution of 1978, also included an economic policy dimension. The PNV was 
the leading economic policy exponent at the Basque General Council,835 even if 
all other parties in the Basque Country supported the restoration of the economic 
agreement. The PNV was criticised because it interpreted the negotiation of the 
Autonomy Statute as recognition by the state of its own policy defi nitions and of 
its way of presenting the statute as a political agreement836 with the Spanish state 
831  The minister for the economy, Luis Atienza Serna (PSE), in his interview of 6.7.1998. 
HGV 2001, 792.
832  The PNV did this in the context of the Barcelona Declaration in 1998, together with 
the CiU, and the BNG of Galicia. Aja 1999, 16–17; see also Documentos para la historia 
del nacionalismo vasco 1998, 156.
833  Conversi sees the Basque Country and Catalonia as the “regions that have been at the 
vanguard of the Spanish economy.” Conversi 1997, 257.
834  Conversi 1997, 288.
835  Cf. the objectives of Ajuriaguerra (PNV) when the mixed commission starting its 
work. López de Juan Abad 1998, 100.
836  Onaindia 2000, 51 & 55–57; El País 24.10.1999.
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whose the substance could be even re-negotiated once the political violence had 
ceased.837 The Autonomy statute (1979) was after all a political success-story for 
the PNV. At the turn of the decade, the PNV heightened its image as the defender 
of fueros.838 The economic agreement negotiation process and the regional law-
making in economic policy became characteristically PNV projects.
The Basque economic agreement, like the question of the PNV sʼ relationship 
to politico-economic power, has been a mere curiosity in the majority of history 
studies. Nevertheless, the economic agreement constitutes a part of the Basque 
Country sʼ institutional, political and economic history.839 The descriptive or 
contractual way of presenting the agreement hides the notion that it would have 
been an automatic agreement and that the parties would have spoken the same 
language without any problems.840 One of the diffi culties a historian faces in 
dealing with the agreement as well as the fueros, is that the agreements with 
the provinces were not similar. A proof of the linkage between the economic 
agreements and the Basque Country sʼ social and economic history is, according to 
Eduardo J. Alonso Olea, that the biggest changes in the arrangement in 1878–1937 
happened in the case of Vizcaya, the province which went through the biggest 
economic, political and social changes in the entire Basque Country during that 
period of time.841 The economic agreement was one of the underlying factors, 
since it facilitated the growth of capital and therefore prepared the way for further 
investment in the industry within as well as beyond the region.
The history of the economic agreements includes the particular problem 
discussed by Alonso Olea that the agreements can be understood as (1) one unique 
agreement which was regularly renewed or (2) as several agreements that followed 
each other, but were related to the same matter. The starting point of Alonso Oleaʼ s 
study is the idea of an agreement that was re-negotiated in 1878–1937. He therefore 
uses the singular form, agreement (Concierto Económico). It is important to note 
this question and the possible political implications behind the terminology when 
a historian discusses the use of politico-economic power. Though the economic 
agreement of the Basque Country was updated and modifi ed during the period 
covered by my thesis, and the newspapers even spoke about different economic 
agreements according to the year in which it was augmented, the basis was always 
the agreement of 1980. This agreement also covered the whole autonomous 
837  The statement by Arzalluz in 1979. Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ranz 2001, 378–379.
838  Corcuera Atienza emphasises how the institutions and administrative structures 
established by the Autonomy Statute enjoyed the support of the majority in the Basque 
Country. Corcuera Atienza 1998, 223 & 230. Cf. the results of the referendum on it. 
According to Corcuera Atienza, the role of fuerism should be to guarantee the realization 
of democracy in the Basque Country, as the Constitution does. Op. cit., 228. 
839  The most signifi cant example of this is the doctoral thesis by Eduardo Alonso Olea, 
El Concierto Económico (1878–1937). Alonso Olea 1995.
840  Op. cit., 14.
841  Op. cit., 15.
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community. Therefore, the singular form of the word is the only historically sound 
form in referring to the years 1980–1998. The representatives of the PNV used 
both the singular and plural forms; this simply refl ects party politics and leans to 
the user sʼ own version of history.
The system of prerogatives constituted by the fueros and abolished defi nitively 
in 1876842 had deteriorated during its fi nal stage. In 1878 it was replaced by 
economic pacts or agreements agreed with the provinces, which allowed the 
provincial councils to carry out tax collection and determine the quota or cupo of 
taxes that every province had to return to the Central Government. The revamping 
of the pacts was realized in the negotiations between the representatives of the 
provinces and the State. The surplus funds stayed in the coffers of provincial 
councils. Historians have drawn contrary conclusions about whether the economic 
agreements created a so-called fi scal paradise in the Basque Country. It is clear 
that the proportion of taxes paid by the local commerce and industry in the 1890s 
remained low as their wealth expanded rapidly. The economic agreement was 
also an exception from the way the Basque provinces were integrated into the 
legal and institutional entity of the rest of Spain.843 Here it was related to the 
centralization of the modern state being “connected with the need to strengthen 
its power to extract revenue”.844 These agreements ameliorated the punitive nature 
of the 1876 law, but they were also the long-expected response to the wish of the 
middle-class in Basque towns to adjust the fueros system, which did not allow the 
region to integrate economically with the domestic market. Those parts of fueros 
in particular which forbade creating a modern economic system in the Basque 
Country should be changed.
The economic agreement still did not include anything other than politico-
economic powers and the provincial councils were blatantly the representatives 
of the fi nancial administration. However, their position in the local administration 
was strong and the provincial assemblies lost their previous power completely.845 
The economy was in general considered as a component of the regionʼ s own 
identity, because the Basque tax system had a special character in 1878–1937. In 
practice the last remnants of the old fueros system were fi nally preserved in the 
economic agreements.846 I can only refer to Alonso Olea: “institutionally foralism 
disappeared, but in fact it remained”.847 The normative capacity decreased, but 
842  The law was drafted by the government of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo. While the 
Spanish parliament discussed this law, he referred to the law of 1839, which he thought 
included the elements that could be used to “solve the problems of the constitutional unity 
of the Spanish monarchy”. The law of 1876 followed the same rationale. This transition 
therefore began in 1839. Mieza y Mieg 1984, 123.
843  Fusi 1984, 161–162.
844  Moravcsik 2001, 169.
845  Mieza y Mieg 1984, 119–121.
846  Fusi 1984, 162.
847  Alonso Olea 1995, 18–19.
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also became incommensurable. The provincial councils were no longer under the 
rule of the assemblies, nor was the State able to control them and their budgeting 
since the governor (El Gobernador Civil) designated by it did not have power to 
intervene in the councilʼ s work as in other regions of the country which belonged 
to the common taxation system.848 Thanks to this arrangement, the councils were 
not just collecting state taxes in the region instead of the state itself, but also 
had their own levies and charges, including the regulations pertaining to them. 
The economic agreement eventually became a means for the councils to maintain 
their services and politico-economic power instead of a substitute for the fueros 
or even an end itself.849
When the economic agreements were to be re-negotiated or adjusted to the 
changes made in the state fi scal system in the following years, the newspapers 
in the Basque Country and the provincial councils were keen to take up the 
question of fueros and the defence of the tradition they embodied.850 Even the 
legality of the State sʼ actions concerning economic agreements could be raised in 
political statements. These agreements, like fueros, became part of the political 
rhetoric of the PNV. Historically seen, Basque nationalism rose to protest against 
the economic and social change in the Basque Country sealed by the economic 
agreements. The PNV was, however, already interested in managing the tax 
surplus left in the region sʼ own hands in the early 20th century, thanks to the 
same economic agreement and also in maintaining that situation for the future. As 
Palafox Gamir has shown, the PNV defended import duties which increased the 
profi tability of local industry, raising them during the fi rst decades of the century. 
At that time the party in economic policy was a defensive political movement 
which found support among the leading Basque businessmen in order to gain 
more fi scal benefi ts and import tariffs. The economy of the region during the fi rst 
period of industrialization was still controlled by the wealthier bourgeoisie, who in 
numerical terms were the smallest group in society. It represented a liberal world-
view, favoured the central government and supported a free market economy. On 
the other hand, it aimed to maximize its economic benefi t which led it to demand 
import duties.851 Palafox Gamir suggests that this was the reason why the PNV 
did not present a modern political programme at the regional or state level before 
the Second Republic.852 In any case, it tells us that the PNV sʼ use of power was 
infl uenced by the Basque and particularly Vizcayan economic elites.
The fi ndings of Palafox Gamir must be seen through the economic history 
of the Basque Country. After the end of the Carlist wars, a signifi cant amount 
848  Alonso Olea 1995, 18–19
849  Op. cit., 383–384.
850  The agreements were re-negotiated in 1886, 1906, 1916 and 1926. Some changes 
were made in the context of the overall modifi cations in the state sʼ system of taxation in 
1888, 1889, 1894, 1900, 1913 and 1920. Fusi 1984, 165.
851  Palafox Gamir 1989.
852  Op. cit., 35–36.
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of capital and investment accumulated in the province of Vizcaya.853 During the 
fi rst period of industrialization, the most signifi cant profi ts in the Basque industry 
were achieved by the foreign companies which had invested in the region. Most 
of those profi ts were invested in the mining industry in other parts of Spain. The 
leading sector of the second phase of industrialization was the iron and steel 
industry, which started in the Basque Country in the 1880s. This was not so much 
because of the profi ts made from exporting minerals, but the superior quality 
steel ingots produced by the Bessemer process, which made the Basque Country sʼ 
steel competitiveness rise in comparison to that of its neighbouring region, 
Asturias. The State also lowered the taxation on iron.854 The iron production of 
Vizcaya in 1881–1895 was about 80 percent of the entire Spanish production. The 
consumption of iron in the Basque industry rose in contrast to steel exports, the 
capital invested originating from the business circles of Bilbao and Madrid as 
well as from the Basque business elites involved in the colonial trade. The new 
steel industry companies were followed by rapid growth in shipbuilding, which 
was pressed by the coasting trade and the trade with overseas colonies. By the 
turn of the century, the Basque Country had become the second largest fi nancial 
centre in Spain after Madrid and Basque businessmen were the most dynamic and 
signifi cant group of entrepreneurs on the Iberian peninsula. After Catalonia, the 
Basque Country was the second most industrialized region in Spain.855 When the 
export markets for Bessemer steel decreased, the Basque industry concentrated 
on the domestic market.856 Basque industrial enterprises benefi ted economically 
from the First World War. During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–1930) 
state procurements softened the effects of the economic recession in the Basque 
industry and compensated for the decrease in the iron exports resulting from 
international advances in technology.
In the long-term, the Basque provincial councils succeeded in strengthening 
the economic arrangement as an agreement, although this was not necessarily 
the result of a conscious policy.857 The situation was advantageous for the Basque 
Country economically since the tax revenue of the provincial councils grew while 
their annual payment to the central government remained the same during an 
agreement period. The funds for these accounts were collected by imposing taxes 
on consumption and movement of goods, in other words by indirect taxes. The 
cost of the collection of payments and constructing the road network were also 
deducted from these sums. Because of the economic agreement, the per capita 
direct taxes were lower in the Basque provinces than elsewhere in Spain. This 
853  Alonso Olea 1995, 33.
854  Op. cit., 32. 
855  González Portilla 1981, vol. I, 156–157.
856  Alonso Olea 1995, 34–35; consequently, investment concentrated on the machining 
of metallurgical products.
857  Op. cit., 23; for example, during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, the provincial 
councils faced problems in their negotiations with the central government.
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system created savings; at the same time the Basque Country was industrialized 
under the leadership of the industry sector which produced engine components 
and was capital intensive. The growing salary costs of the Basque companies 
were balanced by the continuous oversupply of labour and the fact that the critical 
Spanish market remained highly regulated.858
The development by which the economic agreements were becoming signifi cant 
for the national identity was further speeded up by Franco sʼ decision to abolish the 
economic agreements of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa in 1937, but leave the agreements 
of Álava and Navarra in force.859 The peaking of the economy in the Basque national 
identity can be accounted for by the central government remaining weak for a 
long period while the differences between the Basque provinces increased, so that 
the historical development affected the administrative and political development 
and identity. Fueros contributed to the establishment of their own identity, but 
were connected via the recognition given to them by the Spanish kings to the 
Spanish state structure. The Basque Country had never diverged constitutionally 
or administratively from the rest of Spain, although it is likely that there was 
rivalry between these two. The uniqueness of the Basque Country was therefore 
not based on political or administrative isolation.860 The economy regulated by 
fueros was important in this context. The economic agreements were linked to the 
region sʼ wealth and fi nancial management. The PNV wholeheartedly committed 
itself to the policy goal of supporting the restoration of the economic arrangement 
in the political transition period of the 1970s. This was made even easier since 
Franco sʼ actions eventually gave the economic agreements symbolic status. Just as 
the regional autonomy was introduced, they became a part visible of the political 
agenda of the PNV and a cornerstone of its economic policy and strategy. As the 
previous chapter reveals, it also became one of its greatest successes. In sum, 
despite the complexity of the framework formed by the economic agreements and 
fueros, the PNV used it skilfully.
4.3. The strategic role of the party council, EBB
As the history of the Basque Government sʼ economic policy in 1980–1998 reveals, 
the PNV used proportionately more signifi cant powers than its vote (about 23–42 
percent) in the regional elections would have suggested.861 In other words, its 
relative strength remained greater than any other political group in the region. 
Even in 1986–1990, when the Socialists had more seats in the regional Parliament 
– but had received still less votes – than the PNV, the latter was able to keep the 
portfolios of lehendakari and fi nance minister to itself. At that time the PSE and 
the PNV also had the same number of ministers in the Basque government. What 
858  Domínguez Martín 2002, 221–223. 
859  Payne 1985, 209; Fusi 1984, 176–177. 
860  HYML: Raento 1993, 151.
861  Table 2.
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was the reason for this? How did the rule and the revenue remain in the hands of 
the PNV during all those years? In the previous chapter I have demonstrated the 
existence of the PNV sʼ strategy. Having now examined the historical components 
of that strategy, it is time to concentrate on the question of who ultimately used that 
strategy and power. The empiricism of Elton and Foucault and their arguments 
concerning the power structures suggest that a historian should seek the answer by 
analyzing the role and position of the party executive, the PNV sʼ national council, 
the EBB, and the factors linked to it.
Firstly (1) we must note that the EBB had a clear position in the organization 
and the internal division of powers in the PNV. At the end of 1970s, the EBB was 
given the supreme authority when the national assembly of the party (Asamblea 
Nacional) was to decide on the party programme. The extensive autonomy of the 
party councils in the provinces was actually a way of adapting the party structure 
party to the needs of the Basque Country. The PNV had to be able to respond 
to the divergent political and economic circumstances of the provinces and the 
expectations of the voters in that regard. The party structure also helped the 
EBB to strengthen its position during the time of autonomy. If the PNV has been 
sociologically a communal party during its history, politically it has aspired to 
be a model of state structure. Its internal structure imitated the tripartite division 
of powers in a state. The PNV, in its very early stages resembled the core of the 
confederate state that it presented as a model for the sovereign Basque Country of 
the future.862 A communal party became “a party state” by the 1930s according 
to the historian, Granja Sainz.863 This idiosyncrasy manifested itself during the 
years of the Second Republic as well as within the period of my study. In this 
structure assemblies represented legislative power, its institutions of settlement 
judicial power and the councils with the EBB at the head a certain kind of 
Government, e.g., executive power. The party rules approved in 1977 continued 
this traditional model.864 The confederative model of the PNV gave the provinces 
even representation in the party assembly regardless of the differences in the 
party sʼ local support and where the independent status of the party councils 
infl uenced the autonomy statutes of 1931 and 1979 and thus the whole structure of 
the regional administration.865
The PNV sʼ communal nature enabled the party to go beyond merely regional 
parliament-centred policy. The pole position of the PNV within the Basque Country 
in the parliamentary elections of Spain in 1977 was based on its “social presence 
862  Granja Sainz 1995, 150.
863  The PNV sʼ party programme of 1933 resembles, according to Granja Sainz, more a 
constitution than the political programme of a party. Op. cit., 151.
864  Nonetheless, the party was no longer identifi ed with the country (país), the “people” 
was replaced by “membership”, and instead of “municipalities and regions”, it mentioned 
“municipal and regional organisations”. Op. cit., 153; see Figure 2.
865  Granja Sainz 1995, 153.
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and the strong identity of its supporters”.866 This same (2) social sensitiveness 
was channelled up to the EBB. Even in diffi cult times, it showed adaptability and 
its early actions consisted of a mixture of orthodoxy, pragmatism, democracy, 
radicalism and the ability to differentiate essential from non-essential and to 
capitalize on opportunities. All this enabled different and even strongly diverging 
tendencies within the party to co-exist side by side.867 In practice this meant that 
the business elite could have an effect on the PNV policy, though that policy had 
strong ideological roots.
(3) The EBB actively sought more powers and was willing to compromises on 
other issues. The events of the early 1980s are an example of this. The internal 
disputes of the party then led to more direct centralization of decision-making in 
the PNV. This was contrary to the party sʼ democratic character, which was based 
on the role of the party assembly.868 The internal crises and the extra pressure 
caused by the political risk-taking tightened the relations between those who 
supported the concentration of powers and the representatives of the populist 
tradition. While the alignment which was led by party president Arzalluz did 
not originally advocate a decentralized party structure, the regional government sʼ 
role would be to merely coordinate the actions of politically strong provinces. 
He aimed to create a strong party and a relatively strong regional government 
which would however be subordinate to the party. When this failed because of 
the opposition from Garaikoetxeaʼ s cabinet, the EBB intended to strengthen the 
provincial institutions. In practice, the EBB acted “against its own ideology” on 
this question, as Pérez-Agote has remarked.869
In Foucault sʼ power analysis, the use of power is always “an action upon an 
action”.870 In fact, in economic policy the PNV obviously trespassed on the regional 
government, apart from the years 1980–1982. Once Ardanza had succeeded to the 
regional presidency, he and the whole government had also to take the fact that 
the PSE sʼ leader Ramón Jáuregui sat in the coalition governments into account, 
whereas the PNV sʼ party leader was not a member of the government. However, 
though the regional fi nance ministers were, even during the years of the coalition 
governments, often willingly considered in public as technocrats, they were still 
members of the PNV or were close to it. For example, their argument concerning 
the economic agreement resembled the way the EBB acted.871 The EBB could also 
openly come down on the side of the fi nance ministers. Comparing the manifestos 
of the PNV and the statements of the fi nance ministers about the economic policy 
goals shows a lot in common and in some cases the symbolism was very similar.
866  Pablo, Mees & Rodríguez Ránz 2001, 246.
867  Op. cit., 250.
868  Pérez-Agote 1987, 122.
869  Op. cit., 125–126.
870  Foucault 1982, 220.
871  See, for example, the interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la 
Torre, of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 714.
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Despite the symbolism, the EBB sʼ actions and the PNV sʼ more generally revealed 
a way of seeing single economic policy questions pragmatically, sometimes even 
liberally.872 Such issues were ultimately analyzed on purely economic criteria. 
The comment of the fi nance minister of the 1980s, Spagnolo de la Torre, is in 
this respect characteristic: “One thing is your belief in your own position, another 
thing is the way to act in the economic world, and it sʼ necessary to reconcile both 
viewpoints.”873 In sum, when different economic policy views were accommodated 
and arranged under the leadership of the EBB and when policy coherence was a 
goal, nationalism normally had to give way to regionalism.
Pragmatism also appeared in the fact that (4) the EBB had if not an economic 
policy strategy, at least clear goals concerning the economy since the times of the 
pre-autonomy. The PNV considered it should be involved in the coordination of 
all decision-making on the Basque economy, including the public savings banks. 
During the pre-autonomy, the PNV wanted the opinion of the Basque General 
Council to be asked in all questions concerning the state sʼ tax collection in the 
region.874 Since the public fi nances were in the hands of the central government at 
that time, the PNV aimed to start the negotiations on the restoration of the economic 
arrangement quickly. In the Basque General Council the PNV consciously adapted 
the role of economic policy standard-bearer. Despite the limited power of that 
institution, the historical road of regional economic policy began there.
Economic policy goals emphasized social responsibility. An example of this 
was the policy on the public savings banks; this included not merely capitalism, 
but also ideas concerning the responsibilities of society. The project of uniting the 
savings banks in the Basque provinces led to plans to create a central bank for 
the Basque Country. This issue was particularly topical during the years of the 
treasury ministers Spagnolo de la Torre (1985–1988) and his successor Basagoiti 
(1988–1991). To make it a successful project, the future bank was considered to 
need suffi cient authority.875 The question of controlling the credit policy of the 
Basque savings banks was current during Basagoitiʼ s incumbency and at the time 
of economic boom in Spain. He saw it as the business of the regional government 
to address this issue.876 The PNV was willing to use the power relating to the 
savings banks and was clearly aware of their social and economic implications. 
The savings banksʼ share of all credits and savings in the Basque Country in the 
872  Moreno del Río 2000, 201.
873  “Una cosa son tus creencias en lo propio y otra cosa es la forma de actuar en 
el mundo económico, y lo necesario es compatibilizar ambos enfoques.” The treasury 
minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, in his interview of 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 715.
874  Moreover, the council should participate in the fi scal administration at regional, 
provincial, and municipal level. López de Juan Abad 1998, 286-287. 
875  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 716.
876  Interview with the treasury minister, Alfonso Basagoiti, of 15.6.1998. Op. cit., 
854–855; see also The Economist 18.9.1993, 95–96.
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1980s and 1990s was estimated to be normally about half the total.877 Basagoiti 
stressed during his period in offi ce the authority the Statute gives to the region to 
regulate public banking in its area.878 The view of the PNV on a central, regional 
fi nancial institution that would support the public sectors role was also dealt when 
discussing the EC/EU.879
(5) In politically and economically diffi cult periods, the EBB was also obliged 
to seek further support for its policy, the place it chose for this being Vizcaya 
and Bilbao; the traditional power-base of the party. In the diffi cult period of 
internal party disputes of the early 1980s, the EBB leaned visibly on the support 
of bizkaitarrismo. This strong connection had clear implications in the PNV sʼ 
exercise of politico-economic power, since, despite the serious economic troubles, 
Vizcaya was not allowed to lose its place in the context of the Basque national 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The links between the party and the province 
were based on history since the local party council, the BBB, had rapidly become 
the nucleus responsible for carrying on the politics of the PNV in an early stage.880 
Its role in the party was also signifi cant during the period covered by my thesis 
when it increased its powers in relation to the other provincial party councils, the 
GBB and the ABB. This strong bond also caused problems when the PNV-led 
Vizcaya was actively exercising provincial level industry policy through its own 
projects against the will of the regional government. All this disrupted the work 
of the Basque council of public fi nance.
Consequently, the special status of Vizcaya was also a resource. For example, 
treasury minister Basagoiti obviously had good relations with the business elites 
of that province,881 which helped him in implementing the important changes 
concerning the savings banks in the 1980s. As I have previously demonstrated, 
the fi scal policy issues remained fi rmly in the hands of the PNV in the regional 
government and in Vizcaya, the most important industrial area. The infl uence 
of the PNV can be seen as culminating under the period of the last Ardanza 
government (1994–1998) when the management of economic policy was intensifi ed 
and horizontal power was centralized in the hands of the vice-lehendakari and 
treasury minister, Ibarretxe. He combined not just economic and fi scal policy 
877  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 716–717.
878  Cinco Días 31.3.1990; Basagoiti referred to Article 11.2 of the Statute. 
879  Euskadi en el Proyecto de Europa 1991, 30–31.
880  In the party council of Vizcaya, Bizkai Buru Batzar (BBB), which was the fi rst to be 
founded (1895), the characteristic trace of the life in batzokis was visible: it was open to 
all, but almost an isolated, mystic cell. The original goal of the party was to organize itself 
like a “federation of tha batzokis”, which however turned out to be diffi cult to achieve 
because the Nationalistic movement, led by Arana, was not yet a political party in the 
current sense of the word. Corcuera Atienza 1979, 413–414 & 425–426; the role of Arana, 
the movement sʼ founder, was still important, however. Op. cit., 428–431 & 448–449.
881  Interview with the treasury minister Alfonso Basagoiti of 15.6.1998. HGV 2001, 846.
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experience but also theoretical know-how and a strong political background.882 
Consequently, during his period in offi ce the Basque Country acquired even 
more taxation powers and its politico-economic powers became considerably 
greater. The PNV thereby exploited the power structures emphasized by Elton 
and Foucault883 in its economic policy in order to push forward the party sʼ own 
strategy.
(6) The sixth explanation of the PNV sʼ strength can be found in its intention 
to continuously represent different parts of Basque society.884 The euskalerriacos 
saw the region sʼ autonomy as a historical opportunity to re-organize the relations 
between the middle-class, trade organizations and the government by following 
the rules of the market economy.885 However, they actively enhanced the ability 
of the party to function via different interest groups; for them, economy was 
the helpful instrument of a wider policy. Although this alignment had a leading 
position in the early 1980s and was criticized within the party itself for promoting 
the interests of big business, the party was always able to further strengthen its 
positions in the trade unions. The ELA, closely linked to the PNV, had a growing 
proportion of all the trade union members in Basque Country, increasing from 25 
percent to 40 percent in 1982–1986, mainly at the Socialist-led UGT sʼ expense.886 
Interestingly, the image of the PNV in public remained rather neutral concerning 
the trade unions, although it openly welcomed their existence.887 In the regional 
government, the PSE was mainly responsible for public services; this did not mean 
that the PNV did not understand their political potential. It seemed to have realized 
during the 1980s how much it could help its own political project by securing 
the citizensʼ  living standards and addressing the unemployment problem in real 
terms.888 It particularly did not want to present itself as a party linked only to the 
interests of big business. Its ideological and economic policy answer, as I have 
explained, has been “welfare nationalism” since the late 1980s. Interestingly, this 
line was adopted and decided on by the leadership of the party. This demonstrates 
that the weakening power of the euskallericos group within the PNV did not 
mean a corresponding weakening of pragmatism in economic policy decisions.
The history of the regional government shows how PNV economic policy 
activity was related to the infl uence that the business world had on the thinking of 
882  Ibarretxe was the PNV sʼ candidate for the post of lehendakari in the regional 
elections of 1998.
883  Foucault 1980, 142.
884  Acha Ugarte & Pérez-Nievas 1998, 98–99.
885  Zirakzadeh 1991, 119–120.
886  The UGT sʼ percentage declined from 19 to 15, and the CC.OO, which had close 
relations with the communists, remained at 20 percent. The fourth trade union in the 
Basque Country was the LAB, led by the radical nationalists. Onaindia 2000, 64.
887  See Moreno del Río 2000, 201.
888  See the interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 
5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 716.
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the EBB and thus the party. Moreover, the PNV intended to gain a leading position 
among the Basque nationalists and in Basque politics; the economic policy issues 
were foregrounded in this political process. If the PNV instrumentalized the 
economic agreement in its own image-making, for example, so that the largest 
possible support could be achieved in the region, it was also building a picture 
of the Basque Country sʼ ability to obtain all the rights it was entitled to. At the 
same time it remained a means for the local business elites to achieve the power 
in economic policy to meet the needs and interests of the local business world. 
The businessmen believed this was the only way out of the worsening economic 
recession. The infl uence of the business world was also automatic via the persona 
of Garaikoetxea who became party leader in 1977 and had a strong business 
background. Ardanza had also been working in the private sector.
Likewise, it was important for the EBB sʼ politico-economic power that (7) the 
strategy and tactics applied led to prosperity and success, as various negotiations 
of the economic agreement or the Guggenheim museum did. In line with Foucault sʼ 
idea concerning the role of strategy in the exercise of power, EBB statements and 
the political programmes of the PNV continuously monitored the current situation 
of power transfers. This became even apparent during the diffi cult economic 
times of the early 1990s; the PNV still had to defi ne new policies so that the 
unemployment problem could be solved, and the party sʼ representatives, as well 
as the cabinet ministers, actively pointed out that greater authority would facilitate 
this.889 The PNV aimed to acquire the powers in employment not yet transferred; 
the opportunity to guarantee people sʼ living standards and to keep pace with the 
EU average were linked to the continuing lack of power and the way that power 
would be used in the region. Having negotiated the economic agreement and the 
cupo, it was not politically diffi cult for the PNV to argue that it would fully use the 
authority granted. The way in which the role of the public sector was exploited as 
an instrument for the PNV in its work for the good of the region is interesting.
The power of the PNV was also legitimized by stressing simultaneously 
in public how the regional administration had become more responsible for 
the consequences of its actions in gradually increasing its power. The regional 
government sʼ economic policy was described in terms of continuity and constant 
effort to reform the internal administrative structures. The primary goal was to 
create an image of the PNV sʼ exercise of politico-economic power as a long-term 
project which should not be disrupted either. Moreover, the goal was to further 
increase well-being in the region. The political publications listed such things as 
combating social marginalisation and displacement and putting the people fi rst 
as successes. At the same time, the continuity of the economic policy process 
of the PNV was linked to the continuation of the transfers of authority and that 
the regional administration was ready to receive and wield them. In other words, 
the PNV had a clear strategy behind its actions and behaviour, and when the 
889  See treasury minister Juan José Ibarretxe sʼ interview of 21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 
1480−1481.
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party explained in public it did so increasingly in economic terms. However, 
during the 1990s the criticism of the central government sʼ economic policy and 
its effects on the regional economy decreased markedly. It was no longer blamed 
for the structural problems, the underlying argument being the PNV sʼ ability to 
comprehend the needs and problems of the Basque economy better.
What were the consequences of this strategy? All the factors I have explained 
contributed to the fact that in Basque politics, the power of the EBB was signifi cant, 
particularly in relation to the regional government. It must have come as a surprise to 
the party that the way the economic agreement developed into a political project of 
the moderate Basque nationalists and the strong regionalist policy line in economic 
issues actually consolidated the fi rst regional governmentsʼ negotiating position 
with the central government and, importantly, with the provinces as well. At the 
latest, the LTH tangibly indicated how the PNV sʼ dominant, even monopolistic 
position, did not mean that a common economic policy approach existed or was 
even emerging within the party.890 Economic recession and the differing views 
of the local businessmen and the regional administration sʼ representatives on the 
ways to revitalize the economy were not the only economic policy problems of 
the regional government. Something which was still possible in the negotiations 
on the economic agreement was not repeated in the elaboration work of the 
LTH. The principle of strengthening the region sʼ position in its relation to the 
central government was not incorporated in that law and the system it created. 
Interestingly, this corroborates Elton sʼ point that decision- and policy-making 
were separate from the administration. The EBB, and the party in general, was 
to always break new ground in the most important and diffi cult issues. As Aja 
points out, ultimately there was a dialogue between the parties in power, not the 
governments.891 The difference between power and the institutions stressed by 
Foucault is also seen here in that power relations were close to the institutions, 
but the EBB decided to follow the safest and best strategy. The intention was 
to maintain politico-economic power in the hands of the party, which was 
deemed easiest in the provinces rather than the region. A consequence was that 
while the provinces gained power and the internal fi nancing system resembled 
fi scal federalism, the city administrations were economically subordinate to the 
provincial institutions. This meant continuous controversies over public fi nancing 
between Vizcaya and Bilbao892 and even as internal differences within the PNV. 
The party was in power at both levels.
As Foucault states, this situation between the different levels of administration 
was not however static; individuals, i.e., politicians, infl uenced it. Ardanza, who 
had been the head of the provincial council of Guipúzcoa and also worked in 
the corporate world, achieved some stability in the longer term,893 reducing the 
890  Rivera 1998, 90–91.
891  Aja 1999, 201.
892  Cava Mesa 2000.
893  See, for example, Almunia 2002, 279.
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in-fi ghting by leading the regional administration without challenging the power-
structures of the party. Consequently, he even managed to increase the powers of 
the lehendakari. This did not mean that the power of the EBB decreased. Although 
the internal disputes of the 1980s whittled away the powers of the PNV in the long 
term, its strong administrative touch made it an easier coalition partner for the 
PSE than the EA, which was seen as an insecure choice among the Socialists. 
This again helped the public image of the PNV, which wanted to maintain its 
position and be the main Basque nationalist party to be reckoned with.894
The politically unstable second legislature (1984–1986), which was to end 
prematurely, was a time of institutional entrenchment in spite of everything. This 
was also an advantage for the political goals of the PNV and the party executive 
EBB. The development of the departments of the ministers was linked to the 
hierarchy and multi-level nature of the power transfers: (i) fi rst there were transfers 
from the central government to regional government; (ii) from the regional 
government to the provincial administrations and (iii) again from the provinces 
to the regional administration. As a consequence of this, the regional government 
departments grew like topsy. The number of departments was lowest during 
the fi rst Ardanza cabinet.895 During the succeeding years, the administrative 
procedures were further established and the reaction of the PNV to the Socialistsʼ 
accession to the regional government and the challenge of the EA was to control 
such important political issues as the taxation and public funds even more.896 
Interestingly, Ardanzaʼ s cabinets claimed, despite the consolidation of the LTH, 
that leadership in economic policy belonged to the regional government, and the 
provincial administrations were to assist it in that task.897 On the other hand, the 
regional governments tried hard to streamline their own economic policy-making 
structures and coordination.
According to the views of the cabinet minister the regional parliament was 
the basis for the political power in the Basque Country and the common regional 
institutions should be above the provincial councils and parliaments. The role of 
the regional government was to be the political leader. The roots of this thinking 
can also be found in the camp of the Socialists who placed their party leader in the 
regional government, partly to reinforce their weight in a cabinet dominated by 
894  The EAʼs political programme, which included radical, but still democratic ingredients, 
did not make its cooperation with the PNV or the radical HB easy. Garaikoetxea 
2002, 276.
895  Mesa 2000, 108–110.
896  Ardanza appointed the earlier minister of industry, Egoetxeaga, as the vice-
lehendakari and the minister of the economy. Egoetxeaga was one of the most important 
euskalerriacos members of Garaikoetxea sʼ cabinet. Lucas Murillo de la Cueva 1990, 
228−229. The PSE minister's proportion of the total regional government's budget 
exceeded that of the PNV ministers. Mesa 2000, 115.
897  “Órganos de apoyo.” See the interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo 
de la Torre, on 5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 704.
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the PNV.898 In taxation and the management of public funds power existed outside 
of the regional government and importantly, upwards, which confi rms Foucault sʼ 
theory on power relations and overlap in the exercise of power. The historical 
infl uence and the role of the EBB in the creation of this situation was important. It 
also greatly benefi ted from this process during the period of my thesis.
All these factors were crucial; the position of the EBB within the party 
organisation was clear, its social sensitivity and readiness to compromise in order 
to bolster its position were good assets; it also had clear goals in economic policy, 
it was strongly linked to Vizcaya and its business interests, and it was still eager 
to represent different social groups. Finally, local fi nance ministers could always 
rely on the support of the EBB and they were the architects of many economic 
policy achievements. The strategic role of the EBB was by no means weak.
4.4. The PNV sʼ use of politico-economic power 
and the Basque provinces
4.4.1. Relations under tension
Since the beginning of the new autonomy, the PNV, which had become the 
leading party on the Basque political scene, had to face the fact that the social 
and economic structures in Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa and Álava were different and 
sometimes even antagonistic and contradictory. The historically and politically 
disparate development of the provinces had created a pluralism which in turn 
produced a variety of local identities.899 This continued to reverberate in the 
politico-economic power relationships and the struggle that took place; this 
struggle was also in some cases similar to the internal power struggle of the 
PNV. The internal heterogeneity of the Basque Country was on display within 
the PNV and its internal, rival economic and social visions were a fait accompli 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Foucault sʼ reasoning suggests that politico-economic 
power in the Basque Country became a cluster of relationships which the party 
and the EBB aspired to coordinate. However, the tense relationships between the 
provinces made this task diffi cult.
For example, the representatives of the PNV in Álava900 hoped both on account 
of the new economic agreement and the LTH law for a solution that would help 
to make the province even more self-contained. The political tensions in Álava 
repeatedly came to light. At the same time the PNV strove for a stronger position 
in that province, something that proved diffi cult, its support remaining at 30 
percent. The regional councils of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa also emphasized the 
898  Interview with Economic Minister Juan Atienza Serna of 6.7.1998. HGV 2001, 795.
899  HYML: Raento 1996, 203.
900  The most important was the leader of the provincial council, Emilio Guevara (PNV). 
Interview with the treasury minister, Pedro Luis Uriarte, of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 334.
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politico-economic autonomy of the provinces.901 The regional governments led 
by Garaikoetxea did not support that kind of solution, but tried to control the 
provinces economically from the regional administration.
For the regional government, the dispute over the LTH law signifi ed a worrying 
trend in economic policy coordination. This was exacerbated by the PNV sʼ way 
of exploiting the fueros in its political programmes in very general terms only. 
For the provinces it was therefore easy to invoke the party sʼ defi nition of policy. It 
was essential for the future economic policy of the provinces that their traditional 
right to tax collection be preserved in the Statute of Autonomy. The economic 
agreement of 1980, which highlighted the role of the administration of the 
provinces, transferred the right to regulate the taxes to them. The councils of the 
provinces were therefore administratively and economically the most signifi cant 
repositories of the historical rights which the PNV underlined in its rhetoric and 
capitalized on politically. The provinces also became the most signifi cant users 
of those rights.902 The LTH was to regulate the division of powers between the 
regional government and the three provincial councils, as well as including a 
model for the Basque Country sʼ internal system of fi nancing by distributing the 
power to impose tax. This law only strengthened the politico-economic position 
of the provinces in the 1980s when they were able to decide on the regulation of 
taxes as well as the use of the tax revenue.
The infl uence of the provinces on economic policy only became clear at the 
latest when the European Commission started to investigate the tax subsidies at 
the provincial level where the core issues were the special corporate tax credits 
for investment or business start-ups provided by the Basque authorities and the 
fi scal residence shifts produced by those benefi ts. The economic consequences 
of these shifts were linked to the changes in resource allocation involved since 
revenue effects stemming from other taxable bases, such as personal income tax 
or indirect taxes, were also to benefi t the region.903 According to the PNV, the 
provincesʼ  “right” to regulate taxes was recognized, not given by the Spanish 
state. It then was not transferred to the communitarian level when Spain joined the 
EC/EU. The PNV stressed that the EC/EU could not question this historical right 
of the provinces. The only way to fi nd a solution for such problem according to the 
party was for the region to have its voice heard better in the EC/EU by letting the 
Basque representatives participate in the work of the EU when the issues which 
were its responsibility were being dealt with. However, the statements of the PNV 
and the members of the regional government were not precise; they indicated 
however that in practice the regional political leadership would represent the 
provinces.
The PNV sʼ actions enabled the provincesʼ  institutions and its own party 
901  Interview with the treasury minister, Pedro Luis Uriarte, of 24.7.1998. HGV 
2001, 333–335.
902  Onaindia 2000, 80–81.
903  Joumard & Varoudakis 2000, 43.
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councils to infl uence the regional government. Basque economic policy was thus 
characterised by provincial interests and the relationship between the regional 
government and the provinces developed into an extremely sensitive one. My 
analysis of the use of power also reveals that the EBB sʼ attitude towards the 
provinces and their administrations varied in the 1980s and 1990s, depending on 
the objectives of the EBB. These actions sometimes seemed contradictory and their 
motives and outcomes have not been thoroughly assessed so far. They still offer a 
window on the analysis of the party strategy and how it was implemented.
The clearest example of the EBB sʼ and the whole party sʼ strong relationship 
and bond with the provinces can be found in Vizcaya and its administrative 
capital, Bilbao. These were historically important places for the party and in 
1980–1998, as during the previous times in its history, it was here that the PNV 
enjoyed its strongest support. Greater Bilbao also remained a centre of regional 
economic and political power. The Guggenheim museum opened in fall 1997 and 
crystallized the politico-economic problems of the 1980s and 1990s. It was part 
of a bigger project aggregate which was not exceptional in the European context. 
However, it testifi es to the need to turn the problems of the outdated economic 
structures of Vizcaya to its advantage and that the appropriate political decision 
be taken. It was also an indication of innovativeness and the PNV sʼ economic 
policy, which favoured special projects, and the party sʼ determination to use the 
regional politico-economic powers positively: a signifi cant public investment was 
carried out at the provincial level with the blessing of the EBB.
During the time covered by my thesis, Bilbao suffered from the same prolonged 
economic depression as the rest of the region. The city leadership was trying to 
fi nd a way out of this impasse. After the opening of the Guggenheim museum, 
its name was used to explain not just cultural but also economic, political and 
even societal factors. By 1998, economists and journalists were using the concept 
of el efecto Guggenheim, or the Guggenheim effect, when they wanted to refer 
to the positive economic outlook of the Basque Country. The role of the PNV 
and its leadership, the EBB, had been crucial in this process, which importantly 
concerned its power-bases, Vizcaya and Bilbao. I will analyse this process later.
For the reasons I have explained, Vizcaya and Bilbao, despite the prolonged 
economic recession and the crises of the traditional heavy industry, were easier 
locations for the PNV sʼ exercise of politico-economic power than Álava and to a 
lesser extent Guipúzcoa. Support for the party remained low, particularly in Álava. 
Support for the PNV in Vizcaya was also more evenly spread between the social 
groups and the whole province was socially more coherent than other provinces. 
The provincial council of Vizcaya, where the PNV had a signifi cant position 
in the 1980s and 1990s, also differed from the other provincesʼ  administration 
through its greater size.904 The PNV had therefore a larger politico-administrative 
machinery at its disposal than elsewhere.
The political weight of Álava and the practical problems the PNV suffered as 
904  Mesa 2000, 97 & 266.
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a result came out during the negotiations on the economic agreement. The Basque 
side was not just concerned to defi ne the technical details of the agreement, but 
to maintain the inter-provincial political relations. A particular objective was to 
maintain both Álavaʼ s and the other provincesʼ  independence in taxation.905 The 
administrative capital of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gazteiz, had been the centre 
of a diverse province, which for many reasons was not politically easy for the PNV. 
Álava was historically defi ned by its own identity, but as a region it was internally 
less integrated. Its relationship with Vizcaya was full of historical tensions which 
the PNV had to take into account. The politico-economic symbolic value of Álava 
was not low due to the economic agreement maintained by Franco.
With the establishment of the autonomous community, Vitoria-Gazteiz became 
a new centre within the autonomous region and even in its own province. The 
identity of Vitoria-Gazteiz included indications of setting of boundaries with its 
environment906 and negative attitudes towards Bilbao. This eased of the pace of 
the growing political power of the PNV in that city, as in other parts of Álava. This 
was not a new phenomenon, there having been reservations in Vitoria-Gazteiz 
concerning the economic and industrial development of the Bilbao region since 
the latter part of the 19th century.907
In any case, the platform of the PNV in Álava leant on economic issues. This 
was partly for historical reasons; we must note that in the early 20th century, when 
the economic agreement was once again re-negotiated, all the political forces in 
Álava strongly backed the continuity of that arrangement. After the Spanish Civil 
War, the maintenance of that agreement made this issue very important. After 
the death of Franco it was politically advantageous for every party to advocate 
respect for Álavaʼ s economic agreement and interests. Moreover, it is important to 
understand that the PNV sʼ propagandist view on the rural idyll which it appealled 
to from its early existence did not politically help it in Álava or Vitoria-Gazteiz, 
since the so-called vitorianismo, or Vitorianism, historically shunned rural 
culture.908 The diffi culties the PNV experienced in Álava can be best described 
by pointing out that the party started to secure its position in that province and 
outside of Vitoria-Gazteiz only during the Second Republic.909
At the beginning of the current autonomy, the PNV tried to openly support 
Vitoria-Gazteiz, the newly chosen administrative capital of the region, but the 
increasing infl uence of bizkaitarrismo in the PNV during Garaikoetxeaʼ s second 
term did not facilitate the PNV sʼ relations with Álava.910 Neither did this help the 
905  Interview with treasury minister Pedro Luis Uriarte of 24.7.1998. HGV 2001, 317.
906  Rivera Blanco 1990, 23.
907  Op. cit., 31–32; the same anti-Vizcaya spirit characterized the centre-right provincial 
party Unidad Alavesa (UA) in the 1990s. Signifi cantly, foralism had an important role in 
its background. Martínez Sospedra 1996, 316.
908  Rivera Blanco 1990, 27–28.
909  Op. cit., 23–24.
910  See the interview with the lehendakari Carlos Garaikoetxea of 23.7.1998, HGV 2001, 112.
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relationship of the party with Guipúzcoa.911 In conclusion, the power of the PNV 
in Vizcaya brought problems in other Basque provinces in some sense; the most 
obvious example of this being Álava, where the support for the PNV did not rise 
very high. In Guipúzcoa, its main political rival in the 1980s was the Socialists, 
who established a fi rm foothold in San Sebástian. Then again, the EA splinter 
generally group took some of the backing of the PNV in Guipúzcoa. The PNV 
however tried actively to take into account that Guipúzcoaʼ s small and medium 
size companies had different interests from those of big businessʼ in Vizcaya.
4.4.2. Congruent interests – Vizcaya and Bilbao as an example
The province of Vizcaya and the city of Bilbao in general have a special status in 
the history of the PNV and the history of its exercise of politico-economic power 
is no exception. The leadership of the party as well as the regional government 
had an obviously strong relationship to them in 1980–1990, despite the intentions 
of the province to pursue its own industrial policy.912 On the other hand, Vizcaya 
suffered during that whole period from a deep and prolonged economic crisis 
and was a living example of shutdown of the old economic structures. However, 
the support for the PNV in the region did not change radically. The party had 
supporters there not just in the middle-class, but also enjoyed solid support in other 
social groups, something which prevented the other parties seriously challenging 
the PNV in that area.
The leadership of traditional heavy industry in Vizcaya differed from the other 
business elites in the Basque Country during the fi rst and the second industrial 
revolution. It was clearly the leading group among the Basque businessmen 
and maintained strong family business characteristics. There was something in 
Vizcayan capitalism which resembled the Basque traditions: the role of family was 
strong and the task of the eldest son particularly was to continue the business.913 
As I have explained, early in the history of the PNV some of the upper middle-
class in Vizcaya started to support the party; this again changed the general views 
of the PNV concerning industry and its relation to economic growth. Many of 
the ship-owners in Bilbao openly embraced the PNV. By the time of the Second 
Republic, the party had been able to achieve backing even among the industrial 
workers of Vizcaya of whom a signifi cant number were not Basque by birth.914 
In all these groups, the support for the PNV was transferred from one generation 
to another during the 20th century and Vizcaya was a powerful presence in the 
ideology of the party. Bilbao, the cradle of the PNV, remained understandably at 
911  Like an antithesis to the PNV sʼ and Vizcaya sʼ strong bond, the EA and the HB were 
both strongly present in Guipúzcoa. Martínez Sospedra 1996, 316.
912  For example, treasury minister Basagoitiʼ s background was linked to Vizcaya. See, 
for example, the interview with the treasury minister, Alfonso Basagoiti, of 15.6.1998. 
HGV 2001, 846.
913  Cava Mesa 2000, 19.
914  Granja Sainz 1995, 149.
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the heart of party policy. This makes analysis of the political events in Bilbao in 
1980–1998 necessary in order to understand the PNV strategy. That strategy was, 
as Foucault argues in his writings,915 locked into the regional power relations and 
ultimately created the dominant position of the PNV in Basque politics in 1980s 
and 1990s.
My research approach is threefold: (1) First I explain what developments led 
to the adoption of a new economic policy and its implementation. (2) Secondly, 
I demonstrate the congruence of the regional government and Bilbao city 
administration sʼ interests, one result of which was the museum project. (3) Thirdly, 
I explain the rapid economic change that took place in the economy, what the role 
of the new economic policy was in this and what the so-called Guggenheim effect 
meant to Vizcaya and the rest of the Basque Country.
(1) The economic development of Bilbao followed the general direction of 
the regional economy in the period covered by my thesis, because most of the 
heavy industry in Vizcaya was located in greater Bilbao. In the early years of 
autonomy, the new democratic administration of the city was taking shape and 
the political groups criticized each other for authoritarian actions.916 The PNV 
took the lead in the city administration and a balanced budget was achieved by the 
early 1980s when it gained more of the public revenue. The taxation became more 
effi cient, the budgeting more precise and the spending was rationalized. The city 
administration at that time was characterised by modernization and concentration 
on its fi nances.917 However, the Socialists and the EE criticized the PNV for 
infl exible and authoritarian administration. In practice, this criticism was directed 
at the PNV sʼ way of not accepting or taking into account the proposals and ideas 
of other political parties.918 The political independence of the PNV was based on 
its strong majority position, political methods and the general atmosphere in the 
region. The party was still aware of the problems this situation involved. Various 
working groups were created to support the work of the city council and, the 
separate four-year plan was adopted to help the administration and to improve the 
PNV sʼ relations with other parties.919
At the beginning of the 1980s, Bilbao suffered from the growing problems of 
the region sʼ heavy industry and a housing shortage, traffi c problems and a crisis 
in its school system. The main reasons for these problems were the economic 
recession that affected the whole Basque Country as well as mistakes made in 
urban planning in previous decades. In order to ease the situation, the city council 
organized meetings with the representatives of the provincial council of Vizcaya 
in the regional government.920 The political alliance between the PNV and the 
915  Foucault 2000b, 348.
916  Cava Mesa 1999, 29.
917  Op. cit., 30–31.
918  Op. cit., 33.
919  Op. cit., 40–43.
920  Op. cit., 24–26.
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PSE which started at the regional level also became apparent in the Bilbao city 
council.921 Industrial peace in the city government improved, but its relations with 
the provincial council of Vizcaya remained diffi cult, the reason being that the 
provincial council was responsible for deciding on the fi nancing of the city, the 
main feature of the Basque system of fi nance, which in practice restricted its 
economic elbow room. 
Heavy industry had been the mainstay of the economy of the city up to the 
1980s. The Spanish EC membership meant in practice that the shutdown of that 
industry would accelerate; in Bilbao this felt like the end of the old economic 
system. By the end of the decade, the city sʼ borrowing became a real threat to its 
development.922 The underlying reason for this was the system established in LTH 
law by which the provincial councils had strengthened their positions and served 
the interests of their province in the fi rst place, and the regional government only 
after that. However, the fi nancing of cities originated largely from the regional 
government. Cities which represented the local level in the Basque Country and 
whose fi nancial needs grew continuously were placed further away from their 
economic resources in the administration because of the LTH. In the Basque 
Country, the governing bodies of the cities generally hoped for more fl exible 
means of funding.923 There was no consensus within the PNV on this matter and 
the then mayor of Bilbao, José María Gorordo (PNV), openly shifted the blame for 
borrowing onto his own party at the end of the 1980s. He explained his opinions 
by indicating how the regional government and the provincial council controlled 
practically all the economic resources of the city. The 1985 regional law on the 
division of fi nancing (Ley de Aportaciones) established a system where the role of 
the provincial councils clearly exceeded the city and municipal level.924 According 
to Gorordo, the problem of city debts was therefore impossible to solve at city 
level.925 Although the idea of making Bilbao into a future original metropolis 
emerged during his mandate, the priority was then given to fi nding a solution to 
the fi nancial problems. In any case, in the late 1980s a new kind of development 
plan was made for Bilbao (Plan General de Ordenación Urbana), fi nanced by 
the regional government, the Council of Vizcaya and Bilbao city council.926 The 
dominating position of the PNV at various levels of administration, and the 
921  The success of the EA in the regional elections of 1987 weakened the PNV sʼ position 
in the regional administration, as it did in the city leadership in Bilbao, though the main 
stronghold of the EA was Guipúzcoa. Cava Mesa 1999, 61–62 & 82–83.
922  The city sʼ borrowing was increased in the 1980s by large land purchases. However, many 
of these areas were re-sold, and did not remain in the hands of the city; this was important 
when large-scale construction projects were undertaken in the 1990s.Op. cit., 43.
923  Op. cit., 104–105.
924  See the interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, in 
5.8.1998. HGV 2001, 703.
925  Cava Mesa 1999, 69.
926  Op. cit., 72–73.
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decision to give Vizcaya and Bilbao priority were crucial factors in the creation 
of this arrangement.
In Bilbao and its neighbouring areas, a relatively short economic boom was 
experienced at the beginning of the 1990s, but political violence darkened the 
shadow of the city sʼ economic malaise. Although ETA did not strike in Bilbao, 
companies moved away for fear of terrorism. In the problems of the Basque 
Country and Bilbao, it was not just a question of differing economic policy 
views; at the local level the developments which started at the end of 1970s and 
continued into the 1980s were believed to be leading the region sʼ economy and 
society to complete collapse.927 The decrease in population and the change in 
the relative economic importance of Bilbao were statistical facts. In the case of 
Bilbao, the intangible term “mental recession” was also used and the economic 
and social crises of Bilbao fi nally meant that the whole image of the city was 
to be modernized. A transitional stage in the administration of the city started 
in 1991 when the fi ght against the problem of public borrowing was started by 
intensifying economic planning, re-organizing the administration and capital 
base and fi nancing arrangements as well as tightening control of borrowing. 
Atienza (PSE), the regional government sʼ minister for the economy, was involved 
in starting a revitalization project for Bilbao. He emphasized the opportunity to 
utilize EU funding in the projects targeted at improving the communications 
network and infrastructure.928 However, there were problems resulting from his 
restricted powers and the distrust shown by the representatives of the PNV on 
the city council and the regional council of Vizcaya. Furthermore, the idea of 
supporting Bilbao was not unanimously supported within the PSE. In the end, the 
responsibility for the project was given to a private consulting fi rm,929 so that the 
public-private cooperation in this case resulted from lack of political leadership. To 
assist the revitalization of Bilbao and create a joint strategy, a separate association 
was created in May 1991, called Bilbao-Metropoli 30 (BM-30).930 Its objectives 
were to reinforce planning for the future, to publicize it and to assist the city in 
its international relations. The association was also to carry out research and even 
represent the city on special occasions. This association, dedicated to issues of 
urban planning and public administration, hoped to enhance the restructuring of 
the industry and redirect the economy, as well as turn Bilbao into a centre offering 
modern services. The founding fathers of BM-30 were public and private sector 
927  Nuevos Extractos de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País 1998 (I), 
12–13.
928  El Correo 18.5.1990; the interview with the minister of the economy, Juan Atienza 
Serna of 6.7.1998. HGV 2001, 793–795.
929  Andersen Consulting. Esteban 2000, 89 & 99–100.
930  Egin 10.5.1991.
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organizations and private individuals.931 The city leadership aimed at saving 
Bilbao from the economic tailspin, something which seemed unstoppable; a new 
kind of city was to replace the old Bilbao, in which more and more companies and 
factories were closing down.932 The city fathers had also been actively seeking a 
role for Bilbao in the context of European cities since the beginning of the 1990s. 
There were several cooperative networks to choose from but, more importantly, 
the city tried to identify itself again.933
In 1992 various levels of government agreed on cooperation for the Bilbao 
metropolitan area when the Spanish Ministry for Public works, the Basque 
Government, the Vizcaya regional council and the Bilbao city council started the 
Bilbao Ría-2000 joint venture.934 The idea of helping Bilbao and Vizcaya was not 
however received with enthusiasm among the Basque socialists.935 The economic 
policy of the city of Bilbao in the 1990s was a mixture of efforts to revitalize 
and strategically change the economic existing structures towards a tertiary 
sector economy. Active marketing and lobbying was involved. The Guggenheim 
foundation sʼ interest in the Basque Country and Bilbao was confi rmed when the 
representatives of the region were ready to invest a signifi cant amount of money in 
the project. The anthropologist Zulaika, who has studied Bilbao and this project, 
stresses how the problem in this procedure was mainly the way in which Bilbao 
was intended to revive, and how the interest of the Guggenheim foundation, which 
had its own fi nancial problems, was aroused: “by donating 2,000 million pesetas 
[12 million euros] of public money to Wall Street when the region was suffering 
from unemployment of 25 percent”. With that money “a private museum located 
in New York was kept afl oat”.936 From the start, the project included an element 
of signifi cant fi nancial risk-taking. The museum, like the other projects in the 
area, was a positive step toward economic redirection, but did not alone provide a 
reasonable basis or opportunity to start talking about a new economic policy for 
the regional or other governments. My intention is to trace the strategy of the PNV 
in its use of power.
931  World Urban Economic Development 1999, 2; the revitalization of greater Bilbao 
was also followed in the 1990s by the Deusto University sʼ Instituto Deiker, with the 
criteria defi ned for this purpose: El sistema de Indicadores de Revitalización del Bilbao 
Metropoli. These were used to analyse the process of the revitalization according to 
four main criteria: the quality of human resources, internationalisation (i.e., the regionʼ s 
integration in international economic structures), the development of the IT society, and 
sustainable development. Indicadores Estratégicos de Revitalización: Comparación del 
Bilbao Metropolitano con las Areas Metropolitanas del Estado 1999; for the strategy of 
Bilbao Metropoli-30, see Plan estratégico para la Revitalización del Bilbao Metropolitano 
1997.
932  Cava Mesa 1999, 106.
933  Zulaika 1997, 108.
934  Cava Mesa 1999, 117; Esteban 2000, 116. 
935  El Correo 30.10.1991, 22.1.1992 & 7.2.1993
936  Zulaika 1997, 227.
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For my own analysis it is important to see how the strategy of the PNV changed 
and, as the geographer Donald McNeill points out, this was seen locally in the 
form of actual projects.937 The new economic policy intended to solve the socio-
economic problems of Bilbao fi rst of all formed part of the objective of changing 
the image of the city completely in the short term. The city-level decisions to 
redefi ne strategic planning via institutions like the BM-30 happened just as the 
leadership of the PNV was increasingly worried about the bystander role of the 
Basque Country as the preparations for the several international events in Spain 
in 1992 such as the Olympic games in Barcelona, the World Expo in Seville 
and the role of Madrid as the cultural capital of Europe passed it by.938 Zulaika 
emphasizes how diffi cult it is to demonstrate what really happened within the 
party concerning its role in the Guggenheim project. The prominent role of the 
PNV in this is still historically clear.939 My analysis, which takes into account 
the different levels of administration and the party sʼ parallel structures, shows 
how the party was facing a double challenge. Its strongest power-base, Bilbao 
and Vizcaya, needed quick solutions and politically the party was expected to 
demonstrate its capabilities with all the powers granted to the regional level. Since 
Vizcaya was demographically and economically the most important part of the 
region, changing its economic direction would also have the biggest impact. The 
same effect could not be achieved via Guipúzcoa or Álava. The need for image-
raising was also most urgent in Bilbao, which was in a state of economic and 
social degradation. All these reasons had their effect when the party was deciding 
to take the political and economic risk inherent in that particular project. Doing 
nothing to stop the decline of Bilbao and Vizcaya would have also had its own 
obvious political consequences. This ambitious project was thus started and the 
EBB approved the agreement to be made with the Guggenheim foundation in 
December 1991.940 The objective was clearly to remake Bilbao and Vizcaya again 
and restart the Basque economy.
In the Vizcaya provincial council it was the counsellor of treasury, Juan Luis 
Laskurain, also a member of the EBB, who was responsible for this project. Having 
consulted the EBB, he decided that this project would be good for the economy of 
Bilbao. The project idea had also already been approved by those responsible for 
the city sʼ urban planning. Only a few months later, the project was announced to the 
regional government sʼ culture minister, Joseba Arregi (PNV).941 The fact that the 
preparation work was done by the treasury and that the department of culture was 
kept aside till the capital-base was provisionally agreed upon does not alone prove 
that the project was PNV-linked, though it has been used to back that argument.942 
937  McNeill 2000, 491.
938  Zulaika 1997, 27.
939  Op. cit., 27 & 31.
940  Op. cit., 197 & 199.
941  Op. cit., 141.
942  Zulaika, for example, does that. Op. cit., 187 & 189.
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As I have explained in the previous chapter, the treasury remained fi rmly in the 
hands of the PNV. The procedure used in this case indicates the intention of the 
PNV to control the signifi cant politico-economic risks of this project. A revealing 
detail of the power of the PNV in the Basque context is that it made the provisional 
decision to fi nance the museum with the funds from the provincial council.943 
When Laskurain later defended (1996) the solution for Bilbao sʼ and the Basque 
Country sʼ socio-economic problems being found in cultural life, he stressed how 
it was not a question of something “contrary to economic life” and that these 
two were integrated.944 He still admitted that the economic-cultural sector was 
a “great unknown”945 and in the mid 1990s its contribution to Basque GDP was 
only 3 percent. This reveals the scale of fi nancial risk involved in this project and 
the decision-makersʼ  awareness of this. Still, the ministers and representatives 
of the PNV unanimously presented this as a consequence of the regional powers 
and that they were being used for the benefi t of the region and would start a new 
period in its economy.
Importantly, Laskurain sʼ statements indicate how the city leadership had taken 
a political decision to stop the prolonged economic recession,946 thinking this was 
congruent with the views of the regional government. The events of the early 
1990s also reveal how a change took place in the regional government sʼ relations 
with Bilbao; this has been called “channelling of liability” to the city by Pedro 
Ugarte.947 The lehendakari, Ardanza, the region sʼ highest representative, was also 
involved in this project in public. Arregi, the culture minister, stated that in the 
negotiations of this project he represented “a country which was in a deep economic 
crisis, and whose particular problem was terrorism”.948 All this demonstrates how 
this project had a strong basis in the mutual interests of different levels in the 
Basque Country and where the PNV was politically powerful.
Zulaika calls the Guggenheim museum a politico-economic agreement 
produced by the leading politicians of the PNV.949 The partners in the coalition 
government, the Socialists, were informed in detail only when the planning work 
had already long been in hand. Their concerns were related to the fi nancial risk of 
the project; their pressure led to changes in the fi nal agreement made between the 
Basque administration and the Guggenheim foundation. Arregi also demanded 
943  Zulaika 1997, 35–37.
944  None of the new projects which aim at economic development could ignore the 
cultural sector; he referred here to the report by Xavier Dupuis, published by UNESCO 
on this subject. Laskurain 1996, 14.
945  Nuevos Extractos de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País 1998 (I), 
15–16; vrt. Plaza 2000, 266–267. 
946  Zulaika 1997, 61.
947  Ugarte 1999, 143.
948  Zulaika 1997, 151, 153 & 175.
949  Op. cit., 217; see also Guggenheim Magazine 1997, 8–9.
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those changes be made before he would sign the agreement.950 The Socialists 
implied on several occasions that this was not their idea. The other parties in 
the region publicly criticized the PNV for starting this; the differing views of the 
Socialists also emerged on the only occasion when the project was discussed in the 
plenary of the regional parliament in 1992.951 The other parties could not attack 
the main objective of this project, but took notice of the province chosen by the 
PNV for this large-scale effort to change the image of the autonomous community 
and the lack of coordination between the government parties. In this pattern, the 
most active participant was still the PNV.
The Guggenheim museum, which was the third in the world, opened its doors 
in Bilbao in October 1997.952 First of all, this project can be seen as a result of 
the deep economic problems of Bilbao and the whole of Vizcaya as well as the 
need for a structural change and reconstruction of its economy. Secondly, it was 
an example of local and regional level innovativeness,953 and thirdly an example 
of the economic policy of the dominant political force, the PNV, which actively 
sought for solutions to the prolonged economic recession in the early 1990s. The 
outcome was a success and the PNV saw it as demonstrating its own ability to 
act for the good of the region. This project was also considered as an example of 
the contradictions inherent in the economic policy of the party. The PNV aimed 
to develop the regional economy from its own structures and used the regional 
institutions only when the project was already launched. In a certain sense, this 
project continued the pattern of the PNV actions where special projects made 
possible by local tax revenue were used to trigger economic changes. In conclusion, 
the Guggenheim museum was seen by many contemporaries in the Basque 
Country more as an economic project than a showcase of modern art.954 My thesis 
corroborates this notion. More importantly, the history of the implementation of 
this project clearly reveals how politico-economic power existed outside of the 
administrative structures. It also shows how adroitly the PNV used the various 
levels of the administration in realizing its own strategy.
4.4.3. The Guggenheim effect
The economic and social effect triggered by the Guggenheim museum soon became 
apparent in Vizcaya and other parts of the region as well. The term Guggenheim 
950  Zulaika 1997, 179 & 181–182. 
951  PV:PLENO: 04\08\03\00\0025 21.02.1992.
952  ETA tried to sabotage the museum sʼ inauguration, without success. McNeill 2000, 
489; see also Helsingin Sanomat 18.10.1992 & 19.10.1992.
953  Examples of this combination of economic and cultural interests can be found in 
other parts of Europe. Every project is still unique in economic terms. McNeill 2000, 
491; for an institutional perspective on the urban economy, see also Lambooy & Moulaert 
1998; for old and new urban policy schemes of the 1990s in Bilbao see Rodríguez 1998.
954  Onaindia notes counsellor Laskurain sʼ role in this project. Onaindia 2000, 94–95.
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effect955 was introduced in the newspapers to describe the new economic and 
social rise in the city of Bilbao. It was soon applied to the economic upturn in the 
entire Basque Country; outside of Vizcaya its economic impact was more limited 
and the economic turn-around was also based on the growing adaptation of the 
Basque industry to the new technologies.
The museum was fi nanced by 35 enterprises from various sectors, and 14 
other companies and societies supported it with additional funding. Moreover, it 
had a looser connection to 52 other companies. The capital base of the museum 
was therefore considered broad. In practice, the fi nancial aid in the fi rst year of 
activity exceeded 700 million pesetas (4.2 million euros). The self-suffi ciency of 
the museum 12 months after the opening was 67 percent, as against the original 
estimate for the fi rst year of only 45 percent. During that period it generated 
almost 4.5 billion pesetas (about 27 million euros) via purchase tax, income 
tax and company tax for the Basque fi scal administration. The fi rst statistics 
concerning the economic effect of the museum were published in autumn 1998. 
During the fi rst 12 months the museum received about 1,360,000 visitors. The 
profi t in that year was 24.043 billion pesetas (almost 145 million euros), exceeding 
the cost of realization, which was 23.5 billion pesetas (over 141 million euros).956 
It was a successful investment already. The economic risk-taking had still been 
considerable in this project. During the fi rst year, the museum became a symbol 
of the economic resurgence of Bilbao. Thanks to the museum, the income of the 
city from tourism multiplied, growing by 28 percent in 1998. Bilbao had become 
a popular place for congresses and seminars with the help of other large-scale 
building projects.957 All this affected the image of the Basque Country.958
The museum soon took its place in the history of Bilbao and marked a new 
start in the local economy; this building with its original appearance was soon 
obvious in the news concerning the whole region. Guggenheim actually brought 
along a markedly different tone. During the fi rst six months after opening, the city 
received twice as many tourists as expected. The real economic and social effects 
of museum in the Basque Country were to a great extent unexpected. Bilbao itself 
was on the brink of a new economic boom and the shutdown of traditional heavy 
955  El efecto Guggenheim; el fenómeno Guggenheim. See, for example, Expansión 
21.10.1998.
956  Impacto de las Actividades de la Guggenheim Bilbo Museoaren fundazioa en Euskadi 
1998, 4; Expansión 21.10.1998.
957  For example, the modernization of Bilbao sʼ art museum Museo de Bellas Artes. El 
País 2.10.1998.
958  During the fi rst 12 months after opening, there were more than 8,500 newspaper 
articles, 60 percent in the foreign press. Expansión 21.10.1998; El Mundo 24.10.1998; 
for the Finnish newspapers, see Helsingin Sanomat 18.10.1997; for the psychological 
effect, see the interview with the director of the museum, Juan Ignacio Vidarte. El País 
11.10.1998; Onaindia 2000, 56–60.
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industry seemed to have ended.959 The image of Bilbao started to change, receiving 
publicity in the entirely new context of modern art and architecture. The positive 
economic situation brought new challenges to the economic policy-makers. As 
Laskurain had emphasized two years before (1996), other cultural projects in the 
Basque Country were to be utilized and maintained as the regional administration 
and educational institutions had to prepare themselves to meet the needs of this 
service sector. The training and development of human resources was the task of 
the higher education institutions in the region. Laskurain admitted this was a real 
challenge for the region.960
The signs of the emergent economic boom were clear in the Basque economy 
by 1998. The growth of GDP in the region was 5.2 percent, whilst elsewhere in 
Spain it was only higher in the Balearic Islands. The growth of industry was 
no less than 6.2 percent. However, the employment grew only 2.3 percent and 
remained under the medium level which was 3.4 percent. The unemployment rate 
(17.8 percent) dropped below the Spanish average (20.8 percent). The touchstone 
of the Spanish economic expansion, growth in productivity, again increased 
signifi cantly in the Basque Country, being 2.8 percent where the Spanish average 
was only 0.5 percent.961 The visible psychological change in the Basque economy 
and the economic take-off had several causes, including the general economic 
outlook in the EU, the integration process and the preparation of the countries 
which formed the Euro-zone. The low producer prices in Spain, and particularly 
in the Basque Country, also facilitated the rapid growth. The long-term policies of 
the regional government combined in the continuous marketing of the region, its 
emerging new image started to produce results and new companies began to arrive 
and invest after many years of stagnation. Neither did the entrepreneurs move 
away from the region in numbers as they had done under the threat of terrorism. 
ETAʼs unilateral ceasefi re, declared in September 1998, was believed in political 
as well as business circles to have given the regional economy a better outlook.962
The economic and politico-economic developments in Bilbao in the 1980s 
and 1990s were not without repercussions in Europe. Historically, the underlying 
cause is the lateness of the economic depression; since the shutdown of the earlier 
economic structures continued during the fi rst half of the 1990s. It also took 
place in tragic economic and social circumstances when the region suffered from 
political instability and the problem of terrorism persisted; in that sense it was an 
exceptional case in the EU context. Apart from this, Bilbao itself had lost some of 
959  The strongest effect was on metallurgical basic industry, production of special steels 
and domestic electronics and ship-building. Ugarte 1999, 147; for the positive economic 
outlook the museum offered for the future, see Tellitu, Esteban & Carrera 1997.
960  Nuevos Extractos de la Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País 1998, 30–31.
961  España 1998 Memoria sobre la situación socioeconómica y laboral 1999, 67–70.
962  For example, the article written by Manu Álvarez, published in El Correo 4.7.1999; 
El Semanal 20.2.2000 and that written by professor Roberto Velasco, published in El País 
23.10.1998.
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its traditional leadership role during the 1980s.963
The question of the economic consequences of political violence comes up 
again when the effects of the museum are analysed. Interestingly, this issue was 
dealt with by the newspapers in the context of Guggenheim, especially after the 
ETA ceasefi re in September 1998, but in a markedly more open manner than 
before.964 This question was also raised in analysis of the effects of the museum 
by economists.965
Signifi cantly, the Guggenheim museum project was a catalyst which facilitated 
the modernization of an extensive urban centre. It not only brought tourists to 
the area but also expanded the demand for services and consequently helped the 
tertiary sector across the region; this development was particularly important for 
the local hotel and catering service providers. The project was good for the welfare 
of the region. These changes in the economic structures of the Basque Country and 
the fact that the whole region enjoyed an economic boom in 1998 were politically 
benefi cial for the PNV. At that time the party took politico-economic leadership 
in terms of real actions.
In sum, the exercise of politico-economic power of the PNV from 1980 to 
1998 was distinguished by regionalism, populism and capitalism. From early on 
in its history the party skilfully utilized concepts like the fueros and the economic 
agreement in its policy. Importantly, the PNV originally succeeded in gaining 
support using an economically attractive programme, not with romanticism. 
The party sʼ actions in the 1980s and 1990s followed that pattern and tradition. 
Within the power structures of the Basque Country, the PNV often had to deal 
with mutually antagonistic forces. Foralism, without defi ning it in detail, and its 
symbolism, was one response to that reality. In the end, the PNV did not try 
to dismantle the powers of the provinces, since they were needed to carry out 
large-scale projects at the provincial level like the Guggenheim museum. That 
extravagant project was meant to boost the regional economy and to demonstrate 
the willingness of the party to use its powers in a popular way. Moreover, the 
project was certainly capitalistic.
963  Ugarte 1999, 150–151; El País 1.6.1999.
964  See, for example, El País 11.10.1998, and El Correo 19.12.1999.
965  See, for example, Plaza 2002.
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5. THE INCREASE IN POLITICO-ECONOMIC POWER 
AND ITS LIMITS
In this chapter, I consider the question of the increasing authority of the Basque 
Country in the fi nance and economics and its limits. Moreover, I investigate the 
federalist traits of the Basque Country in that respect, and how this question is 
closely linked to the strategy of the PNV. My intention is not to try to contribute 
to the legal or political discussion of the power structures of the Spanish State of 
Autonomies. This is not the point of my study, nor is it my task as a historian. 
My analysis concentrates on the characteristics of the growing politico-economic 
power of the region and how the limitations of its use became apparent by the 
end of the period under consideration. The historical analysis of the actions of the 
PNV naturally offers an insight into the evolution of the State of Autonomies. The 
major developments in the Spanish tax system in the 1980s and 1990s are also 
natural parts of this framework.
In 1980–1998, Spain and the Basque Country were no exception to the rule 
that public spending increased because of social welfare. Since this general trend 
is, however, “often cited as a measure of power of the state”,966 the concepts of 
federalism and fi scal federalism in the case of the Basque Country are important 
to political history. What are their manifestations and implications in this case? 
And what are the problems of the use of these particular concepts in this context? 
These are important questions that have not previously been dealt with in studies 
on contemporary Basque political history. The point of my analysis is to explain 
how all this interlocks with the way the PNV managed the regional economy.
In this chapter, I also demonstrate how the politico-economic powers of the PNV 
at its height simultaneously met the ceiling imposed by the EC/EU regulations. 
The effect the European integration had on the PNV was not inconsiderable 
historically, as Clark points out.967 The extremely complex relationship between 
the party and the integration was apparent in its use of politico-economic power. 
I shall explain this challenge from a historical angle here.
5.1. The road to fi scal federalism in the Basque Country
Through the economic agreement and the cupo, the Basque Country had its own, 
largely independent economy in the 1980s and 1990s. An increasing amount 
of local tax revenue remained in the region and benefi ted its economy through 
public investment. Although Spain is not strictly a federal state, its system of 
autonomous regions, and particularly the Basque Country, had some federalist 
economic characteristics , particularly fi scal, with the transfers of powers in the 
1990s. As the OECD studies indicate, “until 1997, the decentralisation process 
was rapid but was characterised by imbalance between tax assignments and 
966  Moravcsik 2001, 169.
967  Clark 1987.
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expenditure functions” in Spain.968 In any case, the relative proportion of the central 
government sʼ taxable income and wealth decreased, which was particularly true 
in the case of the Basque Country, which in practice had the greatest autonomy 
of all the Spanish autonomous communities in 1998, especially in taxation. Its 
powers were the best example of fi scal federalism in Spain.
Economic theories of federalism have traditionally sought to determine 
the optimal distribution of public economic functions between different levels 
of government, and to create a functional rationale for these various powers to 
intervene in the economy.969 Without going further into the debate which centres 
on whether centralization is “better than” decentralization, it is necessary to keep 
in mind the argument of the PNV representatives that the regional government 
was better able to manage matters such as social welfare and employment. The 
underlying argument was linked to the budgetary opportunities of the regional 
administrations. Moreover, in the case of the Basque Country, both an external 
(the context of the autonomous regions of Spain) and an internal dimension (within 
the Basque Country) of fi scal federalism can be recognized.970
As I have explained in the previous sections, the region had a relatively strong 
position in economic policy issues externally, especially in fi scal policy when 
dealing with the central government. Internally, the fi nancial arrangements of the 
Basque Country resembled a federal system: the provinces were given powers in 
taxation and regulation, which is infrequently delegated by an administration to an 
institution at a lower level.971 This alone was enough to make the Basque Country 
a politico-economically signifi cant region in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite these 
rights, the regional government was still the institution leading the negotiations 
with the central government, naturally in co-ordination with the representatives of 
the provinces. The PNV, thanks to its regionalist policy, its long-time dominance, 
and the know-how it brought along turned out to be a tough negotiator with the 
central government. On the other hand, the fact that the provinces had extensive 
powers and resources led the provincial councils to intervene often in the economic 
problems through subventions.
When the emerging fi scal federalism is analysed historically, we see that in 
the Basque case, the tax incentives were to be replaced by policies leading to a 
successful structural change in the regional economy during the 1990s. Although 
the regional government increased restraint on expenditure and fi scal discipline, 
the local tax revenue was still the key to economic change together with the 
changes that took place in the strategy of policy-makers. In the context of the 
autonomous regions of Spain, the economists pointed out that the version of fi scal 
968  Joumard & Varoudakis 2000, 8.
969  Coglianese & Nicolaidis 2001, 277.
970  For fi scal federalism in Spain, see Jourmand & Varoudakis 2000, 35–46; for the 
general theory of fi scal federalism see Oates 1972.
971  Interview with the treasury minister, Fernando Spagnolo de la Torre, of 5.8.1998. 
HGV 2001, 712.
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federalism implemented was still not theoretically ideal. The result was a model 
with important differences in spending responsibilities and in revenue autonomy 
among the autonomous communities. This fact is related to an institutional factor 
that cannot be ignored in discussing the federal nature of the Basque Country 
and other autonomous communities of Spain. Despite the fact that the position 
of the Basque Country and the Spanish State of Autonomies had characteristics 
reminiscent of a federalist system, there were also clear differences, one of them 
being that in a federal state its members have equal powers. The federalist features 
introduced by the LTH law did not produce that situation.
In the political discussion on integration, the functionality of a federalist 
system is related to preserving the identity of its members. If we take a politico-
economic point of view, we can see that in the case of the Basque Country, it 
was historically a question of solving national problems. Broadly understood, 
all the political models of federalism decree a system of fi scal federalism, i.e., a 
decentralized model of fi nancing which guarantees suffi cient economic resources 
for the various levels of government.972 In the case of the procedure in the Basque 
Country was that the existence of the regionsʼ  politico-economic powers (i.e., their 
own fi nancing) was recognized fi rst; and this power was transferred only later. It 
was known that the division of politico-economic powers would develop in the 
future; in any case, the economic agreement reached in 1980 was considered by 
the Basques to be a fl exible arrangement. The fact that all the political parties 
in the region supported the restoration of the arrangement was also seen as its 
particular advantage.973.
It is important to understand that the economic agreement of 1980 created 
a clear legal and political basis for the developments of the following years.
The agreement started a period of change in the region both fi nancially and 
historically. Where the 19th century economic arrangements had contributed to 
the situation in which the group of local industrial proprietors, the group paying 
the least taxes got richer and the country-side got poorer, the agreement of 1980 
guaranteed local fi nancing to a regional administration capable of carrying 
out its own budgetary and economic policy. The signs of the functionality and 
entrenchment of the system were quick to come to light. Despite the economic 
crises in the region, especially the political problems linked to the LTH (and thus 
to the internal structures of the PNV), the budget of the regional governments 
was balanced during the third term of 1986–1990.974 The project of building the 
Guggenheim museum in Bilbao in the 1990s was a good and perhaps the most 
symbolic example of the opportunities the Basque Country had gained at regional 
level; it was a large-scale public investment, a public-private cooperation project 
972  Larrea Angulo 1991, 10.
973  Op. cit., 11; see also Moreno del Río 2000, 135–136; Even the central government 
stated publicly that it was a good solution to the political situation in Spain. For example, 
La Gaceta del Norte 18.10.1981. Beldarrain Garin 1998, 20.
974  Mesa 2000, 266.
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and fi nanced by local taxpayers. While the budgets of the regional government do 
not tell the whole story and are problematic sources because the powers increased 
gradually, the cupo and its development is a useful tool for a historian. Ultimately, 
it demonstrates how the economic arrangement was not mere theory. The total 
cupo changed signifi cantly over the years.
Taking into account the structures discussed by Elton and Foucault, the 
history of fi scal federalism in the Basque Country is linked to economic and 
political developments in Spain and how the political structures changed. In the 
period 1982–1993, the PSOE had an absolute majority in the Spanish parliament, 
and was not dependent on the support of the regionalist parties. This led to a 
concentration of powers and did not encourage the emergence of elements of 
political pluralism. The decentralization process was nevertheless one of the few 
areas where political pluralism developed quickly. Because of the rivalry between 
the regions, the central government was facing signifi cant political pressures. 
However, there was considerable will to slow this process and even reverse it 
in the 1980s. The LOAPA even included the idea of co-ordinating elections in 
all regions to coincide with the general elections and electoral periods.975 The 
regional elections offered the opposition parties an opportunity to challenge the 
party in power at regional level from the start, and to embrace partisan politics 
with a more comprehensive programme and political agenda. In the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Andalusia and Galicia, the different timing of the regional 
and general elections gives the voters the opportunity to vote for different parties 
according to the level of representation. The regional and municipal elections also 
always take place at different times in these regions. In other regions of Spain, 
the regional elections overlap with the municipal elections, and in the 1980s and 
1990s this worked to the advantage of the party in power in Madrid, because of 
the effectiveness of nation-wide campaigning.976
After Spain had become a member of the EC, the central government was 
able to start a long-term structural adjustment process, in other words, to redirect 
industrial production and to liberalize the trade in goods and various sectors of 
production. This process was further encouraged and facilitated by the Spanish 
membership of the European monetary system (EMS) in 1989, the ratifi cation of 
the Maastricht agreement in 1992, and the creation of the EMU. The PP, which 
rose to power in 1996, continued with the liberalization of the economy, its goal 
being to get Spain to join the common currency without problems. The future 
direction was therefore clear. Despite the benefi ts of the EC/EU membership, such 
as structural funds and the national interregional compensation fund, which was 
introduced later, the stabilization of the economy was delayed, and the decrease 
in the economic differences between the regions slowed, then stopped, and even 
started to grow again.977
975  Colomer 1998, 44 & 47.
976  Op. cit., 45.
977  Domínguez Martín 2002, 284–285.
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Foucault sʼ ideas about the technologies of power help us to further examine 
the question of fi scal federalism and its links to the exercise of power by the 
PNV. Interestingly, the PNV was able to introduce the concept of fi scal federalism 
into the political debate in the Basque country, and it is important to understand 
how this was linked to the party sʼ dominance in the treasury and the way its 
regional representatives handled that portfolio. As I have demonstrated, the 
fi scal and fi nancial experts of the regional government, ideologically close to 
the PNV, belonged to a new generation of politicians and high-level offi cials in 
the region. The treasury minister of Ardanzaʼ s cabinet in 1994−1998, Ibarretxe, 
was a PNV activist and an expert in fi scal federalism.978 Ibarretxe was given the 
task of modernizing and developing the horizontal economic and legal control in 
the government at the same time, through his role as the vice-lehendakari. The 
internal effi ciency of the government was considered to have improved, and the 
new department had a signifi cant strategic role in the administration.979 The aim of 
the PNV was no less than to streamline and develop the common administrative 
structures. The other element in this development was the accumulating know-how 
of the PNV-led administration in fi scal policy. This was combined with the party 
strategy, which aimed at gradual extension of the powers in regional fi nancing. 
The events of 1996–1997, when Ibarretxe negotiated with Rato, his counterpart, 
proved how strongly the PNV had been able to utilize the government, make it 
an instrument for the party and was using the technologies of power, as Foucault 
would put it. At that time, the power of the PNV was more obvious than ever.
The context of fi scal federalism also reveals how the PNV reacted in the 
framework of the autonomous regions. Surprisingly, the reaction can be traced 
by analysing its thinking in relation to the EU, where the principle was to seek 
to strengthen the independent role of the Basque Country. The PNV and the 
regional government it led did not simply aim to meet the real challenge the 
Commission services had created in fi scal issues, but also wanted to stress the 
powers of the Basque Country and its position in relation to other autonomous 
regions of Spain.980 This was not just a result of the power policy of the PNV. 
It was also enforced by the internal situation of Spain, where the autonomous 
regions increasingly competed for the economic and legislative resources granted 
by the central government in the 1980s and 1990s.981 Thus in 1980−1998 they no 
longer competed for labour, but for companies and for the investment and jobs 
those businesses would bring with them. The behaviour of the PNV in defence 
978  Interview with treasury minister, Juán José Ibarretxe, of 21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 
1477; Ibarretxe sʼ expertise was also apparent during the negotiations between the PP and 
the PNV in spring 1996. Anasagasti 2004 194–195.
979  At the same time, a new commission on economic issues attached to the regional 
government was created to increase economic planning. Interview with the treasury 
minister, Juán José Ibarretxe, of 21.12.1998. HGV 2001, 1478−1479.
980  Anasagasti 2004, 238; Raento 1996, 251 & Raento 2002, 107; Raento & Watson 2000. 
981  Colomer 1998, 51.
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of regional economic and economic policy interests was also infl uenced by the 
fact that the autonomous regions did not have the opportunity to infl uence public 
administration policies and policy-making at the national level.982
A standard defi nition of federalism envisages the combination of self-rule 
and shared rule. The autonomous communities of Spain were allowed to develop 
self-rule in certain domains, but in others were to share rule with the central 
government, which could exercise some constraints on further autonomous 
legislative and executive decisions. The most obvious defi ciency of the Spanish 
State of Autonomies, however, was linked to the question of shared rule at the 
national level during the 1980s and 1990s. The autonomous communities could 
hardly contribute to the formation of national public policy, given the lack of 
appropriate institutions.983 In the Basque Country, this led the PNV to take a more 
regionalist and bilateral approach, which fi nally became one of the determinants 
of its policy.
Federalism and complex institutional settings for governance are closely 
related to each other.984 The economic policy aspects of federalism require 
effi cient administrative structures in order to be functional. In the case of the 
Basque Country, the relation between the central and regional administrations 
was balanced when the basic administrative structures in the area developed 
expeditiously in the 1980s and 1990s and had a solid legal basis. Nonetheless, the 
organisational side of the common regional administration was not extensively 
regulated in the legislation,985 and was consequently provisional to some degree 
in the 1980s. Powers, especially in economic policy, were transferred to the 
provinces, and back again to the regional level. This process and the existence 
of a provincial level administration (provincial councils and parliaments) must 
have affected the functions of the regional administration, and this structural 
development was seen, for example, in public spending.
982  Colomer 1998, 50.
983  Ibid.
984  Peterson & OʼToole 2001, 300.
985  Adela Mesa, from the UPV university in the Basque Country, has analysed the 
developments in the regional administration, stressing that the Autonomy Statute and 
Ley de Gobierno do not discuss it suffi ciently. Mesa 2000, 265.
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5.2. The PNV and European integration
5.2.1. From an ideological to an institutional relationship
Spain sʼ road to the EC was long.986 It had already offi cially applied for the 
membership in the summer of 1977, but the actual negotiations only started 
in February 1979. Spain signed the accession agreement in June 1985. The 
membership of the EC, later the EU, brought great changes to the Spanish economy 
and society,987 although it cannot be said that its economy was isolated from the 
framework of Western European economies in the years before membership.988 
Spain sʼ membership was facilitated by its national economic outlook at that time. 
Along with membership, the national economic policy in Spain changed, its new 
building blocks being the economic integration and convergence as well as trying 
to achieve the living standards of other member countries.989 The transitional 
periods given to Spain varied according to the sector concerned. However, Spain 
rapidly became one of the countries that was able to use the funding and support 
offered by the EC/EU the most effi ciently.
Spain sʼ membership also sealed the structural change in the Basque economy 
in the 1980s. The imminent consequences membership had on the regional 
economy arose from adapting the production structures to the new reality of more 
severe competition in many sectors of industry, the result of the disappearance of 
border tariffs. The industry of the Basque Country, which at that time relied to 
a large extent on export products, but which was not used to competition, found 
the EC membership an additional problem. The change was particularly hard, 
fi rst of all, because its production structures were unbalanced. It had concentrated 
on metallurgy and was dependent on highly standardized products. Moreover, 
the local industry used old-fashioned technology, and research and development 
was limited. The large number of small enterprises had little investment capacity. 
The service sector was under-developed, its destiny linked to the development of 
local industry. Within the EC, the Basque Country was classifi ed as a regressive 
industrial region; this, however, allowed it to receive regional funds.
No wonder the location of the Basque Country was seen as problematic at the 
time, since it was feared that the strengthening of the Mediterranean “corridor” 
986  After the treaty of Rome (1957), Spain sʼ interest in European integration grew. In 
1962, it formulated its fi rst application for membership, which was, however, rejected 
in Brussels on the basis that there was no democratic government in the country. The 
crucial phase in the negotiations on membership started in June 1983 and was completed 
in spring 1985. Bernecker 1998, 22.
987  For the economic effects of the EC membership in Spain, see, for example, Tamames 
& Rueda 1998, 535–560.
988  For example, García Delgado underlines that the development of the Spanish economy 
from 1975 till 1986 should be analysed keeping the economic policy and outlook of the 
Franco years in mind. García Delgado 1996, 240.
989  Bernecker 1998, 24.
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(for example, Catalonia and Valencia) would exacerbate the economic isolation of 
the of the region. However, the capacity of the harbours in the Basque Country 
and elsewhere in Northern Spain was recognized, and were seen as facilitators 
of and channels for trade fl ows. At the end of the 1980s, the Basque Country 
and Asturias, which was also known for being an industrial region of the North, 
were described in the European context as regions with a continuously negative 
employment trend. Their unemployment rate exceeded the European average, the 
GDP per capita was almost 20 units lower than the European average, and the 
growth in productivity per capita was particularly low.990 The fi shermen of the 
Basque coastal villages especially felt the effects of the EC membership. Fishing 
was limited and regulated by species as well as by fi shing waters. In 1985–1992 
alone, before the economic recession, the Basque fi shing fl eet decreased from 748 
boats to 548.991 The end of the border trade with France also meant heavy losses in 
income for many small and medium-sized companies in the Basque Country.992
The European social fund, created for the promotion of employability and 
entrepreneurship funded Basque regional government projects in 1986–1989, the 
amount of joint fi nancing being about 3.4 billion pesetas (20.6 million euros). The 
community funding targeted at the projects for unemployed people was almost 
a half.993 The regional development in the Basque Country was supported by 
funding about half the cost of structural development projects targeting particular 
geographical areas or sectors. The Basque Country also received funding from 
the Community funds for agriculture and fi shing. The objectives included helping 
create employment opportunities beyond agriculture, such as tourism in the rural 
areas, enhancing education and training, and maintaining the fi shing industry.994 
Still, the region only benefi ted from a relatively small portion of the structural 
fund target programmes.995
The EC membership had a great effect on budgeting and the structure of 
the budget, not just at state level, but also at the level of the Basque regional 
government. Certain incomes, like customs revenue, were left out, but the 
proportion of payments from structural funds was listed in the credits, and again 
in the debits. Moreover, export subsidies to agriculture, intervention purchasing 
and storage were transferred to an intervention fund, separate from the budget.996 
On the eve of EC membership in 1985, the Spanish parliament approved a law 
on VAT, which replaced some earlier fi scal regulations. The Basque economic 
990  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991, 269 & 275.
991  However, the biggest fall in the number of ships was to take place in the early 1990s. 
Marzo 1994, 39–44.
992  Raento 2002, 100.
993  Marzo 1994, 65.
994  For the defence of the fi shing industry, see CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las 
elecciones europeas 1994, 44–46.
995  Such as 2 and 5b (later including target 2). EU-rahoituksen opas 2000, 3.
996  Cf. Ranki 2000, 121
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agreement was also modifi ed, and its articles concerning luxury tax and company 
acquisitions were changed.997 Through VAT, the membership would also going 
to affect the future cupo, still under negotiation. Consequently, the amount of 
revenue which would remain in the Basque Country was going to increase.
The effects of EC membership were not limited to the Basque economy and the 
regulations on fi nance, but extended to the PNV itself. The party had to commit 
itself, to refl ect on the positive and negative aspects of the membership. As Clark 
has demonstrated, the PNV voters were among the strongest supporters of Spain sʼ 
membership of the Community in the mid-1980s, but they were also “found to 
be the most pessimistic of all partisan groups about the effects of entry into the 
EC, especially on economic areas like infl ation and unemployment”.998 Clark 
sums up this attitude as “strong support for the abstract principle of European 
unifi cation tempered by pessimistic realism as far as the actual impact of the 
EC is concerned.”999 The negative aspects of EC membership were related to 
the increasing unemployment and the further deterioration of the old economic 
structures.1000 In a situation where very few, if any, alternative routes for economic 
development were discussed, this complex approach is understandable. The 
refl ection and ideological reaction of the PNV was under way: the serious danger 
of the region being rapidly economically isolated in the Spanish and continental 
context was highlighted in its political programme, approved at the party 
conference in summer 1987, the fi rst one since 1977. Combatting unemployment 
was the main objective of the party. It also claimed the transfer of powers on 
communications, routes and harbours to the region,1001 so that foreign trade fl ow 
and transit traffi c would go through the Basque Country, bringing income. It was 
also hoped that the EC would provide funding for the modernization of the road 
network. According to its own documents, the party was fully aware of the diverse 
and complex relationship between trade and the adjustment process. In the case of 
the Basque Country, trade would be a trigger for adjustment; it would also make 
the adjustment less expensive for the public sector. Trade was seen as an integral 
part of the adjustment process itself.1002
For the PNV, the EC meant an opportunity to build stronger economic ties 
with the Basque Country of France. The party also had expectations of using 
the integration process to achieve full recognition for the political independence 
997  Beldarrain Garin 1998, 43–46.
998  Clark 1987, 4.
999  Op. cit., 5.
1000  Op. cit., 4–5.
1001  CD/PNV: Nacionalismo para el 2.000 - 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas 
y Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 142 & 210–211.
1002  CD/PNV: Nacionalismo para el 2.000 - 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas 
y Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 164; CD/PNV: 
Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas 1994, 82–83. The position of the PNV 
on this question even included strong anti-protectionist elements.
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of the Basque Country. The PNV considered that the integration process made 
achieving its political goals possible without a direct political confrontation.1003 
The regionalist and nationalist parties, like the PNV and the CiU, sought to replace 
the state structures with a European entity that would lean on the recognition of 
nations without states.1004 The role of the European parliament was signifi cant in 
this context, because its members are elected by the EU citizens, and it is therefore 
a genuinely representative and sovereign institution. Since it was seen as the real 
representative of the citizens, these parties supported the idea of giving it an even 
more powerful role.1005
Historically, since the attitude of the PNV towards European integration 
was positive, Spain sʼ treaty of accession to the EC thus had a generally positive 
reception in the ranks of the party, although, as Clark has pointed out, PNV 
supporters were also the most critical in the region concerning the effects of 
membership. The ideologically biased approach to the EC was revealed in the 
strong reaction of the PNV to the Single European Act of 1986. The PNV like the 
other regional parties in Spain, originally had high expectations concerning the 
act, which they thought should have taken integration to a new level. The attitude 
was soon superseded by open criticism: according to the PNV, the member states 
did not want to give the community institutions the necessary powers.1006 The 
positive tone was restored by modifi cations to the Treaty in Maastricht in 1992.1007 
In the PNV programmes in the 1990s, the effects of the European integration were 
linked to the divergent character of the Basque national economy. Along with 
the changes caused by the EC/EU, the real adaptability of the Basque Country sʼ 
economy became more apparent as did its structural problems, and its strengths, 
such as the high level of education of its population.1008 In the overall picture of the 
PNV sʼ attitude to European integration, economic policy was subordinate to the 
need to achieve collective recognition of the Basque Country, and not just through 
decentralization.1009 Still, the question of developing regional autonomy further 
was linked to the EU.1010
The EU was linked to the strategy and goal-setting of the PNV sʼ political 
programmes and the statements of the EBB. With the EU, the party could 
1003  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas 1994, 7; Quintanilla 
2001, 139.
1004  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas 1994, 9; Quintanilla 
2001, 140.
1005  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas 1994, 5–6; Quintanilla 
2001, 140.
1006  Nacionalismo para el 2.000 - 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas y 
Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 48.
1007  Quintanilla 2001, 198.
1008  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1997, 7.
1009  Op. cit., 9.
1010  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1998, 6.
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defend the cuts in the public sector and the decreasing the role of the state, and 
even reduce the public subventions in the national economy.1011 Then again, the 
European integration was used to demand relevant powers for a future regional 
central bank which, with the support it could offer, would be necessary for the 
public sector in the Basque Country in the context of the integrating Europe.1012 
In other words, the Basque central bank was seen as an answer to the needs of the 
regional economy in the early 1990s at a time when the Spanish peseta, like so 
many currencies in Europe, was going through diffi cult times. The underlying goal 
was to make the Basque Country stronger and more independent in the European 
context, which was mainly an economic context for the PNV. The party also saw 
this as a way of stressing the “unique” role of the Basque Country in the context 
of the autonomous regions, and emphasizing its powers in comparison to the other 
regions. In short, this followed the regionalist strategy of the party.
Within the PNV, there were strong expectations of interregional cooperation at 
European level. In that sense, there were similarities to the political agendas of the 
other regionalist parties in Spain, and the EC was seen from the start as a factor 
crossing the national borders and the state level. This was positive for the policy 
of parties like the PNV and the CiU. They saw the nation states as slowing down 
the evolution of the European institutions, and obstructing them from becoming 
genuinely supranational organs.1013 The PNV, like the CiU, regarded European 
integration and regionalisation as parallel and complementary processes.1014 
However, the PNV rapidly started to stress that the Spanish autonomous regions 
did not acquire the same means to infl uence the Spanish policy-making in relation 
to the EC/EU, as, for example, the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In practice, the EC membership meant changes to regions like Catalonia and the 
Basque Country, which had considerable power and were heavily dependent on 
foreign trade, while offering new kind of opportunities to economic integration.1015 
It still took some time for the PNV to adapt itself to this reality. Moreover, the 
fact that the regions of Spain lacked the opportunity to have their representatives 
by the side of the Spanish politicians and central government offi cials in the EU 
meetings, when their powers were discussed, remained a major question in the 
political statements of the PNV from 1986 onwards.1016 Interestingly, the political 
regionalism that the PNV represented still considered this a politico-economic 
problem. The PNV continued to demanded that the region should be able to open 
1011  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1997, 7 & Aberri Eguna 1998, 5.
1012  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991, 30.
1013  Op. cit., 48–50.
1014  Trias i Vidall de Llobatera 1997, 118; see. CD/PNV: Programa electoral elecciones 
europeas 1994, 15– 16.
1015  Copa 1989, 318–319. 
1016  CD/PNV: ... y ahora Europa. El Proyecto del Partido Nacionalista Vasco en Coalición 
Nacionalista 1989, 29–30; CD:PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas. 
1994. EAJ-PNV, 40; El Mundo 1.12.1997 & 2.12.1997.
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its own representation in the EU.1017
The PNV wanted political benefi ts for itself and the Basque Country in the 
political and economic context of the EC/EU, by bypassing the state level if 
possible. The party thought that although the Basque Country was not given the 
opportunity to directly infl uence the issues in which it would have liked to be 
involved, the participation of Spain in the EC/EU would make it more diffi cult to 
maintain its internal institutions and the power balance between them fully intact 
in the long run. On the other hand, the integrity of the community legislation 
could suffer if the implementation of laws was in the hands of regional or local 
offi cials, not EU member states. The regional governments were not parties in the 
EC/EU treaties or the transfers of sovereignty they incorporated. From the legal 
point of view, an important step in the “formalisation” of the relations between the 
regional entities or other instances beyond the signatories was the participation of 
the regions in the work of ministry councils as representatives of their country.1018 
Autonomous regions, such as the Basque Country and the Åland Islands,1019 also 
have their own legislative powers. In relation to other international agreements, the 
EU treaties have been instrumental in realizing limited transfers of sovereignty 
to the EU, which functions through its institutions. The relationship between the 
PNV and the EU, however, is that the Union is ultimately seen as a creation of 
the agreements made by sovereign states. The legality is therefore based on the 
allocation of authority.
5.2.2. The PNV and the economic policy challenge of the integrated Europe
Previous studies on the Basque economic and political history have pointed out 
that the EC/EU membership and the increased economic competition it brought 
was a major political challenge to Basque nationalism and particularly for the 
ruling party, the PNV. A profound analysis of the changes it caused in the thinking 
and policy of the Basque Nationalist Party is still needed to understand some of 
its decisions and actions. We must wonder why it focused so much on getting the 
voice of the autonomous region heard in Brussels. In other words, why did they 
make such a great effort on this? By answering these questions, my thesis will 
shed new light on the contemporary history of the Basque Country.
It is important to start with the fact that after Spain became a member of the 
EC, the situation of the primary sector in the Basque Country became worse, 
and improving the competitiveness and ensuring the growth of the service sector 
became important for the economy of the region. Not surprisingly, the PNV 
stressed the importance of the private sector and the responsibility of the public 
sector in trying to make the business environment in the region as attractive as 
1017  CD/PNV: Programa electoral para las elecciones europeas 1994, 12–13; The 
Economist 18.9.1993, 95–96.
1018  Bermann & Nicolaidis 2001, 486.
1019  See Autonomies in the European Union 2002, and Hufvudstadsbladet 29.8.2001 & 
1.7.2002.
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possible. The party programmes and platforms show clearly how the corporate 
sector was regarded as the cornerstone of the economy all through the 1980s and the 
1990s.1020 The party underlined that the needs of the private sector were also to be 
met by higher and professional education.1021 The PNV sʼ complex attitude towards 
the European integration was only increased when the central government argued 
that since the heavy industry in other member countries was more competitive, 
the industrial complexes of the autonomous communities like the Basque Country 
or Asturias should not be subsidized and kept alive artifi cially.1022 However, the 
Basque economy still remained heavily dependent on industry, and the service 
sector grew slowly. As I have explained, the attitude of the ranks of the PNV and 
the power of bizkaitarrismo within the party, did not make it easier to accept this 
situation.
What made the Basque Country an exceptional entity in the EC context was its 
ability to regulate taxes, not only to collect and manage tax revenue.1023 This also 
made the politico-economic position of the region diffi cult and sensitive, and the 
EC membership was to affect the local tax regulations more rapidly than perhaps 
expected, and not through further modifi cations of the economic agreement or the 
cupo. The fi rst confl ict between the European Commission, the guardian of the 
acquis communitaire, and the Basque Country had already arisen in 1988,1024 as I 
have explained.1025 Interestingly, when the representatives of the Basque government 
took this dispute on, they did not concentrate so much on the fact that attracting 
companies to the Basque Country took place at times of economic recession; not 
even in public. Instead, they based their arguments on more technical and legal 
grounds.1026 The regional government and the provinces changed the terms of 
the debate to concern the whole Basque system of fi nance, explaining how the 
Commission sʼ logic would lead to the system harming the Internal Market.1027 
This included the implication that these regulations could be seen as belonging to 
the fi scal legislation of a state. However, the geographical borders of the region 
were not the same as the state borders, nor did these regulations extend to all 
1020  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1998, 4–5.
1021  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1997, 11–12.
1022  Interview with the long-serving minister of industry, Jon Azua Mendia, of 8.7.1998. 
HGV 2001, 487.
1023  Oña Gómez & García de Vicuña Peñafi el 2000, 198.
1024  Muguruza Arrese 1997, 28–29.
1025  The Commission started to take action against the regulations of Basque provinces 
that allowed tax incentives to companies doing business in their area. According to the 
Commission, the benefi ts favoured companies, and improved their competitive position. 
These regulations allowed a company to enjoy tax incentives only if it had its domicile in 
the Basque Country. Zubiri 2000, 192.
1026  Ibid.
1027  Muguruza Arrese 1997, 27.
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the taxpayers of a particular area.1028 This led to a procedure which took several 
years. The Commission fi nally handed down its decision in 1993.1029 For the 
historical analysis, the essential point here is how the arguments of the parties did 
not change after the late 1980s: the Basque representatives saw this issue through 
the system of taxation, whereas the Commission services saw it through tax and 
tax collection, which had created a distortion of competition, in other words, a tax 
benefi t.
This serious confl ict concerning the Basque tax regulations needs to be assessed 
using the statements and programmes of the PNV to understand the decisions 
taken by its representatives in the regional administration. An important question 
is the role of the PNV when the decision to use tax benefi ts was taken. How did 
it infl uence all this? This is essential information, since the Commissionʼ s actions 
reveal how the politico-economic powers of the Basque Country had reached their 
limits. In explicating this, we must not forget the complex attitude of the PNV 
and its supporters to the EC and its impact on the region. Signifi cantly, the PNV 
had committed itself to taking the local fi scal legislation into account as a tool for 
enhancing and promoting private investment in the Basque Country in the 1987 
party programme. The party promised to go even further and “take advantage 
of devices that would attract investments to the region”.1030 Economically, the 
PNV sʼ thinking was that increasing investment in the provinces would increase 
the revenue from indirect taxes, particularly VAT, in the long run.
As I have demonstrated in the chapter on the economic policy of the regional 
government, the PNV-led regional administration was under growing pressure to 
use its powers in tax regulation in the 1980s. The PNV had been ostentatiously 
blaming the central government for many of the region sʼ economic woes 
at the beginning of the decade. Some local businessmen even saw it as being 
characteristic of the one-party governments of the PNV.1031 As Garaikoetxeaʼ s 
cabinet ministers emphasized how the Basque economy, because of its limited 
size, was particularly dependent on the economic outlook of Spain and its export 
trade, the ministers stressed the role of the price level in exports and the growing 
expenses caused by delayed liberalization of fi nancial markets.1032 This illustrates 
the point of view of the regional administration, which was trying to combat the 
criticism of the local business world. The economic policy remained linked in 
1028  Thus they were against the treaty, because they did not extend to all tax payers.
1029  Scheme of tax concessions for investment in the Basque Country. The Offi cial Journal 
of the European Communities L134, 3.6.1993, 25.
1030  CD/PNV: Nacionalismo para el 2.000 – 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas 
y Programa. Asamblea Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987, 170–171.
1031  Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 55.
1032  This was explained by emphasizing the continuing dependence of the Basque 
economy on the outlook of the Spanish economy and foreign trade. The role of the price 
level in exports was signifi cant and the delays in the liberalization of fi nancial markets 
increased costs. Uriarte Santamaría 1984, 127–129.
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essence to industry and big local fi rms, although the businessmen regarded the 
measures of the regional government as too little too late. A politically painful 
argument was that the powers gained by the region were not fully utilized to solve 
the situation. This point of view was shared by both small and medium-sized 
companies and big business.1033 In addition, the business elites were fully aware of 
the effect caused by the fear of political violence.1034 This particular problem was 
also tackled by trying to make the region more inviting for the corporate world, 
and a place where it was profi table to invest.1035
To a certain extent, the PNV, which had not organized a party conference 
since 1977 (before 1987)1036 and was operating without an updated platform, was 
capable of using such issues as the LOAPA as political and economic threats 
in the Basque Country. In fact, in the middle of the 1980s, the region gained 
advantages like the cupo, and the economic outlook in Spain should have offered 
better prospects for the Basque Country as well. This was not, however, the case. 
The structural problems of the Basque economy hindered its recovery, and the 
PNV was facing competition not just from the Socialists, but also from the EA. 
All these parties concentrated on the problem of unemployment and the severe 
social problems it caused. This complex of pressure infl uenced the policies of the 
PNV. Concrete results were to be achieved in directing the economy, and rapidly. 
The “tools” already were available. The PNV had to demonstrate its dynamic 
grip by using the powers it had been demanding to be transferred to the region. 
However, the Basque administration was fully aware that the EC was proceeding 
towards harmonization of taxation.1037 Taxation was signifi cant in the economic 
policy of the PNV, because subsidizing industry would no longer be possible 
after the sectoral transition periods. Finally, the PNV must have understood that 
the structures of the Basque economy could not be changed hastily. This last 
point turns out to be important historically. Although the Internal Market was 
believed to be benefi cial for the Basque Country in the long term, the PNV and 
its supporters saw the consequences of the EC membership as potentially harmful 
for the region sʼ well-being at that stage. In sum, the attitude of the PNV was 
confused.
1033  Vizcaíno Monterola 1984, 71.
1034  See Copa 1989, 303 & 307–308.
1035  Euskadi en el Proyecto Europa 1991, 270.
1036  According to Ross, the electoral victories of the PNV fi rst gave it the initiative to 
negotiate on the content of the autonomy statute on behalf of all Basques, and thus a political 
hold on institutions in the region. It also brought problems for the party. Traditionally, the 
PNV had attended to the strong ideological identifi cation of its supporters in situations 
where it was able to gain power in the elections. This was a new situation for the party. 
It went to the fi rst election without an electoral programme, and after the 1977 party 
conference did not organize any until 1987. Ross 1996, 491–492; CD/PNV: Nacionalismo 
para el 2.000 – 2.000 erako Abertzaletasuna. Bases Políticas y Programa. Asamblea 
Nacional Extraordinaria, Zestoa 3–5.7.1987.
1037  Copa 1989, 322–323.
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This overall picture was made even more complicated by taking into account 
developments in Spain itself. As I have already explained, EC membership 
started a new period in the state fi nances, the fi rst stage being characterized by 
deacceleration of public expenditure. It had already stabilized by 1986–1988. 
This development was facilitated by the economic boom of the late 1980s. The 
PSOE government was still forced to fi nd solutions to the challenges the EC 
brought, such as increasing competition, problems in the agricultural sector, low 
growth of effi ciency in industry, and the slowly decreasing, but still relatively high 
unemployment rate. Consequently, the public defi cit grew in spite of the economic 
expansion.1038
Bilbao had already lost its position in Spain as an economic centre to cities 
like Madrid and Barcelona at the beginning of the 1990s; seen from the Basque 
Country, the Mediterranean coastal region had become more important than the 
Atlantic coast. The Basque Country was still largely dependent on foreign trade 
and particularly exports. In the long term, the internal market continued to offer 
benefi ts and opportunities for companies in the Basque Country, as can be seen 
in the trade statistics for 1997–1998, when the export trade through the Basque 
Country increased rapidly. The competitiveness of the economic structures was still 
the Achillesʼ  heel of the Basque Country. Interestingly, there seems to have been 
no diffi culty within the PNV in realizing and accepting the fact that globalization 
was increasingly affecting the Spanish and Basque economies. The dependence 
of the region and its economic structures on the external market was not going 
to shrink. For the same reason, the party emphasized in public the importance of 
the EMU and the process of preparing the economy for the common currency, 
the euro. These would only ease the economic relations with such market areas 
as Germany or France. In a similar way, the openness of the Basque economy 
was seen as an advantage. The programmes of the PNV reveal, however, that it 
was fully aware of how the common currency would also test the adaptability of 
the local economy.1039 In sum, the PNV realized and recognised the long-term 
benefi ts of the integration and convergence. It even advocated this process.
So that the complexity in the PNV sʼ attitude towards the European integration 
and its effects on the exercise of power can be fully understood, it is important 
to underline that the EC/EU had an infl uence on the regional economy because 
it meant fi ercer competition, while the region was unable to profi t from the 
Community funding in the same way as the poorest regions in Spain did. The 
support programmes of the regional government in the 1980s were, however, 
followed by industrial support measures such as EKIMEN, but the EC/EU 
imposed strict limits on them. The electoral programmes of the PNV show that its 
aim had been to make the region attract investment, foreign or domestic, since the 
late 1980s. The policy of the party is clear. The means to achieve this, however, 
developed over the years, as I have already demonstrated in this work.
1038  García de Cortázar & González Vesga 2000, 637–638.
1039  CD/PNV: Comunicados: Aberri Eguna 1997, 6 & Aberri Eguna 1998, 4.
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By the end of the period covered in my study, the biggest political challenge 
to the Basque government and the PNV was the restrictions created by the EU sʼ 
competition legislation, not by the pending transfers of authority. To conclude, it 
is apparent that the deepening EU integration led to a historical change. It became 
more important to participate in decision-making in the EU institutions, or at 
least in the Spanish institutions dealing with EU matters, than to exercise power 
in one sʼ own region, not just in the Basque Country but in all the autonomous 
communities. Without getting into the discussion of what the real opportunities for 
the Basque Country and other autonomous communities were in participating in 
Spanish opinion-making, it is important to note that the PNV started outspokenly 
to advocate more direct representation of the Basque Country in Brussels.
The PNV had to adapt its use of politico-economic power to the confi nes set 
by the European integration. This was a diffi cult task, since it had long been 
openly advocating Spain sʼ membership and it saw not only both political and 
long-term economic benefi ts in that issue. In practice, the party even continued 
to work to enhance the integration process. As I have demonstrated, the Basque 
Country had gained the greatest powers in taxation in comparison to the other 
autonomous regions. The PNV sʼ role as the ruling party was to try to adapt 
those powers to the new EC/EU framework. Finally, the biggest challenge to the 
PNV sʼ exercise of politico-economic power in 1998 was the EU and its internal 
market regulations. This was a dilemma the party tried to solve by its strategy of 
continuously seeking regional benefi ts, but without great success. Simultaneously, 
when the PNV advocated the stronger presence of the autonomies in the Spanish 
EU decision-making, it tried to maintain the distance that the Basque Country had 
in comparison to the other autonomous communities in powers. If new institutions 
or structures were to be created within the Spanish administration, the PNV saw 
the danger of losing its bilateral relationship with the central government. The 
limits the EC/EU set on the exercise of power in economic policy hit the PNV and 
its strategy hard. In this section, I have demonstrated how the PNV tried cut this 
Gordian knot by underlining the restrictiveness of the Basque Country sʼ politico-
economic powers. Where the historical perspective on fi scal federalism reveals 
how the party operated adroitly in a developing administrative environment, the 
same analysis of the party sʼ actions in the continental framework demonstrates 
how diffi cult it was for the PNV to try to combine economic policy and power 
policy objectives. The European integration was for the PNV, among other things, 
a major power policy challenge.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
As I explained at the beginning of my thesis, the PNV sʼ use of politico-economic 
power has not previously been analysed in depth. However, it is an essential 
question in the history of the party. My analysis is based on sources which have not 
been fully utilized so far. The principal questions of my thesis were to recognize 
the use of that power, in other words, the actions, to understand which factors 
infl uenced this and what their effects and consequences were. I have sought to 
fi nd out how the PNV worked in one policy sector, taking into account the earlier 
history of the PNV and its complexity as a dominant regional party.
Above all, the history of the PNV sʼ use of power reveals the existence of a 
strategy which was linked to particular objectives. This strategy and the decisive 
actions of the PNV increased the regional politico-economic powers. Although 
not all the powers listed in the Basque Statute of Autonomy had been transferred 
until 1998, the Basque administration still collected and regulated most of the 
taxes then, and its budgetary powers were greater than ever before.
While the powers in economic policy extended, their limits also became more 
obvious. The biggest challenge to the economic policy of the PNV in 1998 was 
the ceiling created by the EU regulations. This did not make the party sʼ already 
complex relationship to the European integration easier at all, but was a major 
problem for its strategy.
The analysis of the 1980–1998 period also reveals how the party and its 
executive council, the EBB, partly took the role which could have belonged to 
the regional government. The EBB and the party in general backed the treasury 
ministers and other representatives of the PNV in the regional government. It also 
openly supported the conciliatory role of the Basque council of public fi nances 
from the latter part of the 1980s onwards. However, it also took politico-economic 
decisions, such as the LTH and building the Guggenheim museum. It acted as the 
catalyst in the regional power structure.
Through its use of politico-economic powers, the PNV strengthened its 
political position and no other party, including the Basque Socialists, were able 
to seriously challenge its position as the leading regional political force and the 
leading guardian of the treasury in the regional government.
The PNV tried to maintain good relations with the Basque business elites by 
maintaining a strong regional economic policy. It tried to promote the regional 
businesses, for example, by closing the gap between the educational system and 
business and industry. This did not mean that the leading party and the regional 
business elites always agreed on the ways to enhance economic growth in the 
region. It was also diffi cult for the PNV to maintain a neutral line in the crossfi re 
of demands from the various economic sectors of the Basque Country. In the 
end, the PNV used the powers it had, such as the ability to allow tax incentives, 
to foster economic life. The party wanted to develop the economy and make it 
competitive. At the same time, it did not want to dismantle the welfare state. The 
public sector was to continue to provide certain basic services in the policies of 
the party. The public sector was also a good tool for the PNV, since defending the 
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welfare state was a good way to attract votes from different social groups.
Historically, it is important to note that even during the most diffi cult times of 
economic crisis and prolonged depression it was diffi cult to seriously challenge the 
PNV in economic policy issues. If it did not seem to have alternative answers or 
new ideas, neither did anybody else in the region. However, it sought to maintain 
an active role despite its internal discords. My thesis also reveals the extent to 
which the PNV was a prisoner of its own (1) economic policy roots and (2) power 
structures. Elton sʼ theory of political history and Foucault sʼ analysis of power 
played a crucial role in this part of my analysis.
Firstly, (1) these roots were linked to a conservative way of thinking which was 
only one problem more during the economic crises of the early 1980s and early 
1990s. On the surface, the party worked to make the region attractive in the eyes 
of investors, but this was insuffi cient in a situation characterized by a prolonged 
economic depression and structural problems. My point is that the PNV did not 
easily or automatically start to look for solutions to the structural changes outside 
the traditional sectors of the economy. I have explained how neither the party sʼ way 
of thinking or the regional policy process changed overnight, and were hampered 
by the party sʼ own behaviour.
However, my empirical historical study shows that when the attitudes started 
to change within the PNV itself, it began to take the necessary decisions, and 
considerable economic and political chances. It took the biggest chance in Vizcaya, 
the province where its political foothold was the strongest. On the other hand, the 
province and its administrative capital, Bilbao, were living examples of the end of 
a period of economic history. In any case, the change in the PNV sʼ own thinking 
was an important factor in the process of economic revival of the Basque Country 
in the 1990s. This is not underlined in the own statements of the party, since it 
would have undermined its own concept of its continuous and dynamic search for 
solutions. Ultimately, the party, however, decided to start promoting the creation 
of jobs at the other end of the production chain.
The economic policy roots of the party became visible in the way it transferred 
powers to the provinces, which was linked to the question of its own internal power 
structures. Before drawing any conclusions on this, it is necessary to note that the 
position of the PNV in relation to tax incentives was two-fold: (i) tax incentives 
were a quick way of trying to attract investment and facilitate business life in 
the region. Importantly, this did not require any major changes in the economic 
thinking within the party, nor any big choices either concerning which industry 
sectors to subsidize and which not. Since visions of the way of directing structural 
adjustment in the region and about which industries to subsidize and which not 
varied signifi cantly, it is necessary to point out that the incentives did not cause this 
type of internal controversy. The delicate choices between different sectors were 
partly avoided, and the issue of promoting the competitiveness of local industry 
was still involved in the economic policy. The tax incentives were also a relatively 
inexpensive way to infl uence the economy. (ii) The question of tax incentives also 
reveals the infl uence of the political and structural traditionalism within the party, 
as the provinces used the historical powers they had re-gained. In this context, the 
link with the party sʼ ideology is obvious. This exercise of power included one of 
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the essential elements in the PNV sʼ argument that, as a local political movement, 
it knows how best to help the local economy, and once in power, is also prepared 
to use the power it has.
My study reveals how the traditionalists had a strong infl uence on the PNV sʼ 
economic thinking. Naturally, the party emphasized ideas, such as that the views 
and priorities of business must be taken into account in the educational and 
training systems, and that the public sector must participate in the investment in 
research and development. Still, there was an obvious need for regional politico-
economic leadership, and the re-direction of the region sʼ economy became 
practically unavoidable. The decisions taken by the regional government and the 
political statements and programmes of the PNV show that the party sʼ strategy 
was still focussed more on gaining further powers than really carrying out 
expensive structural changes. The possibility of solving the economic problems 
were categorically linked in the party manifesto and the government platform to 
the issue of the powers not yet transferred to the region. Consequently, the strategy 
produced results in the long term, as the situation concerning the powers available 
and the emerging economic boom in 1998 demonstrated.
Secondly, (2) the politico-economic history of the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates 
how the provinces remained the cornerstones of the PNV sʼ use of power. Its 
priorities did not change. The party made a strategic choice in the early 1980s (the 
LTH law) and followed it faithfully. Another thing is how these economic sub-
regions, as well as the differences and relations between the provinces, affected 
the party. My conclusion is that they complicated many projects, and occasionally 
forbade or at least hindered certain measures. In this respect, my results are 
parallel to the observations made by Plaza in discussing the industrial policies in 
the Basque Country in the 1990s.
The history of the PNV sʼ use of power offers a new perspective on the recent 
history of the party and its nature as a regional, moderate nationalist political 
movement. This type of empirical historical analysis provides tools for the 
construction of a solid historical profi le of the PNV. In other words, it helps to 
answer the question of what the PNV was like behind its ideologically coloured 
rhetoric, including economic policy, something not studied before on this scale. 
Naturally, the focus of my analysis also offers information on the PNV sʼ ways of 
operating and on factors that ultimately affect its actions. It tells us how important 
it is to analyse actual historical experience. In the case of the PNV, the historian 
should not forget to consider what the party did, not just what its activists said. 
This was clearly one of the objectives of my study.
My empirical point of view reveals that, in matters concerning economy, the 
PNV was, fi rst of all, an aspirant to and defender of regional powers and rights, 
as well as actively exploiting those powers in the 1980s and 1990s. It was also a 
pragmatic realist in its politico-economic decisions: the role of the Basque Country 
in the foreign trade of Spain was recognized, and this factor was seen as benefi cial 
for the regional economy. It is notable that the infl uence of the euskalerriacos did 
not disappear along with Garaikoetxea, although it did decline within the party. 
The PNV did not question these economic links or their existence, but even tried 
to enhance and facilitate them. As I have pointed out, trade and international 
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economic links were seen as an integral – and inexpensive – part of the regional 
adjustment. The underlying forces in the Basque case were structural, and it must 
be understood how they interacted with the cyclical developments during the time 
period of my study. The PNV recognized the role of the service sector, but it can 
be seen in its political platforms and electoral programmes of the 1990s that it 
still considered that only by helping the industry, the other end of the production 
chain could be enforced. Before the big projects in Vizcaya and elsewhere in the 
Basque Country in the 1990s, the idea of services tilted more towards business 
services than other service sectors. Therefore, the links of the PNV to the region sʼ 
traditionally strong industry cannot be questioned essentially in the time period 
of my analysis.
The gradually widening politico-economic powers are a historical fact of the 
years 1980–1998. At the same time, the historian can see that the PNV followed the 
tactic of continuously and systematically emphasizing the Basque Country sʼ own 
fi nancing system in public, and that the region became economically a complex 
where the role of the central government in directing the regional economy had 
diminished. The Basque Country sʼ small national economy invested its own 
public funds, i.e., taxpayersʼ  money, in its own infrastructures. The region sʼ own 
administration was able to effectively carry out public-private cooperation. 
The dilemma of the PNV was still that when it consciously trivialized the 
central government sʼ role in the economic policy in the region, it linked the 
question of better economic direction to the transfers not yet realized. In any 
case, the fact that the region had extremely extensive powers gave the PNV the 
opportunity to underline the differing nature of the autonomous region. As the 
party demanded that the representatives of the Basque Country be allowed to 
participate in EU decision-making about its authority, it sought to emphasize the 
special status of the region.
Tax revenue, its management and regulation remained at the centre of the PNV sʼ 
interest and was the linch-pin in the party sʼ relationship to the politico-economic 
power. During the period discussed in my thesis, the PNV increasingly kept the 
regional treasury portfolio, and its representatives gathered considerable know-
how and expertise in taxation and monetary management. They were diffi cult 
negotiators for the central government; their professionalism could hardly be 
impugned, and in the 1990s, their expertise in fi scal federalism became obvious. 
This happened simultaneously with the extension of the region sʼ taxation powers. 
The historically elusive concept of the treasury ministersʼ  public image was part of 
a wider framework in which the PNV skilfully used the economic agreement and 
the cupo in its political statements. It consciously portrayed them as distinctive 
marks of the Basque Country sʼ autonomy. In this respect, my thesis explained 
how the economic agreement was continuously and successfully presented in the 
Basque media in the 1980s and the 1990s as a characteristically PNV-led project. 
This process was a part of the PNV sʼ strategy.
Making a historical balance of political actions is always diffi cult. It is extremely 
diffi cult to appraise how successful the structural change still underway in 1998 
was in the Basque Country. The concept of successful structural adjustment is 
not for the historian to decide. Moreover, it must not be confused with how the 
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PNV capitalized politically on the redirection of the local economy. This was 
done in a similar way as it capitalized politically on the issue of the economic 
agreement. It is safer for the historian to keep to fact that the decisions of the PNV 
concerning the regional system of fi nances caused diffi culties for the regional 
government in its economic and fi scal policy, and was not the best solution from 
the economic point of view. On this occasion, the economic policy responded 
to political priorities, and not to an economic rationale. However, the PNV also 
made major politico-economic decisions possible in the determined way in which, 
for example, the Guggenheim project was carried out. It is another matter that 
it was the party, more precisely the EBB, and not any of the local institutions, 
that ultimately used power in that particular case. The power structures of the 
PNV were the key factor in its use of power, and its history cannot be understood 
without realizing that. Elton sʼ and Foucault sʼ ideas, therefore, provided necessary 
and functional analytical tools.
In conclusion, my empirical study demonstrates that the PNV was certainly 
a capitalistic and regionalist political movement and user of power in the period 
covered by my thesis. I thus conclude by suggesting that this historical assessment 
of the PNV sʼ use of politico-economic power in 1980–1998 is a story about 
strategy, regionalism and revenue.
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